I. INTRODUCTION
The two major contributions to oligopoly theory since the 1930s are the full-cost principle, which empirically undermined the validity of marginal analysis, and the limit pricing theory, according to which oligopoly must confront potential competition as distinct from actual competition among existing rivals. Introducing the threat of entry alongside the hypothesis that firms recognize their mutual interdependence set the foundation for theorizing about firms’ strategic behavior (Bhagwati Reference Bhagwati1970; Stigler Reference Stigler1983). This shift of attention occurred due to Philip W. S. Andrews (1949), Roy F. Harrod (1952), Joe S. Bain (Reference Bain1949, 1956), Paolo Sylos Labini (Reference Sylos Labini1957), and above all Franco Modigliani’s formalization (1958).Footnote 1 Modigliani’s review of Sylos Labini’s and Bain’s books is considered the starting point for developments during the 1960s and 1970s of entry-preventing models (McGee 1980).Footnote 2 However, Modigliani’s interpretation diverged in many respects from Sylos Labini’s major aims, and his review should be understood as presenting a transformative twist on Sylos Labini’s model, not simply translating it into mathematical language. Sylos Labini’s analysis was devoted to the dynamic relations among market structures, technological unemployment, and economic development. In contrast and notwithstanding his interest in Keynesian macroeconomics, Modigliani’s review examined only Sylos Labini’s microeconomic static analysis, notably the role of firms’ expectations and the Sylos postulate for determining long-run equilibrium price and output. In doing so Modigliani departed from Sylos Labini’s objective approach to the oligopoly problem as an alternative to subjective analysis based on reaction functions, as well as from Sylos Labini’s dynamic approach to economic phenomena.
There are two explanations for Modigliani’s reading of Sylos Labini’s book. The first, evident in their correspondence, is that he rejected Sylos Labini’s macroeconomics for confusing real and monetary causes of involuntary unemployment. The second pertains to Modigliani’s study during that period of firms’ behavior under uncertainty. Even if Modigliani was unfamiliar with then-current literature on oligopoly theory, the issues under discussion were similar, revolving around the role of expectations and the validity of the profit maximization assumption under uncertainty.Footnote 3
This paper highlights Modigliani’s and Sylos Labini’s differing approaches to the oligopoly problem as emerge from Sylos Labini’s Oligopoly and Technical Progress, Footnote 4 from their correspondence, and from Modigliani’s famous review, New Developments on the Oligopoly Front (1958). Modigliani’s reading of Sylos Labini’s oligopoly model reflects the separate contexts in which they develop their research. It shows how Modigliani’s business studies at Carnegie Tech influenced his reading of Sylos Labini’s theory.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines early contributions to the limit pricing theory. Section III discusses Sylos Labini’s oligopoly model. Sections IV and V discuss Modigliani’s interpretation of Sylos Labini’s microeconomic theory, focusing on the origin of the Sylos postulate. Section VI is devoted to final considerations.
II. FROM ACTUAL TO POTENTIAL COMPETITION
Following Edward Chamberlin’s and Joan Robinson’s contributions to imperfect competition, the study of non-competitive markets increased rapidly but fragmentally in constructing a general theory of price.Footnote 5 This literature developed around some major issues such as: (1) the rationale underlying the full-cost principle, introduced by Robert L. Hall and Charles J. Hitch (Reference Hall and Hitch1939) in EnglandFootnote 6 and, independently, by Paul Sweezy in the US (1939); (2) its consistency with marginal analysis; (3) the validity of the profit maximization assumption (especially the relation between short- and long-run profit maximization); and (4) the role of psychological variables (Cournot’s reaction functions) in determining equilibrium price and output.
