I. The virtues
Aristophanes' Wasps is primarily a satire of the Athenian judicial system: the audience is particularly invited to laugh at ridiculous manifestations of this system and to reflect on its shortcomings. I argue here that the satire of Athenian justice in Wasps is intertwined with Aristophanes' treatment of sōphrosynē, the notion of ‘temperance’ and ‘sound-mindedness’ in both public and private life. I further show that the connection between sōphrosynē and justice in Wasps has implications for the characterization of the play's protagonists, as well as for our reading of its basic plot and its politics. Finally, I demonstrate that these two notions are central to the self-image projected by the poet in Wasps and in other comedies.
Dikaiosynē and sōphrosynē share some strong connections, which begin on the linguistic level: abstract nouns with the suffix -osynē mostly denote individual aptitudes and psychological traits.Footnote 1 The two were perceived as important virtues (both are listed among Plato's cardinal virtues), and they are often mentioned together: ‘πάντες γὰρ ἐξ ἑνὸς στόματος ὑμνοῦσιν ὡς καλὸν μὲν ἡ σωϕροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη’ (‘All [both laymen and poets] with one accord reiterate that soberness and righteousness are fair and honourable’; Pl. Resp. 364a); ‘Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν δικαιοσύνη ἐστί…τὸ ὑπόλοιπον ἐν τῇ πόλει ὧν ἐσκέμμεθα, σωϕροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ ϕρονήσεως, τοῦτο εἶναι’ (‘Not to be a busybody is justice…this is the remaining virtue in the state after our consideration of soberness, courage, and intelligence’; Pl. Resp. 433a–b).
They are both broad terms that encompass individual and social applications (the distinction is not always clear: individual traits and social behaviour depend on and refer to each other),Footnote 2 though they may be felt to differ in their inclinations: as a personal virtue, sōphrosynē has a broad semantic field (apart from ‘moderation’, it is also understood – depending on the circumstances – as ‘sound-mindedness’, ‘wisdom’, ‘prudence’, and ‘self-restraint’) and thus regulates one's relationship with one's own self more wholly than justice.Footnote 3 Justice, too, is applied to individual character (‘persons are thought to be just insofar as they have, as one of the permanent elements of their character, a steady and effective desire to act justly’Footnote 4 ), but has a more pronounced social orientation: it regulates relations with others. This is probably why it was seen as the primary virtueFootnote 5 in the poetry of Theognis (who also praises sōphrosynē Footnote 6 ) and in philosophical prose:
αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀρετὴ μέν ἐστι τελεία, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλάκις κρατίστη τῶν ἀρετῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ δικαιοσύνη.
Justice then in this sense is perfect Virtue, though with a qualification, namely that it is displayed towards others. This is why Justice is often thought to be the chief of the virtues.
(Arist. Eth. Nic. 1129b25–8)It is true that σωϕροσύνη as a term is used only scantily in Aristophanes,Footnote 7 and δικαιοσύνη (though clearly part of classical Greek vocabularyFootnote 8 ) does not occur at all. But there is hardly a play that does not contain some allusion to sōphrosynē (be it through the adjective σώϕρων or the verb σωϕρονεῖν);Footnote 9 and the adjective δίκαιος (and adverb δικαίως) are used relatively frequently in the comedies. Δίκαιος has broad connotations that cover a sense of what is ‘right’ in respect to others generally (Wasps, 1149; Birds, 1222), and also more specifically when respecting or breaking the law is involved (as for example in Clouds, 1434, on the father's legal right to punish his son, and Wealth, 233, distinguishing between goods obtained in a just/lawful manner and an unjust one; see also Birds, 1435).Footnote 10
Aristophanes weaves an artful connection between sōphrosynē and justice, his satire, and his politics. He satirizes the less than ideal manifestations of these two notions: the satire of less than ideal justice spans the length of a whole play, but sōphrosynē, too, receives a fair share of comic attention.Footnote 11 Comedy exploits the fact that, historically, both virtues appear to have been victims of malpractice; this is amply manifested for justice in Wasps, where – as we shall see – it seems to have fallen victim to the dark side of Athenian democracy. Sōphrosynē, on the other hand, was frequently and abusively adopted in old aristocratic, oligarchic, and pro-Spartan discourse (a main source for this is Thucydides).Footnote 12 Aristophanes satirizes it as a principle of traditional paideia (‘education’): in Clouds, it is suggested that it may have more to do with appearances than with substance (1002–8; cf. Knights, 334Footnote 13 ), and indeed sōphrosynē appears weak against the arguments of the new sophistic education (1060–82), especially when presented as imposing an unnatural restraint on pleasures and appetites (1071–82).Footnote 14 It is also accused of being rather self-centred as a psychological trait: the Hermes of Wealth (1119) is σώϕρων (‘prudent’) in the sense that he cares only about himself.Footnote 15
