%20-%20https://sketch.com%20--%3e%3ctitle%3e3ECBBF50-FD08-412A-943D-2CFC5E025A16%3c/title%3e%3cdesc%3eCreated%20with%20sketchtool.%3c/desc%3e%3cg%20id='Stylesheet'%20stroke='none'%20stroke-width='1'%20fill='none'%20fill-rule='evenodd'%3e%3cg%20transform='translate(-926.000000,%20-668.000000)'%20id='BUTTONS'%3e%3cg%20transform='translate(100.000000,%20597.000000)'%3e%3cg%20id='BTN-/-RIGHTS'%20transform='translate(816.000000,%2065.000000)'%3e%3cg%20id='ICON-/-Rights'%20transform='translate(10.000000,%206.000000)'%3e%3cpath%20d='M13.5752841,0%20L1.34943182,0%20C0.59375,0%200,0.586666667%200,1.33333333%20L0,22.6666667%20C0,23.4133333%200.620738636,24%201.34943182,24%20L17.6505682,24%20C18.40625,24%2019,23.3866667%2019,22.6666667%20L19,5.36%20L13.5752841,0%20Z%20M13.5752841,1.89333333%20L17.0838068,5.36%20L13.5752841,5.36%20L13.5752841,1.89333333%20Z%20M1.34943182,22.6666667%20L1.34943182,1.33333333%20L12.1988636,1.33333333%20L12.1988636,5.36%20C12.1988636,6.10666667%2012.7926136,6.69333333%2013.5482955,6.69333333%20L17.6235795,6.69333333%20L17.6505682,22.6666667%20L1.34943182,22.6666667%20Z'%20id='Shape'%20fill='%23595959'%20fill-rule='nonzero'%3e%3c/path%3e%3ccircle%20id='Oval'%20stroke='%23595959'%20stroke-width='1.5'%20fill='%23595959'%20cx='9.5'%20cy='13.5355339'%20r='5.5'%3e%3c/circle%3e%3cpolyline%20id='Path-2'%20stroke='%23FFFFFF'%20stroke-width='1.5'%20transform='translate(9.500000,%2013.035534)%20rotate(45.000000)%20translate(-9.500000,%20-13.035534)%20'%20points='8%2016.0355339%2011%2016.0355339%2011%2010.0355339'%3e%3c/polyline%3e%3c/g%3e%3c/g%3e%3c/g%3e%3c/g%3e%3c/g%3e%3c/svg%3e)
INTRODUCTION
Power sharing and unity governments have become an increasingly popular remedy over the past 20 years to settle internal political divisions or outright conflict in Africa (Cheeseman Reference Cheeseman2011). Many of these Governments of National Unity (GNU) have been brokered by a combination of local and international actors; but instead of providing peaceful consolidation of politics and economic development have led to continued instability. The low success rate is largely due to sustained infighting by local elites who act as veto players. Additionally, the agreements are often lacking the societal dynamics conducive to ensuring success (Cheeseman & Tendi Reference Cheeseman and Tendi2010; Mehler Reference Mehler2013; Bormann et al. Reference Bormann, Cederman, Gates, Graham, Hug, Strom and Wucherpfennig2014).
The case of the establishment of the GNU in Zanzibar provides additional insight into the hurdles of creating power-sharing arrangements as political peace settlements. The formation of the GNU was the culmination of several failed reconciliation attempts driven mostly by external actors over the past two decades. The negotiations finally succeeded when they were led by local political elites, as well as supported by the population through a popular referendum paving the way to constitutionalising the GNU. Some have even argued that the GNU in Zanzibar is based on the unique Tanzanian concept of ujamaa, a socialist-led nation-building exercise, and as such led to the success of the unity government in its inception (Nassor & Jose Reference Nassor and Jose2014).
This paper will argue that the power sharing in Zanzibar was characterised not by consensus, but rather a hybrid of the politics of continuity and collusion, which are also the characteristics of the Zimbabwean and Kenyan unity governments (Cheeseman & Tendi Reference Cheeseman and Tendi2010). The resulting continuity and collusion in Zanzibar provided for the initial appearance of unity, but a deeper examination of the actors and their behaviour unveils sustained mistrust and lack of sufficient goodwill required for successful transformational political development and a consolidated power-sharing government. This became clear when Tanzania embarked on its constitutional review process in 2012 and subsequent deep political divisions in the GNU were laid bare just a year after its inception. These divisions appeared along old geographic and cultural identity markers, between Pemba and Unguja (the two main Zanzibar islands), as well as between Zanzibar and the mainland; reflecting the political history of the Union as discussed below.
The GNU did foster a new type of bipartisan collaboration in the legislature as a response to the hybrid continuity and collusion within the government, partly because of demands from constituents at the grass-roots level. The new bipartisanship experienced in the House of Representatives (HoR) provided an unprecedented check on the executive branch in Zanzibar. Finally, the nature of the political conflict, constituents' expectations of change, and the demand-side accountability created by the referendum exercise prior to the constitutionalising of the unity government, all created a third unique dimension in the political environment in which the unity government initially operated. The introduction of ‘grass-roots’ democracy, where citizens actually experienced real power, possibly for the first time, became a threat to incumbent political elites and needed to be shut down; the constitutional review served this purpose as it again re-divided the populations along political lines. The overall result reinforced the ‘continuity through collusion’, where a transition towards democratic consensus relapsed and continuity regained its dominance.