According to Hall and Hitch, firms’ awareness of their interdependence leads to an indeterminate individual demand curve and corresponding marginal revenue. Their empirical investigations showed that firms generally make no effort to estimate the demand curve, its elasticity, and their marginal costs; they price by applying the simple full-cost formula. Among their significant conclusions was that any maximum profit resulting from applying this rule of thumb emerges accidentally or as an evolutionary by-product. This outcome partly is the consequence of the threat of entry: “If prices are in the neighborhood of full cost, they are not raised by actual or tacit agreement because it is thought that, while this would pay in the short run, it would lead to an undermining of the firms by new entrants in the long run” (1939, p. 22). They also showed the impossibility of a uniquely determined equilibrium price.Footnote 7
The introduction of firms’ reactions to potential competitors underpinned the interpretation of non-maximizing behavior as intentionally intended to forestall entry, giving a rational foundation for using a simple rule of thumb. It also represented the starting point for constructing a new analytical framework based on strategic considerations (see Rothschild Reference Rothschild1947).
Recognition of a crucial role for conditions of entry in determining equilibrium price was due to Bain (Reference Bain1949, 1956), Andrews (1949), Harrod (1952), Harry R. Edwards (Reference Edwards1955), Harold F. Lydall (Reference Lydall1955), Sylos Labini (Reference Sylos Labini1957), and Modigliani (Reference Modigliani1958). Even if their models addressed different hypotheses—such as collusive or non-collusive oligopoly, homogeneous or differentiated products—all investigate the relation between conditions of entry and deterrent pricing by established firms; they abandon the profit maximization assumption and accept a cost-based rule, rather than marginal analysis, for determination of equilibrium price, establishing the basis for subsequent developments and refinements of the limit pricing theory.Footnote 8 Disagreements among economists mainly concerned the level of the entry-prevention price as the result of different hypotheses about existing firms’ reactions to threats of entry.
III. SYLOS LABINI’S OLIGOPOLY THEORY AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS
Sylos Labini and Modigliani first met in 1948 in Chicago. Sylos Labini was in the US on a Fulbright research scholarship to study with Joseph A. Schumpeter; Modigliani had just moved from the Institute of World Affairs in the New School for Social Research to the University of Illinois.Footnote 9 They began a lengthy relationship and correspondence, sharing many intellectual interests. It was Sylos Labini who persuaded Modigliani to return for the first time to Italy in 1954, thereafter visiting throughout the 1960s to collaborate with the Bank of Italy Research Department to develop the first macroeconometric model for the Italian economy.
In 1956 Sylos Labini published for private circulation a provisional edition of Oligopoly and Technical Progress, sending it to his ‘economist friends’ in the US for comments, particularly Alfred Kahn and Modigliani.Footnote 10 Sylos Labini's book was divided into three parts: the first was devoted to determination of the long-run equilibrium price and output under oligopoly. The others discussed the relation between market structure, employment level, and economic development. His research was the result of various intellectual stimuli. Following Schumpeter’s analysis of big corporations, and John K. Galbraith’s and Sweezy’s theory of market power, Sylos Labini devoted his attention to a new oligopolistic form: the “concentrated oligopoly” characterized by a few giant firms who control the market and a number of small satellite producers.Footnote 11 His interest in the dynamic effects of industrial concentration contributed to his ‘discovery’ of classical economists, in particular Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Karl Marx, and places his work within the Italian tradition of the study of institutions and economic development (see Porta Reference Porta2007, p. 31). Sylos Labini’s focus on entry conditions to distinguish between different market forms was, for example, suggested by Alberto Breglia, his mentor during the university years, who considered them to be the fundamental object of study of market behavior.
