Liberal Principles and Factual Assumptions

Blake embraces a form of liberalism that applies global moral egalitarianism to political contexts. It takes individuals rather than states as the ultimate units of moral concern. All individuals, wherever they are, have equal standing. “The equality of all human beings ought to be respected by all political institutions,” says Blake (p. 9). More specifically, Blake's liberalism asserts the following four key principles:

1. (a) All individuals have equal moral status in virtue of their capacity to act as autonomous agents.

2. (b) All individuals have a right to those political institutions sufficient to protect their equal rights as autonomous agents.

3. (c) All individuals have a right to have the coercive actions of such political institutions justified to them as autonomous agents.

4. (d) All individuals have a duty to support, defend, and create such political institutions (pp. 25, 50, 81).

The first principle identifies the metric of respect and concern in Blake's liberalism, focusing on autonomy. Individuals are entitled to be (partly) authors of their own life, free to develop and pursue their own projects and relationships. Following Joseph Raz, Blake takes autonomy to require certain preconditions. These include agents' mental abilities for practical reasoning; the availability of adequate options to choose from; and the limitation of coercion by other agents. The second principle accepts that certain institutions may be necessary to protect and promote agents' autonomy. But since these institutions are coercive, the third principle says that they can only be consistent with respect for autonomy if they can be justified to the agents they coerce in ways they cannot reasonably reject.

The fourth principle identifies a general natural duty to generate and sustain political institutions that support the autonomy of all individuals. This principle has global scope. However, its implementation can be achieved through specification and distribution of tasks among particular associations. Thus, states can be charged with supporting primarily the preconditions of autonomy of their own residents. Blake's discussion of global justice assumes that the world is made up of various states, and takes this as a fixed parameter for the foreseeable future. His concern is to determine what kinds of policy (especially what kind of foreign policy) states should adopt if they are to honor liberal principles.

Distributive Equality as a Domestic, Not Global, Principle

When it comes to distributive justice, we can be concerned with combating absolute deprivation or relative deprivation. The former comprises situations in which some people do not have enough to be able to function as autonomous agents; the latter comprises situations in which some agents have access to fewer economic advantages than others (for example, because they have less income or wealth). According to Blake, liberalism demands combating relative deprivation at the domestic level, but not at the global level. This asymmetry exists because the international context lacks a key phenomenon that we encounter at the domestic level: state coercion. State coercion triggers a heightened demand for justification, which can only be answered if egalitarian distributive concern is acknowledged. To be treated as autonomous agents by their state, citizens require democratic rights; but to enjoy democratic equality, economic inequalities must be reduced (as suggested by some empirical studies according to which economic inequality undermines political equality). Furthermore, economic inequality must be limited if states are to justify to their citizens their imposition of comprehensive rules regarding property, contracts, and taxation, which shape the conditions of economic and social cooperation. Autonomous agents can reasonably reject social structures that are coercively imposed on them and yet give them lower economic prospects than those feasible under alternative structures.

Global Distributive Sufficientarianism

Since there is nothing like the state at the global level, global distributive egalitarianism is inappropriate, according to Blake. This does not mean, however, that distributive justice has no relevance for relations between people (and their states) across borders. Blake endorses a form of global distributive sufficientarianism according to which we have a duty to foster conditions of autonomy for all, regardless of their nationality. We should support foreigners when they face absolute deprivation, and help them build successful democratic states. We should also avoid certain forms of coercion at the international level that would limit their capacity to function as autonomous agents. Even if there is no world state, there are international interactions, and institutions like the World Trade Organization, which operate in coercive ways. On Blake's account, they are unjustified unless they protect and promote autonomy. Thus, wealthy liberal states ought not to prop up undemocratic regimes that violate the autonomy of their residents. And they should not take unfair advantage of the vulnerability of poor countries when shaping the rules of the World Trade Organization. Foreign policy is unjustified when it foreseeably and avoidably fails to respect or promote the autonomy of people beyond a state's borders.

