John Henry Newman has played a relatively minor role in literary-critical accounts of Victorian objectivity. This essay contends, however, that Newman's experiments in autobiographical detachment render his lectures on Certain Difficulties Felt by Anglicans in Catholic Teaching (1850) and his memoir, Apologia Pro Vita Sua (1864), surprisingly legible in the terms established by recent scholarship, even as the same pair of texts also serves to complicate these terms. Amanda Anderson's and Elaine Hadley's respective accounts of “cultivated detachment” and “abstract embodiment” show that, for the Victorians, being objective meant more than simply abstracting oneself from affect, experience, or practice.Footnote 1 Objectivity was seen instead as producing new forms of experience and distinctive emotional investments.Footnote 2 Drawing on these cultural-historical insights, I argue that Newman's depiction of his past self as a separate person from his writing-self enables him to adopt a stance of detachment from his past life and, in particular, from the beliefs that he held before his conversion to Catholicism. This stance establishes Newman rhetorically as an objective judge of his past life, but far from projecting disengagement or indifference, Newman's particular mode of detachment creates the conditions for an “affectively charged objectivity” with quite specific relational implications.Footnote 3 Objectivity is, again, the precondition for experience rather than a route to its effacement.
The autobiographical standpoint that facilitates his engagement with his past does not, however, testify in and of itself to the historicity of Newman's detachment. John Freccero has gone as far as suggesting that a “detachment from the self that was from the self that is” is a perennial feature of conversion literature.Footnote 4 One obvious, albeit relatively proximate, predecessor for Newman's self-detachment might be William Wordsworth (an oft-noted influence), whose “interlocutor” in The Prelude is, as Thomas Weiskel puts it, “a part of himself, archaic or prospective but in any case alienated from his present, who beckons to him across a ‘vacancy.’”Footnote 5 It may be that Newman's disarming rhetoric of retrospection positions him more securely within the ambit of Victorian liberal culture than the alleged historical ubiquity of autobiographical detachment might suggest, but his significance within that context is only partly attributable to his counterintuitive affinities with more obviously exemplary (i.e., “Victorian”) figures such as John Stuart Mill. Newman's work deserves a place in scholarly narratives of Victorian detachment primarily because his writing destabilizes—and thereby (for us) clarifies—then-current notions of objectivity.Footnote 6 As we will see, Newman's autobiographical experiments in Difficulties Felt by Anglicans involve a peculiarly stark “detachment from the self that was from the self that is,” but it is in the Apologia's rather subtler maneuvers that Newman makes his most searching contribution to Victorian thinking about objectivity. His positioning of his past self makes space in the latter text for an inversion whereby Newman's objective stance is itself exposed to objectifying judgment. Furthermore, this inversive structure relies upon the interaction of two distinct forms of objectivity: a confident retrospective stance underpinned by a secure Catholic faith and, second, Newman's past self's anguished detachment from his own (Anglican) identity. As I argue in this essay's final pages, the Apologia's uneasy inclusion of these two styles of detachment leaves the fissiparousness of Victorian objectivity more than ordinarily exposed.
1
Some recent work in the field of Victorian studies has—not without reason—foregrounded Newman's reservations about modern ideals of detachment.Footnote 7 Although several commentators have drawn attention to how his patterns of thought and belief were inflected by the incipient secular liberalism of his historical moment,Footnote 8 Newman has also served, in broader accounts of British intellectual life, as an illustrative deviation from some characteristic tendencies of Victorian modernity. Philip Davis, for example, has adduced Newman's insistence, in An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (1873), on persons’ intimacy with their beliefs—on the existence of “a deep level where the belief is rooted in the person, the person inextricable from his or her belief”—to indicate his distance from “the liberal in John Stuart Mill's On Liberty,” for whom “[b]elief is . . . a voluntary extra, personal only as a matter of private choice or opinion.”Footnote 9 The immediate occasion for Davis's remarks is a passage in Grammar of Assent where Newman insists on the vanity of what Thomas Nagel, in his philosophical account of objectivity, has called “[t]he ambition to get outside of ourselves.”Footnote 10 Newman writes:
It seems to me unphilosophical to speak of trusting ourselves. We are what we are, and we use, not trust our faculties. To debate about trusting in a case like this, is parallel to the confusion implied in wishing I had had a choice if I would be created or no, or speculating what I should be like, if I were born of other parents. . . . We are as little able to accept or reject our mental constitution, as our being. We have not the option; we can but misuse or mar its functions. We do not confront or bargain with ourselves; and therefore I cannot call the trustworthiness of the faculties of memory and reasoning one of our first principles.Footnote 11
