Ever since the 1890s, when his reputation as Britain's – if not the world's – foremost authority on evolution was dramatically undermined by the intellectual and institutional developments that created modern science and philosophy, Herbert Spencer has frequently been invoked as an example of how not to do things. According to his critics, Spencer not only confused facts and values, but did so in the service of an elaborate system that was little more than an attempt to use science to justify the cruellest aspects of the age's social and political thought. Yet Spencer was a very important figure in late nineteenth-century science, whose writings were a source of inspiration for many of his contemporaries. Indeed, it is largely thanks to Spencer that we now talk about ‘evolution’ – a word that Charles Darwin at first tried to avoid. Since the 2003 centenary of Spencer's death, a number of new studies have illuminated Spencer's work and its impact, but the whole of his wide-ranging synthesis has remained a daunting prospect. The publication of Mark Francis's volume – the first book-length intellectual biography of Spencer since J. D. Y. Peel's Herbert Spencer: The Evolution of a Sociologist in 1971 – thus marks a significant moment not just for Spencer scholarship but for all historians of late nineteenth-century science.
Divided into four parts – on Spencer's personality and the intellectual culture of which he was a part; the often obscure metaphysics that framed his work; his biology and philosophy of science; and the entwinement of his sociology, ethics and political thought – Herbert Spencer and the Invention of Modern Life attempts to establish two interrelated points about Spencer's life and work. The first is that the writings Spencer produced from the early 1850s through to his death were all contributions to a complex philosophical whole in which the individual parts, such as his biology and sociology, existed – to use a Spencerian phrase – in a ‘dynamic equilibrium’. Whilst Francis is far from being the first scholar to make this point, it is refreshing, especially when so much contemporary history-of-science writing has become ever more narrowly focused, to see someone grappling with Spencer as a holistic thinker who was constantly adjusting seemingly minor aspects of his work to suit the grander needs of his overall argument about evolution and progress. In so doing, Francis addresses his second concern – uncovering the ways in which Spencer's work was closely bound to events in his life. The upshot is a new and deeper sense of Spencer the person, and of how the directions that his ideas took were as much due to his struggles with his own emotional life as they were to the structure he had set out for his synthetic philosophy during the late 1850s.
Through these entangled strands, Francis makes two important contributions to Spencer studies and the history of late nineteenth-century science. The first, which reinforces and elaborates on points that scholars such as Thomas Dixon and Naomi Beck have recently made, is that Spencer is someone whose politics have largely been misunderstood. As the final part of Francis's book makes clear, Spencer, despite his well-known coining of the phrase ‘survival of the fittest’, did not attach great importance to natural selection and chose instead to emphasize altruism and cooperative behaviour in evolution. Whilst this fact alone is enough to challenge much of what we think we know about Spencer, Francis also shows us how, armed with these ideas, Spencer took positions on contemporary political issues that received views would seldom predict. On the subject of imperialism, for example, the pacifist Spencer, unlike his still celebrated friend, T. H. Huxley, was a vehement critic of Western empires and of the claim that they were a civilizing force for the peoples living under them.
The second sense in which Francis's analysis is particularly strong is his close attention to the ways that Spencer, notwithstanding all of the historiographic wrongs done to him, played an important part in constructing the negative image that his contemporaries had of him and that we have inherited. In addition to carefully revising later editions of his books whilst denying that he had done so, Spencer expended much effort on a two-volume Autobiography which was hardly an exercise in critical self-evaluation. Moreover, as Francis points out in his preface, Spencer gave historians little scope for addressing these problems when he deliberately recalled and destroyed the parts of his papers and correspondence that did not match the account of his life that he had already set out. In his elaboration of this theme, Francis's analysis will have great appeal to enthusiasts for ‘self-fashioning’ as a category of historical analysis.
Alongside these overwhelmingly positive features of Francis's book, there are aspects that are at times problematic. As one would expect of a study of the entire oeuvre and life of a writer as prolific and complex as Spencer, the book is long and extensively footnoted. Francis's abiding concern with pointing out the links between each and every part of Spencer's work makes even more pressing the need for readers to be able to find an easy path through the book. The layout is no help here: the book is printed in small typeface on large pages. Worse, paragraphs frequently run to over a page in length, making sections of the book – Francis's exegesis of Spencer's evolutionary theory comes to mind – arduous reading. But this minor criticism should not detract from an overall sense of a great achievement on Francis's part. Even the most critical of readers will leave Herbert Spencer and the Invention of Modern Life with the feeling that, even if they have not read the last word in Spencer studies, they have read the book that Spencer studies has needed for quite some time.