Still, the predominant image of sōphrosynē is a positive oneFootnote 16 – it is, after all, a Platonic cardinal virtue! – nor does Aristophanes seem to aim at total subversion: again in Clouds, sōphrosynē is made part of the debate between the personified notions of Κρείττων and Ἥττων Λόγος (Better and Worse Argument), and it is praised by the former, while the final victory of Worse Argument leads to disastrous consequences. ‘Positive’ sōphrosynē is significantly linked with dikaiosynē. Notably, some versions of Clouds name the two opponents as Δίκαιος and Ἄδικος Λόγος (Just and Unjust Argument); even if these names are not what Aristophanes used, they are certainly not inappropriate choices.Footnote 17 For Just Argument, sōphrosynē as part of good old Athenian paideia is linked with ‘τὰ δίκαια’ (961–2):Footnote 18
Very well, I shall describe how the old education used to operate in the days when I flourished by propounding what's just, and when decency was accepted custom.
The poet links sōphrosynē and justice in more than one comedy. The Chorus of Frogs (727–8) suggests that the Athenians should trust citizens who possess these virtues:
The ones we acknowledge to be well-born, wise, just, fine and outstanding men.Footnote 19
We hear in Birds (1433–5) that a sōphrōn man should earn his living in a ‘just manner’. Note the contrast between δικαίου and δικορραϕεῖν:
But surely there are other respectable occupations, where a man your size should be making an honest living instead of cobbling up lawsuits.
In the same play (1539–40), sōphrosynē (soundness) is named among the possessions of Zeus, together with euboulia (political prudence) and eunomia (law-abiding conduct); in real life, all three were clearly regarded as ideal qualities of political administration.Footnote 20 A personified Eunomia appears as a sister of Dikē, the goddess of Justice, in Hesiod's Theogony (902).
II. Wasps: plot and characters revisited
Sōphrosynē and justice were no doubt important to the life of the classical polis, and the world of Wasps is lacking in both. This comedy's plot is arguably one long demonstration not just of the failures of justice but also of the absence of ‘positive’ sōphrosynē, confirming the inherent connection between the two. Aristophanes' satire in Wasps primarily targets failed social applications of justice. However, it is evidently also concerned with individual applications: that is, with (lack of) justice as a trait of individuals, and predominantly with this perverse form of concern with justice, which was known as philodikia (extreme fondness for litigation). Philodikia apparently characterized a good many Athenians of Aristophanes' time, as also implied in the above-mentioned passage from Birds (1433–5) and elsewhere in his plays (e.g. Ach. 375–6; Peace, 505). The term does not occur in the comedies,Footnote 21 but clearly the thematic interest in sōphrosynē and dikaiosynē is not merely conceptual. Often in the play, the absence or the maltreatment of justice is conveyed with terms from the root dik- (δίκη, δικάζειν, δικαστής, δίκαιος, ἄδικος, and ἀδικεῖν).Footnote 22 There are two instances of σωϕρονεῖν and one of ἄϕρων.Footnote 23
The plot of Wasps in brief: the old man Philokleon, the comedy's central character, is addicted to jury service. Although clearly in no financial need, he is presented as spending every single day at the law courts with his fellow jurymen (the members of the Chorus, old and poor Athenians), who judge cases on bogus principles, while maintaining a blind allegiance to the politician Kleon for increasing the jurors' salary. The character of Philokleon is juxtaposed with that of his son, Bdelykleon, who strongly opposes the former's jury activities and despises Kleon. Bdelykleon tries and eventually succeeds in proving to his father and to the Chorus that they have fallen victim to an unworthy politician, who exploits them without attributing to them their rightful share of public gains; he then converts his father to a new, but equally questionable way of life, away from politics, dedicated to personal enjoyment.