POLITICAL IMPASSE AND RECONCILIATION ATTEMPTS
Zanzibar is a semi-autonomous archipelago consisting of the two main islands Unguja and Pemba, as well as numerous smaller islands, and forms a constituent part of the United Republic of Tanzania. The merger of the two independent countries Zanzibar and Tanganyika formed the Tanzanian Union in 1964. Its legal foundation is articulated in the Articles of Union which established two governments: The United Republic of Tanzania which oversees all Union matters and all non-Union matters for Tanzania mainland; and the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar which retains its executive, legislature and judiciary with jurisdiction over all non-Union matters within the historical boundaries of the Zanzibari state. The Articles of the Union served as the basis for the 1977 Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, which currently has 22 Union mattersFootnote 1 where the Tanzanian government has sole jurisdiction for the entire United Republic including Zanzibar (Government of the United Republic of Tanzania (GURT) 2005). The ‘Union issue’ in Zanzibar has been one of significant controversy since the formation of the United Republic, with an ongoing debate on both the format of the United Republic and Zanzibar's place within it.Footnote 2 Irrespective of the long-term and continuing debate over the Union issue and the ongoing constitutional review process, Zanzibar has always had a distinct national identity and a fundamentally different political culture from Tanganyika and after 1964, Tanzania mainland. CCM was constituted through a merger of Zanzibar's ASP and Tanganyika's TANU in 1977 during the one- party era in Tanzania. Despite the formal merger, the two camps within CCM remained distinct as a result of the Union dynamics and Zanzibari nationalism. However, once multi-party politics returned to Tanzania, CCM Zanzibar became increasingly reliant on not only financial largesse from Tanzania mainland, but political and security support to maintain their hold on power in Zanzibar. Yet, Zanzibar retains significant influence due to the legacy of the Union as Nyerere's pan-African project and its over-representation (in relation to demographics) in high-level party decision-making bodies.
Since the first multiparty elections in 1961 for the Legislative Council under the British Protectorate Government, the political culture in Zanzibar has been characterised by exclusive politics and identities, rather than the inclusive political culture which emerged on Tanzania mainland under the ujamaa ideology of Mwalimu Julius Nyerere. Moss & Tronvoll (Reference Moss and Tronvoll2015) suggest the question of identity in Zanzibar has been framed in historical, social, regional and ethnic terms, both before and after the 1964 Revolution in Zanzibar. After the reintroduction of multiparty politics in 1992, this resulted in a two-party system reflecting rigid political identities structured around ethnic, social and regional factors (Unguja island vs. Pemba island): the incumbent Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM), the ruling party since independence; and the Civic United Front (CUF), which was established in 1992 by a number of former CCM officials who were purged from the party during the late 1980s (Burgess et al. Reference Burgess, Issa and Hamad2009).
The de facto two party system that arose in Zanzibar, its stark polarity and nearly equal numbers of partisans, led to everlasting dispute and varying levels of political violence during the 1995, 2000 and 2005 elections and after.Footnote 3 Fundamental to the conflict, beyond the struggle for political power, was the institutional set-up inherited from the one-party state, inter alia a lack of independence of the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) and other oversight institutions.
To mitigate the repeated political fall-out and electoral violence, three attempts were made at institutionalising political reconciliation to reach a sustained solution to the entrenched political conflict in Zanzibar. The first attempt brokered by the Commonwealth led to the Muafaka I accord in 1999, aimed at electoral and governance reforms to ensure a level playing field ahead of the 2000 election. The agreement was never implemented, due to ill will and lack of commitment, in particular from the incumbent (Cameron Reference Cameron2002; Rawlence Reference Rawlence2005; Matheson Reference Matheson2012). Following the highly disputed and manipulated elections in 2000 in which results in 16 opposition-controlled constituencies in Unguja Urban were cancelled, a peaceful protest in January 2001 was cracked-down upon leading to the killing of some 40 people and producing Tanzania's first political refugees with more than 2000 fleeing to Kenya (Human Rights Watch 2002a, b). Muafaka II in 2001 was again aimed at resolving the protracted conflict and restoring Pemban representation in the legislature (Human Rights Watch 2002b). Beyond the Pemban by-election in 2003, Muafaka II led to some marginal success in providing for the establishment of a Department of Public Prosecution and limited electoral commission reform, but without the goodwill and mutual trust required for a credible electoral cycle in 2005. Muafaka II was externally led by the President of Tanzania (under pressure from Western development partners) and a joint committee from CUF and CCM members (mainland and Zanzibar), and focused mainly on technical electoral matters. Of note, the Zanzibar government was not a party to the agreement. Thus the reconciliation processes failed to bring lasting reform to Zanzibar's governance and solve the political deadlock, due to a rather narrow technical focus and lack of local commitment from the Zanzibar Government (Bakari & Makulilo Reference Bakari and Makulilo2012).
