Porphyrian Universalism: A Tripartite Soteriology and Eusebius's Response*

Michael Bland Simmons

doi:10.1017/S001781600900073X

Porphyrian Universalism: A Tripartite Soteriology and Eusebius's Response*

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2009

Michael Bland Simmons

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Michael Bland Simmons*: Affiliation:
Auburn University Montgomery

Article contents

Extract
Porphyry's ThreeWays and the Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes
The AdMarcellam: Katharsis for the Novice Philosopher
De philosophia ex oraculis: A Tripartite Soteriology and Eusebius's Response
Conclusion
References

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Extract

In recent years scholars from a broad spectrum, including classicists, patristic and biblical scholars, ancient historians, and specialists in ancient Judaism,1 have demonstrated an increasing interest in universalism. There has been very little written, however, on Porphyry's search for universal salvation, and whether Eusebius of Caesarea's understanding of universalism2 —here defined as the universality of a particular cult's soteriology (or even more briefly stated, the belief in universal salvation)—was influenced polemically by Porphyry. Eusebius's great apologetic works, Praeparatio evangelica and Demonstratio evangelica (henceforth P.E. and D.E.), written ca. 313–318 and ca. 318–324 c.e., respectively,3 provide many passages in which he artistically weaves universalist themes into his overall theological argument: P.E. contains 187 such passages, while D.E. has 417, more than twice that number.4 While some of the sub-themes of each work are either identical to one another or very similar in scope and content, the different audiences addressed—P.E. is primarily written to pagans against the charge that Christianity is new and thus lacks the authenticity of an ancient tradition, while D.E. responds to Jewish criticisms and gives pastoral guidance for the bishop's flock—can account for differences in both rhetorical method and theological emphases.

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Type: ARTICLES
Information: Harvard Theological Review , Volume 102 , Issue 2 , April 2009 , pp. 169 - 192

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S001781600900073X [Opens in a new window]
Copyright: Copyright © President and Fellows of Harvard College 2009

In recent years scholars from a broad spectrum, including classicists, patristic and biblical scholars, ancient historians, and specialists in ancient Judaism,Footnote ¹ have demonstrated an increasing interest in universalism. There has been very little written, however, on Porphyry's search for universal salvation, and whether Eusebius of Caesarea's understanding of universalismFootnote ² —here defined as the universality of a particular cult's soteriology (or even more briefly stated, the belief in universal salvation)—was influenced polemically by Porphyry. Eusebius's great apologetic works, Praeparatio evangelica and Demonstratio evangelica (henceforth P.E. and D.E.), written ca. 313–318 and ca. 318–324 c.e., respectively,Footnote ³ provide many passages in which he artistically weaves universalist themes into his overall theological argument: P.E. contains 187 such passages, while D.E. has 417, more than twice that number.Footnote ⁴ While some of the sub-themes of each work are either identical to one another or very similar in scope and content, the different audiences addressed—P.E. is primarily written to pagans against the charge that Christianity is new and thus lacks the authenticity of an ancient tradition, while D.E. responds to Jewish criticisms and gives pastoral guidance for the bishop's flock—can account for differences in both rhetorical method and theological emphases.

My aims in this paper are twofold. First, the central thesis is that Porphyry's search for universalism ultimately led him to devise a hierarchical, tripartite soteriology substantially influenced by Neoplatonic concepts, and that Eusebius is responding to this Porphyrian universalism in both P.E. and D.E. Thus the debate concerning Christian universalism (i.e., the Church'sFootnote ⁵ claim that Jesus Christ was the fulfillment of Old Testament prophecies about the Messiah and he alone is the one way of salvation for all humankind, whether Jew, Greek, or barbarian) took place during the decades preceding the Council of Nicaea. In showing this to be the case, I shall argue that we cannot assert that Eusebius is responding to the universalist argument which Porphyry developed in De regressu animae, quoted by Augustine in De civitate Dei 10.32, simply because there is no evidence that Eusebius had ever read this work in which Porphyry claims to have searched for the via universalis salutis animae liberandae (“the one way for the universal salvation of the soul's liberation”). However, this is not the only Porphyrian work which addresses the universalist theme, and thus I shall argue that it is De philosophia ex oraculis, of which Eusebius had indisputable knowledge and from which he quotes in both P.E. (many times) and D.E. (only once), to which he is polemically responding. The second aim, although subordinate to the central thesis, is to demonstrate that the conventional chronology of De philosophia ex oraculis is defective and should be discarded, and that the work coheres better with a date ca. 300 c.e., just before the outbreak of the Diocletianic Persecution when universalism was central to the pagan-Christian conflict. It is therefore to be regarded as one of Porphyry's later writings, and not a youthful work produced in his pre-Plotinian period (i.e., before 263 c.e.) as many have hitherto thought.

Porphyry's Three Ways and the Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes

In De civitate Dei 10.32, Augustine informs us that after intensive research, Porphyry failed to find the one via universalis salutis:

Cum autem dicit Porphyrius in primo iuxta finem de regressu animae libro nondum receptum in unam quandam sectam quod universalem contineat viam animae liberandae, vel a philosophia verissima aliqua vel ab Indorum moribus ac disciplina, aut inductione Chaldaeorum aut alia qualibet via, nondumque in suam notitiam eandem viam historiali cognitione perlatam, procul dubio confitetur esse aliquam, sed nondum in suam venisse notitiam.Footnote ⁶

Initially, the most striking element of this passage is that Porphyry's meticulous and methodical searching through the teachings of the various philosophical sects and the many religious traditions of his age, including those of the Indians and the Chaldaeans, logically presupposes a lengthy period of time in which he was involved in extensive research. I shall come back to this later. Secondly, although Augustine is most probably not giving us all the pertinent information from the De regressu animae, I would posit that the passage quoted above is authentic and thus reveals the accurate contents of this Porphyrian work. The gist is that Porphyry attempted to find the universal way for the soul's salvation—which I assume meant one way for all souls—but after much searching finally concluded that, although there undoubtedly was such a way, he had not found it.

Another Porphyrian work, however, De philosophia ex oraculis, tells us a different story altogether. In the prologue to that collection of oracles aimed at edifying the religious faith of the pagans of the early fourth century,Footnote ⁷ Eusebius informs us that Porphyry now claims to have found the way of salvation for everyone:

Βέβαιοϛ δὲ καὶ μόνιμοϛ ὁ ἐντεῦθεν ὡϛ ἄν ἐκ μόνου βεβαίου τὰϛ ἐλπίδαϛ τοῦ σωθῆναι ἀρυτόμενοϛ, οἷϛ δὴ καὶ μεταδώσειϛ μηδὲν ὑϕαιρούμενοϛ… . ”Εξει δὲ ἡ παροῦσα συναγωγὴ πολλῶν μὲν τῶν κατὰ ϕιλοσοϕίαν δογμάτων ἀναγραϕήν, ὡϛ οἱ θεοὶ τἀληθεϛ ἕξειν ἐθέσπισαν· ἐπ’ ὀλίγον δὲ καὶ τῆϛ χρηστικῆϛ ἁψόμεθα πραγματείαϛ, ἤτιϛ πρόϛ τε τὴν θεορίαν ὀνήσει, καὶ πρὸϛ τὴν ὅλην κάθαρσιν τοῦ βίου.Footnote ⁸

One might deduce from this passage that Porphyry now claims the teaching contained in his collection of oracles is the only sure source for the salvation of all souls, clearly revealing his discovery of one via universalis. I would suggest, however, that in the Philos. orac. Porphyry attempted to offer not one identical way for everyone, but three different ways which virtually encompass all humans, and thus, in a true sense, he did essentially create his own distinct universalism: It was religiously and philosophically integrative, characterized by ascending gradations and hence hierarchical, something that we should expect from a neoplatonic philosopher.Footnote ⁹ Porphyry's soteriological system was universalist, and it was probably designed, on the authority of pagan oracles, to counter the universalist claims of the Christians of the late third/early fourth centuries.

Augustine provides evidence for these three ways. In Civ. 10.27, we are told that Porphyry believed the philosopher can cleanse the intellectual part of the soul by virtue of his intellectual life,Footnote ¹⁰ and therefore does not need theurgy for such purification. Yet only an elite few possess the aptitude for philosophy, so for the masses—and here I suggest he means the uneducated—theurgy can be implemented for the cleansing of at least the spiritual part of the soul, so that when they depart this temporal life, although they will not return to the Father, they will dwell (temporarily) “above the realm of air among the aetherial deities” before their next incarnated life on earth:

ut videlicet quicumque a philosophiae vitute remoti sunt, quae ardua nimis atque paucorum est, te auctore theurgos homines, a quibus non quidem in anima intellectuali, verum saltem in anima spiritali purgentur, inquirantFootnote ¹¹

Theurgy can thus cleanse only the spiritual soul, not the intellectual soul, and the latter, although purified in itself, cannot be made immortal or eternal.Footnote ¹²

To sum up, there is one way of salvation for the (neoplatonic) philosopher by which the intellectual soul is cleansed, and another way for the uneducated masses by means of theurgy, which brings about the purification of the spiritual soul. There is nothing surprising here: Scholars have acknowledged such a dual soteriology in Porphyry's thought for some time.Footnote ¹³

According to Augustine, however, Porphyry offered another way for the cleansing of the spiritual soul, distinct from both philosophical and theurgical salvation:

Confiteris tamen etiam spiritalem animam sine theurgicis artibus et sine teletis, quibus frustra discendis elaborasti, posse continentiae virtute purgari.Footnote ¹⁴

Although Andrew Smith in his seminal work on Porphyry in 1974 acknowledged another way to salvation by virtue in Porphyry's thought,Footnote ¹⁵ in addition to theurgy and philosophy, no one to my knowledge has noticed that Augustine does not just say by virtue here, but “by the virtue of continence” (posse continentiae virtute purgari). This brings me to the relationship between the neoplatonic scala virtutum and the Porphyrian phrase, “posse continentiae virtute purgari.” In Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes 32 Porphyry, following Plotinus, analyzes the four classes of virtues (scala virtutum): the civic, purificatory, contemplative, and exemplary virtues.Footnote ¹⁶ Each of these, however, contains the four cardinal virtues of Platonism: Prudence, Courage, Temperance, and Justice.Footnote ¹⁷ This means that the definition of continentia/σωϕροσύνη is determined by which class of the four virtues into which it falls:

1) Civic VirtuesFootnote ¹⁸: σωϕροσύνη consists in the agreement and harmony of appetite and reason (Sent. 32: σωϕροσύνη δὲ ἐν ὁμολογίᾳ καὶ συμϕωνίᾳ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ πρὸϛ λογισμόν) and moderates the passions so human conduct conforms to the laws of human nature (Sent. 32: τῶν μὲν γὰρ πολιτικῶν μέτρον ἐπιθεῖναι τοῖϛ πάθεσι πρὸϛ τὰϛ ἐν τοῖϛ κατὰ ϕύσιν ἐνεργείαϛ),Footnote ¹⁹ making human beings benevolent toward each other and mutually uniting citizens.Footnote ²⁰
2) Purificatory Virtues: σωϕροσύνη consists in the soul's purifying itself of passions (Sent. 32): τῶν δ;ὲ καθαρτικῶν τελέωϛ τῶν παθῶν ἀποστῆσαι (τὸ) τέωϛ μέτρον λαμβανόντων.
3) Contemplative Virtues: σωϕροσύνη is the conversion of the soul toward intelligence (Sent. 32): καὶ ἄλλαι αἱ τοῦ ἤδη τελείου θεωρητικοῦ καὶ ἤδη θεατοῦFootnote ²¹
4) Exemplary Virtues: σωϕροσύνη is conversion toward oneself/residing in intelligence (Sent. 32): καὶ ἄλλαι αἱ τοῦ νοῦ, καθ’ ὅ νοῦϛ καὶ ἀπὸ ψυχῆϛ καθαρόϛ.