Wasps presents Philokleon's obsession with the law courts as the by-product of a fundamental lack of judgement about the true function of Athens' political leaders and about his own good; this is a deficiency not only in sophia but also in sōphrosynē as ‘sound-mindedness’.Footnote 24 It is not just Philokleon: the Chorus – that is, Athenian jurors (mostly poor men of advanced age)Footnote 25 – suffer from a lack of wisdom (early in the play, they are presented like a flock of sheep; 31–3). They have misjudged Kleon, who literally buys their trust (cf. Knights, 799–800), and who clearly has no true respect for justice.Footnote 26 He appears in Wasps (894–997) in a comic trial as a bad Dog, who absurdly accuses another Dog (a thin disguise for another Athenian public figure, the general and politician Laches) of committing precisely the kind of injustices of which he himself is guilty, namely embezzling money and enriching himself in dubious ways.Footnote 27 In harmony with their master, neither Philokleon nor the Chorus (who function as a mirror of a segment of the Athenian demos) seem to have ever possessed sōphrosynē or to have really served justice. There are repeated references to their stealingFootnote 28 and to the apparently unscrupulous manner of deciding cases brought to their courts, including, in one instance, disregarding the provisions of a will, to which Bdelykleon reacts with the verb ἀδικεῖς (589). Philokleon equates the function of dikazein with ‘do harm’ (340; compare his morally negative portrayal of dikastai at 548–58).Footnote 29
Clearly, this is a practice that would fail the forensic definition of justice later proposed by Aristotle: ‘ἔστι δὲ δικαιοσύνη μὲν ἀρετὴ δι’ ἣν τὰ αὑτῶν ἕκαστοι ἔχουσι, καὶ ὡς ὁ νόμος· ἀδικία δὲ δι’ ἣν τὰ ἀλλότρια, οὐχ ὡς ὁ νόμος’ (‘Justice is a virtue which assigns to each man his due in conformity with the law; injustice claims what belongs to others, in opposition to the law’; Rh. 1366b9–11); ‘δοκεῖ δὴ ὅ τε παράνομος ἄδικος εἶναι καὶ ὁ πλεονέκτης καὶ ἄνισος … τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἄρα τὸ νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον, τὸ δ’ ἄδικον τὸ παράνομον καὶ τὸ ἄνισον (‘Now the term “unjust” is held to apply both to the man who breaks the law and the man who takes more than his due, the unfair man.…“The just” therefore means that which is lawful and that which is equal or fair, and “the unjust” means that which is illegal and that which is unequal or unfair’; Eth. Nic. 1129a32–4).
The core element of this definition is the contrast between justice and pleonexia, ‘greediness’, ‘claiming more than one's fair share’.Footnote 30 As has been noted before, this contrast is frequently thematized in Aristophanes' plays, which often explore self-interest and greed: the character of Dikaiopolis in the Acharnians (who wants to serve justice and the common good but also gives in to individualism), and the tension between the demands of the law and individualistic tendencies in the Ecclesiazusae are two good examples.Footnote 31 Concern for self-interest and concern for the public good are not necessarily incompatible, but Aristophanes shows that caring for one's own interests often leads to greed, selfishness or dishonesty. In Wasps, the Chorus put their own self-interest above the law when they engage in stealing;Footnote 32 Philokleon's partying at the end of the play involves attacking innocent citizens, including a female bread-seller, whom he ironically advises about ‘acting sensibly’ (σωϕρονεῖν, 1405). The lack of respect for laws and social institutions that determine what each person is or is not entitled to, and the replacement of the ideal of public service with greed, is presented by Aristophanes as a failure of sōphrosynē in one instance: in the later homonymous comedy, wealth is linked with Hybris, the worst Greek vice, while sōphrosynē is said by the personified Penia to go hand in hand with poverty (Wealth, 563–4). The fact that Penia appears to lose in the debate to the play's hero, Chremylos, has less to do with her arguments for the superior moral character of the poor, and more with the force of the instinctive human desire to be rich (see especially Wealth, 598–600).Footnote 33