After the hobbled Muafaka II implementation and the manipulated 2005 election process, a third, locally led attempt to find a solution to the ‘Zanzibar problem’ was initiated in 2007. This initiative had the strong backing of the new Union President Jakaya Kikwete who had promised to solve the protracted conflict when opening the Parliament in January 2006, following his election victory in October 2005. Led by a joint committee from CCM and CUF, it developed a written reconciliation agreement, known as the Butiama or Bagamoyo agreement since they convened there. These discussions nearly resulted in a deal between the two sides, but it fell apart when President Karume of Zanzibar added the requirement of a referendum to ask for the people's endorsement of the agreement. CUF did not trust the intentions of President Karume, viewing the additional referendum clause as a torpedo designed to sink the deal.Footnote 4 While the Butiama/Bagamoyo agreement appeared dead at the time, the terms of the agreement during those talks would eventually lay the foundation for the future maridhiano negotiations which resulted in the GNU.
Although some reforms were implemented to the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) as part of the Muafaka II process (Nassor & Jose Reference Nassor and Jose2014), they failed utterly to provide mutual trust between the contending parties, and among the population at large. This became obvious when the voter registration process commenced in the summer of 2009 in Pemba. Numerous small-scale violent attacks on CCM and CUF supporters and property were observed by the authors of this article who served as long-term observers to the election process during the first phase of registration from August–October 2009.Footnote 5 The troubled start to the voter registration created room for confidential talks between representatives of the two parties, which eventually led to a path-breaking new accord.
When President Karume and CUF leader Maalim Seif Shariff Hamad met on 5 November 2009 in the Zanzibar Statehouse, a tectonic shift took place in the maligned reconciliation process and political environment in Zanzibar. The ‘handshake agreement’ as it became known, Maridhiano in Swahili, was an informal gentleman's agreement between the two political leaders, built on trust and goodwill rather than technical details and terms laid out in a formal document (Matheson Reference Matheson2012). As Bakari & Makulilo (Reference Bakari and Makulilo2012) show, the previous agreements were based on structured documents and understandings at formal institutional party levels, allowing players to veto any deal deemed to threaten interests on either side. Maridhiano was different; not only were the discussions secret and informal, they were anchored at the highest levels of the two parties, with President Amani Karume and CUF Secretary General Maalim Seif Shariff Hamad personally involved. Although these two were the primary actors behind the breakthrough, they were supported by a clandestine group of handpicked partisans from both sides working behind the scenes. Maridhiano was proceeded by the formation of a bi-partisan committee (3 CCM and 3 CUF) led by senior CCM member Hassan Nassor Moyo, a member of the first cabinet in Zanzibar after the 1964 Revolution, a former Minister in the Union government and one of the architects behind the merger of TANU and ASP to create CCM.Footnote 6
The Moyo Committee, as the group became known, worked behind the scenes to put in place the formal pieces of the agreement, based on the premises laid down in the unimplemented Butiama/Bagamoyo agreement. The key principles of the Bagamoyo agreement addressed accusations of past electoral rigging and the need to create a level playing field; addressed political injustices and promoted a harmonious political atmosphere; agreed on a format of the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar (power sharing); and finally put forward an action plan on implementation.Footnote 7 Importantly, these guiding principles were not re-codified in writing and anchored in the two parties, but were done more informally and through back channel communication between President Karume and Maalim Seif. Thus, the agreement finally emerged as a private motion by CUF House Member Abubakar Bakari in the House of Representatives in January 2010, allowing President Karume to keep a distance, as his party was not formally included up to this point. Concomitantly, CUF could show to their supporters that they were leading the way towards a solution to the long-standing political divisions.
The private motion proposed constitutional amendments to the 1984 Zanzibar constitution catering for the formation of a GNU, creating two Vice Presidents and sharing of cabinet posts. Furthermore, it declared Zanzibar as one of the two constituent countries in the United Republic of Tanzania. In a subsequent referendum held on 31 July 2010, 66·4% of voters approved the formation of a Government of National Unity, to be effectuated based on the outcome of the October 2010 general elections.
THE MOTIVATIONS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE GNU SETTLEMENT
There were different motivations, and possibly objectives, held by CCM and CUF in reaching and implementing the Maridhiano agreement. We will here identify and explore the key issues which led to the establishment of the GNU.
Voter registration in Zanzibar has been severely criticised during every election since the introduction of the multiparty system in 1992. In the Muafaka II Accord, both parties recognise the faults of the history of voters' registration on the isles. In order to eliminate this liability in future elections, a key element in the Muafaka accord was to establish a credible permanent voters' register in Zanzibar, through the first round of registrations in 2004–2005.
CUF at the time of Maridhiano was in an increasingly weak position vis-à-vis the electoral cycle where the Legislative Act No. 7 of 2005 introduced a new requirement to provide a Zanzibar Identification Card (ZID) in order to register in the new biometric permanent voter registry exercise in 2009 and 2010. In previous Zanzibar elections, the registration process had been a flash point for conflict and allegations from both CCM and CUF of ‘stacking the deck’ with illegitimate registrations. In an attempt to address this at least from the CCM perspective, the use of the Zanzibar ID card was introduced as a new permanent electronic voters' registry was to be established. When the Identification Act was initially passed in 2006, all Zanzibaris were encouraged to register for the ZID. CUF at the time being suspicious of the intentions of the government and these IDs urged supporters to boycott this initial registration process, which many CUF supporters did. In hindsight, this was a huge strategic error by CUF, when it became clear that this would be a legal requirement in order to register to vote in the 2010 elections. An additional obstacle for CUF in the registration process was the crucial role of the local village/ward leader (sheha) in identifying eligible voters in the locality (based on criteria of time of residency and belonging). As shehas are politically appointed, they act both as a local civil servant as well as the incumbent local ‘party leader’. Consequently, the sheha is a highly politicized position and well placed to obstruct voter registration of potential opposition voters, which was used to particular effect in 2009/10 by denying papers for CUF sympathizers (Bakari & Makulilo Reference Bakari and Makulilo2012).