In 1950 Sylos Labini moved to Cambridge (UK) and studied under Dennis Robertson’s supervision. The stay in Cambridge reinforced his critical attitude towards marginal analysis and his interest in classical economics. He rejected the neoclassical static approach to competition based on the number of firms and horizontal demand curve in favor of the classical dynamic notion.Footnote 12 Piero Sraffa’s famous critique to Marshallian theory represented the starting point to Sylos Labini’s analysis of different market structures.Footnote 13 In particular, his microeconomic theory sought to show that industry long-run equilibrium price and output depend on the initial industrial structure (criée par hazard) and conditions of entry. Sylos Labini’s aim was to demonstrate how alternative equilibrium positions could be reached, to make explicit the determinants of mark-up level, to discuss the rational foundation of the full-cost principle and its inconsistency with marginal analysis. The singularity of his oligopolistic model originated in its assumptions of technological discontinuities and constant marginal costs up to the limit of plant capacity—the latter derived by Sraffa (1925, Reference Sraffa1926) and demonstrated by empirical investigations. The discontinuities assumption, which represented a critique of the neoclassical production function based on continuous factors substitutability, acts as a barrier to entryFootnote 14 and explains the coexistence of different-sized firms within a same industry, despite the hypothesis of decreasing average costs. Smaller and medium firms could not, in fact, expand their output to benefit of economies of scale, since “the transition from small to large firms is not gradual; there are jumps and the jumps become broader as concentration proceeds” (Sylos Labini Reference Sylos Labini1956, p. 44). On the other hand, larger firms were not willing to eliminate the smaller ones because they could expand only by setting up new establishments equal to those already in operation, and consequently the costs of starting a price war might exceed possible gains.Footnote 15 Since large firms are the most efficient, they also act as leaders in fixing the price. Sylos Labini numerically demonstrated the process by which the long-run equilibrium price, defined as the price that does not attract new firms, is established. His examples were based on the full-cost formula and the distinction between a price that guarantees minimum profit (P m) and the “exclusion price” that discourages potential competitors (P c, with P c< P m): “If the price leaders intend to prevent the entry of new firms of a given type, they must keep the price below the level which would give the new firms their minimum profit rate: the ‘entry preventing’ price, P c, is lower than P m” (1956, p. 48).
He concluded that even if several equilibrium prices exist (each corresponding to the initial industrial structure), the price generally settles at a level slightly above the entry-preventing price of the least efficient firms (that is, smaller firms). Therefore, recognition of potential competition gave to businessmen “a narrow zone of discretion” in fixing their prices. In other words, from a static perspective, “there is no difference,” in terms of market power, between oligopolistic firms and pure competition (1956, p. 61). In contrast, under dynamic conditions differences appear, the main one being that in oligopoly innovations were accessible only to large firms and did not translate in cost and price reductions, as in pure competition, with harmful effects on economic development and employment.Footnote 16
Sylos Labini’s model also demonstrated the inconsistency between marginal analysis and the mark-up theory. He compared the two theories for the determination of the equilibrium price and showed that the margin “q” has deeply different meanings. In neoclassical theory it is strictly connected with demand elasticity, but in his model the mark-up has to be considered “a residual,” which is determined once the equilibrium price has been established and not vice versa, as in marginal analysis (1956, p. 88). Thus, it indirectly depends on the same forces that settle the price: not only demand elasticity, but also market extension and institutional factors, such as firms’ and trade unions’ monopolistic power (1956, pp. 36–39 and 87–97).Footnote 17
Sylos Labini’s theory on price determination was especially conceived to set an objective foundation under the analysis of oligopolistic markets. He rejected Cournot-type and Edgeworth-type solutions based on “abstract hypothesis of an essentially psychological nature”:Footnote 18
One method often used to put some sort of order into the galaxy of hypotheses and solutions is to start with the simplest case of oligopoly, duopoly, and to distinguish between Cournot-type and Edgeworth-type solutions. … Both types of solutions rest on abstract hypothesis of an essentially psychological nature. More and more complicated assumptions have been made about ‘reaction curves’ and ‘conjectural variations’. The production of such hypotheses and solutions has assumed alarming proportions. … In contrast with this school of economists there is another that propounds a single, very simple and perfectly determinate, solution, based on the assumption of a kinked demand curve. (1956, pp. 25–26)Footnote 19
From a macroeconomic viewpoint his study of the dynamic implications of the oligopolistic market aimed to supplant Keynes’s psychological explanation of unemployment with an objective one based on market structures. Thus, his microeconomic theory related closely to his dynamic analysis in the second and third parts of the book:
The problem of the market form, which concerns individual firms, and the problem of effective demand, which concerns the economy as a whole, have always been discussed separately. The two questions have been treated by two different methods of analysis: microeconomic analysis in the neoclassical theory and macroeconomic analysis in Keynesian theory. The neoclassical theory of market forms has found severe critics in Sraffa and his successors. … Yet integration of the two types of analysis seems feasible and desirable. In particular, it seems that the psychological assumptions, which are a weak point in Keynesians theory, may conveniently be replaced by objective assumptions. Such integration would surely be highly fruitful for the further progress of economic theory. (1956, pp. 190–191)Footnote 20
In the preface of the 1962 English edition, Sylos Labini emphasized that his work represented an attempt to find some common ground on which micro and macro methods of analysis can meet and combine (1962, pp. viii–ix). As we will see, these methodological premises likely represent Sylos Labini’s reply to Modigliani’s interpretation of his model, underlining their divergent approaches to oligopoly.