Lack of integrity, wisdom, and judgement is not the only or even the main manifestation of the absence of sōphrosynē in Wasps. Of the play's protagonistic father and son duo, we are particularly invited to observe the old man, Philokleon – a character who is completely out of control, who also lacks sōphrosynē in the sense of self-restraint and moderation. The just individual, however (as defined by Plato in his Republic, 441e–442d), is someone in whom reason governs passion. The point of sōphrosynē as temperance is that pleasant activities should be engaged in rationally, according to the thinking and moral concerns of a wise person, who understands the proper place of these activities in the larger cadre of a human life.Footnote 34 ‘Pleasant’ is whatever someone is said to be a lover of (as Aristotle explained in Eth. Nic. 1099a8–12) – in the case of Philokleon, the function of the hēliastēs: he is labelled as ϕιληλιαστής by the slave Xanthias, a ‘compulsive juror’ (Wasps, 88; Sommerstein's translation). It is indeed in this philo- that the affliction begins (see Wasps, 77), as the old man engages in the juries without moderation or restraint; his passion is described as a form of sickness or insanity (87–130). He seems to be governed by an uncontrollable anger (also a feature of the wasp-natured Chorus) and to take pleasure in the suffering of the defendants.Footnote 35 He gives a seemingly rational account of the juror's privileges in the Agon (548–727), but this serves only to underline the selfish motivation and doubtful morality of jury service, as well as the lack of moderation in his own self-image: he compares his authority to that of Zeus (619, 548–9; cf. 518)! As he lacks temperance, he is by default then incapable of being just (on a psychological level) or of serving justice (on a social level).
It is true that Philokleon's attitude changes in the course of the play, as he is made by his son to realize that the system and the leaders he serves are not worthy of respect: the jurors are not free, they are controlled by corrupt prosecutors, trials are decided on the basis of bribes, and jury pay is much less than what the demos should be entitled to (240–4, 650–704).Footnote 36 Philokleon is made to see that he is better off as an apragmōn, concentrating on his private life.Footnote 37 Aristophanes connects this apragmosynē, which is a form of detachment from politics (to be seen perhaps as a conservative reaction to the negative qualities of Athenian democracyFootnote 38 ), with sōphrosynē. So Philokleon's withdrawalFootnote 39 from jury service appears at first as a nod to sōphrosynē, as the Chorus' protreptics at 729 and 748 clearly imply: he should follow his son's advice and change his ways
Listen, listen to his words, and don't be irrational, or too unyielding and tough a man.
(729–30)Maybe now he's listening to your arguments and really being sensible, changing his ways from now on, and listening to you.
(747–9)In what follows, however, the old man is quick to replace one pleasurable activity with another, which he may exercise uncontrollably. Towards the end of the play (from 1303 onwards), we watch him get drunk, dance wildly, tell offensive jokes, leave with the flute-girl, and attack random people on the street on his way home and finally his own son; ironically, he is now the potential ‘accused’ in many lawsuits to be brought against him by the people whom he wronged (1332–4, 1406–8, 1415–41). It seems that Philokleon's recognition of the lack of justice in society and politics has led to further degeneration of his individual sōphrosynē (proving once again the interdependence between public and private sphere). The moral degenerative process appears unstoppable, leaving us to wonder whether temperance may indeed be learned.