These are understood to be on an ascending scale within the divinization of the human soul—that is, the civic virtues are inferior to the purificatory, which, in turn, are inferior to the contemplative, reaching an apex in the exemplary virtues.Footnote ²² As well, Porphyry says: “Whoever possesses the superior virtues, we may note, also necessarily possesses the lower ones, but the converse is not the case.”Footnote ²³ So to whichever class of the four virtues we assign Porphyry's other way, we must keep in mind this principle of ascending ontological and spiritual values.Footnote ²⁴

If each class of the four virtues mentioned (Civic, Purificatory, Contemplative, and Exemplary) contains temperance (Augustine's continentia or Porphyry's σωϕροσύνη), and according to Civ. 10.28, as noted above, the other way of salvation for the soul is by the virtue of continence, we must now ask ourselves to which class of virtue within the scala virtutum is Porphyry referring? I suggest that the key is in posse continentiae virtute purgari (Civ. 10.28), with continentia corresponding to σωϕροσύνη, and purgari relating to the Greek καθαρίζω/κάθαρσιϛ.Footnote ²⁵ If this is correct, then there is only one class that is possible, and that is the second, or the Purificatory Virtues—especially if we recall that according to Augustine, Porphyry taught that by the virtue of continence the lower soul can be cleansed. In the Sententiae Porphyry says that the Purificatory Virtues, the second class, are superior to the Civic Virtues because they free the soul from its union with lower things.Footnote ²⁶ They also enable one to rise to contemplation—the third class has not yet been achieved, but one at the second class is ideally moving toward contemplation (πρὸϛ θεωρίαν) of intelligible reality.Footnote ²⁷ Furthermore, the Purificatory Virtues detach the soul from things here (τῶν ἐντεῦθεν) and enable one to abstain from the carnal affections.Footnote ²⁸ Temperance—Augustine's continentia and Porphyry's σωϕροσύνη—within the Purificatory Virtues is defined as the soul's not sharing or obliterating bodily passions,Footnote ²⁹ purifying itself from the brutal desires characteristic of the body.Footnote ³⁰ The object of the Purificatory Virtues is to detach the soul completely from the passions and raise the soul to true existence by assimilating it to the divinity,Footnote ³¹ another way of expressing the Platonic principle being like God, which “could suggest greater continuity in the process of divinization, to the extent that the divine appears as a more graduated structure in which levels are linked by means of more intermediate terms.”Footnote ³²

Two passages from the Sententiae help to further elucidate the meaning of this otherwise enigmatic assertion by Augustine that Porphyry taught that the spiritual part of the soul can be purified by the virtue of continence.Footnote ³³ First, in Sententiae 32, Porphyry stresses the importance of the Purificatory Virtues above the other three for the cleansing or separating of the soul from the body:

’Επιμελητέον οὖν μάλιστα τῶν καθαρτικῶν ἡμῖν σκεψαμένοιϛ, ὅτι τούτων μὲν ἡ τεῦξιϛ ἐν τῷ βίῳ τούτῳ, διὰ τούτων δὲ καὶ ἡ εἰϛ τὰϛ τιμιωτέραϛ ἄνοδοϛ. διὸ θεωρητέον, ἄχρι τίνοϛ καὶ ἐπὶ πόσον οἵα τε παραλαμβάνεσθαι ἡ κάθαρσιϛ· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ἀπόστασιϛ σώματοϛ καὶ τῆϛ ἀλόγου παθητικῆϛ κινήσεωϛ.Footnote ³⁴

Secondly, just prior, we are told that σωϕροσύνη within the Purificatory Virtues consists in the soul's not sharing the passions of the body, which clearly refers to Augustine's spiritual soul, cleansed by the virtue of σωϕροσύνη: τὸ δέ γε μὴ ὁμοπαθεῖν συνίστησι τὸ σωϕρονεῖν (Sent. 32; see Civ. 10.28: “continentiae virtute posse purgari”). It is clear from the above passages that σωϕροσύνη plays a very significant role in the conversion process from each lower stage to the next higher one.

The Ad Marcellam: Katharsis for the Novice Philosopher

Porphyry's epistle to his wife, Ad Marcellam, written ca. 300–302 c.e., sheds light on the passages from The City of God and the Sententiae that we have looked at above.Footnote ³⁵ I shall argue that this is a propaedeutic philosophical tract whose primary purpose is to indoctrinate his wife of ten months into the elementary doctrines of the other way. In the preface of her translation of the Epistle to Marcella, Kathleen Wicker states that it “presents basic doctrines of Porphyry's system in a simplified form, illustrated through the use of sententiae and exempla to make them readily understood and remembered by a novice philosopher.”Footnote ³⁶ She then adds that “the Ad Marcellam, in spite of the cryptic references to advanced Neoplatonic concepts, is best understood as an elementary exposition of Neoplatonism which is neither fully representative of the complexity of Porphyry's mature thought nor of Neoplatonism as a philosophical system.”Footnote ³⁷ While there is nothing in these descriptions with which I disagree, we can significantly refine both their scope and application.

It is certainly true that Marcella is a novice philosopher.Footnote ³⁸ Porphyry speaks of her natural aptitude for philosophy,Footnote ³⁹ apologizes that he has been away on business,Footnote ⁴⁰ and encourages her to adhere to the precepts he had begun to teach her during the ten months of their marriage.Footnote ⁴¹ He informs her that he is eager to resume her instruction as soon as possible,Footnote ⁴² and admonishes her not to forget what she has been taughtFootnote ⁴³ because she has chosen reason (τὸν λόγον), not passion (τὸ πάθοϛ), as her guardian.Footnote ⁴⁴ From this point in the epistle to the end (Marc. 6–35), the general theme is soteriology, and he focuses on temperance by which the soul flees the body, controls the passions, is purified, and begins to turn itself to God. The question now is whether the sub-themes of his exposition in this section (6–35) relate to what we have defined as the other way. Footnote ⁴⁵ I believe that they do for the following reasons.

First, Porphyry consistently emphasizes the importance of virtue in Marcella's life.Footnote ⁴⁶ The first section after the introduction (Marc. 7), in which his central theme (soteriology) begins to be developed, reveals the importance of the virtue of σωϕροσύνη for the cleansing of the lower soul, Augustine's posse continentiae virtute pugari (Civ. 10.28): On their road to the ascent to the gods, he tells her, the practitioners of the virtue of σωϕροσύνη have thought that painful experiences contribute more to virtue than pleasures do.Footnote ⁴⁷ Marcella has already encountered many struggles in the contest (εἰϛ ἀγῶνα) of self-control.Footnote ⁴⁸ This coheres with Sent. 9, where Porphyry describes the separation of the soul from the body required of philosophers as a death; Footnote ⁴⁹ and Sent. 32, where he states that struggles (μάχη) will have been left behind once the soul has made progress toward κάθαρσιϛ.Footnote ⁵⁰ Hard work is necessary for the person aspiring to virtue on the “blessed road to the gods” (τὴν μακαρίαν εἰϛ θεοὺϛ ὁδόν).Footnote ⁵¹ Recalling the “via salutis universalis animae liberandae” of Civ. 10.32, Porphyry speaks of the “way of salvation” (τῆϛ σωτηρίαϛ τὴν ὁδόν)Footnote ⁵² requiring the soul's separation from the body, especially every passion of the soul which is extremely hostile to its salvation.Footnote ⁵³ Only then can the soul be free from sins that result from passions.Footnote ⁵⁴ Plato (Phaedo 67 AB), he says, taught that it is not lawful for the pure to partake of the pure (Marc. 9: καθαροῦ γὰρ μὴ καθαρὸν ἐϕάπτεσθαι οὐδ;έν). Then Porphyry says something to Marcella that is very significant for our analysis: There exists in her both savior and that which is being saved (Marc. 9: τὸ σῴζον καὶ τὸ σῳζόμενον).Footnote ⁵⁵ Thus she should train herself to flee the body and ascend into herself (Marc. 10).Footnote ⁵⁶ Virtuous hard work (πόνουϛ)—and the context dictates that σωϕροσύνη is meant—is important in this salvific process because it is preparatory for the liberation from the body (Marc. 12). It alone can draw the soul upward to God (Marc. 16).

Κάθαρσιϛ as the agent by which the soul is cleansed for the purpose of living a life of temperance (Augustine's continentia; Porphry's σωϕροσύνη) is accentuated throughout the epistle as well. Remembering that σωϕροσύνη within the Purificatory Virtues is defined by Porphyry in Sent. 32 as the soul's purifying itself of passions, we first note that Marc. 6 recommends Marcella to stay away from pleasures and indolence since she has chosen not to follow passion; and later he says that the soul who longs for the things related to the body is ignorant of God (Marc. 13). Κάθαρσιϛ is stressed: a pure body, he says, must be subservient to a pure soul (καθαρᾷ καθαρόν) undefiled by passions (Marc. 13). Intemperance (ἀϕροσύνην) and ignorance prevent the impure soul from knowing the divine law (Marc. 26):

ὁ δέ γε θεῖοϛ ἀγνοεῖται μὲν ψυχῇ δι’ ἀϕροσύνην καὶ ἀκολασίαν ἀκαθάρτῳ ἐκλάμπει δὲ ἀπαθείαϛ καὶ ϕρονήσεωϛ.Footnote ⁵⁷

The intellect guides the soul's ascent, first in grasping the law of nature—an allusion to the Civic Virtues—written for temperate men, and then the divine law (Marc. 26–27).Footnote ⁵⁸ He elaborates upon the virtue of continence in sections 29–30: She is to remain pure by abstinence, break away from every vain yearning, and be totally in control of herself. Later he compares a physician who heals the body with medicine to how philosophy purges the soul of passions (Marc. 31).Footnote ⁵⁹ In doing this, the soul becomes more like God (Marc. 32) because God protects only the pure from destruction (Marc. 33). “Pure” here, again, refers to being separated from the passionate attachment to the body. Great education is required to be in control of the body; she should be prepared to amputate the whole body to save her soul.Footnote ⁶⁰ He warns her not to be a slave to the passions because a person cannot be free, and thus like God, and at the same time governed by the passions (Marc. 32).Footnote ⁶¹ Such admonition would not be necessary for a mature neoplatonic philosopher who had at least already arrived at the third level of virtues, the Contemplative, let alone the highest, those of the Exemplary.Footnote ⁶² It is reasonable to conclude that the Ad Marcellam had the objective of training the novice philosopher in the via salutis by which the spiritual soul is cleansed by the virtue of σωϕροσύνη.

In sections 18–25 we find more important information which not only supports the present interpretation, but also helps to shed light on the perplexing problem of dating Porphyry's works. First, he says that the greatest fruit of piety is to honor God according to ancestral customs (κατὰ τὰ πάτρια, Marc. 18),Footnote ⁶³ a statement that seriously questions the veracity of the Bidez hypothesis,Footnote ⁶⁴ an argument still followed by many scholars even today. It dates all of the highly religious/superstitious works like the Philos. orac. in a Pre-Plotinian period (before 263 c.e.), and the more philosophically mature, and therefore less religious/superstitious works (De regressu animae, Sent., etc.) to a post-Plotinian period (after 263 c.e.).Footnote ⁶⁵

The basis of this interpretation is a statement found in Eunapius's Vita philosophorum 457:

αὐτὸϛ μὲν οὖν ϕησὶ (νέοϛ δὲ ὢν ἴσωϛ ταῦτα ἔγραϕεν, ὡϛ ἔοικεν), ἐπιτυχεῖν χρηστηρίῳ μηδενὶ τῶν δεμοσίων· ἐν δὲ αὐτῷ τῷ βιβλίῳ καταγράϕει, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἄλλα πραγματεύεται πολλά, ὅπωϛ χρὴ τούτων ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν. ϕησὶ δὲ καὶ δαιμόνιόν τινα ϕύσιν ἀπὸ λουτροῦ τινὸϛ ἐκδιῶξαι καὶ ἐκβαλεῖν Καυσάθαν τοῦτον ἔλεγον οἱ ἐπιχώριοι.Footnote ⁶⁶

It is quite erroneous to date any work of Porphyry on the basis of this testimony for a number of reasons.Footnote ⁶⁷ First, Eunapius is writing about a century after Porphyry's death. Secondly, it is clear from the contents that Eunapius is not sure about the historical accuracy of his statement, so it is safe to conclude that the phrase νέοϛ δὲ ὢν ἴσωϛ ταῦτα ἔγραϕεν, ὡϛ ἔοικεν expresses his subjective sentiments based upon hearsay from an unspecified source. Thirdly, since Eunapius does not name the work, the event described can have been derived from a number of Porphyry's works, the Philos. orac. being only one of several possibilities. Next, it is well known that Eunapius often exaggerates his information, and is not always historically accurate.Footnote ⁶⁸ Finally, there is no evidence in the entire Porphyrian corpus that suggests Porphyry ever lost interest in the religious traditions of the masses, so a work containing such an interest does not preclude a post-Plotinian date. The Wolff-Bidez hypothesis should, therefore, be discarded once and for all.