IV. THE ORIGIN OF THE SYLOS POSTULATE
In a eighteen-page letter of comments to the 1956 provisional edition, Modigliani discussed Sylos Labini’s oligopolistic model and his macroeconomic theory. As further emerges from their correspondence, they had discussed several of Sylos Labini’s issues before this early version circulated.Footnote 21 Modigliani’s letter is the starting point for his 1958 review of the article.
Modigliani defined Sylos Labini’s theoretical model, developed in Part One, chapters II and III, as the most convincing contribution to oligopoly theory because its definition of barriers to entry combined economies of scale and established firms’ price-output policy. However, he rejected Sylos Labini’s macroeconomic analysis and his dynamic implications, commenting extensively on his confusion between real and monetary causes of unemployment and his definition of the investment function (Modigliani to Sylos Labini, September 14, 1956, in MP, Box CO24).
Modigliani’s comments on the microeconomic model focused on Sylos Labini’s numerical examples and the hypothesis of constant output after entry on which they are constructed. Modigliani considered this hypothesis as Sylos Labini’s most original assumption, since it implies that potential rivals, in evaluating the possibility to enter the market, look at the price after entry, introducing anticipations in his analytical framework. He read Sylos Labini’s numerical examples concerning effects of entry on equilibrium price and output as alternative strategies adopted by established firms and anticipated by potential competitors to forestall entry. In doing so, however, Modigliani shifts attention from Sylos Labini’s objective descriptions of the entry effect to a subjective approach based on behavioral assumptions. In fact, Sylos Labini differed from Modigliani in considering the hypothesis of constant output simply as the result of empirical evidences (Roncaglia Reference Roncaglia2006).Footnote 22
Why did Modigliani propose this interpretation? His letter suggests he was seeking rational explanations for firms’ non-maximization behavior that was implicit in the hypothesis of constant output after entry. Modigliani declared that hypothesis unrealistic, along with the hypothesis that potential entrants expect incumbent firms to let the equilibrium price fall. Instead, new firms should expect to share the market at the pre-entry price because larger firms reduce production.