The uncertainty of how many potential CUF voters had been denied registration for the 2010 elections, was likely a factor in the decision-making process by Maalim Seif and the CUF members of the Moyo Committee in pushing for a deal at that point in time, knowing their weakness in getting their sympathisers to register to vote. CUF also saw this as a chance to put in place prior to the elections a guarantee of power of some sort, either leading or at least participating. Moreover, CUF was of the opinion that CCM would be more inclined to ‘allow them to win’ if they were guaranteed a seat at the table inside the government if they lost.
Conversely, the motivations and objectives of CCM and President Amani Karume to enter into a settlement were mixed, and perhaps partly personalised. First, given the timing of the deal, President Karume would not have to share power during his Presidency as he was at the end of his second term. By reaching a settlement he would leave a positive legacy in regards to the political development of Zanzibar. Although CUF leadership advocated for President Karume to extend his term in office to ensure the Maridhiano was maintained in the short term, CCM members of the Moyo Committee and Karume himself rejected this, opting instead for bringing in an outsider from the divisive CCM Zanzibar internal politics. Additionally, such a deal would also give President Karume and others the guarantee that no retroactive measures would be taken to investigate deals or accumulation of wealth by the administration and its members conducted while in office.Footnote 8 Furthermore, CCM leadership on Tanzania mainland had an interest in settling the Zanzibar problem once and for all to avoid further international embarrassments and had basically already agreed to it during the Bagamoyo discussions. President Kikwete had promised in his inaugural speech that he would devote his time to making peace in Zanzibar, and he saw the Maridhiano as a result of that promise. These mutually reinforcing motivations, funnelled through a confidential and informal process are what led to the Maridhiano accord, despite the lack of involvement and backing of the CCM party branch in Zanzibar.
Although both sides had strong motivations, CUF clearly had more to gain than CCM in any deal. This resulted in a skewed power dynamic between the two sides with CUF in a weaker position. Once the maridhiano process shifted from the informal to the formal codification of the deal, the CCM Zanzibar veto actors started to position themselves and work to ensure that continuity of their grip on power would be maintained. Starting in the House of Representatives several members from the CCM caucus openly opposed the motion when it was presented in the House. Additionally, CCM party officials with ambitions to run for the presidency (such as Presidential Candidate and Former Chief Minister Dr Gharib Bilal) openly opposed it.Footnote 9 This resulted in a watered-down motion, although the main pillars of a GNU at the top level remained intact.
THE FORMAT OF THE GNU
The final motion passed by Zanzibar House on 29 January 2010 changed key provisions in regards to the formation of the unity government and the powers vested in the Senior and Junior partners. First, rather than having the runner-up in the Presidential election take on the position of Chief Minister and leader of government business in the House of Representatives, the final motion created two Vice Presidential positions. The first of the Vice Presidents would come from the runner-up party, a largely symbolic position with a portfolio given out by the President at his discretion. The second Vice President would come from the winning party and essentially assume the role of the Chief Minister leading government affairs in the House of Representatives and be second in line to the Presidency.Footnote 10 This also entailed that no new ‘maridhiano government manifesto' would be developed, but the GNU should implement the manifesto of the winning party.
Second, the proportion of Ministerial posts would not be based on Presidential votes, but rather on the proportion of seats in the House of Representatives. This was a fundamental requirement from CCM, also backed by President Kikwete.Footnote 11 The slim margins in previous Presidential elections would have more or less guaranteed a 50/50 cabinet in the Unity government. But given the CCM dominance on Unguja which has more Representatives in the House than Pemba, where CUF is dominant, CCM would be able to minimise the number of CUF ministers, the ratio being based on elected seats in the House. The third change made in the final motion that passed the House concerned local government structures. At the time Regional Commissioners were members of the House of Representatives appointed by the President. The original motion proposed these positions and the District Commissioners would be shared between the unity government partners based on Presidential votes. CCM members opposed this primarily on the grounds that these positions were more civil servants than overtly political positions. As such the final motion proposed the removal of the Regional Commissioners from the House of Representatives, making these positions formally non-political in order to maintain both Regional and District Commissioner positions as Presidential appointments. This kept the GNU format only in the cabinet and ensured that CCM would still control local government administration, including the appointment of the shehas who, as indicated above, play a crucial role for the incumbent during elections. Finally, the final motion included a provision to amend the 1984 election law in order to allow for a referendum, empowering the Zanzibar Electoral Commission with a mandate to hold it as soon as possible. The Referendum Act of 2010 and its power was fuelled by a shared spirit of nationalism, giving Zanzibar a new powerful tool that could be employed on the ever-contentious Union matters and Union framework in the future.