Since Ad Marcellam supports traditional polytheism, contains elementary philosophical doctrines at best, and is indisputably dated to ca. 300–302 c.e., the end of Porphyry's literary career;Footnote ⁶⁹ it does not easily fall into either category. For example, in section 18, after he stresses the importance of τὰ πάτρια, Porphyry apparently contradicts himself by saying that tears do not move God; sacrifices do not honor God; votive offerings do not adorn God; and thus Marcella must let her God-filled intellect be united to God because “like must gravitate to like,” resulting in her intellect being a temple to God. (Marc. 19). Then at the end of the section on piety (23), he concludes that Marcella should leave the door open to worship the gods both ways, by sacrificial rites and by thought. How can we explain his emphasis upon τἁ πάτρια and his philosophical approach in the same passage? I would suggest that this is the crux of the other way: It functions somewhat as a spiritual pivot, connecting the novice with the world in which she lives, but also allowing her to progress beyond it. Indeed, it weans her from a dependence upon corporeal reality, and thus ultimately leads her to practice the two highest levels of the scala virtutum, at which time she would be able to contemplate intelligible reality, experience the unio mystica (final release), break the cycle of reincarnations, and experience permanent union with the One. Hierarchical soteriological systems, which included progressive spiritual stages culminating in a supreme ontological or metaphysical principle, were common in the religious and philosophical culture of Late Antiquity, and undoubtedly played a significant role in the development of Porphyrian universalism.Footnote ⁷⁰

Thus spiritual conversion from each lower stage to the next implies noetic progression, and σωϕροσύνη plays a pivotal role in the conversion process toward, and then in union with, the Nous.Footnote ⁷¹ At the two lowest levels (Civic and Purificatory), there is a conversion toward true existence for which, Porphyry seems to imply, divine assistance is necessary, and thus all of the meanings of salus/σωτηρία which were applicable to the traditional cults of the Greco-Roman world will have been incorporated at these levels and subsumed in the phrase τὰ πάτρια. After them one does not need help from the gods because one has become either θεόϛ (Theoretical) or Πατὴρ Θεῶν (Exemplary).Footnote ⁷²

Two other passages are worth mentioning. In Ad Marcellam 25, Porphyry speaks of the one who has gained control over the body in contradistinction with the one who lives according to natural law, which parallels the distinction made between the definitions of σωϕροσύνη within the Civil and Purificatory Virtues, respectively (Sent. 32). Finally, in Ad Marcellam 32, in discussing the value of fleeing the body,Footnote ⁷³ Porphyry stresses the importance of knowing oneself, recalling the statement in Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes 32 that the foundation of purification—and hence, the Purificatory Virtues—is to “know yourself”:Footnote ⁷⁴

πῶϛ δ’ ἄν γένοιτο καὶ μέχρι τίνοϛ, ῥητέον. Πρῶτον μὲν οἶον θεμέλιοϛ καὶ ὑποβάθρα τῆϛ καθάρσεωϛ τὸ γνῶναι ἑαυτὸν ψυχὴν ὄντα ἐν ἀλλοτρίῳ πράγματι καὶ ἑτεροουσίῳ συνδεδεμένον.Footnote ⁷⁵

Ad Marcellam,Footnote ⁷⁶ one of the latest works in the Porphyrian corpus, is very important for the present argument since it is a soteriological work which says absolutely nothing about theurgy. Though it does contain philosophical doctrines, they are, as we have noticed, quite elementary, not going into the deeper metaphysical and ontological teachings of neoplatonism. For example, there is nothing about the One, and very little about the Nous, or the importance of contemplation of the intelligible realm; conversely, there is a great deal about controlling the body and the passions, as well as cleansing the soul from attachment to the things of material reality. Why would Porphyry harp on controlling the passions like this throughout the epistle if Marcella had already progressed to the highest soteriological tier? As well, Augustine (Civ. 10.27) states that Porphyry taught that the theurgical way to salvation was for “all who turned away from the pursuit of philosophy”; clearly indicating that any other way(s) for the salvation of the soul would have to be through philosophy. I conclude that Ad Marcellam was a propaedeutic, soteriological epistle for circulation within Marcella's social and intellectual circles,Footnote ⁷⁷ with the primary purpose of indoctrinating his wife—and other beginning philosophers—in the elementary doctrines of the other way.Footnote ⁷⁸ Its high ethical content, emphasis upon traditional piety, and the offer of a way of salvation for at least the lower soul would have represented an attractive alternative to the concepts of salvation found in Christian scripture.Footnote ⁷⁹ It was also the closest that paganism ever came to a truly universalist soteriology, the overall paradigm of which I suggest looked something like this:

1) Salvation for the uneducated masses who embraced traditional polytheism, including animal sacrifice and theurgical rites.Footnote ⁸⁰ This purified only the lower part of the soul. According to my argument this would presuppose the practice only of the Civic Virtues. As noted above, the practice of political virtues within the Neoplatonic Platonopolis represents the first step in the divinization of the soul and will have guaranteed the salus of the cities and the perpetual blessings of the gods, an ideology expressed in the Tetrarchic New Imperial Theology.Footnote ⁸¹
2) Salvation for those, like Marcella, who have shown some aptitude for philosophy and have begun to receive training in fleeing bodily pleasures, controlling the passions, and thus cleansing the lower part of the soul.Footnote ⁸² As we have seen, this way included the Purificatory Virtues. Although one could ideally progress from here to the third and highest way, I suggest that Porphyry viewed this path as mutually exclusive to the others.
3) Salvation through neoplatonic philosophy, which included contemplation of intelligible reality and ultimate union with the One. This way included the third and fourth classes of virtues, the Contemplative and the Exemplary.

De philosophia ex oraculis: A Tripartite Soteriology and Eusebius's Response

Although it will require a separate publicationFootnote ⁸³ to analyze all the pertinent data, I should like to suggest that this tripartite soteriological scheme was incorporated into the Philos. orac., with each via salutis addressed in each one of the three books of the work, as noted in the prologue and cited above.Footnote ⁸⁴ Porphyry claims there that the contents of his work provided “the only sure source of salvation” for his readers (Βέβαιοϛ δὲ καὶ μόνιμοϛ ὁ ἐντεῦθεν ὡϛ ἄν ἐκ μόνου βεβαίου τὰϛ ἐλπίδαϛ τοῦ σωθῆναι) predominantly by means of philosophy, but, to a lesser extent, by means of contemplation and the entire (τὴν ὅλην) purification of life—which, I further suggest, implies both kinds of purification of the soul as noted above, either by theurgy/the traditional cults, or by the virtue of continence, with the latter implied in contemplation (πρόϛ τε τὴν θεωρίαν). But is there any evidence for this in the contents of De philosophia ex oraculis?

The extant fragments of Philos. orac. certainly cohere with the soteriological paradigm that I propose, in two respects. Firstly, many fit a thematic context of salvation via τὰ πάτρια, with an emphasis on theurgical rites.Footnote ⁸⁵ Porphyry offers his readers the “heaven taught path” of sacrificing animals to demons or the ethereal and heavenly powers.Footnote ⁸⁶ Numerous fragments allude to theurgical rituals by which the deities are bound,Footnote ⁸⁷ to performing rituals on cultic images to induce revelatory dreams,Footnote ⁸⁸ to procuring a vision of a god or averting evil,Footnote ⁸⁹ or to dissolving the decrees of fate.Footnote ⁹⁰ Secondly, a few fragments indisputably address a philosophical way to salvation that conforms to the other way via virtue analyzed above. For example, in 308 F, we are told that the gods benefit humankind by setting examples of σωϕροσύνη.Footnote ⁹¹ Both 325 F and 325aF deal with salvation by the Purificatory Virtues and the soul's conversion to the Νοῦϛ.Footnote ⁹² Finally, 346 F appears to summarize philosophical salvation by means of virtue, the same kind of soteriology that we have seen in both Marc. and Sent., which would have been unintelligible to the masses, but too elementary for the mature neoplatonic philosopher.Footnote ⁹³

Although none of the extant fifty-eight fragments of Philos. orac. reveal the via salutis of the intellectual soul, which was for the neoplatonic philosopher, this should not pose problems for our interpretation. Only four fragments in toto concern philosophy, and these all refer to purification of the lower soul by virtue, primarily σωϕροσύνη. Yet Porphyry in the prologue explicitly states that the contents of the work will primarily concern philosophy. This presumably means that most of the oracles addressed the second and third ways noted above, namely salvation by virtue for the lower soul and salvation by neoplatonic philosophy for the intellectual soul. The explanation for the total absence of evidence for the latter and very little for the former is obvious: Christians, the only authors who quote from Philos. orac., focused almost exclusively on the first way (by means of τὰ πάτρια, with an emphasis on theurgy), and almost totally ignored the other two ways. In short, the contents of the fragments indicate that polemically Christians found it more tempting to poke fun of Porphyry's attempt to find a way of salvation for the masses, often vituperating him as contradictory in his thought,Footnote ⁹⁴ than to dismantle what would undoubtedly have been a cogent and sophisticated philosophical argument.

It thus makes perfect sense that Porphyry's universalist claims in Philos. orac. are genuine, and that it was written much later than scholars have hitherto asserted. The pre-Plotinian date for Philos. orac. should be discarded, since it rests upon the weak testimony of Eunapius; rather, a date ca. 300 c.e. coheres with the intellectual debates between pagans and Christians just before the outbreak of the Diocletianic Persecution. De regressu animae, in which Porphyry concluded that the via universalis was not found, was the (probably much) earlier work. After intensive research and with the help of what appear to be contemporary oracles of his day, Porphyry changed his mind when he wrote De philosophia ex oraculis at the beginning of the fourth century.Footnote ⁹⁵

If Eusebius (whether in P.E. or D.E.) is indeed retorting this distinctive Porphyrian form of universalism as delineated above, one should expect to find evidence that he is criticizing the three ways of the Philos. orac., given that it is cited in both of his apologetic works while De regressu animae was apparently unknown to him. Indeed we do see such evidence: All thirteen references to universalism in book six of P.E. are directly related to Porphyry,Footnote ⁹⁶ and after quoting him twelve times, in 6.6.242d Eusebius alludes to his adversary's tripartite soteriology of philosophy, traditional religion, and virtue, driving home his main polemical point that paganism is theologically bankrupt as compared with Christian universalist claims. After referring to those Christians who have suffered for their savior's pious teaching, he says:

Μιᾶϛ ἄρα καὶ τῆϛ αὐτῆϛ ἔτυχον μοίραϛ, ὡϛ ὑϕ’ ἑνὶ λόγῳ καὶ διδασκαλίᾳ δουλωθῆναι, μίαν τε γνώμην καὶ προαίρεσιν ἐνδείξασθαι καὶ ψυχῆϛ ἀρετὴν μίαν, ἕνα τε καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀναδέξασθαι βίον, καὶ λόγον ἀγαπῆσαι τὸν αὐτόν, τάϛ τε αὑτὰϛ ἀγαπητικῶϛ ὑπομεῖναι πάθαϛ δι’ ἔνστασιν εὔσεβείαϛ. Καὶ τιϛ ἄν ὀρθὸϛ τοῦτο συγχωρήσειε λόγοϛ, νέουϛ κατὰ ταὐτό, καὶ πρεσβύταϛ, καὶ πᾶν μέτρον ἡλικίαϛ, ἀρρένων τε καὶ θηλειῶν γένη, ϕύσειϛ τε βαρβάρων ἀνδρῶν, οἰκετικῶν ὀμοῦ καὶ ἐλευθερίων, λογίων τε καὶ παιδείαϛ ἀμετόχων, οὐκ ἐν γωνίᾳ τῆϛ οὐδ ὑπὸ τοῖσδε γενομένων τοῖϛ ἄστροιϛ καθ’ ὅληϛ δὲ τῆϛ ἀνθρώπων οἰκουμένηϛ, εἱμαρμένηϛ ἀνάγκῃ ϕάναι βεβιασμένουϛ τόνδε τινὰ τῶν πατρῴων ἀπάντων προτιμῆσαι λόγον, καὶ τὸν ὑπὲρ εὑσεβείαϛ ἑνοϛ τοῦ ἐπὶ πάντων Θεοῦ θάνατον ἀσπάσασθαι, τά τε περὶ ψυχῆϛ ἀθανασίαϛ εὖ μάλα δόγματα παιδεύεσθαι, καὶ ϕ ιλοσοϕ ίαν οὐ τὴν ἐν λόγοιϛ τὴν δὲ δι’ ἔργων προτιμῆσαι;Footnote ⁹⁷

Eusebius's emphasis upon “one and the same destiny,” “one doctrine,” “one mind and will,” “one kind of life,” and the enduring of “the same sufferings” in the context of discussing universal salvation for all humanity regardless of gender, ethnicity, age, character, legal status (slave or free), or educational level, clearly reveals a literary rebuttal of Porphyry's search for one via universalis salutis animae liberandae. It could equally be interpreted as a diatribe against Porphyry's three ways (as opposed to the Christians' one way through Christ). The reference in this passage to three distinct ways (one virtue of the soul [ψυχῆϛ ἀρετὴν μίαν]; all ancestral religious customs [τῶν πατρῴων ἀπάντων]; and philosophy that consists not in words but in actions [καὶ ϕ ιλοσοϕ ίαν οὐ τὴν ἐν λόγοιϛ τὴν δὲ δι’ ἔργων προτιμῆσαι;]) makes it equally clear that he is polemically responding to De philosophia ex oraculis.

Another important passage is P.E. 5.9.197b. After quoting from a fragment of Philos. orac. (Smith, 350 F) that deals with compelling the gods by means of theurgical rites, which Eusebius again pejoratively calls magic, we find Eusebius alluding to Porphyry's three ways:

Πῶϛ δὲ θαυμάζεσθαι ἄξιοι καὶ θεραπείαιϛ θεῶν τιμᾶσθαι οἱ καὶ τοῖϛ τυχοῦσι γόησι τὸν τρόπον πανωλεστάτοιϛ καταδουλούμενοι, καὶ τὸ μὴ καλὸν μηδὲ συμϕέρον παρὰ γνώμην πράττειν ἀναγκαζόμενοι, ἀγόμενοί τε καὶ καθελκόμενοι, οὐ δι’ ἀποδοχὴν σωϕροσύνηϛ ἀνθρώπων, οὐδὲ ἀρετῆϛ χάριν ἤ τινοϛ μέρουϛ ϕ ιλοσοϕ ιαϛ, μεθόδοιϛ δὲ γοήτων απειρημέναιϛ;Footnote ⁹⁸

What is extremely interesting in this passage is that the words σωϕροσύνηϛ ἀνθρώπων, “men's continence,” which are erroneously translated “men's morality” by Gifford, are found in the same sentence with ἀρετῆϛ, as if to emphasize the other way we have analyzed above, in addition to explicit references to compelling the deities (i.e., by theurgical rites) and promoting virtue or any branch of philosophy. It is evident that Eusebius is calumniating the three ways to salvation of Porphyrian universalism.

A final example is P.E. 5.15.203.a–b. After quoting from Philos. orac. five times in chapters 11–14 of book 5,Footnote ⁹⁹ Eusebius sums up his argument by playing virtue and philosophy, the more noble ways to salvation, against Porphyry's theurgical rites, which are again described as “evil arts of sorcery”:

Διὰ τούτων καὶ τούτοιϛ ὁμοίων ὁ γενναῖοϛ ‘Ελλήνων ϕ ιλόσοϕοϛ, ὁ θαυμαστὸϛ θεολόγοϛ, ὁ τῶν ἀπορρήτων μύστηϛ, τὴν ἐκ λογίων ϕ ιλοσοϕ ιαν ὡϛ ἀπόρρητα θεῶν περιέχουσαν λόγια παραϕαίνει, ἄντικρυϛ τῆϛ πονηρᾶϛ καὶ δαιμονικῆϛ ἀληθῶϛ δυνάμεωϛ ἐξαγορεύων τὰϛ κατ’ ἀνθρώπων ἐνέδραϛ. Τί γὰρ ἄν γένοιτο βιωϕελὲϛ ἀνθρώποιϛ ἐκ τῆϛ κακοτέχνου γοητείαϛ; Τί δ ἄν ἔχοι θεοϕ ιλὲϛ ἡ ἀψύχων ξοάνων περιεργία; Ποίαϛ δ ἂν εἰκὼν γένοιτ’ ἂ ἐνθέου δυνάμεωϛ ἡ τῶν τοιῶνδε σχημάτων μόρϕωσιϛ; Τί δ οὐ μάλλον ϕ ιλοσοϕεῖν περὶ ἡμᾶϛ ἢ μαγεύειν καὶ τὰ ἀπειρημένα διώκειν συμβουλεύειν ἐχρῆν, τοῦ κατ’ ἀρετὴν καὶ ϕ ιλοσοϕ ιαν τρόπου πρὸϛ εὐδαίμονα καὶ μακάριον αὐτάρκουϛ τυγχάνοντοϛ βίον;Footnote ¹⁰⁰

The τὴν ἐκ λογίων ϕ ιλοσοϕ ίαν is an explicit reference to De philosophia ex oraculis, and here again we find Eusebius disparaging Porphyry's three ways to salvation.

Conclusion

Porphyry, the greatest anti-Christian writer in antiquity, constructed his tripartite universalist soteriology delineated above, which included the masses, novice philosophers, and mature neoplatonists in a hierarchical system, because he was evidently concerned about Christian claims that Christ offered the one via salutis for all humanity. Although we do not have any hard evidence, it seems a reasonable conclusion that during the Peace of Gallienus, which lasted from ca. 260–300 c.e.,Footnote ¹⁰¹ Christians were growing in number and spreading geographically throughout the Roman Empire.Footnote ¹⁰² Whether Porphyry's De philosophia ex oraculis was written in conjunction with Diocletian's imperial conference or not, to initiate a persecution of the Christians,Footnote ¹⁰³ nevertheless a much later date than has hitherto been given for the work seems logical. Eusebius, writing his apologetic works ca. 313–324, certainly exudes a confidence that Christian universalism is an important cause for the success of the Church, and it is worth considering the possibility that by the time he started writing D.E. (ca. 318–324 c.e.) this confidence was reinforced, in light of the fact that there are more than twice the number of occurrences of universalism in this work than in P.E. (written ca. 313–318 c.e.).Footnote ¹⁰⁴ Perhaps he had heard about Constantine's conversion and felt compelled to rub the Christians' new optimism in the pagans' faces, thinking it unnecessary to mention Porphyry or any of his works more than once in D.E. Footnote ¹⁰⁵ Although it would be a few years before the first Christian emperor's “Court Theologian”Footnote ¹⁰⁶ would design a political theology based on the concept of one God, one king, and one empire,Footnote ¹⁰⁷ it appears that the universalist debates between Christians and pagans in the late third and early fourth centuries helped to lay a strong ideological foundation for the eventual Constantinian Revolution.Footnote ¹⁰⁸

References

1 E.g., Elizabeth DePalma Digeser, “Lactantius, Eusebius, and Arnobius: Evidence for the Causes of the Great Persecution,” Studia Patristica 39 (2006) 33–47; and idem, The Making of a Christian Empire: Lactantius and Rome (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000) 96–104; Michael Bland Simmons, “Universalism in the Demonstratio evangelica of Eusebius of Caesarea,” (forthcoming, Studia Patristica); idem, “Via universalis salutis animae liberandae: The Pagan-Christian Debate on Universalism in the Later Roman Empire (A.D. 260–325),” StPatr 40 (2006) 245–61; and idem, Arnobius of Sicca: Religious Conflict and Competition in the Age of Diocletian (Oxford Early Christian Studies; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) 264–303; Joel Kaminsky and Anne Stewart, “God of all the World: Universalism and Developing Monotheism in Isaiah 40–66,” Harvard Theological Review 99 (2006) 139–63; Jeremy M. Schott, “Porphyry on Christians and Others: ‘Barbarian Wisdom,’ Identity Politics, and Anti-Christian Polemics on the Eve of the Great Persecution,” JECS 13 (2005) 277–314; Denise K. Buell, “Race and Universalism in Early Christianity,” JECS 10 (2002) 429–68; Marc Hirschman, “Rabbinic Universalism in the Second and Third Centuries,” HTR 93 (2000) 101–15; Henry Chadwick, “Christian and Roman Universalism in the Fourth Century,” in Christian Faith and Greek Philosophy in Late Antiquity (ed. Lionel R. Wickham and Caroline P. Bammel, assisted by Erica C. D. Hunter; Leiden: Brill, 1993) 26–42; Garth Fowden, Empire to Commonwealth: Consequences of Monotheisim in Late Antiquity (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); Jon D. Levenson, “The Universal Horizon of Biblical Particularism,” in The Bible and Ethnicity (ed. Mark G. Brett; Leiden: Brill, 1996) 143–69.

2 See, e.g., the works by Simmons in the note above; Jeremy M. Schott, Christianity, Empire, and the Making of Religion in Late Antiquity (Divinations: Rereading Late Ancient Religion; ed. Daniel Boyarin, Virginia Burrus, and Derek Krueger; Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008) esp. 52–78 (containing one of the best analyses of Porphyry in recent decades); Aaron P. Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument in Eusebius' Praeparatio Evangelica (Oxford Early Christian Studies; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 198–200, 211–16, who prefers the approach of “narrative of ethnic identity”; Aryeh Kofsky, Eusebius of Caesaea: Against Paganism (Leiden: Brill, 2000) 216–19, 297, 310; Michael J. Hollerich, Eusebius of Caesarea's Commentary on Isaiah: Christian Exegesis in the Age of Constantine (Oxford Early Christian Studies; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 171–73; Friedhelm Winkelmann, Euseb von Kaisareia. Der Vater der Kirchengeschichte (Berlin: Verlags-Anstalt Union, 1991) 126–35; and T. D. Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981) 184–88.

3 T. D. Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius, 178–87, 278. For P.E., I use herein Eusebii Pamphili. Praeparationis Libri XV (ed. E. H. Gifford; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1903), and Porphyrii philosophi fragmenta (ed. A. Smith and D. Wasserstein; Stuttgart: Teubner, 1993) for the fragments from Philosophia ex oraculis.

4 For P.E. including sub-themes, see now Simmons, “Via universalis salutis animae liberandae”; for D.E., see idem, forthcoming.

5 I am well aware of modern scholars' designation of “Christianities” to describe the many Christian groups which both preceded and succeeded Nicaea, but I use “Church” here in a collective/general sense because most of the early believers in Christ would certainly have espoused the view that he was in some sense the savior of the world whether they are categorized as orthodox or heretical.

6 “Now when Porphyry says towards the end of his first book On the Return of the Soul that no one system of thought has yet embraced a doctrine that embodies a universal path to the liberation of the soul, no, neither the truest of philosophies, nor the moral ideas and practices of the Chaldaeans, nor any other way of life, and adds that this same path has not yet been brought to his attention in the course of his research into history, he is undoubtedly acknowledging that some such path exists though it had not yet come to his attention” (trans. David S. Wiesen; LCL 413). For a different view see Gillian Clark, “Augustine's Porphyry and the Universal Way of Salvation,” in Studies on Porphyry (ed. George Karamanolis and Anne Sheppard; BICS Supplement 98; London: Institute of Classical Studies, 2007) 127–40, who mistakenly argues (139) that Porphyry's soteriology ex-cluded the masses.