Using Sylos Labini’s examples, Modigliani shows that constant prices, not constant output, would appear more profitable to larger firms after entry. However, under this hypothesis the peculiarity of Sylos Labini’s model, based on coexistence of differently sized firms, disappears. New large firms could find it profitable to share the market with established firms, excluding small- and medium-sized plants. It also followed that Sylos Labini’s price was not an equilibrium price. Once the possibility of entry is taken into account, potential competitors will be induce to enter, unless a policy of price reduction and the equilibrium solution will be “à la Chamberlin-Robinson with extra-profits … eliminated through excess capacity” (Modigliani to Sylos Labini, September 14, 1956, my translation, MP, Box CO24). According to Modigliani, the above conclusions could be avoided and Sylos Labini’s constant output hypothesis could be set on a rational foundation by interpreting it as evidence of established firms’ strategic behavior to deter entry: “[We can suppose] that established larger firms can forestall potential competitors by making it clear that they are willing to cut prices temporarily to make entry unprofitable for new firms; and since they have lower costs they certainly can cut the price to a level which is still profitable for them but not for firms of inferior size” (ibid.).Footnote 23 In the formation of potential competitors’ anticipations, Modigliani highlighted the importance of large firms’ reputations in effecting price reductions: “a policy of threat towards outsiders [potential entrants] combined with a policy of ‘live and let live’ towards established firms is much more easy when there are only one or few large firms able to exercise an effective leadership and create a record on their attitude towards new invasions” (ibid.).Footnote 24
Nonetheless, Modigliani was aware that by introducing strategic behavior into Sylos Labini’s model he was suggesting a reading based on game theory, with solutions that become different, indeterminate, and unstable:
For example there may be the possible solution of a single firm with a monopoly price and sufficient production capacity to reduce the price to a level below the convenient point for smaller firms.... Nonetheless, even this solution can be unstable because it may still attract or permit the entrance of a new large firm that might hope to force the existing firms to share the market at the monopoly price or something near it. … (Modigliani to Sylos Labini, September 14, 1956, my translation, in MP, Box CO24)Footnote 25
From game theory Modigliani also borrowed the criterion for distinguishing stable from unstable equilibrium positions. He defined equilibrium position A as more stable than B if, as the result of random disturbances or intentional price wars, it is profitable to move from B to A but not vice versa. In other words, A is more stable than B if and only if its profits exceed B.
The hypotheses of constant output and strategic behavior also led Modigliani to restrict the validity of Sylos Labini’s model to small markets. By formalizing the conditions of entry, Modigliani showed the inconsistency between Sylos Labini’s hypothesis of a large market size and coexistence of plants using different technologies:
entry condition:
$$p\left[ {x\left( {p_1^m} \right) + {x_j}} \right] &lt; p_j^m$$where p 1m is the equilibrium price (technology 1 is the less efficient), and p jm is the minimum price allowed by method of production j. When the above condition is not satisfied, a firm adopting technology j will find it convenient to enter the market. Thus, following Sylos Labini’s hypothesis of constant output, the equilibrium price will fall below p 1m, eliminating firms of size 1 and 2. This mainly happens under the hypothesis of large market size (with respect to j) where a production increases equal to x j is negligible, as well as the corresponding price reduction. According to Modigliani, there will be only firms adopting the maximum scale of technology (that is, the number of coexisting techniques of production will tend towards one) and extra-profit will tend towards zero.
Modigliani also pointed out that his definition of the entry condition was consistent with Sylos Labini’s conclusion that “large markets … increase the likelihood of an aggressive price policy on the part of large firms, designed to eliminate small and medium firms.” Therefore, the larger the market, the larger tends to be the average size of firms (1956, p. 60). However, the two economists derived opposite implications. To Modigliani, this situation does not contradict the case of pure competition and zero concentration, since there will be only firms of equal efficiency and size. For Sylos Labini, it represented the case for higher concentration.Footnote 26
According to Modigliani, limiting the validity of the model to small markets was consistent with Sylos Labini’s assumption of one or few established firms able to exercise an effective leadership combining a limit-price policy towards potential entrants with a live-and-let-live attitude towards smaller firms. Furthermore, as long as the group is self-disciplined, extra-economic factors will induce larger firms to accept and support coexistence alongside small firms. Those factors may include antitrust laws and the argument that the highly efficient firms cannot cut prices because doing so leads smaller firms to bankruptcy. To Modigliani, his interpretation also suggests that large plants have excess capacity only for strategic reasons.