While each party side saw the deal as less than perfect, it appears that Karume and Seif understood these dynamics and were willing to accept them. Although their intentions are not truly known given the secret discussions held on 5 November 2009, it appeared that both leaders saw the deal as one that went beyond solving the internal political impasse, to also address Zanzibar's place in the United Republic of Tanzania. In spite of their reservations, it is likely that CUF accepted the structure of the GNU with the belief that the GNU would be a favourable avenue for reconciliation and the first step on a process to revise the overall Union framework. As Moss & Tronvoll argue, improved relations between CCM and CUF borne out of leadership trust enabled CUF to accept a proposal for a GNU and subsequently its formation after the referendum (Killian Reference Killian2008; Moss & Tronvoll Reference Moss and Tronvoll2015). It can also be argued that CUF's willingness to accept the conditions of the GNU buttresses the idea of politics of collusion and continuity.
Cheeseman & Tendi (Reference Cheeseman and Tendi2010) argue that the attitudes of veto players in power-sharing have played a significant role in defining how power-sharing has played out in Africa. Drawing from the hard-line positions of key CCM stalwarts, it is evident that their stances at the time of negotiation influenced the structure of the GNU, in favour of a continued CCM dominance. We argue that partisan veto players from CCM frustrated the prospects of creating a solid and balanced constitutional platform for a government of national unity.Footnote 12
There was little debate on the floor of the House of Representatives when passing the Constitutional Amendments creating the GNU, and mostly praise was heaped upon the move: ‘Let us put up our hands for this 100%. Let us show Zanzibaris that we are there with them. Those Zanzibaris that were not a part of the 66·4% behind this decision, it is now our duty to make them put their hands together too so that we and Zanzibaris support this government in unison, with 100%.’Footnote 13 By this point the final format was clearly altered in CCM's favour, giving the junior partner little power and ensuring continuity for CCM elites, at the same time creating incentives for CUF to engage in a weak collusionary politics where mutually advantageous possibilities would be created.
THE GNU DEBATE BEYOND THE PARTY ELITES: GRASSROOTS REACTIONS
It was clear that the referendum would support the establishment of a GNU, but the excitement was focused on how big a support it would get. The referendum passed with 66·4% of voters favouring a unity government system,Footnote 14 but with abnormally low turnout for Zanzibar of 71·8% overall,Footnote 15 and as low as 59% in some constituencies on Unguja. Support for the referendum ranged from 95·1% of voters in certain CUF stronghold constituencies in Pemba (Mtambwe, Mgogoni, Kojani), while ‘No’ votes took the majority in a total of 10 CCM constituencies strongholds, all on Unguja island.Footnote 16 For example in Donge, one of the most strident anti-CUF and anti-maridhiano constituencies in Unguja at the time, a voter explained,
We did not understand what the gains and dangers of the Government of National Unity were. So the only people who decided to go out and vote did so for political reasons. They did not want to lose their jobs with the government, so they wanted to be seen going out to cast their ballots. The rest stayed at home.Footnote 17
There was a concerted effort by President Karume and CUF to push for a ‘Yes’ vote, while those in the ‘No’ camp were restricted to underground campaigns, because of President Karume's position and use of both the power of the Presidency and Deputy Chairmanship of CCM to keep the official position as ‘Yes’. Those who did dare to speak out in favour of a ‘No’ vote were reprimanded by the President's office. As one Zanzibari put it,
We saw no reason to vote, since the decision was something that both parties and the government had already made. If we are the sail on a dhow, we simply go the way the wind blows us. So to go and vote on this was a waste, the thing was already decided.Footnote 18
The relatively low turnout in the referendum is thus likely to reflect a broader opposition against the proposed GNU format among largely CCM voters. With a third of Zanzibaris openly against the GNU in the vote, and likely many others who did not turn out to vote in the process, there were significant constituencies in Zanzibar who opposed a unity government in any format. What is clear from the results is that while CUF supporters nearly unanimously supported the GNU amendment, CCM was sharply divided on the issues and the CCM ‘Yes’ vote was probably in a minority.
Enhancing nationalism in lieu of GNU
Beyond the amendments catering for the set-up of a GNU, there was one other key issue addressed in the Zanzibar constitutional amendments which embraced grassroots sentiments: enhanced nationalism. House Members took this opportunity to make a number of additional amendments beyond a GNU format addressing ambiguities over Zanzibar's place in the United Republic of Tanzania. The most significant of these was the explicit recognition of Zanzibar as a nchi Footnote 19 or country/state in Swahili in Section 1 of the Zanzibar constitution (ZRG 2010a). Furthermore, Section 2 of the 1984 constitution was deleted and replaced with a new section stating: ‘Zanzibar is among two constituent states of the United Republic of Tanzania.’Footnote 20 These amendments aimed to push for the recognition of Zanzibar as a country under the Union government and a partner state in the United Republic of Tanzania. The issue was seen as a joint Zanzibari reaction to the infamous comment in the Union Parliament by Prime Minister Pinda in 2008 that Zanzibar was not a country (Jube Reference Jube2008).