This passage would seem to distance Newman from the larger cultural project of Victorian objectivity. If one's “mental constitution” is inescapable, then adopting a distanced perspective on oneself and one's deep-seated commitments must, in principle, be impossible: as Elizabeth Louise Bevis Gallick puts it in her discussion of the Grammar, “we have no ability to adopt an external view of our own convictions.”Footnote 12 Newman's “we” seems very different here from, for example, “the person of character” delineated by Mill, who “though surely full of opinion, is nonetheless quite astonishingly capable of momentary disinterestedness, of in some instances becoming a bystander even in relation to his own most precious convictions and pursuits such that he may even see fit to change his mind or even his actions.”Footnote 13 My reading of Newman's earlier, autobiographical texts will ultimately insist on their separability from the Grammar of Assent. It is notable, however, that even this later text, seemingly inimical to the intellectual priorities of Victorian literary culture, in fact contains an (admittedly circuitous) affirmation of detachment. Newman writes in a subsequent chapter that we tend not to contemplate the possibility of losing our present beliefs: “What belief, as such, does imply is, not an intention never to change, but the utter absence of all thought, or expectation, or fear of changing.”Footnote 14 His ideas about commitment are nonetheless shadowed, however, by the “thought” of change, a fact that becomes clearer in a subsequent discussion of “certitude”: “if I am certain of a thing, I believe it will remain what I now hold it to be, even though my mind should have the bad fortune to let it drop.”Footnote 15 In the latter of these sentences it seems that we are, after all, capable of the kind of hypothetical reflection that the strength of our commitment had, in the former, appeared to militate against. Furthermore, that very same strength—which, as it turns out, gives us greater confidence in our commitments than it gives us in ourselvesFootnote 16—seems wholly compatible with the committed subject conceiving of a version of him- or herself who does not hold his or her commitments. The subject is a bystander, then, not to his or her commitments but, by virtue of holding those commitments, to a crucial aspect of his or her identity (i.e., the fact that he or she holds them).Footnote 17 This brief comment in Newman's treatise opens a view onto the more significant depictions of self-detachment in Difficulties and in the Apologia.
The latter text's central argument is buttressed by a suggestion that Newman was a different person at different points in his life. In foregrounding discontinuity of identity, my reading of the Apologia seeks to modify a widespread (though not universal) critical emphasis on continuity.Footnote 18 Jonathan Loesberg offers an elaborate and theoretically sophisticated variation on this emphasis. Loesberg's reading hinges on Newman's account of self-consciousness as simultaneously “a divorced act of reasoning” and “a primary, unquestionable epistemological act”—that is, as both detached from and embedded within the self of which it is conscious.Footnote 19 I take this reading of Newman's philosophy to be concordant with my above discussion of the Grammar of Assent. Loesberg goes on to argue, however, that Newman's writings on consciousness form a theoretical framework for what he (Loesberg) takes to be the Apologia's distinctive, if implausible, claims for continuity. Newman does not say, that is, “that while he at one time held certain religious beliefs, he had in all honesty changed them”; rather, we are to believe “that Newman's conversion involved no central change in any of his earlier beliefs, that his Catholicism was simply the working out of what he had always believed as an Anglican.”Footnote 20 Loesberg is quite right in identifying a sense of continuity in Newman's memoir: even early on in the narrative, the Apologia attributes to Newman what Lawrence Poston calls “[a] disposition to accept [‘Roman’] Catholicity,” and the text shows Newman “uncovering” this disposition “as his consciousness expands.”Footnote 21 But as John D. Barbour has noted, “There is . . . an interesting tension within the Apologia between Newman's suggestion that he does not really undergo a radical transformation but remains true to his original beliefs and his need to show that he has changed and was not secretly a Catholic during the Tractarian controversy” (that is, during Newman's years as a prominent Anglican polemicist).Footnote 22 Sister Mary Baylon Lenz has likewise identified an insistence on Newman's “Anglican fidelity” in the years preceding his conversion, and, as she seems to imply in distinguishing “Newman the Catholic” from “Newman the Anglican,” it is his insistence on fidelity that prompts Newman to distance himself from his past self.Footnote 23 This distancing effect, I want to suggest, is an important counterpoint to the Apologia's emphasis on continuity. As we will see in Difficulties Felt by Anglicans, it also played a more general role in Newman's framing of his lapsed beliefs.
