Understanding Shiite Leadership is an attempt to push back against analysis suggesting that Shiʿi leaders are violent radicals or extremists. The central argument of the book is that the Islamic Republic of Iran and Hizbullah are best viewed through the lens of what Shaul Mishal and Ori Goldberg call the “middle ground” reality, which places the emphasis on how Shiʿi leaders engage with the world. The authors open the book by suggesting that Shiʿi specialists Hamid Dabashi, Ervand Abrahamian, and Said Amir Arjomand represent the “high-ground approach” since they consider religiosity to be a reflection of psychology, sociology, and economic class struggle, respectively (p. 5). In place of these so-called high ground analyses, Mishal and Goldberg argue that the political history of the Islamic Republic represents a clash of multiple middle ground visions (p. 82). The authors define the Shiʿi middle ground paradoxically as belief in unimpeachable truths that are horizons instead of destinations, and as “resistance toward unassailable answers and absolute stability” (p. 6). Further, the authors conclude that the middle ground is not only prevalent in modern Shiʿism; it is a global phenomenon that is reshaping international politics and economics and replacing high-ground extremes (p. 136). The authors are on firmest ground when they argue that Shiʿism is not monolithic and that Shiʿi leaders attempt to fill the void of the Hidden Imam through the interpretation of truth and order (pp. 6–8, 82).
Links between the authors' definitions of middle ground and Shiʿi leadership are, at times, disjointed. For example, the conclusion that a “disdain for hierarchy” (which is a middle ground ideal) is a prominent trait of modern Shiʿism is tenuous given that Shiʿi leadership itself is hierarchically stratified (p. 54). Additionally, the authors argue that the engagement of a plurality of Shiʿi parties is “the hallmark of a virtuous Shiite society” (p. 12). Although applicable in some historical contexts, this does not hold true for the many modern Usūlī clerics, who declared infidelity (takfīr) on non-Usūlīs, including Akhbārīs, Sufis, and Shaykhīs. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine how the Shiʿi establishment in Iran is “motivated by diversity rather than similarity or unity,” which represents yet another middle ground principle (pp. 132, 135). While diversity is certainly perceivable within the Usūlī establishment, it is not of primary concern to the movement.
The first four chapters of the book promise to outline the Shiʿi worldview and the environment in which it operates (p. 8). Although Mishal and Goldberg point to some of the central issues at the heart of Shiʿi authority, the historical analysis paints an incomplete picture. The authors rightly emphasize the Safavid period (1501–1722) as a critical stage in the development of political Shiʿism. However, the lack of reference to the 18th and 19th centuries leads to several misinterpretations. For example, although the Usūlī movement did not prevail until the late 18th century, the authors suggest that the Usūlī-Akhbārī dispute was settled in favor of Usūlīs in the 17th century by “Ayatollah” Muhammad Baqir al-Majlisi (1616–98; p. 19), who, in fact, famously advocated a middle way between the Usūlī and Akhbārī schools. Additionally, the authors suggest that Safavid scholars were sources of emulation (sing. marjaʿ al-taqlīd) (p. 17), even though marjaʿiyyah did not emerge in practice until the 19th century as the book rightly indicates in the second chapter (p. 22).
Evidence related to Ayatollah Khomeini is more consistent than pre-20th century Shiʿi history, even if the analysis does not exactly present a nuanced understanding of Shiʿi leadership. The authors' efforts to invert the extremist/moderate narrative is most evident when they argue that Khomeini's political Shiʿism represents a return to the traditional benign middle ground and that Pahlavi secular nationalism represents the high ground, which was an attempt to create a new Iranian identity of “superimposed extremes” (pp. 26, 42, 46). Since the authors avoid Khomeini's innovative political ideology or the Shah's appeal to Iranian tradition, their analysis is lopsided, like the narrative they attempt to replace. The authors further assert that Khomeini “reveled in multiplicity of spaces” unlike the Pahlavi government that attempted to build the state around a single space (p. 9). This analysis ignores the fact that Khomeini's rule was not pluralistic, as evidenced by his brutal persecution of Communists, Bahaʾis, and Shiʿi critics of Khomeini's brand of political Shiʿism. Mishal and Goldberg rightly point out, however, that Khomeini was not a fundamentalist who adhered to a fixed ideology since his vision of Shiʿism was indeed innovative (p. 33).
The second half of the book is more coherent than the first and does illustrate that Shiʿi leadership in the 21st century is not monolithic. On the basis of case studies of the past ten years, the authors argue that Shiʿi leadership in Iran is defined by the maintenance of friction between the conformist, traditional, and revolutionary modes (p. 59). For Mishal and Goldberg the 2006 election in Bahrain exemplifies the Shiʿi conformist mode since Iran did not attempt to influence the outcome of the elections. Family planning and Iran's engagement with Venezuela are given as evidence for the prevalence of friction between the traditional and revolutionary modes (pp. 65, 68, 71). The nuclear issue, according to Mishal and Goldberg, characterizes an attempt on the part of Shiʿi leaders to maintain “double friction”—with the international community and within Iran—and represents the strategies of conformism and confrontation (p. 76). The authors argue that the 2009 and 2013 presidential elections in Iran exemplify the internal battle over “middle ground” politics. They contend that President Ahmadinejad treated the middle ground as a necessary evil, whereas the protesters were fighting to preserve middle ground politics (pp. 83, 89). The 2013 election of Hassan Rouhani, which “brought with it sweeping change” according to Mishal and Goldberg, therefore, signifies the victory of the middle ground and the failure of Ahmadinejad's extremism (pp. 81, 97–98). In the chapter dedicated to Shiʿism in Lebanon, Mishal and Goldberg define Hizbullah's middle ground as “conformist resistance,” which is a result of its fragmented environment (pp. 100, 104). This complex strategy, according to the authors, allows Hizbullah to pursue seemingly contradictory tactics, such as armed conflict and diplomatic negotiation with Israel, and a political identity rooted in both Lebanese nationalism and Shiʿi communalism (pp. 99, 106).
The attempt of the authors to challenge simplistic conclusions that the Islamic Republic and Hizbullah are fueled by some primordial Shiʿi extremism is welcomed. Their writing style is accessible to the nonspecialist, and for the specialist the book adds a new element to the corpus of Shiʿi studies and is one of few works to analyze Shiʿism in the 21st century. However, the authors' acceptance of the binary choice that Shiʿism is either extremist or moderate proves to be problematic. A wider range of evidence would certainly prove that Shiʿi leadership is more complex than what Mishal and Goldberg's middle ground suggests. For example, there is little discussion on Ayatollah Khamenei, although he has been the most powerful Shiʿi leader in 21st-century Iran. Although the authors are not explicit regarding Khamenei's relation to the middle ground, they seem to view him as a high ground extremist given that he expressed a desire to put an end to the office of the presidency (p. 95). Perhaps the inclusion of additional primary and secondary sources would have improved the book given that the bibliography is limited to three pages of secondary English sources and several additional pages of electronic resources, which are primarily English-language news reports.