In addition, a new Section 2A was added to the Zanzibar constitution, granting the Zanzibar President the power to divide Zanzibar into Regions, Districts and other areas in accordance with the existing Act passed by the House of Representatives. This new Section directly clashes with the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania which in Section 61 (1)(3) grants this power to the President of the United Republic, but who shall consult the President of Zanzibar when Zanzibar territory is concerned.Footnote 21
These amendments were targeted to capitalize on the wave of nationalism at the grassroots level following the referendum and the excitement for opening a new chapter in the political history of Zanzibar. Strategically, this was also an issue that the Karume government saw as a way to help pacify opposition to the deal from CCM Zanzibar. By harnessing nationalism within CCM Zanzibar, these amendments would in turn help the recently nominated CCM presidential candidate Dr. Ali Mohammed Shein who was not the first choice of CCM Zanzibar's special committee to be the party flag bearer in 2010. Dr. Ali Mohammed Shein was seen as the choice of Karume and CCM Mainland. Dr. Shein had been out of Zanzibari local politics since his appointment to the Union Vice Presidency in 2002 and had close ties to the Tanzania mainland side of the party ensuring support from this bloc. At the same time, he was viewed by Karume as a moderate and relative outsider who would sustain the maridhiano process he had put in place.Footnote 22
POSITION SHARING, NOT POWER SHARING
The 2010 elections were imbued with the spirit of maridhiano and were largely peaceful from the start of the campaigns to the announcement of the election results. President Amani Karume (CCM) and opposition CUF leader Seif Shariff Hamad were focused on initiating and bringing about true reconciliation by fostering leadership trust between the two parties and bridging the identity gap between the parties and the people of Zanzibar (Moss & Tronvoll, Reference Moss and Tronvoll2015). The 2010 results were controversial, but after heavy pressure from the mainland upon Maalim Seif and in the spirit of maridhiano the two leaders accepted and agreed on declaring CCM's Ali Mohammed Shein as the winner in the 2010 general elections with 50·1% of the vote, with CUF's Seif Shariff Hamad garnering 49·9% (ILPI 2010). In other words, a true maridhiano result. However, the GNU format subsequently established was one of position sharing rather than real power sharing, as shown below.
The role of the Vice Presidents in the GNU
Section 39 in the Zanzibar Constitution was amended creating the positions of a First Vice President (1st VP) and a Second Vice President (2nd VP), the latter replacing the position of the Chief Minister. The President appoints the First Vice President after consultation with the party that came in second position in the Presidential elections. The formal powers of the First Vice President are vague, only providing that the First Vice President shall be the principal adviser to the President and “shall perform all other functions assigned to him by the President'.Footnote 23 The 1st VP is also explicitly barred from being a member of the Zanzibar House of Representatives (Article 39(4)).”
The ambiguity of the position of the 1st VP can be traced back to the maridhiano process that was based on trust and informal agreements, rather than institutional anchoring. The legal ambiguity was created by translating the informal into the formal constitutionalising of the position, giving the President wide discretion on defining the mandate for the 1st VP position.
President Karume and those who supported the maridhiano process sought a Presidential candidate who would be amenable to the unity government format. The strong opposition to the Maridhiano from both high level and mid-level veto players forced Karume and his pro-Maridhiano camp to find an ‘outsider’ to the traditional power structures within CCM Zanzibar. CCM Zanzibar grudgingly accepted the party's selection of Ali Mohammed Shein, at that time the Vice President of the United Republic, particularly when the key veto actor Dr Gharib Bilal was offered the ‘carrot’ of the Union Vice Presidency (Makulilo Reference Makulilo2012). But while CCM was able to offer a sufficient ‘carrot’ to Bilal, his network of veto actors remained active in Zanzibar. As one CCM member in his camp put it: ‘The leaders will do what they want anyway, that is what they did with the Presidential Candidate, I do not see the point in voting for a President I do not want in a kind of government I did not want.’Footnote 24
Such sentiments placed President Shein in a difficult position when he assumed the Presidency, having to balance the new unity government format, while surrounded by numerous veto players seeking to limit the impact of CUF and in particular 1st VP Maalim Seif Hamad on the new government. The 1st VP position was thus given a limited portfolio in ‘soft’ areas of the government, including environment, anti-drug efforts and HIV/AIDS. Furthermore, President Shein aimed at pacifying veto players worried about the advisory role of the 1st VP and stated publicly on numerous occasions that while both the 1st and 2nd VP were his advisors, he alone was the decision maker and as President he could choose to ignore advice provided by his top advisors (Luhwago Reference Luhwago2013). Such statements reflected the continuation of exclusionary politics that had characterised Zanzibar and contributed to the subsequent political impasse. It demonstrated to the veto players that CCM was only sharing positions with CUF, rather than substantive power. As the Director of the Zanzibar Legal Services Centre explained, ‘GNU is moving slowly and it seems CCM is not ready to fully accommodate CUF. They (CUF) expected an Executive VP position and they got a ceremonial post.’Footnote 25
The 2nd VP position, on the other hand, would share an equal role with the 1st VP as the primary advisor of the President, in addition to its primary function as the leader of Government affairs in the Zanzibar HoR. This gives the 2nd VP both significantly more power and a defined role and responsibilities compared with the 1st VP. The 2nd VP being in charge of Government Affairs both in the House and in the day-to-day running of the Government, even had an additional portfolio of Union Affairs and intra-governmental coordination. These roles vest significant authority in the 2nd VP office and retain the winning party's monopoly on political power on the isles. Furthermore, the 2nd VP is exclusively given the authority to chair cabinet meetings (Article 45(1)), in the absence of the President. Thus, the winner of the General Elections and the Presidency retained basically all power over policymaking, government priorities and how the government operates, as the winning party's election manifesto would be the guiding policy document for the GNU.