7 Although the Philos. orac. contained some anti-Christian oracles (see Smith, Porphyrii, 343 F [Civ. 19.22.17–23.17]; 344 F [Civ. 19.23.30–37]; 344 a F [Civ. 20.24.8–26]; 344 b F [Civ. 22.3.22–25]; 345 F [Eusebius, D.E., 3.6.39–7.2]; 345 a F [Civ. 19.23.43–73]; 345 b F [Civ. 10.27.37–39]; 345 c F [Augustine, Cons., 1.15.23]; and 346 F [Civ. 19.23.107–133]), I do not believe it was primarily aimed at Christians, but rather that Porphyry provided a proactive, positive assessment of polytheistic religious and philosophical culture for his pagan readers, and according to the interpretation nuanced herein, provided a tripartite universalist soteriology. See, e.g., the following for those scholars who argue that Philos. orac. was primarily written for pagans with soteriology being the central theme: R. Goulet, “Hypothèses récentes sur le traité de Porphyre Contre les Chrétiens,” in Hellénisme et christianisme (ed. Michel Narcy and Eric Rebillard; Paris: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 2004) 61–109, esp. 67, 102–3; Michael B. Simmons, “The Eschatological Aspects of Porphyry's Anti-Christian Polemics in a Chaldaean-Neoplatonic Context,” Classica et Mediaevalia 52 (2001) 193–215, at 210–12; idem, Arnobius of Sicca, 264–303; John Granger Cook, The Interpretation of the New Testament in Greco-Roman Paganism (STAC 3; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000) 151; Digeser, Making of a Christian Empire, 102; Kofsky, Eusebius of Caesaea, 3, 119; Andrew Smith, “Porphyry and the Platonic Theology,” in Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne (AMPWM 26; ed. A. Segonds and C. Steel; Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2000) 177–88, esp. 187; C. Van Liefferinge, La Théurgie. Des oracles chaldaiques à Proclus (Kernos Supplément 9; Liège: Université de Liège, 1999) 185–86; A. R. Sodano, Vangelo di un pagano (Milan: Rusconi, 1993) 4; Robin Lane Fox, Pagans and Christians (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1987) 197; John J. O'Meara, “Porphyry's Philosophy from Oracles in Eusebius's Praeparatio Evangelica and Augustine's Dialogues of Cassiciacum,” Recherches Augustiniennes 6 (1969) 103–39, esp. 108; idem, Porphyry's Philosophy from Oracles in Augustine (Paris: EA, 1959) 29; For the opposite view cf., e.g.: A. Busine, Paroles d'Apollon. Pratiques et traditions oraculaires dans l'Antiquité tardive (II ^e-VI3 ^esiècles) (Leiden: Brill, 2005) 288–95; P. F. Beatrice, “Pagan Wisdom and Christian Theology According to the Tübingen Theosophy,” JECS 4 (1995) 403–18, esp. 416; W. H. C. Frend, “Prelude to the Great Persecution: The Propaganda War,” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 38 (1987) 1–18, esp. 11; Robert L. Wilken, The Christians as the Pagans Saw Them (New Haven: Yale Universtiy Press, 1984) 136.

8 Eusebius, P.E., 4.7 (Gifford's translation): “Sure, then, and steadfast is he who draws his hopes of salvation from this as from the only sure source, and to such thou wilt impart information without any reserve.… And our present collection will contain a record of many doctrines of philosophy, according as the gods declared the truth to be; but to a small extent we shall also touch upon the practice of divination, such as will be useful both for contemplation and for the general purification of life.” For the significance of the prologue, see Andrew Smith, “Porphyry and Pagan Religious Practice,” in The Perennial Tradition of Neoplatonism (ed. John J. Cleary; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1997) 29–35, at 29, where he states that what Porphyry says in the prologue “has been simply ignored.”

9 For an excellent analysis of the background for philosophical developments, with reference to the neoplatonic tripartite/hierarchical division of philosophy, see P. Hadot, “Les divisions des parties de la philosophie dans l'Antiquité,” Museum Helveticum 36 (1979) 201–23, esp. 220 for Porphyry's contribution. For the Plotinian background, see Robert M. Berchman, Porphyry Against the Christians (Vol. 1 of Ancient Mediterranean and Medieval Texts and Contexts: Studies in Platonism, Neoplatonism, and the Platonic Tradition; ed. Robert M. Berchman and John F. Finamore; Leiden: Brill, 2005) 93–113 (and the review of Michael B. Simmons, JECS 16 [2008] 263–65).

10 “Tu autem didicisti non a Platone, sed a Chaldaeis magistris, ut in aetherias vel empyrias mundi sublimitates et firmamenta caelestia extolleres vitia humana, ut possent dii vestri theurgis pronuntiare divina; quibus divinis te tamen per intellectualem vitam facis altiorem, ut tibi videlicet tamquam philosopho theurgicae artis purgationes nequaquam necessariae videantur”

11 Civ. 10.27: “Evidently you want all who are turned away from the pursuit of philosophic excellence, which is too lofty for all but a few, to seek out theurgists on your recommendation, in order to obtain catharsis at least of their spiritual, though not, to be sure, of their intellectual soul.”

12 Ibid.: “Sufficit quod purgatione theurgica neque intellectualem animam, hoc est mentem nostram, dicis posse purgari, et ipsam spiritalem, id est nostrae animae partem mente inferiorem, quam tali arte purgari posse asseris, inmortalem tamen aeternamque non posse hac arte fieri confiteris.” See also ibid.: “mittis homines ad theurgos, ut per eos anima spiritalis purgetur illorum qui non secundum intellectualem animam vivunt?”

13 E.g., Andrew Smith, Porphyry's Place in the Neoplatonic Tradition (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974) xiii, where he claims the major theme of the Porphyrian corpus appears to be the ascent and salvation of the soul. See also pp. 59–61, 104, 130–35, 145. “Theurgy and virtue are both involved though they are mutually exclusive and form two distinct ways of salvation for the ordinary man” (60–61); “Porphyry's search for the salvation of the soul led him from a consideration of the nature of the soul to an attempt to find a universal teaching on salvation which would even embrace the magico-religious practice of theurgy” (xiii). See also idem, Philosophy in Late Antiquity (New York: Routledge, 2004) 80, for the anima spiritalis which is susceptible to magic and ritual (= Plotinus's lower soul connected with the semi-corporeal soul vehicle which is a link to universal sympathy used by magic), and the anima intellectualis which relates to the Forms (=Plotinus's higher soul). On De regressu animae dealing with the salvation of the ordinary man via theurgical rites, see pp. 59–60. See also, e.g., Digeser, “Lactantius, Eusebius, and Arnobius”; Garth Fowden, “Late Polytheism: The World View,” in The Crisis of Empire, A.D. 193–337 (vol. 12 of The Cambridge Ancient History; ed. Alan K. Bowman, et al.; 14 vols.; 2d ed.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 521–37, esp. 530–31; Marco Zambon, Porphyre et le moyen-platonisme. Histoire des doctrines de l'antiquite classique XXVII (Paris: J. Vrin, 2002) 274–76; Michele Cutino, “I Dialogi di Agostino dinanzi al De regressu animae di Porfirio,” Recherches augustiniennes 27 (1994) 41–74, at 43; Massimo Della Rosa, Sentenze. Introduzione, traduzione e commento (Garzanti: I Grandi Libri, 1992) xiv; Francine Culdaut, “Un oracle d'Hécate dans la ‘Cité de Dieu',” Revue des Études Augustiniennes 38 (1992) 271–89, at 279; Giuseppe Girgenti, Introduzione a Porfirio (Gius: Laterza & Figli, 1997) 105–11; Ruth Majercik, The Chaldean Oracles: Text, Translation, and Commentary (Studies in Greek and Roman Religion 5; Leiden: Brill, 1989) 32–33; Andrew Smith, “The Pagan Neoplatonists' Response to Christianity,” The Maynooth Review 14 (1989) 25–41; idem, “Porphyrian Studies since 1913,” in Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt 2.36.2 (ed. W. Haase; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1987) 718–73, esp. 731–37; H. Lewy, Chaldaean Oracles and Theurgy: Mysticism, Magic, and Platonism in the Later Roman Empire (Le Caire: L'Institut français d'archéologie orientale, 1956); J. Bidez, Vie de Porphyre. Le philosophe néo-platonicien (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1913) 95.

14 Augustine, Civ. 10.28: “Still, you do admit that even the spiritual soul can, without the aid of the theurgic arts and rites, which you have wasted so much effort to learn, be purified by the virtue of continence.” For the use of ϕαντασία in Porphyry's religious thought see the excellent essay by Anne Sheppard, “Porphyry's Views on Phantasia,” in Studies on Porphyry, 71–76.

15 Smith, Porphyry's Place, 129–33. See also n. 13 above. See also Eugene Teselle, “Porphyry and Augustine,” Augustinian Studies 5 (1974) 113–47, esp. 131–32, who describes the body and senses, the spirit, and the intellect as Porphyry's “three levels of religion.”

16 For the Greek text I follow Porphyrii sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes (ed. Erich Lamberz; Leipzig: Teubner, 1975); see also L. Brisson, ed., Porphyre. Sentences. Études d'introduction, texte grec et traduction française, commentaire (2 vols.; Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 2005), which includes an English translation by John Dillon. Sent. 32: “Αλλαι αἱ ἀρεταὶ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ, καὶ ἄλλαι αἱ τοῦ πρὸϛ θεωρίαν ἀνιόντοϛ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο λεγομένου θεωρητικοῦ, καὶ ἄλλαι αἱ τοῦ ἤδη τελείου θεωρητικοῦ καὶ ἤδε θεατοῦ, καὶ ἄλλαι αἱ τοῦ νοῦ, καθ’ ὅ νοῦϛ καὶ ἀπὸ ψυχῆϛ καθαρόϛ. For a good analysis of these, showing their compatibility with Aristotelian ethics, see George E. Karamanolis, Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 303–8; for development in the Platonic tradition see H. J. Blumenthal, “Marinus' Life of Proclus: Neoplatonist Biography,” Byzantion 59 (1984) 469–94; and M. Vorwerk, “Plato on Virtue: SOPHROSUNE in Plato's Charmides and in Plotinus Enneads I.2(19),” American Journal of Philology 122 (2001) 29–47.

17 Sent. 32: ϕρόνησιϛ, ἀνδρεία, σωϕροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη. For the development of the scala virtutum in later neoplatonism, e.g., in Marinus's Life of Proclus, see Henri D. Saffrey, Alain-Philippe Seconds, and Concetta Luna, Marinus. Proclus ou Sur le Bonheur (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2001) 3–5 and 65–70; and Blumenthal, “Marinus' Life of Proclus.” For Sent. 32 see e.g., Blumenthal, “Marinus' Life of Proclus,” 476–79; and A. R. Sodano, Introduzione agli intelligibili. Traduzione, commento e note con in appendice il testo greco. (Naples: Associazione de Studi Tardoantichi, 1979) 36–42.

18 On these see Dominic J. O'Meara, Platonopolis: Platonic Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). For Porphyry's doctrine of the political virtues, see pp. 44–46. For an excellent analysis of the four virtues in Porphyry's thought see now Luc Brisson, “La doctrine des degrés de vertus chez les néo-platoniciens. Une analyse de la Sentence 32 de Porphyre, de ses antécédents et de ses conséquences,” in Études Platoniciennes I. Publication annuelle de la Société d'Études Platoniciennes (ed. Jean-François Pradeau; Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2004) 271–86.

19 See also Sent. 32: αἱ δὲ ψυχῆϛ ἀνθρώπου κατακοσμούσηϛ τὸν ἄνθρωπον διὰ τὸ μέτρα τῇ ἀλογίᾳ ἀϕορίζειν καὶ μετριοπάθειαν ἐνεργάζεσθαι.

