As the title suggests, this work seeks to explain the staying power of the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan. To his credit, Russell Lucas eschews essentialist arguments that rely on religion or culture to explain the staying power of Arab authoritarianism. He opts instead for an institutional approach, examining “regime manipulation of domestic political institutions … to quiet discontent caused by unpopular policies” (p. 1). Lucas argues that the regime has focused what he calls throughout the analysis “survival strategies” on three centers of political and civil society: political parties, the parliament, and the press. These strategies have enjoyed varying degrees of success, and the analysis concentrates on three factors—he does not prioritize them or give an indication of how much they explain—that have influenced the success or failure of the survival strategies: “the resourceful use of constitutional rules by the regime; the reinforcement of the opposition's disunity of collective action [sic] against the survival strategy and the regime's policies, and the attention to not imposing costs on sectors of the regime coalition that could fray its unity” (p. 2).

The main body of the book is then devoted to examining the regime's interaction with the parties, press, and parliament by focusing on the promulgation of a series of press and electoral laws, as well as a National Pact. The discussions of the regime's position as well as opposition response to these various documents constitute the real original contribution of the book, and give the reader a good sense of the range of opinions involved, as well as the key points of contention. They also raise the important, but unanswered, question of why some authoritarian regimes are more rule or rule-of-law bound than others.

Conspicuous in its absence is an explanation of why the author chose to focus on the institutions he did. Perhaps it was a function of his desire to look at rule-based venues of contestation, but a solid case can be made that these are hardly key institutions to regime survival in Jordan. This problem is then related to another that runs throughout the book, that of underspecification of the composition of the “regime coalition,” an entity that is as critical to the analysis as is the opposition (which Lucas does detail in different contexts, though always from an elite perspective). Nowhere is there a serious discussion of who the components of this coalition are. Passing reference is made to the tribes, and it is noted that the Palestinian sector of the population (with the exception of some parts of the business community) has not been a part of the coalition, but this is hardly sufficient. A better understanding of what the regime coalition has been (and there is no reason to assume it is fixed, which he appears to do), would have prompted the selection of different institutions, most notably, the army and the bureaucracy. Few close observers of Jordanian politics would argue that any of the three institutions he has looked at could challenge regime survival. And he has ignored two that truly could, just as he has largely ignored the Transjordanian-Palestinian relationship/rivalry throughout the analysis.

The underspecification of the composition of the regime coalition is related to another problem that plagues the analysis. The author notes the regime's ability to divide the opposition and reward members of the coalition, and he gives some examples in the detailed discussions of the press and electoral laws. However, he asserts more than illustrates the various carrots and sticks he quite rightly claims the regime uses. There is no real discussion of patronage politics; the only hint we have concerns the electoral law's setting aside seats for minorities who are then more easily coopted as a result of the perks of office. But certainly it is more complicated than this. The use of the General Intelligence Directorate and its policies of harassment of the press and other civil society actors, as well as changes in treatment of the civil service and the military, need to be detailed in order to make the case for success or failure in co-optation.

Lucas does make clear that there is a relationship between the external challenges Jordan has faced and internal responses by the regime, which have led to a rollback in the early liberalization (1989–93). Indeed, he shows that domestic opposition to Jordan's role in the “peace process” was a major factor in the resurgence of more authoritarian practices. However, when examining survival strategies (and the term is overused throughout the text, as virtually everything the regime does is portrayed as a survival strategy), he does not seriously engage the kingdom's relationship with the United States. One could argue that the regime moved to suppress dissent because Jordan's peace treaty was a sine qua non of a strong military and financial relationship with the United States. The rumblings of parliamentarians or writings of unruly journalists pale in importance in comparison with the impact that the loss of U.S. support could have had on the regime.

Two final points. First, while I am sympathetic to any argument that avoids cultural essentialism, the institutional argument here is often circular: Strategies have been successful because the monarchy has been “prudent” or has used constitutional rules resourcefully (pp. 155–56). The author provides no criteria for judging ex ante what would constitute prudence or resourcefulness. The conclusion that authoritarianism will continue as long as rulers can manipulate institutions effectively does not take us very far.

Lastly, the final chapter comprises short presentations on Morocco, Egypt, Kuwait, and Iran. Presumably, Lucas was asked to “broaden his analysis” beyond a single case study, which, unfortunately, is seen by some as inferior. But let us be frank. The presentation of what can only be a superficial analysis in 10 extra pages on four cases, the reasons for the selection of which are not noted, does nothing to extend the applicability of his analysis. The pages would have been better allocated to unwinding some of the argument's circularity or more carefully defining key terms.