China-Russia relations present a puzzle to Western analysts. Uncomfortable with the two nations’ rapprochement, many of them solve this puzzle by explaining these relations as something temporary and not defined by long-term factors. These analysts view the China-Russia relationship as deeply unbalanced and resulting from a series of one-sided concessions on Russia's part. They present the two nations’ rapprochement since the mid-2000s as a product of China's strength, rather than mutual interests or shared values, and as something that is little more than a tactical reaction to the West's global power and influence. On that basis, they assume that if the United States exercises good judgment and relies on soft power, then China's strength and strategic integration with the world economy will prevent further development of the Russia-China strategic alliance.
Gilbert Rozman's book seeks to dispel this reasoning by arguing for China and Russia's cultural, rather than political, affinity. In particular, he introduces six dimensions of the two nations’ identities—ideology; history (the temporal dimension); economic, political, and cultural identities (the sectoral dimension); organization of the domestic system (the vertical dimension); vision of world order (the horizontal dimension); and degree of homogeneity (the intensity dimension).
Rozman finds evidence of Russia and China moving in sync on identity grounds since the emergence of communism. It is communism and its enduring legacy that his book presents as “the most powerful transformative agent of national identity ever to spread through the world,” although communism, in his view, should be associated more with the idea of a “hypertrophied state” rather than a classless society (p. 6). As a result of communism, the two nations’ identities have developed multiple commonalities following the period of totalitarian rule. Both of them advocate the importance of a national ideology; present their histories as continuous; stress the advantages of a centralized state; perceive their political, economic, and cultural system to be superior to those of Western states; and are highly critical of what they see as the West's hegemony and imperialism in international relations.
Rozman further maintains that the legacy of communism may be expected to endure because of China and Russia's psychological need for national identity construction, for successful presentation of the West as enemy, and to appeal to the domestic public. To document his claims about the decisive role of communism, he focuses on the development of the two nations’ identities in the 1970s and 1980s and then their transition in the 1990s to the 2010s.
Rozman is not unaware of potential objections to his argument and responds to those that highlight state top-down control and censorship, as well as those stressing the existence of alternative viewpoints on national identity as differing from those imposed by the state. He also tries to engage with those cautioning against overestimating structural identity factors at the expense of the rapidly changing factors of political contexts and leadership. He constructs a dynamic national identity framework that incorporates structural as well as political factors. Herein lies the danger of subsuming alternative explanations under one master explanation, thereby making the developed framework unassailable. It might have been more helpful to highlight the theoretical contribution by formulating empirical questions not answered by critics of the identity argument. Besides, the important objections to Rozman's argument may come from rationalists who insist that Russia and China's interests are incompatible and maintain that interests, not identity, drive relations and alliances in world politics. The book's concluding pages briefly consider such rationalist arguments, yet such arguments deserve to be strongly engaged throughout.
On the other hand, the importance of communism in Russia and China's identities runs the risk of being overstated at the expense of their Confucian and Sinocentric or tsarist and Russocentric views that were formed over centuries, not during a decades-long experience. In a number of respects, communism and communist ideology are secondary to the two nations’ imperial experience, which explains their differences regarding adopted communist models. The point of differences between China and Russia's national identities is not central to the book's argument, yet deserves to be highlighted. The two nations diverge in their experiences with the West, world status over the last three centuries, international outlook, ideology, (quasi) religious tradition, degree of modernization, and other respects. In addition to interest-based considerations, these historical and cultural factors will continue to complicate China and Russia's strategic partnership.
These criticisms notwithstanding, The Sino-Russian Challenge to the World Order is an excellent contribution to the discussion of Russia-China relations and their implication for a future world order. The central argument is clear and important, and will influence understanding of the issue by scholars and practitioners alike. The book will also be useful in graduate and upper-division undergraduate courses devoted to these subjects.