With several anti-maridhiano ministers and veto players in key positions, the GNU in Zanzibar never really had a chance to develop beyond the constitutionalised role. The high-level resistance to the maridhiano deal and GNU format from the early days onwards demonstrated the power of the veto players within CCM who could stymie reform efforts led by President Shein, as his technocratic and slow and steady pace of decision-making apparently did not curb hardliners' influence in CCM. As the 2nd VP and other veto players consolidated power, this group drove the agenda that aimed at continuity of the status quo and reducing the prospects for significant change and reform from the new Government. However, this does not mean that the GNU was a failure from the start. During the initial two years of the GNU government (2010–2012), both CCM and CUF ministers as well as 1st VP Maalim Seif expressed that the GNU format was working well and they could have constructive and productive cabinet meetings of the Revolutionary Council.Footnote 26
The Revolutionary Council, Ministers and Deputy Ministers
The new GNU Revolutionary Council, the formal name of the Cabinet in Zanzibar, was to reflect the proportion of seats in the House won by each party. There are no constitutional provisions on the division of the portfolios between the GNU member parties, leaving the decision to the President, advised by his two Vice Presidents. Again, Maridhiano and the GNU were built on a foundation of trust rather than a formal agreement, placing the burden of continuing and widening of the reconciliation process on the personalities in Government and how they interpret the broad provisions in the Constitution. President Shein in 2010 appointed a cabinet comprised of 16 line Ministers and three Ministers without portfolio, with a fair amount of balance between the two partners in terms of the key Ministries, although CCM retained the most powerful and important ones. Based on the representation in the House, CCM was given 11 Minister positions with CUF given eight. In addition, four CCM Deputy Ministers and two CUF Deputy Ministers were appointed.Footnote 27
Notably, all CCM Deputy Ministers were appointed to key Ministries that had CUF Ministers, as a way to counterbalance CUF Ministers. But while such appointments are indicative of the politics of continuity, there is also an aspect of the politics of collusion. While providing a superficially more functional government of national unity, under the surface this allows collusion where CUF Ministers can only operate by working with their CCM counterparts continuing the culture of rent-seeking, patronage and impunity. A prime example of this was how CUF Minister of Infrastructure and Communication Hamad Masoud HamadFootnote 28 and his CCM counterpart Deputy Minister Issa Haji Ussi, neither took responsibility nor were they held accountable by the President or the House for the ferry disaster in 2011, in which more than 2,500 individuals lost their lives as a result of negligence by Zanzibar Port Authorities (Sanani Reference Sanani2013). Likewise, a report about widespread corruption in the construction of the new airport and in a number of land deals was brought to the House and investigated by a special committee, yet no prosecution or disciplinary action was taken against those mentioned in the report, including prominent CCM figures and their families.Footnote 29 Such lack of accountability mirrors the culture of impunity similar to the coalition government in Kenya after the formation of their unity government, further demonstrating the extent to which CUF Ministers have joined in with their CCM partners to ensure continuation of the status quo through the politics of collusion and continuity.
The House of Representatives
The 10th amendment to the Zanzibar Constitution formally impacted the HoR in two distinct ways. First, the President would need to designate two out of 10 appointed members to the House to the opposition (Article 66), upon consultation with the leader of the opposition. Practically, this was used to appoint two CUF leaders to the House in 2010Footnote 30 who were given ministerial posts. Second, it increased the percentage of women's special seats in the House from 30% to 40% as provided for in Article 67(1). The appointment of the special women's seats is based on the political party representation in the House.
However, a clear picture of the shallow depth of the bipartisan cooperation at the elite level, and the sustained control of the party whip particularly on the CCM side, was revealed during the election of the House Leadership. Rather than working across the aisle to select a Speaker, and Deputy Speaker or House Chairman, taking into consideration the nature of the government and reconciliation spirit, CCM used their majority to ensure that CCM members held all House leadership positions. CUF members had expected that the ‘maridhiano spirit’ at its height would have translated into non-constitutionalised changes in how the House would be led and were disappointed by the lack of goodwill from the CCM house leadership in this regard.Footnote 31
Nevertheless, the discourse in the House during the initial years of the GNU was a welcome surprise to those who were seeking deeper reconciliation and reform. This was based on the assumption that inclusive government arrangements disrupt vertical accountability and relationships between citizens and their representatives (Le Van Reference Le Van2011). Although many observers from the international community feared that the House would become a rubber stamp institution for the new unity government, in fact it turned out to be the institution where the Maridhiano's impacts were most significant.
