Paul Clements believes that, despite the prominent role that notions of “good” and “bad” and “right” and “wrong” play in the lives of most individuals, they are concepts that are frequently ignored by social scientists engaging in political and social analysis. Rather, such analyses tend to focus exclusively on the idea of interest satisfaction as the basis for explaining individual practical decision-making. That is the approach embodied in neoclassical economics and rational choice theory and, according to Clements, it “stands as the only established microfoundations for political or social analysis” (2; see also 149). However, while such an approach might be sufficient for analyzing certain kinds of political and economic activities—such as voting patterns and rates of inflation, for example—it can provide only an impoverished and, consequently, inadequate assessment of the “social and political dynamics underlying most social problems” (2), or so argues Clements. Rectifying that problem requires that analysts consider a broader range of influences on individual decision-making. In particular, an effective analysis necessitates that one also consider the role played by principles: interests and principles “are the basic structural components of our social world” (190), and both are “engaged when we make decisions” (4).

Clements argues that principles—which “underlie our senses of right, justice, fairness, appropriateness, legitimacy, and propriety” (5)—determine one's perspective of existing sociopolitical “reality” and guide individuals' understanding of their interests. Consequently, principles inform individuals' assessments of the desirability or acceptability of existing sociopolitical circumstances and the need for, and preferred character of, change. Accordingly, like Immanuel Kant and John Rawls, Clements contends that a consideration of principles is critical to identifying accurately the motivation for individual and collective behavior.

Clements labels the resulting framework “Rawlsian political analysis” because his distinction between interests and principles embodies Rawls's distinction between the “good” and the “right.” Indeed, Clements declares that “the distinction between the good and the right, and the consequences of this distinction for social analysis, is the topic of [Rawlsian Political Analysis]” (1). For Rawls—borrowing from Kant—the “good” refers to individuals' rational desires, or interests. Alternatively, the “right” concerns sentiments of justice (principles), and a just society requires that the right be assigned priority over the good when rendering decisions about matters of public import, that is, decisions that impact all citizens.

In turn, the distinction between an analysis that considers both the right and the good, as opposed to an analysis that considers only the good, reflects Rawls's distinction between “the reasonable” (the right) and “the rational” (the good). Like Rawls, Clements suggests that the reasonable and the rational are “independent from one another” (2): while the rational refers to the capacity to develop and pursue a conception of “the good,” the reasonable concerns “the ability to generate an idea of what is fair in particular circumstances … and to use such an idea to guide one's behavior” (7). According to Clements, ensuring that the microfoundations of political analysis include “the reasonable” is necessary if we are to recognize adequately the influence that individuals' sense of fairness has on their practical decisions (and, consequently, behavior).

Clements uses three case studies to demonstrate and support his argument. First, he reviews the establishment and operation of the Grameen Bank of Bagladesh. The bank has been celebrated as “one of the few successful large-scale [nonprofit] microfinance programs serving the poor” (21), “regularly … [reporting] repayment rates around 98 percent” (97). Clements argues that the prevailing explanation for the bank's success—namely, “the overall structure of incentives facing all the agents involved (branch managers, borrowers, local chiefs)” (99)—fails to capture some of the most important dynamics involved. In particular, that explanation does not acknowledge the critical role played by the carefully cultivated ideology animating the Bank's operation, the constituent principles of which are “connected with a shared sense of purpose, oriented to development and empowerment” (101), influences that are clearly revealed when Rawlsian analysis is employed.

Next, Clements examines the political history of the state of Bihar in India, assessing the role played by the caste system in determining the state government's (in)ability to address effectively Bihar's desperate poverty and chaotic social conditions. While analyses based upon neoclassical economics attribute Bihar's problems to “the various ways in which the state's economy departs from the free market ideal” (144), a Rawlsian analysis demonstrates that, in fact, it is the feeling of resentment generated by the caste system's influence on politico-economic behavior that best explains the “widespread [government] corruption and inefficiency” (122) that has plagued Bihar and prevented it from escaping the extreme sociopolitical conflict and poverty for which it has become known.

Finally, Clements explores the problem of global climate change. Essentially, he contends that one of the principal motivations behind efforts to reduce CO₂ emissions is the desire to act in a manner that effectively balances “competing interests in order to reach a well-grounded general perspective” (149)—the goal that animates the idea of social justice. However, the prevailing responses to climate change, employing neoclassical economics, include “no concept of social justice” (151), thereby generating proposals (past and present) that are detrimental both to the poor and to future generations, thus running afoul of the requirements of social justice. Alternatively, a Rawlsian analysis—and, in particular, the use of Rawls's hypothetical “original position”—enables one to identify policies that embody “orientations that serve as grounds for doing justice” (181).

Clements offers an extremely interesting multidisciplinary examination, engaging political science, economics, international development, history, psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy (to name the obvious). He contends that his proposed Rawlsian framework “reframes political economy as inherently ethical and grounds it in a conception of social justice” (191; see also 189) and, in so doing, rectifies the neglect of the “discourse of justice” that has characterized political and social analysis.

To many—especially those familiar with and supportive of the work of Rawls—Clements's proposal might seem (somewhat) commonsensical, if not self-evident. However, Clements has done a very valuable service in clearly articulating and demonstrating the importance of ensuring that sociopolitical analysis embrace a Rawlsian perspective. Clements presents not only a thoughtful and persuasive theoretical argument, but, importantly, he supports that argument with concrete evidence. In so doing, he develops a framework for political and social analysis that “can support deeper understandings of the nature and form of our social world and richer expressions of human freedom” (193), and thus provides an extremely useful contribution to the existing scholarship.