20 Ibid.: Αἱ μὲν τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ἐν μετριοπαθείᾳ κείμεναι τῷ ἕπεσθαι καὶ ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ λογισμῷ τοῦ καθήκοντοϛ κατὰ τὰϛ πράξειϛ· διὸ πρὸϛ κοινωνίαν βλέπουσαι τὴν ἀβλαβῆ τῶν πλησίον ἐκ τοῦ συναγελασμοῦ καὶ τῆϛ κοινωνίαϛ πολιτικαὶ λέγονται.

21 See Girgenti, Introduzione, 113–14: “Porfirio pensa naturalmente all'Anima universale, ma ogni anima individuale, in quanto partecipa di quella universale, può elevarsi a questo livello delle virtù contemplative.”

22 Sent. 32: ἄλλο οὖν γένοϛ τρίτον ἀρετῶν μετὰ τὰϛ καθαρτικὰϛ καὶ πολιτικάϛ, νοερῶϛ τῆϛ ψυχῆϛ ἐνεργούσηϛ. See Enneads 1.2.1.21–23: ῏Αρ’ οὖν οὺ κατὰ τὰϛ πολιτικὰϛ ὁμοιούμεθα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰϛ μείζουϛ τῷ αὐτῷ ὀνόματι χρωμέναϛ; and O'Meara, Platonoplois, 36–38.

23 In this paper I give John Dillon's English translation in Brisson, Porphyre: 2.813. Sent. 32: καὶ ὁ μὲν ἔχων τὰϛ μείζουϛ ἐξ ἀνάκηϛ ἔχει καὶ τὰϛ ἐλάττουϛ, οὐ μὴν τὸ ἔμπαλιν.

24 E.g., Sent. 32: αἱ δὲ πολιτικαὶ τὸν θνητὸν ἄνθρωπον κατακοσμοῦσι—καὶ πρόδρομοί γε αἱ πολιτικαὶ τῶν καθάρσεων. See also Girgenti, Introduzione, 112–18.

25 On the Purificatory virtues, Sent. 32: αἱ δὲ ψυχῆϛ ἀνθρώπου καθαιρομένηϛ τε καὶ καθαρθείσηϛ ἀπὸ σώματοϛ καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων παθῶν.

26 Sent. 32: Αἱ δὲ τοῦ πρὸϛ θεωρίαν προκόπτοντοϛ θεωρητικοῦ ἐν ἀποστάσει κεῖνται τῶν ἐντεῦθεν· διὸ καὶ καθάρσειϛ αὗται λέγονται, ἐν ἀποχῇ θεωρούμεναι τῶν μετὰ τοῦ σώματοϛ πράξεων καὶ συμπαθειῶν τῶν πρὸϛ αὐτό.

27 Ibid.

28 Sent. 32: δεῖ γὰρ κοσμηθέντα κατ’ αὐτὰϛ ἀποστῆναι τοῦ σὺν σώματι πράττειν τι προηγουμένωϛ.

29 Ibid.: τὸ δέ γε μὴ ὁμοπαθεῖν συνίστησι τὸ σωϕρονεῖν.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.: αὗται μὲν γὰρ τῆϛ ψυχῆϛ ἀϕ ισταμένηϛ πρὸϛ τὸ ὄντωϛ ὄν.

32 O'Meara, Platonoplois, 38.

33 Civ. 10.28.

34 “We ought therefore to direct our attention most of all to the purificatory virtues, basing ourselves on the reflection that the attainment of these is possible in this life, and that it is through these that an ascent may be made to the more august levels. We must therefore consider up to what point and in what degree it is possible to receive purification; for it involves, after all, separation from the body and from the irrational motion provoked by the passions.”

35 For historical background, commentary, Greek text, and German translation see W. Pötscher, Porphyrios PROS MARKELLAN (Leiden: Brill, 1969). For the date, ibid., 2: “Als Zeitpunkt für die Abfassung wird man mit aller Vorsicht wohl etwa das Jahr 300, bzw. das erste Jahr (oder die ersten Jahre) des 4. Jahrhunderts annehmen.” See n. 69 below.

36 I follow the Greek text found in Kathleen O'Brien Wicker, Porphyry the Philosopher: To Marcella (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1987) 20–21.

37 Wicker, Porphyry the Philosopher, 21.

38 Ibid., 20–21.

39 Marc. 3: πρὸϛ τὴν ὀρθὴν ϕ ιλοσοϕ ίαν ἐπιτηδειότητα τῆϛ ϕύσεωϛ.

40 Ibid. 4: καλούσηϛ δὲ τῆϛ τῶν ‘Ελλήνων χρείαϛ καὶ τῶν θεῶν συνεπειγόντων αὐτοῖϛ ὑπακούειν.

41 Ibid.: ἐν τοῖϛ δέκα μησὶν οἷϛ μοι συνῴκησαϛ.

42 Ibid.: σπεύδω μὲν γὰρ, ὅν ἄν δύνωμαι τρόπον, τὴν ταχίστην πάλιν ἀναλαβεῖν. I concur with Pötscher, Porphyrios, 11 n. 1, and Wicker, Porphyry the Philosopher, 85, who posit that philosophical instruction is the object of ἀναλαβεῖν .

43 Ibid. 5.

44 Ibid. 6.

45 The structure of Marc. is: chs. 1–6, Introduction; chs. 7–10, Foundation of Argument = Soteriology; chs. 11–16, Being like God; chs. 17–23, Piety; chs. 24–35, Natural and Divine Law (in context of separation of soul from body and controlling the passions.)

46 See Girgenti, Introduzione, 115–16.

47 Marc. 7: ὅθεν καὶ ἔδοξε τοῖϛ σώϕροσι “τὰ ἐπίπονα τῶν ἡδέων μᾶλλον συντελεῖν εἰϛ ἀρετήν.”

48 Ibid. 5.

49 ‘Ο θάνατοϛ διπλοῦϛ, ὁ μὲν οὖν συνεγνωσμένοϛ λυομένου τοῦ σώματοϛ ἀπὸ τῆϛ ψυχῆϛ, ὁ δὲ τῶν ϕ ιλοσόϕων λυομένηϛ τῆϛ ψυχῆϛ ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματοϛ//: καὶ οὐ πάντωϛ ὁ ἕτεροϛ τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἕπεται.

50 οὐκ ἔσται τοίνυν μάχη προκοπτούσηϛ τῆϛ καθάρσεωϛ.

51 Marc. 7.

52 Ibid. 8.

53 Ibid. 9.

54 Marcella's education is in discarding the passions from the soul, not in acquiring vast learning, because they are not conducive to the salvation of her soul: πρὸϛ δὲ τούτοιϛ οὐχ ὅτι “πᾶν πάθοϛ ψυχῆϛ εἰϛ σωτηρίαν αὐτῆϛ πολεμιώτατον, καὶ ἀπαιδευσία μὲν τῶν παθῶν πάντων μήτηρ, τὸ δὲ πεπαιδεῦσθαι οὐκ ἐν πολυμαθείαϛ ἀναλήψει, ἐν ἀπαλλάξει δὲ τῶν ψυχικῶν παθῶν ἐθεωρεῖτο.” (Marc. 9)

55 On this see Ruth Majercik, “Porphyry and Gnosticism,” Classical Quarterly 55 (2005) 277–292, 282.

56 Marcella is admonished to train to ascend to herself and thus gather together all of the parts scattered and cut from their former unity: εἰ μελετῴηϛ εἰϛ σεαυτὴν ἀναβαίνειν συλλέγουσα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματοϛ πάντα τὰ διασκεδασθέντα σου μέλη καὶ εἰϛ πλῆθοϛ κατακερματισθέντα ἀπὸ τῆϛ τέωϛ ἐν μεγέθει δυνάμεωϛ ἰσχυούσηϛ ἐνωσεωϛ (Marc. 10); with this compare Sent. 32: δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τούτου ὀρμώμενον τοῦ πείσματοϛ συνάγειν αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματοϛ καὶ τοῖϛ μὲν τόποιϛ, πάντωϛ γε μὴν ἀπαθῶϛ πρὸϛ αὐτὸ διατιθέμενον. See also Enn. 1.2.5.6–7: in Plotinus's response to the question, “How far is separation of the soul from the body possible?”, he answers: ’Απὸ μὲν δὴ σώματοϛ ἴσωϛ μὲν τοῖϛ οἷον τόποιϛ συνάγουσαν [πρὸϛ] ἑαυτήν. etc.

57 “Divine law, of course, is unknown to the impure soul because of its ignorance and intemperance, but it shines forth in the pure soul because of its freedom from passion and prudence.”

58 See John M. Rist, “Theos and the One in Some Texts of Plotinus,” Mediaeval Studies 24 (1962) 169–80 at 170, for the Plotinian doctrine (e.g., Enn. 3.4.2.15) regarding the direction of human life toward what is intellective, or toward the νοῦϛ or θεόϛ. This is reprinted in idem, Platonism and Its Christian Heritage (London: Variorum Reprints, 1985) no. VII.

59 ὥσπερ γὰρ ἰατρικῆϛ οὐδὲν ὄϕελοϛ, εἰ μὴ τὰϛ νόσουϛ τῶν σωμάτων θεραπεύει, οὕτωϛ οὐδὲ ϕ ιλοσοϕ ίαϛ, εἰ μὴ τὸ τῆϛ ψυχῆϛ ἐκβάλλει πάθοϛ.

60 Marc. 34: μεγάλη οὖν παιδεία ἄρχειν τοῦ σώματοϛ. πολλάκιϛ κόπτουσί τινα μέρη ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ: τῆϛ δὲ ψυχῆϛ ἕνεκα ἕτοιμοϛ ἔσο τὸ ὅλον σῶμα ἀποκόπτειν.

61 Καὶ ὅσῳ τῆϛ τοῦ σώματοϛ προσπαθείαϛ ἀϕ/ίσταται, τοσούτῳ μέτρῳ τῷ θείῳ πελάζει.

62 The importance of self-control for the novice philosopher is emphasized up to the last section of the Ad Marcellam (35): ψιλῆϛ δὲ ἕνεκα ἡδονῆϛ μηδέποτε χρήσῃ τοῖϛ μέρεσι: πολλῷ γὰρ κρεῖττον τεθνάναι ἤ δι’ ἀκρασίαν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀμαυρῶσαι.

63 οὗτοϛ γὰρ μέγιστοϛ καρπὸϛ εὐσεβείαϛ τιμᾶν τὸ θεῖον κατὰ τὰ πάτρια.

64 Published in his Vie de Porphyre, 15 n. 3. This hypothesis was influenced by Gustavus Wolff's philological analysis in his Porphyrii de Philosophia ex oraculis haurienda librorum reliquiae (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1962) 38, a reprint of the 1856 publication (see also pp. 14–16 and 227–28).

65 Scholars have for decades been critically re-evaluating the Wolff-Bidez chronology. See (e.g.): Digeser, “Lactantius, Eusebius, and Arnobius”; idem, The Making of a Christian Empire, 91, 95–97, 161; idem, “Lactantius, Porphyry, and the Debate over Religious Toleration,” JRS 88 (1998) 129–46, esp. 130 n. 8, 134–35 and 146; Simmons, “Via universalis salutis animae liberandae”; idem, “Porphyry of Tyre's Biblical Criticism: A Historical and Theological Appraisal,” in Readings in Christian Communities: Essays on Interpretation in the Early Church (ed. Charles A. Bobertz and David Brakke; CJAS 14; Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002) 90–105; idem, Arnobius of Sicca, 26; Busine, Paroles d'Apollon, 235–38; Schott, “Porphyry on Christians and Others,” 277–314, esp. 284–85 and 289; Zambon, Porphyre et le moyen-platonisme, 33–35, 270; T. D. Barnes, “Monotheists All?” Phoenix 55 (2001) 142–62, 156–59; E. C. Clarke, Iamblichus' De mysteriis: A manifesto of the miraculous (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002) 6; Helene Whittaker, “The Purpose of Porphyry's Letter to Marcella,” SO 76 (2001) 150–68, esp. 155; Polymnia Athanassiadi, “The Chaldaean Oracles: Theology and Theurgy,” in Pagan Monotheism in Late Antiquity (ed. Polymnia Athanassiadi and Michael Frede; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 149–83, esp. 178; Andrew Smith, “Porphyry and Pagan Religious Practice,” 29–35, esp. 29 & 34; P. F. Beatrice, “Towards a New Edition of Porphyry's Fragments” (ed. Goulven Madec and Denis O'Brien; CEA 131; ΣΟΦIHΣ ΜΑIHΤΟRΕΣ; Chercheurs de Sagesse: Hommage à Jean Pépin; Paris: IEA, 1992) 347–55, esp. 350–55; Andrew Smith, “Porphyrian Studies since 1913,” 717–73, esp. 722–25, 733–34; Fox, Pagans and Chistians, 171, 196–97; Garth Fowden, “Late Antique Paganism Reasoned and Revealed,” JRS 71 (1981) 178–82, 180; Robert L. Wilken, “Pagan Criticism of Christianity: Greek Religion and Christian Faith,” in Early Christian Literature and the Classical Intellectual Tradition in Honorem Robert M. Grant (ed. William R. Schoedel and Robert L. Wilken; TH 54; Paris: Editions Beauchesne, 1979) 117–34, 131–32; R. T. Wallis, Neoplatonism (2d ed.; London: Bristol Classical Press, 1972) 99; Smith, Porphyry's Place, 134, argues that the Philos. orac. reveals a much more critically minded Porphyry than has hitherto been assumed, and the work can thus “no longer be used to prove a ‘superstitious’ Porphyry”; O'Meara, “Porphyry's Philosophy from Oracles,” 109–10, 119, 137; idem., Porphyry's Philosophy from Oracles in Augustine, 33–34.