Despite Modigliani’s detailed comments and suggestions, Sylos Labini introduced only minor changes to his microeconomic analysis in the 1957 definitive edition. Many of Modigliani’s comments are followed by Sylos Labini’s notes of disagreement. In particular, with reference to Modigliani’s discussion of entry conditions and the hypothesis of constant output, Sylos Labini wrote: “This is not my hypothesis, the interpretation of this point is not correct” (Modigliani to Sylos Labini, September 14, 1956, MP, Box CO24, my translation).Footnote 27
V. MODIGLIANI’S 1958 ARTICLE REVIEW
Although Sylos Labini disputed Modigliani’s interpretation of his oligopolistic model, in July 1957 he asked him to review the book.Footnote 28 Modigliani initially appeared disinterested, claiming to be unacquainted with recent English literature on the subject:
Last year I spent a considerable time and effort in going over the first version of Sylos’ book.… At that time I was very favorably impressed … notably by part I and the oligopoly model developed there. On the other hand I had serious reservations about other parts and stated my criticisms to Paolo. I have not had the opportunity to look over the revised edition so I do not know to what extent he may have taken care of my observations.… In recent years I have not been too closely interested in oligopoly theory and market structures and therefore my knowledge of the literature is at least spotty.… It is quite possible that what really impressed me in Paolo’s book is really not so original. … I have for instance the feeling that Paolo’s focus on entry as the essential element in price behavior has been exploited by others in recent years but don’t know precisely when and where.… Perhaps you could relieve my worries on this point by letting me know if you too regard the analysis of part I (especially chapter II) as very significant and perhaps by suggesting me some major pieces of literature. (Modigliani to Alfred Kahn, July 29, 1957, in MP Box CO24; emphasis added).
He then agreed to write the review on the basis of his detailed comments of the 1956 provisional edition, and asked to Sylos Labini to return them. Modigliani’s review parallels them closely. The main difference is that in his review, he does not discuss Sylos Labini’s macroeconomic analysis, giving the impression that the second and third parts of the book were separate from the oligopoly model, whereas the connection between the micro- and macroeconomic analysis represented one of Sylos Labini’s major aims.
Furthermore, in New Developments on the Oligopoly Front, Modigliani discusses Sylos Labini’s (Reference Sylos Labini1957) and Bain’s (1956) books jointly (Sylos Labini suggested the reading of Bain). As in the letter, Modigliani emphasizes the definition of oligopoly as strictly connected with behavioral assumptions that emerge from Sylos Labini’s and Bain’s contributions. He calls their theory “a welcome major breakthrough on the oligopoly front” (1958, p. 215) because they describe barriers to entry as the combined result of economies of scale and incumbent firms’ price-output policies. He also points out that their analysis of “the behavior of potential competitors” is neglected by previous literature. Then Modigliani concentrates on Sylos Labini’s static analysis, suggesting possible extensions in the so-called Sylos–Bain–Modigliani (S–B–M) model. As before, Modigliani diverges from Sylos Labini’s objective approach, ascribing a crucial role to psychological variables such as potential entrants’ anticipations.Footnote 29 To Modigliani, in fact, the central problem of oligopolistic markets is the ability of potential entrants to anticipate effect of entry on equilibrium price as the result of anticipating existing firms’ reactions. The solution appeared in Sylos Labini’s hypothesis of constant output. The hypothesis had been introduced as new entrants’ expectations being consistent with a minimax approach to uncertainty: “potential entrants behave as though they expected existing firms to adopt the policy most unfavorable to them, namely, the policy of maintaining output while reducing the price (or accepting reductions) to the extent required to enforce such an output policy” (1958, p. 217). Modigliani labelled this hypothesis the “Sylos postulate.” It was introduced as a necessary condition to solve the impasse of the indeterminacy of firm’s reactions and “to find a definite solution to the problem of long-run equilibrium price and output under homogeneous oligopoly, or at least a definite upper limit to the price, to be denoted by P 0 and a corresponding lower limit to aggregate output, say X 0” (1958, p. 217).Footnote 30 As before, Modigliani also borrows from game theory the criterion of dominance to distinguish between stable (“rational”) and unstable (“less rational” and “irrational”) structures, repeating the reasoning developed in the letter.Footnote 31
In October 1957, Modigliani sent a copy of his review to Sylos Labini, hoping he would be satisfied with the possible extensions he suggested. Sylos Labini replied that Modigliani’s review represented an original work with original developments of his model. He especially complained about Modigliani’s neglecting of the last parts of the book, in particular the relation between effective demand and involuntary unemployment (Sylos Labini to Modigliani, October 18, 1957, in MP Box CO24).
