Students of East Asia know how important history—mainly negative historical memory of Japanese imperialism—has been in shaping East Asian international relations even though the Japanese empire collapsed in August, 1945. Thus, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa and Kazuhiko Togo aptly titled their edited book on East Asian historical memories East Asia's Haunted Present (2008). While writing this review in Tokyo, this reviewer was reminded of the continuous drama of historical animosity and periodic efforts at reconciliation: Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan sought again to move beyond the shadow of history by apologizing to South Korea for Japan's brutal colonization on the occasion of the centennial anniversary of Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910. But the two East Asian democracies have yet to put the past behind them. While the South Korean government welcomed the Kan apology, similar to the prime ministerial apology in 1995, it wants Tokyo to announce the annexation pact as null and void while the Japanese government continues to hold the view that the annexation was consistent with international law at that time. The Japanese and Koreans also disagree on the number of looted Korean cultural artifacts to be returned to Korea. And it was widely noted that Kan apologized to only half of Korea. In addition, there was opposition to Kan's remarks from within the ruling Democratic Party of Japan and the main opposition Liberal Democratic Party.
In case one thinks only the Chinese and Koreans refuse to let bygones be bygones, the Japanese had their annual commemoration of the A-bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki a few days before the Kan apology. The American ambassador to Japan attended the Hiroshima ceremony for the first time, which was viewed by many Japanese as a hopeful sign that an American president might one day come and apologize for what they view as an American act of immoral and unnecessary atrocity against humanity. For those interested in a nuclear-free world, such Japanese historical memory has a positive impact as it creates particularly strong public pressure on the Japanese government to pursue a nuclear nonproliferation policy.
As the preceding examples demonstrate, the topic of reconciliation is thorny and multidimensional. In The Search for Reconciliation, Yinan He approaches the issue by asking, and attempting to answer, the following question: How can we simultaneously look to the future and address the justice claims of those wronged in the past? The solution He offers in her excellent book is “deep reconciliation,” defined as the common expectation of no war, full national recognition, comprehensive economic interaction, and harmonious mutual feeling.
Defining deep reconciliation as the goal, the author then asks why some countries are able to achieve deep reconciliation as the basis of durable peace while others cannot. Specifically, why have the Germans and Polish achieved durable peace while the Chinese and Japanese have failed to do so even though the two pairs started out with similar mutual hostilities after the end of World War II? A key determining factor is each country's understanding of its history: Germany and Poland, to a certain degree, have a shared historical memory, while China and Japan have produced contradictory national myths. This begs the question why some countries can harmonize their historical memories while others cannot. She points out some differences between Germany and Japan, namely Germany's national purpose in unification, stronger leftist parties, and civil society. She also contrasts, to a lesser extent, Poland and China by discussing the fact that Poland stopped national mythmaking.
Is democratization a crucial factor here? Not apparently: the Japan-South Korea pair shows the limit of that argument. One crucial causal factor He emphasizes in terms of the development of national memory is the societal response. Elites do not just engage in national mythmaking. They have to anticipate societal response. Is this story ultimately about differences between European and Asian societies then? Yinan He does not go in that direction, for good reasons. As she demonstrates skillfully in her book, there are enough path-dependent political institutional variations to provide a noncultural argument, and this fact allows her to offer the governments in question concrete policy suggestions to aid in narrowing the gap in historical memory. One policy suggestion she offers is the development of cross-national history research projects. Indeed, creating new policies that encourage historical reconciliation is a far easier task than attempting to directly change society.
In addition to He's insights regarding reconciliation, He's book is important for another reason: Through its assertion of the importance of historical memory and national mythmaking, it is a bold challenge to the realist view of East Asian international relations. She carefully avoids claiming that realist considerations do not matter. It is now a familiar argument among many students of East Asia to challenge the realist view of the region. It is easy to show how realism does not work that well in explaining certain periods or issue areas in East Asian international relations. Defenders of realism would point out that the alleged realist thinking being criticized is misrepresented or that realism does not claim to explain everything anyway—it explains the big and important things. The value of He's book lies in its thorough analysis of realist versus historical memory arguments in several cases spanning over six decades. While some Asian experts have voiced views similar to He's—urging joint history study projects for example—she has produced one of the few works that actually demonstrates the salience of historical memory in a serious empirical work.
This book is well organized. Following a theory chapter, she starts with a case chapter on German-Polish relations set as a contrast with her main focus on Sino-Japanese relations, which are discussed in four chapters following a chronological order from the end of World War II to 1972 when diplomatic relations were normalized, to the 1980s when history came back as a contentious issue on the diplomatic agenda, and to the post–Cold War period. Some other scholars including this reviewer would divide postwar Sino-Japanese relations into pre-1972, 1972–1989, and post–Cold War periods. But it is reasonable for He to highlight the 1980s since she focuses on the historical memory issue.
The book's organization is consistent with the case method He adopts. She tested the competing theories by examining carefully the contrast between her two main cases of German-Polish and Sino-Japanese relations and the variation within the cases. To generate even more variation, He also mentions a few additional cases in the conclusion chapter, namely Japanese–South Korean, Greco-Turkish, Israeli-Palestinian, Indian-Pakistani, US-Philippine, US-Vietnamese, and UK-Indian relationships. As one would expect, these additional cases do not add much to the overall argument because they are not as carefully prepared as the two key relationships. They are more meant for future research as He herself makes clear.
He clearly had a normative concern for ensuring durable peace but wrote as a cool-headed social scientist basing her arguments on empirical evidence about issues that are often emotionally charged in the region. Wisely, she put Sino-Japanese reconciliation in a comparative study with German-Polish reconciliation, making her work part of a welcome recent trend of looking at East Asian historical controversies in a broader context. A broad perspective contributes not only to social science knowledge but also to the erosion of excessive national mythmaking in East Asia.