The Apologia was written in response to Charles Kingsley's attack on Newman's character, an attack that included what Newman took to be an insinuation that he had been covertly advancing the interests of the Catholic Church while serving as an Anglican clergyman. As Frank M. Turner puts it, “In 1864 a chance occurrence allowed Newman to resurrect and publicly defend that nearly forgotten ‘character of history,’ his earlier self in the English Church.”Footnote 24 A particular sticking point in the public controversy that prompted Newman to write his memoir was Kingsley's construal of one of Newman's Anglican sermons. Newman responded to this construal by ventriloquizing Kingsley in a pamphlet now printed as an appendix to the Penguin edition of the Apologia:
[Kingsley] takes it for granted that the Sermon is the writing of a virtual or actual, of a conscious Roman Catholic; and is impatient at the very notion of having to prove it. Father Newman and the [Anglican] Vicar of St. Mary's are one and the same: there has been no change of mind in him; what he believed then he believes now, and what he believes now he believed then. To dispute this is frivolous; to distinguish between his past self and his present is subtlety, and to ask for proof of their identity is seeking opportunity to be sophistical.Footnote 25
In order to defend himself from Kingsley's charges, Newman calls into question the transtemporal identity of Father Newman with the vicar of St. Mary's: as Jan B. Gordon puts it, a “bifurcation of self” serves in the Apologia as a legitimating tactic.Footnote 26 Vindicating Father Newman's good faith means vindicating the analogous good faith of the vicar of St. Mary's, but that very vindication requires showing that the latter was sincerely advocating the wrong faith. The question of confessional affiliation, foregrounded as it is by Newman's pairing of his past and present titles, overlaps with the issue of personal identity. Newman is in effect saying here: I was not being disingenuous when I delivered the sermon, because I was not (quite) the man I am now. We can, I think, legitimately, if imaginatively, extrapolate from this claim a more radical notion if we rephrase it in the third-person terms in which (as we shall see) Newman elsewhere referred to his past self: the man who delivered that sermon was not being disingenuous because he was not (quite) me. We can in this sense read Newman's polemic as the fulfillment of an obligation toward a separate person whom he considers to have been perilously wide of the mark on matters pertaining to salvation.Footnote 27 As Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick said of Henry James's detached (yet also “eroticized”) treatment of his younger self in the New York prefaces, “this figuration opens out a rich landscape of relational positionalities.”Footnote 28
Newman's defensive posture might be construed as a variation on the self-care ethic that he articulates in the main narrative while describing his refusal to steer other Anglicans through the gate that he himself was tentatively approaching: “Certainly to myself my own duty seemed clear. They that are whole can heal others; but in my case it was, ‘Physician, heal thyself’” (Apologia, 198–99).Footnote 29 Again, Victorian conceptualizations of what Donna Haraway would later call “embodied objectivity” seem relevant here.Footnote 30 Michel Foucault wrote that “the principle of care of oneself” in post-Socratic philosophy “took the form of an attitude, a mode of behaviour; it became instilled in ways of living; it evolved into procedures, practices, and formulas that people reflected on, developed, perfected, and taught.”Footnote 31 Newman's rhetorical positioning of his past self might be seen as just such a practice, an example of what Anderson—who also relates Victorian styles of detachment to “Foucault's practices of the self”—calls “[t]he attempt to embody subjective detachment within narrative or formal practices.”Footnote 32 But Newman's specific invocation of “identity” and its attendant paradoxes also points to the complex temporality underlying the ethic that I extrapolated above.