(1) Autonomy, Wellbeing, and Domestic Distributive Egalitarianism

Blake does not clearly show how concern for autonomy generates distributive egalitarianism at the domestic level. When introducing the claims of autonomy, Blake says that they demand adequate material opportunities, not maximal and equal ones (p. 23). So, at first pass, a liberalism that only focuses on autonomy does not generate distributive egalitarianism but rather a form of sufficientarianism. Blake argues that higher demands are triggered by the justification of state coercion. But this is not convincing unless the metric of justice is expanded to include more than the preconditions of autonomy. If the latter constitute the only relevant basis of justification, then it is not true that “governmental coercion . . . give[s] rise to a demand for material egalitarianism” (p. 87). Concern for political equality is not enough to ground concern for material equality.

Take Rawls's theory of justice, often invoked by Blake. The material preconditions of democracy trigger what Rawls calls the “fair value of political liberty,” but not yet Rawls's second principle of justice demanding fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle (which allows only those inequalities that maximize the condition of the worst-off). Rawls, unlike Blake, recognizes that additional arguments are needed to justify material equality (or “maximin”). He also, unlike Blake, provides those arguments.Footnote ² Furthermore, the justification of the state's imposition of property, contract, and tax law does not generate the second principle either, if it is only the preconditions of autonomy that provide the terms by reference to which residents are to press distributive claims on their state. They can have adequate opportunities without having equal opportunities, and the worst-off can have adequate opportunities without their condition being as good as possible.

To really yield “material egalitarianism” (or the maximin of the difference principle), the justification of state coercion must take the residents of a state to legitimately press claims that focus not only on their autonomy (as defined by Blake) but also on their access to conditions for wellbeing, and on access to as many of those conditions as reasonably feasible. They must want opportunities that go beyond the threshold of distributive sufficientarianism, and care about having access to as much income and wealth as possible. Distributive egalitarianism calls for equally enabling people to live flourishing lives in which they can develop and exercise their various capacities. Blake's formulation of liberalism cannot really capture material egalitarianism without having to expand its metric of distributive justice to include access to conditions for wellbeing (for which maximal sets of economic opportunities, income, and wealth are proxies) in addition to autonomy (as he defines it).

(2) Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Egalitarian Distributive Concern

Blake takes state coercion as a sufficient condition for egalitarian distributive concern. Is it also a necessary condition? Blake is not very clear on this point. Some formulations seem to point toward an affirmative answer.Footnote ³ Blake's considered view, however, seems to be that although state coercion is not in principle a necessary condition, it is the “best explanation” of the source of distributive egalitarianism available, and thus, in the absence of a compelling alternative, it functions as a necessary condition (p. 80). However, since Blake does not really explore alternative accounts of the source of distributive egalitarianism, his comparative judgment is not given any justification. I take this opportunity to invite Blake to provide us with such a justification.

(3) The Initial Plausibility of Global Distributive Egalitarianism

Interestingly, an argumentative basis for global distributive egalitarianism can be found if we combine the results of the discussion in point (1) above with a plausible reformulation of some key principles in Blake's discussion. The relevant upshot from point (1) is that to justify distributive egalitarianism (domestic or global) we need to take into account people's interest in accessing conditions of wellbeing, which can go beyond the threshold of sufficientarian views. We can add to this the commitment to global moral egalitarianism (as discussed in the Liberal Principles and Factual Assumptions section above), which takes every human being to have claims of justice on every other human being. These two points generate the initially plausible view that each of us should have equal respect and concern for everyone else's access to conditions of wellbeing. We can further develop this view by reformulating Blake's four principles as follows:

1. (a) All individuals have equal moral status in virtue of their capacity to act as autonomous agents and develop and exercise their various capacities (and thus to pursue their wellbeing).

2. (b) All individuals have a right to those political institutions sufficient to protect their equal rights as autonomous agents and as pursuers of their wellbeing.

3. (c) All individuals have a right to have the coercive actions of such political institutions justified to them as autonomous agents who pursue their wellbeing.