66 “He himself says (but perhaps as seems likely he wrote this while he was still young), that he was granted an oracle different from the vulgar sort; and in the same book he wrote it down, and then went on the expound at considerable length how men ought to pay attention to these oracles. He says too that he cast out and expelled some sort of daemon from a certain bath; the inhabitants called this daemon Kausatha” (trans. Wilmer C. Wright; LCL 134). For a good analysis of the testimony of Eunapius, see Sodano, Vangelo, 197–251.

67 Cf. Wolff, Porphyrii de Philosophia, 38, who after citing the text from Eunapius states: “Patet ab Eunapio libros περὶ τῆϛ ἐκ λογίων ϕ ιλ. significari; hos igitur a Porphyrio adolescente scriptos esse censet. Quod iudicium re ipsa confimari in superioribus ostendimus; nam Plotinianae doctrinae nullum in his libris apparet vestigium, vita Orphicorum non commendatur, deorum nomina et sacra secundum communem ritum traduntur, oracula non ex philosophia, sed philosophia ex oracula explicatur.”

68 R. Goulet, “Variations romanesques sur la mélancolie de Porphyre,” Hermes 110 (1982) 443–57 at 454, noting Eunapius's “tendance à déduire des textes des conclusions controuvées et son total irrespect à l'égard des données objectives de sa source.”

69 A vast majority of scholars date the work to the very late third or early fourth centuries, e.g., Whittaker, “Purpose of Porphyry's Letter,” 76; Digeser, Making of a Christian Empire, 93; Liefferinge, La Théurgie, 206; Karen Alt, “Glaube, Wahrheit, Liebe, Hoffnung bei Porphyrios,” in Die Weltlichkeit des Glaubens in der Alten Kirche. Festschrift für Ulrich Wickert zum siebzigsten Geburtstag (ed. Dietmar Wyrwa; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1997) 25–43, esp. 30; see also idem, “Porphyrios als Helfer in griechischen Nöten. Brief an Markella Kap. 4,” in Worte, Bilder, Töne. Studien zur Antike und Antikerezeption (ed. Richard Faber and Bernd Seidensticker; Würzburg: Königshausen and Neumann, 1996) 201–10; Scott Bradbury, “Julian's Pagan Revival and the Decline of Blood Sacrifice,” Phoenix 49 (1995) 331–56, esp. 338; Wicker, Porphyry the Philosopher, 1; E. des Places, ed., Porphyre. Vie de Pythagore. Lettre à Marcella (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1982) 90; Pötscher, Porphyrios, 3, and note 35 above; Giuseppe Faggin, Porfiri: Lettera a Marcella. Il Testamento Morale dell'antichità (Genoa: Il Basilisco, 1982) 17; L. Vaganay, “Porphyre,” DTC 12 (1935) (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1908–1950) 2555–90, col. 2562; Wolff, Porphyrii de Philosophia, 36: “Senior etiam, quum iam sholis Platonicis Romae praeesset, epistulam ad Marcellam dedit, de qua in vita Porphyrii dixit.”

70 E.g., one may note here Mithraism, Neoplatonism, various Gnostic sects, Manicheanism, and even the Early Church with its practice of instructing catechumens to become full communicants. For Porphyry's concept of “progression” within the scala virtutum see now Brisson, “La doctrine des degrés de vertus chez les néo-platoniciens,” 279.

71 For example, in the context of addressing the importance of becoming totally in control of oneself, Porphyry advises Marcella to turn her intellect toward God: τὸ ϕρόνημα τετράϕθω πρὸϛ τὸν θεόν (Marc. 20).

72 See Smith, Porphyry's Place, 135: “It is only when a man reaches the higher virtues that he begins to save his higher self or return to his real self by means of the theoretical virtues.” Thus the last two stages (Theoretical and Exemplary) have the same substance, divinity, in common, and differ only in degree (θεόϛ [Theoretical] or Πατὴρ Θεῶν [Exemplary]), not in kind, as is not the case of the Civic Virtues, which produce good humans; and the Purificatory Virtues, which produce good Daimones. One can reasonably infer that the Theoretical and Exemplary stages were perceived by Porphyry to be taken together and to represent the final path for the salvation of the soul, which was for the mature Neoplatonic Philosopher. This is how the four classes of virtues cohere with a tripartite soteriological scheme.

73 See Sent. 32.

74 See Heinrich Dörrie, Platonica Minora (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1976) 474–90. On the fragments of Porphyry's Περὶ τοῦ Γνῶθι σαυτόν (Suda 4.178.21 = 272T Smith, Porphyrii; Stobaeus 3.21.26 [3.579.6–580.5 = 273F Smith, Porphyrii]), and their relationship with the Ad Marcellam, see Sodano, Vangelo, 181–93; see also Karamanolis, Plato and Aristotle in Agreement, 293; Des Places, Porphyre, 92, with Delphic connections; and Clemens Zintzen, “Mystik und Magie in der neuplatonischen Philosophie,” Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 108 (1965) 71–100, at 87–88.

75 Sent. 32, answering the question, “How can one purify the soul?”: “We must state how this would come about, and up to what point. For a start, it is as it were the foundation and underpinning of purification to recognize that one is a soul bound down in an alien entity of a quite distinct nature.” (trans. Dillon, 2:814)

76 See p. 178 and n. 69 above.

77 See Sodano, Vangelo, 37, who comes to a similar conclusion: “la Lettera a Marcella è probabilmente l'eco di rifelessioni fatte nell'ambito di un circolo in cui l'ascetismo pitagorico era confortato dalla parola del Maestro tradotta in sentenze.”

78 See Helene Whittaker, “Purpose of Porphyry's Letter,” 150–68, who argues that Marc. was written, with Christians in mind, for a public audience not familiar with the tenets of neoplatonism.

79 See Lucien Jerphagnon, “Les sous-entendus anti-chrétiens de la Vita Plotini ou l'évangile de Plotin selon Porphyre,” Museum Helveticum 47 (1990) 41–52, who compares Vita Plotini with the gospel of John; and Des Places, Porphyre, 89, who describes the letter as “une sorte de protreptique, traité de vie spirituelle et manuel de religion intérieure.”

80 See Liefferinge, La Théurgie, 183: “si l'on doit parler de theurgie dans l'oeuvre de Porphyre, ce n'est pas au sens restraint d'une secte de mystiques mais au sens large du rite païen.”

81 See J. H. W. G. Liebeschuetz, Continuity and Change in Roman Religion. (Oxford: OUP, 1979) 243.

82 See Smith, Porphyry's Place, 104, who rightly observes that Marc. “involves what one might term traditional piety rather than ‘theurgy’ with its sacramental and magical elements.”

83 Forthcoming.

84 P.E. 4.7=303F, Smith. See p. 172 above. The Italian scholar Pier F. Beatrice's attempt to revive and develop O'Meara's (1959) thesis that the Contra Christianos and Philos. orac. are one and the same work is not convincing. Cf. notes 65 and 102 for examples of Beatrice's works in which this thesis is found. Arnobius's Adversus nationes is the earliest Christian response to Porphyry's search for a via universalis salutis liberandae animae. See Simmons, Arnobius of Sicca, 46–93 for the date of the Adv. nat. (302–305 c.e.); and for Arnobius's universalism argument, see 264–303. Unconvincing is Mark J. Edwards's “Porphyry and the Christians,” in Studies on Porphyry, 111–26, esp. 120–23; and idem, “Dating Arnobius: Why Discount the Evidence of Jerome?,” Antiquité tardive 12 (2004) 263–71. Among the deficiencies of his historical method on dating the Adv. nat. are 1) his attempt to explain away the present tenses of Adv. nat. 4.36, which are explicit references to Diocletian's first edict of February 303, as “rhetorical licence” (the context fits much better a composition of the Adv. nat. contemporaneous with the promulgation of the edict rather than twenty-four years later when the Church was in a more peaceful period); 2) the reference to viri novi fits better the period before the outbreak of persecution and the religious and philosophical works of Porphyry; 3) his argument concerning Lactantius's silence is weak, on which see Simmons, Arnobius of Sicca, 50–53; 4) his insistence that the different dates for Arnobius given in the Chron. and the Vir. ill. of Jerome must be harmonized (rather than interpreted, as most scholars argue, as contradictions); and 5) his attempt to explain the attack upon pagan sacrifices throughout book 7, which makes much better sense just after Diocletian's fourth edict on sacrifice (304 c.e.) rather than in the 320s.

85 These references are found in Smith, Porphyrii, and Wolff, Porphyrii de Philosophia. 314 F (Eusebius, P.E. 4.8.4–9.2; see Wolff, Porphyrii de Philosophia, 111–18); 323 F (Eusebius, P.E. 9.10.1–2; see Wolff, Porphyrii de Philosophia, 139–41); and 324 F (Eusebius, P.E. 9.10.3–5; see Wolff, Porphyrii de Philosophia, 139–141).

86 314 F (Eusebius, P.E. 4.8.4–9.2; see Wolff, Porphyrii de Philosophia, 111–18).

87 306 F (Firmicus Maternus, De errore profanorum religiorum 13.4–5; see Wolff, Porphyrii de Philosophia, 111; 313 F (Eusebius, P.E. 3.14.7; see Wolff, Porphyrii de Philosophia, 126–27); 316 F (Eusebius, P.E. 5.10.13–11.1; see Wolff, Porphyrii de Philosophia, 129–30); 320 F (Eusebius, P.E. 5.14.2–3; see Wolff, Porphyrii de Philosophia, 134–37).

88 317 F (Eusebius, P.E. 5.12.1–2; see Wolff, Porphyrii de Philosophia, 130–31); 318 F (Eusebius, P.E. 5.13.1–2; see Wolff, Porphyrii de Philosophia, 131–32); 319 F (Eusebius, P.E. 5.13.3–4; see Wolff, Porphyrii de Philosophia, 133–34).

89 329 F (Eusebius, P.E. 4.19.8–20.1; see Wolff, Porphyrii de Philosophia, 152–54).

90 339 F (Eusebius, P.E. 6.3.5–4.3; see Wolff, Porphyrii de Philosophia, 165).

91 308 F (Eusebius, P.E. 5.6.2–7.2; see Wolff, Porphyrii de Philosophia, 122–23).

92 325 F (Hartmut Erbse, Fragmente Griechischer Theosophien (Hamburger Arbeiten zur Altertumswissenschaft 4; Hamburg: Hansischer Gilden Veralg, 1941) 173.17–174.22; see Wolff, Porphyrii de Philosophia, 143–47; Smith, Porphyrii, also refers to Karl Buresch, Klaros. Untersuchungen zum Orakelwesen des späteren Altertums [Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1889] nos. 27–29); 325aF (Fragmente griechischer Theosophien 30, p. 174, 23–25, Erbse).