The philosopher Derek Parfit argued that if one understands one's future selves to be less than fully continuous with one's present self, then one should regard those future selves as distinct persons to whom one owes moral consideration. We can intelligibly claim, in light of this notion, that certain actions that would otherwise seem only to be imprudent are in fact “morally wrong” because of the harms they will do to a future self who is not (quite) identical with the person performing them.Footnote 33 Parfit suggests an analogy with
our special obligations to those to whom we stand in certain relations, such as our parents, children, pupils, patients, clients, or constituents. A person stands to himself in the future in another special relation, which we could claim to create similar special obligations.Footnote 34
Newman is looking backward rather than forward, but the ethical stakes in his response to Kingsley are comparable to those in Parfit's argument.Footnote 35 The fundamental difference between Newman's successive affiliations is the basis on which he can imply a degree of discontinuity between his past and present selves, and this discontinuity can in turn be seen as the source of a “special” obligation. That is, the transtemporal difference between Newman's contrasting sets of beliefs is what enables him to frame his past self as (almost) a different person, and it is the space that subsists between different persons that might be said to produce an obligation of the kind Parfit describes.Footnote 36
This engagement with the question of identity is what connects the Apologia to the broader conceptual projects that infused its historical moment: the ethical and affective dynamics discussed above ultimately derive from a particular kind of detachment. Newman's defensive attitude with regard to his past self's good name is aligned, that is, with an apparent detachment from that self. This is not to deny the text's evident ambivalence about detachment. As Davis notes, there are certainly passages where Newman seems intent on depicting “a self which is very much aware of being a creature, living inside a thing called human life, without being able to see it, like God, from above.”Footnote 37 Such moments warrant Davis's aligning the Apologia with the Grammar of Assent and the latter text's insistence on embeddedness. As we have already seen, however, the later text is also marked by Newman's peculiar style of abstraction, even if this counterstrain is more apparent in the Apologia. There are, furthermore, suggestive rhetorical tensions and correspondences between the two texts. Immediately before the long passage from the Grammar quoted above, Newman allows talk of trusting certain of our faculties when such talk takes the form of “a figure of speech.” As it happens, we see one such loose usage in the Apologia, in the form of a negative counterpart to Newman's assertion in the Grammar that “[i]t seems to me unphilosophical to speak of trusting ourselves” or “[t]o debate” our own trustworthiness: “from distrust of myself, I shrank from the thought, whenever it was brought home to me that I was influencing others” (Apologia, 199).Footnote 38
On a related note, whereas the Grammar asserts that “[w]e do not confront or bargain with ourselves,” Newman depicts the emergence of his memoir from a kind of bargain he made with himself: “I had long had a tacit understanding with myself, that, in the improbable event of a challenge being formally made to me, by a person of name, it would be my duty to meet it” (Apologia, 4). Such commonplace locutions might seem, in themselves, to imply a kind of objective stance, just as, in John Casey's account of objectivity and ethics, “[t]o be angry with oneself is to adopt something like an impersonal point of view.”Footnote 39 In any case, these lines from the Apologia take on a heightened significance not only when we compare them with their counterparts in the Grammar of Assent, but also when we consider them alongside Newman's more radical exercises in life-writing. An obvious place to go here would be the texts published long after his death as his Autobiographical Writings. Of particular note is the “Autobiographical Memoir” (1874), which is written in the third person and which prompted its editor, Henry Tristram, to ask: “Does the history of literature furnish another example of a man, who has written, not his own autobiography, which has become common enough, but his own biography, as though the writer and his subject were distinct individuals?”Footnote 40 But I want instead to focus on the Difficulties lectures, which, while not primarily autobiographical, exhibit an extreme version of the self-detachment that the Apologia would later attempt more tentatively.
2
At various points in the Difficulties Felt by Anglicans lectures, Newman the convert makes his case against the Church of England by quoting and analyzing his earlier Anglican writings. Sometimes he refers to the author of those works in the third person, and he once argues against a self-quoted argument (“it has been urged”) whose provenance is specified only in a footnote.Footnote 41 The published text of Difficulties Felt by Anglicans, which is framed as the written version of a series of orations, thereby teases its reader (regardless of what Newman really said to his audience) with the possibility that, in the case of the footnote, the original lecture was delivered without the quotation being attributed to its author by name. Such maneuvers serve once again to detach Newman from his past self and commitments, and they underline his affinity with a liberal culture whose emblematic figures were, by Hadley's account, depicted “sit[ting] in their private chambers writing measured accounts of other thinkers’ ideas, indeed writing about their own ideas as if they were others’ ideas.”Footnote 42 In one lecture he ventriloquizes the claim that Anglican clergymen (or, more specifically, those belonging to the Anglo-Catholic party within the Church of England at whom his arguments are primarily directed) will have received subjective confirmations of the truth of their theological positions and of the rightness of their institutional position. Whichever “external facts” Newman adduces, whichever deft feats of argumentation he attempts to pull off, will (allegedly) be trumped by the Anglicans’ “internal facts”—that is, their subjective experiences of sanctity within the Church of England (71). The stakes seem particularly high here, since this ventriloquized argument bears a close resemblance to Newman's own claim—ventured both before and after his conversion—that, as Ian Ker has put it, the foundations of belief “lay outside the range of logical argument and belonged to the inner life of the individual.”Footnote 43 As his argument progresses, however, Newman refuses to concede on the point of religious subjectivity:
I have no intention at all of evading their position,—I mean to attack it. I feel intimately what is strong in it, and I feel where it halts; so, to state their argument fairly, I will not extemporize words of my own, but I will express it in the language of a writer, who, when he so spoke, belonged to the Established Church. (74)
He goes on to quote from and then critique one of his Anglican sermons, which advances an experiential argument for the Church of England's viability. In seeking thereby “to attack” the experiential argument, the Catholic Newman seems to rely upon insights that are necessarily idiosyncratic: he appears to fall back, that is, on what Stephen Thomas calls the ostensibly “common-sense[] view that individuals have private access to their own experiences, which they, and they alone, can remember.”Footnote 44 Newman has had all of the experiences that the Anglican Newman had and can therefore meet arguments from subjectivity on their own grounds. In tapping this vein of private subjectivity, the text seems to moderate the dramatic differentiation of Newman's Anglican words from “words of my own.”Footnote 45 Yet this is not quite how the argument works itself out once the lengthy quotations are concluded. After offering his qualified assent to a “preference of internal evidences to those which are simply outward” (78–79), Newman implicitly plays the card of his own present-day subjective religiosity by claiming that “one inward evidence at least Catholics have, which this writer [the younger Newman] had not,—certainty” (79). The basis for this claim seems to be the fact that Newman has now been both an Anglican and a Catholic and is therefore in a position to compare the states of Anglican uncertainty and Catholic certainty.Footnote 46 His Anglican opponents may brandish their subjective experience at him, but his own subjective experience affords him an argumentative advantage in both quantitative and qualitative terms. He has had more experience than his Anglican self can be said to have had, because Newman ceased to be an Anglican and yet is still alive, and he has also had more kinds of experience—two rather than one—than an Anglican who has yet to cross the threshold can claim. But the experiential claim then suddenly recedes, albeit only (in the argument's larger context) temporarily:
No one can read the series of arguments from which I have quoted, without being struck by the author's clear avowal of doubt, in spite of his own reasonings, on the serious subject which is engaging his attention. He longed to have faith in the National Church, and he could not. “What want we,” he exclaims, “but faith in our Church? With faith we can do everything; without faith we can do nothing.” So all these inward notes which he enumerates, whatever their primâ facie force, did not reach so far as to implant conviction even in his own breast; they did not, after all, prove to him that connection between the National Church and the spiritual gifts which he recognised in his party, which he fain would have established, and which they would fain establish to whom I am now addressing myself. (79–80)
This passage indicates one reason why self-quotation is so important to Newman's textual construction of objectivity: it enables a specific mode of public positioning. Michael Warner has influentially delineated a “set of assumptions” operative in the American “republican” public sphere that were
developed in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, on the basis of which print could be taken as normally impersonal. By “normally impersonal,” I mean that the reader does not simply imagine him- or herself receiving a direct communication or hearing the voice of the author. He or she now also incorporates into the meaning of the printed object an awareness of the potentially limitless others who may also be reading.Footnote 47
Newman cannot be straightforwardly aligned with this impersonal conception, but the passage from Difficulties Felt by Anglicans quoted immediately above is nonetheless perversely reliant upon the logic of an impersonal public sphere in its implied account of reader response. In the republican model described by Warner, when members of the public make rational judgments about the printed materials they read, they are engaging in an activity to which either a direct acquaintance with the authors of those materials or an awareness of those authors’ personal characteristics would be, at best, superfluous.Footnote 48 Newman's hermeneutic practice ascribes evidentiary decisiveness to authorial intention—an ascription that, according to Warner, was precluded by the impersonal understanding of print that produced, for example, the United States Constitution.Footnote 49 But Newman's claim that his past self's intentions are directly apprehensible from the published text nonetheless attests to his affinity with the republican model. In claiming that “[n]o one can read the series of arguments from which I have quoted . . . without being struck by” their import, he appeals specifically to an ideal of public perspicuity and generalizable reader response.Footnote 50
In making this move, Newman temporarily surrenders the argumentative advantage derived from his personal knowledge of the vicar of St. Mary's. Even when he offers such claims as “[h]e longed to have faith in the National Church, and he could not,” Newman sounds as though he is simultaneously offering a personal reminiscence and a literary critic's speculative deduction.Footnote 51 The evidence supporting his attribution of “doubt” is the text written by his past self, and this evidence, because of its public availability, affords Newman no epistemic advantage over his present audience.Footnote 52 Printed words are in this respect quite unlike the psychological data exclusively available to personal recollection: the impersonality peculiar to print enables Newman to engage his past self as though, to return to Tristram's formulation, “the [present] writer and his subject were distinct individuals.”Footnote 53 His argument may be reliant upon his subjective state in the present—that is, his state of Catholic certainty—but for all the difference it makes, the vicar of St. Mary's could just as well be an imprint on a page as an epoch of Newman's personal history.