Can it? The poet implies that exposure to the desired or accepted moral outlook might do the trick (1460–1), although it is admittedly hard to depart from one's natural character (1456–7), and a sōphrōn upbringing may fail to produce the desired result (as the earlier-mentioned comic examples of superficial sōphrosynē may imply), but we also need to ask who the educator is. Bdelykleon first appears sōphrōn, in the sense that he is apragmōn: he keeps away from law courts and politics, which (as we have seen) is a feature of Aristophanic sōphrosynē. But does he really behave in the spirit of sōphrosynē and justice? He seems to be guided by good intentions (to educate his father in temperance), but to act wrongly on them. He orders the beating of his father and the old men of the Chorus (456–9) – by no means a just action (Pheidippides and Hetton/Adikos Logos in Clouds, 904–6, 911, 1321–5, are also father-beatersFootnote 40 ). His effort to make Philokleon presentable among the rich and aristocratic people (Wasps, 1003–7, 1122–264) seems only to aim at a superficial kind of sōphrosynē (the one precisely ridiculed in Clouds) and a twisted form of justice, which reminds us of selfish Hermes in Wealth: Bdelykleon only cares for his father's interests and ignores those of the other wasps, in contrast with the above-mentioned Aristotelian definition of a just individual as one who takes only his fair share of good things. His intention to push his father towards a hedonistic life is morally questionable (e.g. 736–40) – again not on a par with genuine sōphrosynē. It is no surprise that it all backfires. Bdelykleon, much like his father later, acts on the premise of the recognition of lack of justice in society and politics – and ends up making decisions that injure both sōphrosynē and justice; the σοϕία (‘wisdom’) attributed to him by the Chorus towards the end (1465) must have sounded comic indeed. The conflict of generations, an important theme of the play,Footnote 41 is thus comically resolved in that both father and son appear to be lacking in the basic virtues – much like Strepsiades and Pheidippides in Clouds.Footnote 42
A number of scholars have argued convincingly in favour of the unity of the plot, despite the apparent discrepancy between its first part (up to Philokleon's conversion) and the second, which is to an extent dominated by wild party scenes. They have noted the poet's foreshadowing and allusion techniques that link earlier with later scenes (for example, lines 341 and 736–40 foreshadow the pleasures that await Philokleon); they have also commented on the analogy between the law courts and the symposium – both have social form which is disrespected by Philokleon.Footnote 43 We may add that in both cases social form falls victim to the hero's aphrōn and unjust behaviour; the lack of sōphrosynē and justice presents itself as a further strong unifying thread between the play's first part and its final scenes, as the poet explores diverse manifestations of what can be conceived as the opposite of prudence. Thus, the absence of sōphrosynē as moderation first takes the form of an obsession with law courts, then re-emerges in Philokleon's excessive partying. Failure to adopt a sōphrōn and just behaviour is also a shared element in the characterization of Philokleon and the Chorus, who differ in other ways: unlike Philokleon, the members of the Chorus are poor old men, who are entirely dependent on jury pay (Wasps, 300–16) and who do not take any part in the hero's grotesque final act.Footnote 44
We may thus affirm the connection in Wasps, on a deep structural level, between individual sōphrosynē, individual justice, and the carrying out of justice in society.Footnote 45 The sōphrosynē–justice dynamics appear to be something of a balancing act: the absence of one also signals the absence of the other.
III. The politics of Wasps
How does the connection between sōphrosynē and justice affect the politics of Wasps? It is no exaggeration to say that the present and future of Athenian democracy, as pictured in the comedy, seems to depend on this connection. The demos as the sovereign body of free Athenian citizens takes no good care of the city's affairs; nor do leading political figures such as Kleon, who use the judicial system for their own gain. Greed – mentioned above as a frequent concern of Aristophanic comedy – is emphasized in Wasps as an abominable quality of the city's democratic leadership (655–724).Footnote 46 The situation described is a far cry from the philosophical thesis that good rulership should equal just and sōphrōn rulership (see, for example, Plato, Republic, 501b).Footnote 47 Kleon's role as a ‘protector’ of justice in Wasps shows nothing but disrespect for justice; this implies a moral attitude that may be compared to the sophistic discourse of Platonic dialogues that interprets dikaiosynē and pleonexia as the justice of the stronger or the more powerful (Grg. 483a–d, Resp. 343a–344c; see also Thuc. 5.105.2, and especially Kleon's position in the Mytilene debate, Thuc. 3.36–48). One might question whether the demos in a direct democracy might really be seen as ‘weak’: the Athenian demos was a large body of citizens with decisive power in the Assembly and the courts.Footnote 48 Aristophanes, however, has made clear that it is the demos' lack of sōphrosynē that makes them weak.
