A reexamination of the interaction of politics, law, and government in early Stuart England is badly needed, and James Hart admirably attempts to fill that void. Focusing on a reconsideration of how political theory worked on the ground, he strives “to examine the ways in which successive Stuart administrations used the machinery of the legal system to enforce public policy” (viii) within the context of an “unmistakable transformation of the law into a public commodity” (ix). Deciding to ignore both criminal and ecclesiastical law, as well as local government, the result is a mixed one.

The work is organized into four sections: “Foundations of the Law” (structure, machinery, and the judiciary), “Royal Government” (James I and Charles I), “Parliamentary Government” (Parliament and Council), and “Cromwellian Government” (the new republic and good constable). An introduction sketches a sensitive portrait of the problems of law, politics, and government; an increasingly centralized government's management of war, religion, and the economy; and making law a public commodity with its resulting debate and conflict. A short conclusion summarizes the incidental failures in administering the law across the two reigns, culminating with the reforms of 1640 and the lawlessness and political divisions of the succeeding years. The book ends with a select bibliography of printed primary and secondary sources and a comprehensive index.

The major strengths of the book are in a careful synthesis of issues and cases, and its exploration of the nuances of political and legal problems. There are, for example, excellent discussions of the Fairley (39–41), Fuller (44–47), Bates (91–98), Five Knights (122–31), and Mr. Cony's (284–88) cases, but sometimes the groundwork is limited. An example of this is the subject of Sir Edward Coke, Lord Ellesmere, and King James on prohibitions and the equity–common law conflict: it rests largely on the work of Sir John Baker and Louis Knafla, but not the more recent work of Allen Boyer, Mark Fortier, Charles Gray, and G. W. Thomas. There is a similar problem with the author's discussion of Calvin's case and Anglo-Scots Union. In spite of more recent work that has underscored the stability of Jacobean law and government and exposed its strong central control as more myth than reality, Hart still seems occupied with the older views of J. S. Cockburn and W. J. Jones.

Chapters 4–8 center on king and Parliament in the Caroline era. Here there are useful analyses of the Short and Long Parliaments, although one could have wished for lengthier discussions of legislation and adjudication (182–91), especially with the book's theme on the problem of governance. There is also a substantial chapter on the Great Council, the Grand Remonstrance, and impeachments in 1641–42. Here the author follows the framework established by Conrad Russell and John Morrill. One of the book's real strengths is the assessment of law in the new republic in chapter 7. While the forum is largely a parliamentary one, there is ample consideration of courts, judges, and the Levellers—especially John Lilburne.

Chapter 8 on Thomas Cromwell as the “Good Constable” is unusual in this work in that it is based largely on printed and manuscript sources. Hart argues persuasively that the Lord Protector embraced the responsibilities of defending the rule of law “with enthusiasm” (276). He appointed men of distinction to the bench but was unable to resolve the problem of the legitimacy of his protectoral ordinances. In the end, Hart compares Cromwell's view of the law with that of Charles I: “multi-layered and complex” (291), from instinct as well as expediency. Where he differed from the Stuarts was that he knew the law only in its abstractions. That, together with his insecurities, brought in his last years a capricious and arbitrary behavior that reflected those of Charles I before him.

While there is much of Sir Francis Bacon, Sir Edward Coke, and Sir Matthew Hale, other major legal minds and writers of the era such as Sir John Dodderidge, Sir Henry Finch, William Lambarde, John Selden, Sir Henry Spelman, Francis Tate, Francis Thynne, and Ralph Starkey are either barely mentioned or omitted. In the era of legal dissent from the 1630s through the 1650s, the voices of prominent law reformers such as Sir Francis Barrington, William Hakewill, William Leach, Henry Robinson, and John White are absent. Indeed, not even James Harrington or Thomas Hobbes make the discussion.

The work hinges substantially on older writing in the area. Major recent and pertinent books that have not been considered include Christopher Brooks’ Lawyers, Litigation and English Society since 1450 (1998), Michael Braddick's State Formation in Early Modern England, c. 1550–1700 (2000), Malcolm Gaskill's Crime and Mentalities in Early Modern England (2000), John Baker's The Law's Two Bodies (2000), Daniel Fischlin and Mark Fortier's edited Essays on the Writings of James VI and I (2002), and the works of Johann Sommerville. As a result, Hart offers the reader a useful tour of the subject, but one that is still in parts somewhat ensconced in older views. Tightly organized and clearly written, The Rule of Law will take its place as a useful supplement to the literature on law and government in seventeenth-century England.