3
Newman's figurations of discontinuity in the lectures produce an unnervingly stark version of the kind of “distanced relation toward one's self” privileged by the Victorian project of detachment (Anderson, Powers of Distance, 4). One might object, however, that these moments all concern Newman's relation to opinions that he has, at the time of writing, abandoned. They do nothing to challenge fundamentally his later emphasis, in the Grammar of Assent, on what Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels have called “the inescapability of belief”: one's present commitments and perspectives surely remain a ubiquitous frame of reference.Footnote 54 The Apologia seems to mark this as an important distinction, albeit somewhat idiosyncratically. The famous opening of the final chapter emphasizes the stability and durability of Newman's Catholic faith (214). Newman here “contrasts”—as Barbour puts it—“the agonized perplexity and vacillation of his long deconversion [from Anglicanism] with his peaceful mind and conscience since becoming a Roman Catholic.”Footnote 55 (Indeed, another critic has taken the “difference between” these psychological states as the basis for Newman's “aware[ness] that ‘his past self and his present’ have distinguishable identities.”)Footnote 56 Newman's commitment to Anglicanism seems, that is, to have been strangely reflexive, as he implies in a number of striking formulations. During an early period of disquiet he wondered—notwithstanding his “confidence . . . in the grievousness of what I called the ‘dominant errors’ of Rome”—“how was I any more to have absolute confidence in myself? . . . how was I to be sure that I should always think as I thought now?” (93–94). In later describing his “growing dislike . . . to speak against the Roman Church herself or her formal doctrines,” Newman claims that “I was very averse to speaking against doctrines, which might possibly turn out to be true, though at the time I had no reason for thinking they were” (119). In a similar spirit, he writes in the penultimate chapter that, as his commitment to his nominal membership in the Church of England waned, he had “[a] strong presentiment that my existing opinions would ultimately give way, and that the grounds of them were unsound” (195). These lines may fall short of attributing to Newman the impossible “position from which we can see our beliefs without really believing them” dismissed by Knapp and Michaels,Footnote 57 but they nonetheless suggest that the Anglican Newman's growing doctrinal misgivings afforded him a detached relationship with his own Anglican identity. This style of detachment marks a clear contrast with the opening of the Apologia's final chapter, where Newman seems wholly disinclined to adopt a detached view of his adopted commitments. It seems that, for the Catholic Newman writing the Apologia, a perspective on his present commitments analogous to the one he adopts on his past—and to the one he adopted toward his Anglican identity during that past—is, likewise, both inaccessible and, happily, unnecessary.Footnote 58 The difference between Newman's Anglican reflexivity and Catholic security is underlined by the epistemological claim advanced toward the end of the “strong presentiment” paragraph: “Certitude of course is a point, but doubt is a progress; I was not near certitude yet. Certitude is a reflex action; it is to know that one knows. Of that I believe I was not possessed, till close upon my reception into the Catholic Church” (196). Newman's still point of certainty seems, then, to coincide with—even if it is not necessarily the cause of—a semidetached view of the “progress” of his past beliefs.Footnote 59 Again, however, this detached view has little in common with the liberal strain of self-detachment by means of which modern subjects detach themselves from their present commitments. Newman's seemingly illiberal objectivity does not completely dominate the Apologia's autobiographical discourse, however. William Myers has described Newman's editorial recontextualizations of his work in the Apologia as exhibiting a career-long “habit of self-quotation and retelling in an apparently unending pursuit of self-definition and self-explanation.” Because “comment itself is a text, and calls implicitly for further comment . . . , the possibility of definitive explanation vanishes.”Footnote 60 This account suggests that the text jeopardizes its ostensibly objective perspective because of its implicitly prospective structure. I would like to suggest, though, that a more interesting tension within the text derives from the retrospective character of Newman's narration. By opening a view onto his past self's detached style of commitment, Newman admits a competing form of objectivity to that embodied in his secure narratorial stance.Footnote 61
In a much-discussed passage, Newman recalls a moment in 1839 when his confidence in the Anglican Church was shaken:
After a while, I got calm, and at length the vivid impression upon my imagination faded away. What I thought about it on reflection, I will attempt to describe presently. I had to determine its logical value, and its bearing upon my duty. Meanwhile, so far as this was certain,—I had seen the shadow of a hand upon the wall. It was clear that I had a good deal to learn on the question of the Churches, and that perhaps some new light was coming upon me. He who has seen a ghost, cannot be as if he had never seen it. The heavens had opened and closed again. The thought for the moment had been, “The Church of Rome will be found right after all”; and then it had vanished. My old convictions remained as before. (116)