We must be cautious about comedy's fidelity to political and historical facts. The grimly funny picture painted by Aristophanes of the judicial system and of its politicians is of course a comic exaggeration, and it is futile to look for a serious political message. But the political character of Wasps is hard to ignoreFootnote 49 and has fruitfully (even if not entirely conclusively) been analysed before. The comedy clearly presents a conflict between different positions; whether these are read as ‘democratic’ and ‘aristocratic’Footnote 50 or ‘radical democratic’ and ‘conservative democratic’Footnote 51 (the former in each pair is represented by Kleon), or whether one prefers to avoid such labels altogether,Footnote 52 there is no doubt that the poet wished his audience to see the Philokleon–Bdelykleon antithesis (solidified in their names) as a direct consequence of the faults and absurdities of Athenian justice and related politics, themselves the product – as has emerged from the previous section – of the abandonment of sōphrosynē. Because of their lack of sōphrosynē as prudence, the Athenians prove unable to select wise advisors and fall prey to incompetent, selfish leaders (Kleon's group), who show no interest in the good of the demos Footnote 53 and do not hesitate to turn the workings of justice into a farce. The comically ironic lines 411–14 consequently make us wonder whether the enemy of jury service and law courts should be called μισόπολις (‘hater of the polis’) and whether δικάζειν δίκας (‘to judge lawsuits’) is really a good thing.
Wasps emphasizes endorsement of Kleon, expressed in Philokleon's name and role, as a disastrous choice, but it also cheats its audience of any expectations that Bdelykleon should represent what is right for the city. In a number of passages Bdelykleon is comically suspected of conspiring against Kleon, who stands for the rule of the people.Footnote 54 The play treats Kleon's group as no true democrats, and, of course, young Bdelykleon is a hilarious conception of a ‘tyrant’. The plot's outcome suggests that it is neither the pro-Kleon nor the anti-Kleon feeling that endangers democracy but the lack of sōphrosynē on both sides; in order to be viable, democracy needs to be a sōphrōn state of affairs, where justice reigns.Footnote 55 Tyranny is the most feared outcome of (among other factors) the lack of wisdom that has brought to power the new demagogue politicians, and the lack of justice that corruption has brought with it.Footnote 56 (Indeed, a few years later, in 411 bce, this faulty democracy would briefly yield its place to oligarchy). The idea of democracy as articulated by Aristophanes is closely bound up with traditional sōphrosynē, which should not be seen as an exclusive property of aristocratic thinking; it is valorized in tragedy, comedy, and oratory as a quality of Athenian public life and of the individual ordinary democratic citizen.Footnote 57 It is finally significant that sōphrosynē ‘becomes firmly connected to the Athenian democratic constitution’ after 404, as appears from fourth-century oratory.Footnote 58
IV. Aristophanes the wise
Aristophanes presents himself (or rather, his poetic persona) as both sōphrōn and dikaios (Ach. 500–1 etc.; Knights, 510); he thus claimed for himself the qualities that he thought of as desirable in his fellow citizens. The Chorus of Knights implies that he is sōphrōn (σωϕρονικῶς οὐκ ἀνοήτως εἰσπηδήσας ἐϕλυάρει; He acted discreetly, and didn't leap mindlessly in and spout rubbish; 545). He produced at least one sōphrōn comedy (Clouds, 537). The parabasis of Wasps (especially 1009–14, 1051–9) describes him in a similar light and presents his judgement and intellect as beneficial to his viewers, whom he claims to advise. This is an indication that he wished his audience to see him as a kind of educator.Footnote 59
Should Wasps be read as a lesson for sōphrosynē? There is no doubt that the performance of Wasps, as with all comedy, was first and foremost entertainment and not persuasive rhetoric or an actual think tank. Indeed, there is no comedy (especially Greek Old Comedy) without an amount of aphrosynē! However, it is fair to wonder whether the poet's depiction of the plight of a demos lacking in sōphrosynē and justice intended to warn his audience of the dangers of renouncing these two fundamental virtues.Footnote 60 In spite of the jokes against the inadequacies of his fellow Athenians as citizens, he probably did not consider them as thoroughly incapable of good judgement.Footnote 61 Nevertheless, he cannot have seriously believed that his plays could lead to an improvement of the people's politics: one of his heroes explicitly refers to comedy's limited potential to heal the city's sicknesses (Wasps, 650–1). Nor did his hope of Wasps leading the poetic competition materialize: the play only achieved second place, which he probably saw as an unjust outcome,Footnote 62 just like the third place of Clouds the previous year (see the relevant complaint expressed by the Chorus of Wasps at 1017, 1043–50).Footnote 63 Aristophanes thus emerges as a good and sōphrōn but underappreciated entertainer and teacher – at least, this is what he seems to have thought of himself.