It is gratifying that thoughtful philosophers and bioethicists like Mahowald and Nelson are continuing to address the objections to prenatal testing that have been made by disability scholars and advocates. But it is frustrating to see those objections presented in ways that reflect the doubts of those who reject them more than the intentions of those who make them, in ways that make those objections appear censorious toward pregnant women and prospective parents or naïve about nonverbal expression. We recognize that disability critics share the responsibility for these misunderstandings, that their objections to prenatal disability testing have not always been made as clearly or consistently as they might have been. We therefore welcome this opportunity for clarification and rebuttal. Briefly, we will argue against Mahowald that it is not apparent how prospective parents could have a duty to potential offspring requiring them to prevent the birth of any child expected to have a life worth living. And we will remind Nelson that our primary concern is with the perpetuation of stigma; that even if any reason for abortion can be framed in terms of a trait of the fetus to be aborted, only certain reasons for abortion are based on the rejection of future children because of stigmatized traits.
We largely agree with Nelson's critique of Mahowald. Although we do not think that, in focusing on duties to potential offspring, Mahowald means to exclude duties to actual offspring or others, or to suggest that only women have duties to their potential offspring, we share Nelson's confusion about which potential offspring the woman is supposed to have a duty to. She surely does not have a duty to promote the welfare of all the offspring she could bear—even qualified by a disproportionate-harm exemption, that duty would require her to bear as many children as she could stand. But if her duty is not to all her potential offspring, then to which? If she is already carrying a single fetus—the most common circumstances for prenatal testing—she will hardly promote the welfare of that fetus by aborting it if it turns out to have a genetic impairment that does not preclude a worthwhile life. Nor will she necessarily promote the welfare of any future children she will have by aborting this one—the impact on future children of an impaired sibling is impossible to gauge. Even if the abortion of this fetus would increase the odds that she would bear another child, she cannot, as we have pointed out, have a duty to potential offspring to promote their welfare by bringing them into existence.
Preventing the gestation or birth of an impairment-bearing embryo or fetus might promote the welfare of other potential offspring in some circumstances: for example, if a woman had to decide which of several IVF embryos to implant or which fetus to “thin” to avoid the risks of a supernumerary pregnancy. But in those cases, the welfare of the other embryos would be promoted merely by selecting them over their “rivals,” whether or not those rivals would be disabled. In most cases, the object of the woman's duty will be unclear. She may abort with no idea if she is going to try again, or with a resolve not to. In the former case, to whom does she owe the duty? In the latter case, would anyone be aggrieved by her resolution? Finally, like Nelson, we do not see why Mahowald thinks a woman would fail to promote the welfare of potential offspring by aborting an impaired fetus only if the abortion would “involve disproportionate harm to other beings of equal moral weight”—the exception clause she adds in her “most compelling argument.” Although disproportionate harm to such others might make it unfair to promote the welfare of future offspring, it is not clear why it would actually prevent the promotion of their welfare.
However we understand the duty to promote the welfare of future offspring, the claim that it is fulfilled by the selective abortion of children with impairments must be based on an assumption that those children will have (or perhaps produce) less welfare as a result of their impairments. Yet Mahowald never explicitly makes that assumption; she appears to believe it is too obvious to even need stating, let alone defense. Critics of prenatal testing emphatically reject that assumption, however; they argue that the impact of impairment on welfare is far more complex and socially mediated than proponents of prenatal testing have recognized. If Mahowald wishes to refute those critics, rather than to illustrate their concern, she must explain why, in either the existing discriminatory society or in some hypothetical nondiscriminatory society, impairments are welfare-reducing characteristics. She needs to address the serious questions disability scholars and advocates have raised to challenge that assumption: Does an impairment, in the absence of social stigma and social institutions and attitudes that perpetuate stigma, necessarily reduce the welfare of the person who has it? What is the definition of the “welfare” that is allegedly being reduced?
Moreover, any argument that impairments were, in general or on average, welfare reducing would likely apply to a host of other characteristics, many of which may have genetic indicators. Would Mahowald claim that a duty to promote the welfare of future offspring required prospective parents to screen out those characteristics? Does she want to claim that only the child expected to have maximal welfare, however she would define it, should be born? And if that were her duty, wouldn't she have a derivative duty to take whatever steps, including PGD, were necessary to identify that fortunate individual? And even if Mahowald required only “satisficing,” not maximizing, she would have to explain whether or how a welfare-promotion duty would permit the birth of children into families facing sadness or hardship, into countries with cruel governments, or into any of an array of adverse circumstances. Would not the prospective parents in those circumstances better promote the welfare of future children by waiting until conditions improved? How long should they have to wait?
Mahowald may be correct in claiming that many of the reasons prospective parents give for aborting based on disability are not discriminatory. But those reasons may still be synecdochal (if that is an adjective), in letting the part—the impairment—obscure the whole—the life of the future child with an impairment. As Mahowald notes, women and couples often feel driven to abortion based on perceived “responsibilities to children already born, … ignorance of the quality and quantity of life that someone with a particular disability is likely to experience, … , and pressures from others to terminate a pregnancy after prenatal diagnosis of disability” (p. 458).1
Mahowald MB. Prenatal testing for selection against disabilities. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2007;16:457–62.