4. (d) All individuals have a duty to support, defend, and create such political institutions.

On this reformulated view, we have a natural duty to foster social arrangements that support the autonomy and wellbeing of all human beings. Given the commitment to universal equal concern and respect for all, this natural duty links to a view of global distributive justice that is egalitarian rather than merely sufficientarian. When we consider whether persons could reasonably accept existing or proposed social arrangements, we should pay attention to their reasons to protect and promote their autonomy and wellbeing. This exercise of justification has global scope, and yields global distributive egalitarianism. Inegalitarian principles are reasonably rejectable by those whose prospects for wellbeing are made lower than they could be. This is no less true in the global context than it is in the domestic one.

(4) A More Dynamic View of Nonideal Theory

Of course, the view I have just offered, however desirable, may turn out to be hopelessly utopian in practice. Global distributive egalitarianism clearly seems much less feasible than global distributive sufficientarianism for the foreseeable future. But we can respond to this worry by extending Blake's own response to the feasibility obstacles facing global distributive sufficientarianism. He says that we can envision incremental changes that will triumph over those obstacles over time (p. 129). Surely, the same can be said about global distributive egalitarianism. Its fulfillment may not be likely in the short or medium term. But we can envision incremental changes that take us from the status quo to the fulfillment of global distributive sufficientarianism, and from the latter to the increasing approximation of global distributive egalitarianism. If global distributive equality is morally desirable, then approximating it over time seems to be an appropriate political goal.Footnote ⁴

We can engage in nonideal theorizing without losing sight of ambitious principles of global justice. Blake does not deny that we “may develop theories that may guide us in our long-run revision of basic forms of political and social organization” (p. 45), but he thinks that we should adopt a form of “institutional conservatism” that grants the main outlines of the existing states system—which entails, given his theory, a confinement of egalitarian distributive concern to domestic settings. After all, he says, the current facts that the world is divided into separate states, and that these “states have widely different economic, political, and military powers,” are “unlikely to be significantly overcome during any of our lifetimes” (p. 45).

I think that Blake's account of nonideal theory is insufficiently dynamic. We can keep demanding global egalitarian principles in view and use them to motivate the steps we take even in the short and medium term. Even if it is true that major transformations will not occur in our lifetimes, they could still occur in the future, but be less likely to occur if we do not act now in ways that create the conditions for their achievement.Footnote ⁵ Many generations to come will inherit a world shaped by our actions and omissions. We owe them something better than the social and political parameters that we currently face, and which Blake's theory accepts as unchanging. If we do not start the journey now, they will be in the same position as we are now, facing the same questions. This should not go on ad infinitum. The change can and should start now. Political philosophy has a role to play in this process. It can articulate and defend ambitious normative goals (such as the pursuit of global distributive equality) rather than clipping the wings of our political imagination by confining us to the horizon of global distributive sufficientarianism.

(5) A Better Grasp of Current International Injustices

The full realization of global distributive egalitarianism is a vision for the long term, but it also triggers obligations now. First, as intimated in the previous section, it helps us choose between alternative domestic and international social arrangements in the short and medium term. Other things being equal, an arrangement that makes the achievement of global equality in the future more likely is better than one that makes it less likely. Second, global distributive egalitarianism may be significant for characterizing and responding to current international injustices in a more lucid way. In some passages, Blake worries about conditions of international trade that involve “exploitation” of people in poorer countries by people in richer countries (pp. 125, 128). A global egalitarian approach is better for characterizing the wrongs involved in international exploitation than a global sufficientarian approach. Sufficientarianism may fail to condemn exploitative relationships that occur among parties that are above the threshold of sufficiency, whereas egalitarianism would be able to challenge them as involving a failure to display equal concern for everyone's access to conditions of wellbeing. Exploiters take unfair advantage of the exploited by using the superior bargaining power that background economic inequality affords them to generate distributive profiles that benefit them disproportionally. Exploitation is enabled by, and fosters, material inequality. Global egalitarianism requires precisely the prevention of this circle of unfairness.