Jerome H. Buckley argues that this is at best a qualified “epiphany,” and that it is therefore consistent with a sense that “Newman . . . is intent on presenting an orderly development, a consistent evolution with no sudden or ‘fickle’ reversals.”Footnote 62 A consistent evolution would seem to militate against my emphasis on discontinuity of identity.Footnote 63 Yet something strange happens during Newman's epiphany, precisely because of the vacancy—to recall the Wordsworthian term cited by Weiskel—it creates between Newman the less-than-wholly-secure Anglican and Newman the (truly) secure Catholic. This gap enables a reframing of Newman's narratorial perspective.Footnote 64 If we take as authoritative the textualized “thought” that Newman here attributes to his past self, Newman did not temporarily become a Catholic at this (epiphanic) moment. Rather, he became temporarily convinced that he would at some point become a Catholic or, at least, that the Church would at some point be “found right” by some person or by some group of people (the latter presumably including Newman).Footnote 65 The uncertainty here derives from an impersonal passive construction (“will be found right”) that, to borrow a phrase from Sharon Cameron, seems to “represent[] experience and affect as independent of any person or entity to whom experience and affect could be referred.”Footnote 66 Anticipating the logic of detachment we have seen play out in Newman's postconversion texts, the Anglican Newman whose thought this is seems to anticipate his future “religious opinions” without fully identifying with them as opinions that he will hold himself.Footnote 67 Just as “Father Newman” will elsewhere write about his past self as if he were a different person—and we perhaps see a hint of that rhetorical move in the analogously impersonal construction “The thought for the moment had been”—here the Anglican Newman, in receiving an intimation of his future beliefs, seems, notwithstanding the emotional freight of this moment, to regard those beliefs from a slight distance. One might say—adapting Thomas Pfau's remark from a rather different context—that Newman's autobiographical “specularity . . . yields to a potentially interminable reflexivity as the seeing subject abruptly becomes conscious of itself as the objectified and alienated focal point of a disembodied gaze.”Footnote 68
This inversion is consistent with what I earlier identified as the perversity of Newman's project of vindication. He is justifying his past self by showing that he was wrong—that he was in a state of error, indeed, that imperiled his personal salvation. The text's governing tension is nicely encapsulated by Thomas Vargish's ambivalently “tragic” reading and by Martin J. Svaglic's claim that “the Apologia is the drama of a[n Anglican] soldier who, through defeat and submission, at last finds peace.”Footnote 69 These interpretations remind us that, while Newman's conversion is the happy ending of his narrative, the project of vindicating his past self means he has to emphasize that this happy ending would once have seemed to him a fall into error. The logic of the text's overall argument dictates that the Anglican Newman must once have regarded conversion as undesirable.Footnote 70 Newman sometimes tries, as we have seen, to separate his past and present selves, but in the Apologia he also effectively incorporates the former's perspective on the latter as well as vice versa.Footnote 71 Newman's life-writing thereby reframes his present beliefs by exposing the objective autobiographer's standpoint to reciprocal scrutiny.
4
It would be wrong, however, to treat this putting-under-strain as a reason to dissociate Newman from the broader cultural projects with which I have sought here to align him. The text in effect allows us to witness what Pierre Bourdieu described as the kind of “reflection . . . that consists in objectifying the subject of objectification.”Footnote 72 Bourdieu claims that it is multiple subjects’ “mutual objectification,” rather than the “turning of subjectivities upon themselves,” that stimulates “progress towards greater reflexivity”: “No one can forge weapons to be used against his opponents without having those weapons immediately used against him by them or by others.”Footnote 73 Newman's framing of his past self seems to me to circumvent Bourdieu's obstacles to the “turning of subjectivities upon themselves.” Not only is it true that, as Stephen Thomas puts it, Newman in his Catholic writings “turns his guns upon his former self,”Footnote 74 but, as we saw in the passage quoted above (and in a qualified departure from Bourdieu's principle), the Catholic Newman's weapons are also effectively used against him by the spectre of his Anglican self.Footnote 75 This dynamic anticipates the logic underpinning the Grammar's account of an “utter absence of all thought, or expectation, or fear of changing.” Newman's confidence in his present beliefs, a confidence that enables him to detach himself from his past self, gives rise to a retrospective structure whereby those present beliefs are themselves viewed from a detached perspective. In this admittedly counterintuitive respect, the Apologia corresponds, presumably in spite of Newman's intentions, very closely to the paradigms of Victorian objectivity: detachment here emerges from seemingly unpropitious conditions.Footnote 76