93 346 F (Augustine, Civ. 19.23.107–33; see Wolff, Porphyrii de Philosophia, 185–86).

94 E.g., 314 F (P.E. 4.8.4–9.2; see Wolff, Porphyrii de Philosophia, 111–18) and 315 F (P.E. 4.9.3–7; see Wolff, Porphyrii de Philosophia, 118–21). Eusebius shows that Porphyry upheld animal sacrifice in Philos. orac. (P.E. 4.8–9), and then (P.E. 4.10–13) quotes from De abstinentia, which condemned animal sacrifice, attempting to prove that Porphyry contradicted himself. This is neither fair nor objective since Abst. was written for philosophers and at least parts of Philos. orac. were written for the uneducated masses, as we have noted; but by developing a method of literary retort, Eusebius polemically does to Porphyry what Porphyry in his anti-Christian writings attempted to do to Christian scripture.

95 See now Schott, Christianity, Empire, and the Making of Religion, 56 n. 29.

96 Following the divisions found in Gifford: 6.praef. 236a–b; 6.3.240c; 6.6.242d; 6.6.245c–d; 6.6.251a–b; 6.6.253a–b; 6.6.253b; 6.6.253c.1–4; 6.6.253c.5–10; 6.6.253d; 6.6.253d–254a; 6.6.254a–c; 6.11.295d–296a.

97 P.E. 6.6.254a.3–20: “They found therefore one and the same destiny, to be brought into subjection under one system and doctrine, and to display one mind and will, and the same virtue of soul, to accept one and the same kind of life, to love the same doctrine, and to endure contentedly the same sufferings for their steadfast piety. But what sound reason would allow us to say this, that young and old together, of every age, and of either sex, men of barbarous nature, slaves and free, learned and uneducated, not born in a corner of the earth nor under these same stars with us, but throughout the whole world inhabited by man, have been forced by a necessity of fate to prefer a certain doctrine to all the customs of their forefathers, and to welcome death for the religion of the One God over all, and to be thoroughly instructed in the teaching concerning the immortality of the soul, and to prefer a philosophy that consists not in words but in deeds?”

98 P.E. 5.9.197b: “Or how can they deserve to be admired and honoured with divine worship who are enslaved by common imposters of the most abandoned character, and compelled to perform what is neither honourable nor expedient contrary to their judgement, and are led and dragged down, not because they approve men's morality, nor to promote virtue or any branch of philosophy, but by forbidden practices of imposters?”

99 316 F (P.E. 5.10.13–11.1; see Wolff, Porphyrii de Philosophia, 129–30); 317 F (P.E. 5.12.1–2; see Wolff, Porphyrii de Philosophia, 130–31); 318 F (P.E. 5.13.1–2; see Wolff, Porphyrii de Philosophia, 131–32); 319 F (P.E. 5.13.3–4; see Wolff, Porphyrii de Philosophia, 133–34); and 330 F (P.E. 5.14.1; see Wolff, Porphyrii de Philosophia, 138–39).

100 P.E. 5.15.203.a–b: “By these and the like quotations this noble philosopher of the Greeks, this admirable theologian, this initiate in the secret mysteries, exhibits The Philosophy to be derived from Oracles as containing secret oracles of the gods, while openly proclaiming the plots laid against men by their wicked and truly daemoniacal power. For what benefit to human life can there be from these evil arts of sorcery? Or what pleasure to the gods in this scrupulous care about lifeless statues? Of what divine power can there be a likeness in the formation of such shapes? Why should he not have counselled us to study philosophy rather than to practise magic and pursue forbidden arts, if the path of virtue and philosophy is sufficient for a happy and blessed life?”

101 Although storm clouds started gathering over the Christians beginning with the military martyrs of the 290s c.e. in the Roman army, on which see Lactantius, Mort. 10.1 and Alan K. Bowman, “Diocletian and the First Tetrarchy, A.D. 284–305,” Cambridge Ancient History 12, 67–89, at 85; but these were local problems restricted to soldiers. The first edict regarding Christian persecution was issued on February 24, 303 c.e., on which see Simon Corcoran, The Empire of the Tetrarch: Imperial Pronouncements and Government A.D. 284–324 (rev. ed.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 179–81.

102 Scholars are not in agreement here. For recent interpretations of the “Third Century Crisis” and data on Christian demographics, see the pertinent chapters in Cambridge Ancient History 12, although there is often a tendency to water down contemporary testimony from Christian authors like Eusebius, Lactantius, and Arnobius.

103 This is yet another hotly debated topic amongst scholars. By 302 c.e., the date of the Diocletianic concilium principis mentioned by Lactantius (Mort. 11), Porphyry was the most famous anti-Christian writer of the period; thus it is difficult to think of a better context for his remark to Marcella that “the needs of the Greeks summoned me and the gods joined their requests” (Marc. 4: καλούσηϛ δὲ τῆϛ τῶν ‘Ελλήνων χρείαϛ καὶ τῶν θεῶν συνεπειγόντων) than his attending an imperial conference whose purpose was to discuss the persecution of the Christians. On this viewpoint, see Henry Chadwick, The Sentences of Sextus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959) 142; Digeser, “Lactantius, Eusebius, and Arnobius”; idem, Making of a Christian Empire, 96, 114, 162; idem, “Lactantius, Porphyry, and the Debate,” 145; Michael Bland Simmons, “The Emperor Julian's Order to Rebuild the Temple in Jerusalem: A Connection with Oracles?” Journal of Ancient Near Eastern Studies 43 (2006) 67–116, at 96; idem, “Porphyry of Tyre's Biblical Criticism,” 101; idem, “Graeco-Roman Philosophical Opposition,” in The Early Christian World (ed. Philip F. Esler; 2 vols.; London: Routledge, 2000) 2:840–68, at 850; and idem, Arnobius of Sicca, 22–27, 302; Andrew Smith, Philosophy in Late Antiquity, 64; idem, (1989), 36; Whittaker, “Purpose of Porphyry's Letter,” 155; Henry Chadwick, “Philosophical Tradition and the Self,” in Late Antiquity: A Guide to the Postclassical World (ed. G. W. Bowersock, Peter Brown, and Oleg Grabar; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999) 60–81, at 69; Girgenti, Introduzione, 128; Sodano, Vangelo, 112; R. Joseph Hoffmann, Porphyry's Against the Christians: The Literary Remains (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus, 1994) 164; Beatrice, “Antistes Philosophiae: Ein Christenfeindlicher Propagandist am Holfe Diokletians nach dem Zeugnis des Laktanz,” Augustinianum 33 (1993) 31-47, at 39; Arthur J. Droge, Homer or Moses? Early Christian Interpretations of the History of Culture (HUT 26; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1989) 180; P. Pirioni, “Il soffiorno siciliano di porfirio e la composizione del ΚΑΤΑ ΧRIΣΤIΑΝWΝ,” Rivista di Storia della Chiesa in Italia 39 (1985) 502–8, at 504; Wilken, Christians as the Pagans Saw Them, 134; idem, “Pagan Criticism of Christianity,” 131; Des Places, Porphyre, 89, 106 n. 2; Pötscher, Porphyrios, 66; Pierre Benoit, “Un adversaire du Christianisme au IIIe Siècle: Porphyre,” Revue Biblique 54 (1947) 543–72, at 552; Bidez, Vie de Porphyre, 116. Other scholars do not agree that Lactantius, Mort. 11 and Marc. 4 imply Porphyry's attendance at the conference in 302, e.g.: Goulet, “Hypothèses récentes,” 101–4; idem, Macarios de Magnèsie. Le Monogénès. Tome I. Introduction génèrale(Paris: J. Vrin, 2003) 1:118; Christoph Riedweg, “Porphyrios über Christus und die Christen. De Philosophia ex oraculis Haurienda und Adversus Christianos im Vergleich,” in L'apologétique chrétienne gréco-latine à l'époque prénicénienne. 13-17 Septembre 2004 (Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique 51; Geneva: Fondation Hardt, 2005) 153 n. 9; Alt, “Glaube, Wahrheit, Liebe,” 30; idem, “Porphyrios als Helfer,” 201–10; T. D. Barnes, “Scholarship or Propaganda? Porphyry Against the Christians and its Historical Setting,” BICSL 39 (1994) 53–65, at 58–59; and idem, “Porphyry Against the Christians: Date and Attribution of Fragments,” Journal of Theological Studies n.s. 24 (1973) 424–42, at 432; but note idem, “Monotheists All?” 157, suggesting a date for Philos. orac. ca. 300; Wicker, Porphyry the Philosopher, 417; Fox, Pagans and Chistians, 196 n. 90; A. J. Festugière, Trois Dévots Païens (Paris: La Colombe, 1944) 8; and Wolff, Porphyrii de Philosophia, 13, who gives an interesting explanation: “Decem mensibus post nuptias in Graeciam profectus, negotiis aliquamdiu—Athenis sine dubio, ubi schola Platonica florebat—retinebatur.”

104 As noted above, there are 187 occurrences of the theme of universalism in P.E., as compared with 417 in D.E.

105 345 F (Eusebius, D.E. 3.6.39–7.2; see Wolff, Porphyrii de Philosophia, 180). This is despite the fact that, as noted above, the theme of universalism is found more than twice the number of times in D.E. than in P.E.

106 I do not mean to imply that this was in any way an official title or position. Constantine and Eusebius only met a few times in their lives, so Eusebius's imperial theology was created as a geographically distant, albeit genuine, supporter of the first Christian emperor and his policies.

107 See Fowden, Empire to Commonwealth, 80–99, at 88, where the phrase “one god, one empire, one emperor” is used to describe Eusebius's concept of Constantinian Universalism.

108 For the “Constantinian Revolution,” see T. D. Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius, with which I concur. For other possible interpretations of the transformation from a pagan to a Christian empire, see: Schott, Christianity, Empire, and the Making of Religion, 125 (Constantine created an ideology of empire from Christian apologetics); Averil Cameron, “Constantine and the ‘peace of the church,’” in The Cambridge History of Christianity. I. Origins to Constantine (ed. Margaret M. Mitchell and Frances M. Young; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 538–51, and idem, “The Reign of Constantine,” CAH 12, 90–109, at 108–9 (Constantine was determined to unify the church); Charles Matson Odahl, Constantine and the Christian Empire (New York: Routledge, 2004) 268–84 (Christianity was transformed from a persecuted minority cult to the established religion of the empire); Pat Southern, The Roman Empire from Severus to Constantine (New York: Routledge: 2001) 281 (political unification); Martin Wallraff, “Constantine's Devotion to the Sun after 324,” StPatr 34 (2001) 256–69 (integration of the religious culture of the empire); H. A. Drake, Constantine and the Bishops: The Politics of Intolerance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000) 27 (use of coercion and political prowess by Constantine to bring about unity, explained as social process); Rodney Stark, The Rise of Christianity: How the Obscure, Marginal Jesus Movement Became the Dominant Religious Force in the Western World in a Few Centuries (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1997) 212 (Christianity was a revitalization movement leading to Constantine); Fowden, Empire to Commonwealth, 85 (there was no sudden Constantinian Revolution; Nicene Orthodoxy triumphed only under Theodosius); Fergus Millar, The Roman Near East 31 BC–AD 337 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993) 599 (imposition of unity by using normal penalties of criminal law); Fox, Pagans and Chistians (Christianity was insignificant until Constantine); Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius, and idem, “The Constantinian Revolution,” in The Crake Lectures 1984 (ed. Ivan Cohen and Margaret Fancy; Sackville, New Brunswick: The Crake Institute, 1986) 39–57 (Constantine benefited from an already strong and flourishing church); see also the pertinent essays in Noel Lenski, ed., The Cambridge Companion to the Age of Constantine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

Article contents

Porphyrian Universalism: A Tripartite Soteriology and Eusebius's Response*

Extract

Information

Porphyry's Three Ways and the Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes

The Ad Marcellam: Katharsis for the Novice Philosopher

De philosophia ex oraculis: A Tripartite Soteriology and Eusebius's Response

Conclusion

References

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