Modigliani’s review was followed by the English translation of Sylos Labini’s Oligopoly and Technical Progress in 1962. There, Sylos Labini indicates the main differences among his model, his major aims, and Modigliani’s interpretation:
Considering the scientific value of Modigliani’s analysis and the original approach to certain specific problems and their solution, his paper is to be regarded as more than a critical review of the two books; it is a new and significant contribution to the theoretical problem of oligopoly.… Nor have I attempted to work out the whole analysis in the light of Bain’s and Modigliani’s contributions [with regards to the first part]. … It seemed to me that if I were to recast my whole analysis, this would not only involve a radical revision of the logic structure of my book, but, just because of the kinship between my analysis and the two others mentioned, might also impair the homogeneous texture of my argument. (1962, pp. vii–ix; emphasis added)Footnote 32
In particular, Sylos Labini does not emphasize, as Modigliani did, the role of the Sylos postulate. In subsequent editions he still read the hypothesis of constant output as the result of empirical evidences rather than in terms of established firms’ strategic price-output policy. He did not discuss the postulate in the 1957 Italian edition, even though Modigliani had already suggested his behavioral interpretation in his letter. He introduced the Sylos postulate in the English edition without, however, ascribing to it a relevant role in determining the equilibrium solution:
If new firms enter the market, the existing ones continue to produce as much as before. They do so not only to discourage the entry of new firms … but also because by lowering their output the existing firms would raise their total average cost (since on our assumptions total average cost is decreasing up to the limit of plant capacity) … if existing firms decide to produce less than maximum output, they do so not under pressure of new entry, but on the basis of independent economic calculations. (1962, p. 43; emphasis added)
The publication of Modigliani’s article review was followed by a debate in the Journal of Political Economy (1959). Donald E. Farrar and Charles F. Phillips Jr. from Harvard University criticized the S–B–M model. They defined it as reminiscent of Cournot’s duopoly theory and rejected the “bad psychology” expressed by the Sylos postulate. According to Farrar and Phillips, the postulate assumed away the “very essence of oligopoly theory” (1959, p. 416) that is the recognition of mutual interdependence, which represented the oligopoly’s major problem. Nonetheless, they admitted, “Recognition of entry provides oligopoly theory with a new point of joint profit maximization for existing firms—the entry precluding price-output combination …” (1959, p. 417).
Modigliani’s reply referred to the differing hypothesis and conclusions of Cournot’s and the S–B–M modelsFootnote 33 and defended the plausibility of the Sylos postulate: “It requires a good deal of obtuseness for the members of the closed Cournot group not to see that they can all improve their lot by cooperating. … But it would seem to be the best part of prudence for a potential entrant to give serious consideration to the possibility that the existing firms will make him as unwelcome as they possibly can” (1959, p. 418).