Fine M, Asch A. The question of disability: No easy answers for the women's movement. Reproductive Rights Newsletter 1982;4(3):19–20.
Parens E, Asch A, editors. Prenatal Testing and Disability Rights. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press; 2000; Asch A. Why I haven't changed my mind about prenatal diagnosis: Reflections and refinements. In: Parens E, Asch A, eds. Prenatal Testing and Disability Rights. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press; 2000; Asch A, Wasserman D. Where is the sin in synecdoche? In: Wasserman DT, Bickenbach JE, Wachbroit RS, eds. Quality of Life and Human Difference: Genetic Testing, Health Care, and Disability. New York: Cambridge University Press; 2005.
We would also note that Mahowald does not appear to understand Asch's synecdoche argument. Far from expressing Asch's view, the person with cerebral palsy who declares that he would not be the same person if not for that condition may be displaying the kind of synecdoche Asch is concerned about. As she notes, “disability is not, and need not, be ‘central’ for everyone” who shares the disability critique of prenatal testing.4
See note 3, Asch 2000:241.
We also wish to address Nelson's skepticism about our critique of prenatal testing—that in aborting a fetus with a genetic impairment, a woman is typically, if not always, confusing the part for the whole. This is Nelson's response:
It may seem tempting here to turn to an observation of Professor Asch's that Mahowald quotes approvingly—the claim that in abortions prompted by beliefs about future disabilities, “the part stands for the whole.” … Yet this observation gets us nowhere new. Insofar as Asch's claim is true about aborting on the basis of disabilities, it will be equally true in cases where a woman terminates a pregnancy because of concerns about her partner's stability, or because she has lost her job, or because her family is too large, or because her child would impede her career: None of these features of any of these prospective children's lives would make up his or her whole story. (pp. 464–5)5
Nelson JL. Testing, terminating and discriminating. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2007;16:462–68.
We have no wish to dispute Nelson's claim that such relational characteristics as “being the child of an unstable partner” can be regarded as traits or parts. As Nelson points out, disability itself is a relational characteristic: A child with a disability is a child likely to be subject to various forms of discrimination and prejudice. But this misses the point of the critique, made in the one piece Nelson cites (with which he should be better acquainted, as a member of the working group for which it was produced) and more fully developed in later work. Our concern is not merely that in testing for disability, women focus on a single trait; it is that in focusing on that trait, they may overlook, or fail to consider, other characteristics of the future child. This danger arises because disabilities are stigmatized traits, and in testing and aborting for disability, many prospective parents respond in a characteristic way to stigma—letting the part eclipse the whole.6
Goffman E. Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentiss-Hall; 1963.
This contrast can be seen in considering two “traits” on the basis of which, as Nelson notes, many women chose to abort: being poor and fatherless. These may also be stigmatized traits in some contexts. But it would misrepresent the phenomenology of the pregnant woman's decisionmaking to claim that she treats them that way. A poor woman who declines to have a child while still in poverty does not want her future child to suffer the privation and exclusion that she faced, but she typically does view her future child as a stereotypically poor individual, in whom she can see nothing but hunger, resentment, and menace. She may have rich, detailed fantasies of a talented and sensitive child whose ambitions are crushed by poverty—fantasies that may exaggerate the impact of poverty but do not stigmatize the child. Similarly, a woman who resolves that “no child of mine will be bearing the name of shame I've been wearing” (“Love Child,” Diana Ross) is not driven by an invidious stereotype of “the illegitimate child.” She may imagine her child as a full, complex human being, but fear that his myriad virtues will be overlooked in a world that sees only his illegitimacy. It is certainly possible that some woman who abort because they feel too poor to raise a(nother) child or because they dread the social and emotional burdens of illegitimacy also stigmatize the future child as poor or illegitimate. But our sense is that this is as atypical for poverty or illegitimacy in this society as it is oppressively typical for disability. Other traits besides impairments can be stigmatized, of course, and if prenatal selection became available against such traits as dark skin color, we would subject it to the same critique as prenatal disability testing.
It is important to recognize that it is the power of stigma, much more than the biological/cognitive feature that is stigmatized, which makes that feature a salient facet of identity. A diagnosis of cystic fibrosis or Down syndrome or deafness or achondroplasia does have some value in predicting the individual's life experiences, but the predictive value of that diagnosis owes much less to the biological facts than to the social response they elicit. Knowing that a child will be deaf, for example, tells the prospective parents nothing except that the child will not hear; it does not reveal how the inability to hear will affect the child's sense of herself, her place in the world, her friendships, her involvement in community and family, her education, employment, or romantic prospects. Disability is central to the identities of some critics of prenatal testing only because prevailing social attitudes have made it necessary for them to continually reaffirm the worth of their lives with these characteristics. If it were as legitimate to be deaf as tone-deaf, to have Down syndrome as to be mystified by macro-economics, people with these characteristics, as well as their families and friends, would have less need to band together into support and advocacy groups.
