This book offers a comprehensive study of Edmund Burke's thought (not his career or biography), including psychological and epistemological as well as moral and political themes. It is insightful, ambitious, and of high scholarly quality, and it contrasts with recent studies that have focused on more specific aspects of Burke's life and thought.
The book is unified by the Burkean conception of the “moral imagination,” which William Byrne sees as the key to his thought. It is true that Burke uses this phrase only once (p. 22), but that is in the famous “decent drapery” passage of Reflections, which, along with other key passages, Byrne carefully examines. The author admits, however, that Burke was not a systematic philosopher, and it is difficult to pin down what exactly the moral imagination involves (p. 67). Burke himself was clearly a man of strong imagination, which he frequently verbalized in his well-known eloquence, but his rhetoric is conspicuously missing from this study. Burke treats the imagination in his aesthetics (in particular the Introduction to his Sublime and Beautiful), to which Byrne devotes a chapter, although he concedes that here, too, Burke's analysis of the imagination is “imprecise” (p. 54). In Byrne's interpretation, the moral imagination functions for Burke as a faculty of judgment—perceptual, aesthetic, moral, and political—with reason playing an ancillary role. The moral imagination is also connected to other familiar Burkean concepts, including sentiment, tradition, prescription, prejudice (in Burke's special sense of venerable beliefs and attitudes), character, and manners.
Byrne carefully explores the many linkages among these themes in a way that is true to Burke, but ultimately, the central idea of the moral imagination remains fuzzy and systematic conclusions elusive. In these discussions, Byrne acknowledges debts to Martha Nussbaum on emotional intelligence and Stephen K. White on aesthetic-affective epistemology, but he relies more often on older works by Benedetto Croce, Michael Oakeshott, Claes Ryn, and especially Irving Babbitt.
In the end, Byrne sees the moral imagination as a creative faculty that synthesizes mental materials to create “wholes” and give them meaning (pp. 68, 94). Indeed, it constructs (to use a non-Burkean word) our “reality,” including our social reality, along with the associated “worldviews” (Byrne's words). This process presumably occurs both in individuals and in groups, although—for Burke and for Byrne—the individual's imagination is normally shaped strongly by social attitudes, education, and custom. The difficulty here is that an imagination that creates a perceptual and moral reality seems highly idealistic, skeptical, and relativistic, although Byrne wants to deny that Burke is a relativist and reasonably cites Burke's rejection of “geographical morality” in his attack on Warren Hastings as evidence (p. 136).
The problem, though, appears in Byrne's discussion of Burke's “public policy” causes in Chapter 5. The moral imagination seems a reasonable way of accounting for Burke's sympathy for the American colonists and grasping the profound difference of outlook that separated them from the governing English Tories. Likewise, it was sympathetic imagination that allowed Burke to understand Irish grievances and, more interestingly, why Jacobinism might have had some appeal in Ireland in the 1790s. Burke's identification with the victims of Hastings's policies in India provides an even clearer case.
Surprisingly missing from this discussion, however, is Burke's campaign against the French Revolution. Byrne, of course, often notes in passing Burke's attacks on the revolutionaries (whom he often calls Jacobins—incorrectly when discussing the Reflections). A more sustained treatment might have suggested that while Burke's attack was grounded in his moral-imaginative appreciation of old-regime European civilization, his theory could hardly deny that the revolutionaries were also motivated by a compelling imaginative moral vision of their own—egalitarian, democratic, utopian perhaps, but one that could compete with Burke's in its inspirational capability. Burke called the revolutionaries “metaphysicians,” meaning that they were moved by dangerous political abstractions, whereas a more sound and humane outlook must be grounded in the complexity of actual social practice and tradition—but both orientations, on Burke's alleged view, are imaginative constructions. Burke is also said to have held that the metaphysicians had lost their “grasp on reality” (p. 79), but this contradicts Byrne's view that reality is a creation of the imagination.
In fact, the Tories of the 1770s had a worldview that Burke presumably absorbed from his friend Dr. Johnson, one that centered on unqualified British sovereignty in its empire; and although Byrne does not put it this way, Hastings, too, had his own moral imagination vis-à-vis India, one that held that India must be ruled despotically because all Asia knew was oriental despotism. Burke's antagonistic stances in these cases thus involved a clash of imaginations. A relativistic conclusion is hard to avoid if one's theory holds that moral imagination is the source of one's reality.
Byrne acknowledges the problem when he says that Burke was concerned to foster the “right sort of moral imagination.” Although not well defined, it is clear that such an imagination must conform to normative standards that are universal and inherent, as Byrne often says, in the order of the world. As this latter phrase indicates, Byrne gives qualified approval to the familiar natural-law interpretation of Burke that dates from the 1950s (p. 158). The qualification stems from the fact that natural law is usually held to be discoverable by reason, which seems to be at odds with Burke's emphasis on sentiment and imagination and his de-emphasis on reason, at least the kind of reason that is manifested in metaphysics. Natural-law interpreters of Burke also usually see a disjuncture between Burke's aesthetics, grounded in emotion, and his moral and political philosophy, whereas Byrne sees all these forms of judgment as parallel or congruent (p. 65). Some Burke scholars, however, especially Francis Canavan, emphasize the role of practical or prudential reason in the Aristotelian natural-law tradition, which is brought to bear in applying general principles to particular circumstances, or in statesmanship. The moral imagination in Byrne's interpretation appears to play a role analogous to practical reason and, hence, in Burkean statesmanship.
Beyond the reconstruction of Burke's thought, Byrne's title indicates his ambition to present a Burke “for our time.” Not surprisingly, this turns out to center on the value of the moral-imagination method in addressing social and political issues. In particular, Byrne suggests that a Burkean approach would be helpful in negotiating the increasingly prevalent problems of cross-cultural misunderstandings and conflict. This is a reasonable suggestion, one that resembles some earlier commentators' appreciation of Burke as the embodiment of a high-minded but nondoctrinaire statesman.
In bringing Burke to the twenty-first century, finally, Byrne also associates Burke with postmodernism, a thesis that is misleading as well as startling, although a conservative-postmodern nexus has been noted in other contexts (pp. 5–6, 160). All Byrne seems to mean by this is that Burke shares a critical stance toward modernity with postmodern writers, of whom Richard Rorty and Jean-Francois Lyotard are briefly mentioned (but not closely examined). Burke's response, we are told, was to return to premodern sources (tradition, prescription, natural law)—a distinctly nonpostmodern move. Notably, Byrne does not connect his postmodern idea with the potential antifoundationalism of the reality-creating function of the Burkean moral imagination.
Beyond the lack of substantial similarities between Burke and postmodernism, it is also problematic to view Burke as antimodern. This claim can be sustained only if one tendentiously equates modernity with the French Revolution and its ideological progenitors and descendants (p. 4). This is a claim that those who stand in that tradition might want to make, but there is no reason to ascribe it to Burke, who after all was a reformist Whig (p. 18) in the most progressive country of his time. England's constitution, parliamentary government, market economy, and legally protected personal rights were all aspects of a different but equally viable form of modernity—and one in which Burke was entirely at home.