Despite differences between Modigliani’s and Sylos Labini’s approaches to the oligopoly problem, the subsequent literature quoted the two works jointly, often referring to Modigliani’s review as the “brilliant formalization of Sylos’ model” (see, for example, Bahawti Reference Bhagwati1970). Contrary to Sylos Labini’s intentions, the S–B–M model came “to be accepted as part of the mainstream theory of non-competitive markets” (Roncaglia Reference Roncaglia2006) and a classical contribution to the limit pricing theory. It represented a first step towards application of game theory and strategic behavior to the oligopoly problem. The Sylos postulate was in fact regarded during the 1970s as Nash–Cournot behavior by entrants, with the incumbent acting as a Stackelberg leader (see Osborne Reference Osborne1973, Gilbert Reference Gilbert1989, among others). According to Richard J. Gilbert:
Potential competition has been recognized as a mechanism to control the exploitation of market power at least since the work of J. B. Clark (1902), but it was not until 50 years later that economists, most notably Joe Bain and Paolo Sylos-Labini, refocused attention on the idea. With inputs from the theories of imperfect competition, optimal control, and dynamic games, their work evolved into ever more sophisticated models of the reactions of existing competitors to the threat of new competition. (1989, p. 107)
VI. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
Modigliani’s reading of Sylos Labini’s book appears clearly influenced by his different background and interests in economics. Sylos Labini pursued an idea of economic development strictly linked with institutional transformations, an approach that found a direct connection with the Italian tradition of political economy. His attention to the dynamic effects of innovations naturally led him to study with Schumpeter and to discover classical economists. From his subsequent research at Cambridge (UK), where his major references were Sraffa’s, Joan Robinson’s, and Nicholas Kaldor’s contributions to study of non-competitive markets, he reinforced his critical attitude towards marginal analysis. His aim was to give an objective foundation to the oligopoly theory, in contrast to the prevailing behaviorist approach based on firms’ reaction functions.
On the other hand, Modigliani earned his PhD from the New School for Social Research under Jacob Marshack’s supervision.Footnote 34 He was a mathematical economist, member of the Cowles Commission during the 1950s, then considered the avant-garde of new mainstream economics. From 1949 through the 1950s, Modigliani worked on two projects researching firms’ behavior under uncertainty, at the University of Illinois and then at the Carnegie Tech Institute.Footnote 35 These investigations likely influenced why he related the threat of entry strictly to the uncertainty problem, ascribing to new entrants’ anticipations a crucial role in determining the limit price. Even if he did not know the recent literature on oligopoly theory, the main issues under discussion, such as the validity of the maximization assumption and the role of expectations in decisions, were similar. Discussing Marshack’s and Leonard J. Savage’s minimax regret rule of choice—the basis of the Sylos postulate—at the 1949 American Economic Association conference, Modigliani defined it as reasonable and promising for introducing in the “process of choice under ignorance the fundamental economic principle of opportunity cost” (1949, p. 207). Thus, according to him, the minimax regret principle “might be of considerable help in explaining and forecasting economic decisions …” (ibid.).Footnote 36
The Illinois research originated from the dissatisfaction with the traditional postulate of rationality considered as of little or no use under uncertain conditions. Its aim was to investigate the formation of firms’ anticipations, providing direct evidence of the course of expectations in the US economy (Modigliani and Cohen Reference Modigliani and Cohen1961, p. 3). The second research, on firms’ production planning, took place at Carnegie Tech with Charles Holt, John Muth, and Herbert Simon in collaboration with the Cowles Commission and financed by the Office for Naval Research. Their starting point was a definition of uncertainty in terms of scarce and costly information, and a definition of rationality as strictly connected to the entrepreneurs' ability in obtaining and using it. Even if Modigliani did not abandon the optimization assumption under certain conditions, he accepted Simon’s hypothesis of satisficing behavior to analyze how firms behave under oligopoly: “Simon's distinction between the two criteria [maximizing and satisficing behavior] is, indeed, useful to analyze the importance of the outside world for a firm’s activity. Given the cost of a decision, if you find yourself in an environment in which a satisficing solution is sufficient to produce profits, you don’t go beyond it, for it would be more expensive” (2001, p. 87).Footnote 37
To conclude, Modigliani’s acquaintance with the minimax criterion and Simon’s satisficing behavior influenced his reading of Sylos Labini’s model and well explains his behaviorist approach to the oligopoly problem, in contrast to Sylos Labini’s objective analysis.