Moreover, even if traits such as being impoverished were stigmatized, they would lack one feature that makes selection against disability so problematic. All stigmata taint the individual, but some taint more deeply than others. Disability, unlike poverty, but like sex or skin color, has a biological component that gives its stigmatization a more enduing character. For disability, that component is increasingly associated with chromosomal or genetic characteristics that are detectable prenatally. It is from a desire to avoid having a child with those characteristics that a pregnant woman typically seeks to be tested. If she wished to abort any fetus she was carrying, she would not get a diagnostic test but simply schedule an abortion, usually far earlier in her pregnancy. Though much of the impact of disability is socially constructed, the biological information that gives rise to the desire for selective abortion concerns a part of the physical or cognitive makeup of the future individual that will remain with him in whatever social circumstances he finds himself. Yet that part also shapes, no less than poverty, his social circumstances. The contrast is not strictly between an immutable and a mutable characteristic: Impairments can often be corrected, poverty is often recalcitrant. It is, rather, between a characteristic that, because of its biological or genetic aspects, is perceived as internal and essential to its bearer, and one perceived as external and accidental. Unlike poverty, disability is seen as a taint that is difficult or impossible to purge. If poverty were “biologized” or “racialized,” as it may well be in caste societies—linked to biological or genetic features by religion, folklore, or pseudoscience—it might be perceived and treated like a disability, albeit one that could not be “prevented” by prenatal testing and selective abortion.
Although stigmatization is a key element of our critique of prenatal testing, we have argued that parents who select embryos on the basis of “positive” traits like musical talent would also fall short of an ideal of unconditional welcome; a commitment to a conception of the family as a uniquely inclusive association rather than, in Leo Kittay's words, an exclusive club.7
Kittay E, Kittay L. On the expressivity and ethics of selective abortion for disability: Conversations with my son. In: Parens E, Asch A, eds. Prenatal Testing and Disability Rights. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press; 2000:169–70.
Even this broader critique would not apply, however, to abortion on the basis of the kind of “traits” that Nelson suggests. A woman who does not want to continue with her pregnancy because she is poor or unmarried is not setting conditions on the kind of child she will have. Rather, she has not begun, or has abandoned, a parental project. She does not want to have a child at this time; she does not wish to welcome a new member to her family. Unconditional welcome is an ideal for a prospective parent; it cannot be held up to reproach an individual who declines that role.
Admittedly, there are close or borderline cases. Perhaps a woman who seeks prenatal testing for disability will choose to terminate not because of a specific aversion to raising a child with an impairment, but because the process has made her more fully appreciate what a massive responsibility it is to raise any child. Or, to adapt an example one of us introduced in an earlier exchange with Nelson, consider a woman who wants a child, but not one by Ted, one of the two men with whom she has been intimate.8
See note 3, Asch 2000:237–8.
Why couldn't Nelson respond that the woman seeking a suitable sperm donor had begun the parental project of having a child with a suitable genetic endowment? Even if that undertaking could be called a parental project, it would be one that repudiated, in its very conception, the ideal of unconditional welcome.
This brings us to the last issue we would like to raise in this response: Both Mahowald and Nelson support the practice of prenatal testing and think that those who criticize it are mistaken in their premises, their conclusions, perhaps their evidence, and perhaps their logic. This comprehensive rejection of “the disability critique,” however, is primarily based on its characterization by other proponents of prenatal testing, not on the arguments of the critics themselves. The most glaring example is the term “expressivist argument,” which was created by one of the chief detractors of critics of prenatal testing.10
Buchanan A. Choosing who will be disabled: Genetic intervention and the morality of inclusion. Social Philosophy and Policy 1996;13:18–36.
The “expressivist” objection to prenatal testing—that it reflects or embodies a conviction that children with impairments are a burden to themselves, their parents, and society—is more appropriately directed to the practices and policies adopted by professional groups than to the often-confused and ambivalent decisions made by individuals in the face of those practices and policies. (p. 172)11
See note 3, Asch, Wasserman 2005.
Even the older formulations of one of us, Asch, in which somewhat less care was taken than should have been, do not in context support the reading of the objections to prenatal testing described by those who coined the term “expressivist argument.” The claims Asch has made in various articles with which both authors are familiar are those described in Parens and Asch:
Prenatal diagnosis is based on either morally problematic views about desirable parental attitudes and morally questionable views about people with disabilities, or on misinformation about the nature and consequences of disability. (p. x)12
See note 3, Parens, Asch 2000:x.
The objections that Asch and others have raised about the “message” of prenatal testing have generally concerned the social meaning of the development and routine administration of those tests, not by their use by individual women and couples. Although it is certainly debatable whether the social meaning of the practice of prenatal testing has been shaped by the history of eugenics to the same extent that the display of the Confederate flag has been shaped by the history of white supremacy,13
Asch A. Disability equality and prenatal testing: Contradictory or compatible? Florida State University Law Review 30:315–42, 333–4.