The House rearranged the seating of members from partisan CCM and CUF blocks to a mixed seating arrangement with the two parties' members into a ‘government’ and ‘backbenchers’ divide. This new seating yielded direct benefits as it increased interaction amongst backbenchers from the two parties and provided fertile ground for cooperation to hold the government accountable for its actions. This arrangement led to a more vigorous questioning of government authority than had been observed since the reintroduction of multiparty politics in Zanzibar in 1992. With the interparty tensions at their lowest levels ever and an expectation from constituents for a ‘peace dividend’, backbenchers in the House needed to demonstrate they would push the government to deliver when the new House opened after the 2010 elections. During the first two years of the GNU the House was thus active in questioning the government in a bipartisan manner on issues surrounding Union cooperation and coordination, oil and gas, hospital and health issues, the budgeting process, as well as forming several special committees. They even went so far as introducing private motions to form Special Committees to investigate corruption and misuse of government funds and assets in several controversial land deals and contracts for services.Footnote 32
As time passed and more controversial issues arose, however, such as the United Republic Constitutional Review process which emerged in 2012, insufficient structures (both formal and informal) to check the executive and ensure continued bi-partisan cooperation in the House, hampered the full realisation of Maridhiano and the GNU potential. Rather, a new quasi-bipartisan system emerged in the House where backbenchers both from CCM and CUF continued to be critical of the government, but in an increasingly partisan fashion. This allowed the senior partner in government to manipulate the discussion in the House and as a result to reduce space for reform coalitions amongst the backbenchers. Union matters, such as the issue of oil and gas rights, is a good example of this. While CUF backbenchers would push hard for concrete actions from the Government and demanded a clear timetable for the Union government to remove oil and gas from the list of Union matters, CCM backbenchers for the most part would allow the government to continue to maintain the status quo and promises of action to remain unfulfilled.Footnote 33
Constitutional safeguards for continued GNU
In order to ensure the continuation of the GNU regardless of political elites' interests, a new section was added to the Zanzibar constitution providing for a popular referendum or a two-thirds majority vote in the House of Representatives on future changes to the Zanzibar constitution. By including these significant thresholds to amend key sections of the Constitution, the Maridhiano leadership sought to ensure that the GNU format would be able to withstand challenges from those who had been against the idea of a unity government, in particular those within CCM. The high thresholds would ensure that even during difficult electoral periods in the future, both parties would be bound to form a unity government. However, a two-thirds supermajority in the House could reshape the unity government format without a referendum, as provided for in section 80A (3) of the Zanzibar Constitution 2010.
CONCLUSION: THE END OF GNU
The formation of the GNU in Zanzibar was a process characterised by fits and starts since the Muafaka processes began in the late 1990s. It was the maridhiano process in 2009 that finally led to the constitutionalised unity government format in Zanzibar. But while the GNU initially was hailed as the start of a new chapter in Zanzibar's political history, the behaviour of the key actors in the Government characterised by the hybrid politics of continuity and to a lesser extent collusion, continued divisive politics and restricted the space for meaningful reform. An additional burden to the broadening political space was the start of the flawed Constitutional Review process in Tanzania in 2012. Although the first phase of the constitutional review process was participatory and citizen centred, when the draft constitution reached the Constituent Assembly, CCM using their numerical superiority sought to reverse the proposed three government format for the United Republic of Tanzania (Union, Tanganyika and Zanzibar governments) to the status quo, which led to the boycott of the assembly by the opposition block. Following the CUF and opposition pull-out and sustained boycott of the Constitutional Assembly in 2014, the GNU was still in place but outside of the government the parties had moved back to the old highly contested politics of the pre-Maridhiano era.
When CUF elites lost patience playing second fiddle to CCM and it dawned upon them that the GNU format would not lead to CCM's acceptance of free and fair elections, the GNU format would collapse. This is what happened in the 2015 general elections. It was an unprecedentedly calm election process, and the most transparent and free election ever held in Zanzibar (Roop & Weghorst Reference Roop and Weghorst2016). This resulted in an alleged CUF victory. However, after the results were tallied, the Chairman of the Zanzibar Election Commission annulled the election, claiming massive irregularities.Footnote 34 An attempt to negotiate the post-election crisis failed, and a re-run was ordered on 20 March 2016. CUF boycotted the re-run which led CCM to winning all seats in the House, and establishing a government alone. Although CCM later appointed three minor and loyal opposition party leaders to the new House and cabinet in 2016, they used their new supermajority to start repealing aspects of the GNU format. Although the 1st VP position remains empty despite calls to abolish this position, no changes have been made to this clause. However, the House did amend Section 66 of the Zanzibar constitution to allow President Shein to appoint two members to the House without consulting the leader of the opposition party in the GNU or House of Representatives. CCM leaders, including the 2nd VP, has on the other hand reassured observers about their intent and interest to retain the constitutional GNU set-up until the next election in 2020 and beyond.Footnote 35
The GNU was a result of the work of two national leaders who sought to start the development of a new political culture through a hybrid of continuity and collusion. But by leaving out the party and particular key players in CCM, space for veto actors remained. When the additional political burden of a contested Union constitution review process commenced, the contentious Union issues were exploited to ensure continuity of power. Consequently, temporary reforms are now possibly being rolled back to a maintenance of the status quo, rather than moving forward to ensure a transformational change in Zanzibar society and politics.