The “mutual objectification” staged in the Apologia should also alert us, however, to the complexity of Victorian detachment more generally. As I implied above, what we see in the autobiography is a confrontation between Newman's Anglican detachment, which enabled him to observe the tendencies of his unstable commitments, and the Catholic Newman's detachment, which is compatible with an emphatically stable faith. This confrontation is, again, evocative of broader tendencies in Victorian literary culture. Anderson's highly influential account of Victorian detachment contends that “both Victorian and contemporary thinkers generate false oppositions and exclusions in their consideration of differing modes and practices of detachment” (24). Anderson's proposed solution to such false oppositions is “a more capacious understanding of critique” (178), but for my purposes her most resonant insight, which is repeatedly confirmed in readings of Charlotte Brontë, Matthew Arnold, and others, is that “the Victorians played various forms of detachment against one another, casting some as progressive and ennobling, and others as dangerous and corrupting” (23). Subsequent work in Victorian studies, some of it avowedly inspired by Anderson's research, has (even) further expanded our understanding of Victorian detachment by reading it into seemingly incongruous practices such as immersive or erotically charged novel reading.Footnote 77 The conceptual fissiparousness of objectivity has likewise been underlined by important work on the history of science (work that has itself informed the study of Victorian literature in recent years). Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison have shown not only that scientific objectivity is a “recent and [historically] contingent” phenomenon,Footnote 78 but also that objectivity has itself demonstrably meant different things at different times: it “is a multifarious, mutable thing, capable of new meanings and new symbols.”Footnote 79 This multifariousness can, moreover, give rise to conflicts between different modes: “the highest expressions of objectivity in one mode may seem worthless when judged by the standards of another mode.”Footnote 80
Newman's case illustrates these dynamics particularly clearly because we see him in the Apologia shifting, through his conversion, from one such “mode” to another.Footnote 81 Such shifts complicate the kind of schematic view of objectivity offered at one point by Nagel: “An advance in objectivity requires that already existing forms of understanding should themselves become the object of a new form of understanding, which also takes in the objects of the original forms.”Footnote 82 For Nagel, “the distinction between more subjective and more objective views is . . . a matter of degree,” and he matches this claim with an analogy that makes his emphasis on quantitative difference particularly clear: “We may think of reality as a set of concentric spheres, progressively revealed as we detach gradually from the contingencies of the self.”Footnote 83 The difference between Newman's Anglican reflexivity and his Catholic detachment would seem, by contrast, to be qualitative. Although the Apologia's structure foregrounds the former's supersession by the latter, it is less clear that, in moving from one kind of objectivity to another, Newman's perspective has become more (or, indeed, less) objective. Nagel's broader analysis of objectivity is, I should note, more nuanced than the “concentric spheres” model might seem in isolation to suggest, but a closer gloss on Newman's conversion can nonetheless be found in Stanley Fish's essay “Critical Self-Consciousness,” a text that has sometimes been cited antagonistically by defenders of nineteenth-century objectivity.Footnote 84 Fish writes that “any gain in awareness is simultaneously a loss. . . . [T]he passing from one point of view to another deprives you of whatever insights and certainties flow from the point of view you have ‘transcended’ (in quotations because it is transcendent only in relation to a new set of constraints).”Footnote 85 Although the shift we see in Newman—the title of whose 1847 conversion novel Loss and Gain is felicitously recalled by Fish's rhetorical balancing of “loss” and “gain” here—might better be described as a shift from detached uncertainty to detached certainty, Fish helps us to see that the anguished consciousness of Newman's Anglican self (at least as it is depicted in the Apologia) is different in kind, as well as in degree, from the narratorial perspective from which that consciousness is made available to us as readers.
It is this dynamic that, in turn, makes Newman's autobiographical texts potentially valuable to scholarly understandings of Victorian objectivity. As the Difficulties lectures attest, Newman's treatment of his past self renders him surprisingly legible in the terms of his broader cultural context. But the Apologia, though its rhetorical pyrotechnics are more restrained than those of the earlier work, ends up taking us further. The logic of the Apologia's argument requires a degree of differentiation between Newman's past and present selves. As we have seen, however, Newman's past self also practices his own distinct style of detachment, a style to which Newman's present self is implicitly exposed. By staging an encounter between these two stances—both putatively objective, but very differently constituted—Newman provides a surprisingly compelling figure for the tensions attendant upon Victorian detachment.
