Lucien Jaume's 2008 award-winning Tocqueville: The Aristocratic Sources of Liberty is now available in English, thanks to the linguistic labors of Arthur Goldhammer. The book weaves intellectual biography, history, and political thought into a scholarly masterwork that was twenty-five years in the making. Jaume explains that he did not think he could do justice to Tocqueville without exploring the “intellectual and ideological landscape of French liberalism in the 19th century” (5). Awareness of Tocqueville's ongoing conversations with counterrevolutionary, liberal aristocratic, republican, and so-called doctrinaire contemporaries (not to mention royalist family members) is for Jaume the indispensable path to Tocqueville's genuine and typically “veiled” voice. The author takes to heart the admonition of historian Lucien Febvre not to “kill the dead a second time” by replacing their true thoughts, beliefs, and loves with a subjective interpretation inadvertently based on contemporary sensibilities (7 and n23). Jaume insists that the attempt to ferret out the extent to which key Tocquevillean ideas emerged from ongoing dialogue with and among his contemporaries provides the necessary precondition for a genuine understanding of Tocqueville's own thought as well as his continuing relevance at the beginning of the twenty-first century.
The focal point of Jaume's book is Democracy in America (DA) and its relationship to the Old Regime and the Revolution, although he also makes copious use of Tocqueville's extensive correspondence and the manuscripts included in Eduardo Nolla's edition of Democracy in America. The book is divided into five parts, the first four of which analyze one aspect of Tocqueville's person and work within its immediate historical context—political scientist, sociologist, moralist, and writer. The fifth and concluding part of the book attempts to weave these four elements together within the context of Tocqueville's rivalry with Guizot and debt to Chateaubriand. According to the author, the unifying problem at the center of Tocqueville's published work is “authority,” or more precisely its collapse, together with the new forms of authority then beginning to emerge (10). Although Jaume claims that “none of the themes of Democracy in America was original to its author,” he does acknowledge that Tocqueville succeeded in drawing from his cacophonous milieu a book that far overshadows most of his contemporary interlocutors while rivaling the best among them (de Staël, Guizot, Constant) (8).
Of the four attributes used to organize the book, Jaume indicates that “the key to the analysis” and “the heart of the work” is found in the third and central part devoted to “Tocqueville as moralist” (10). It is here that Jaume explores Tocqueville's “Jansenist leanings” (189–90), describing a Tocqueville who, though skeptical of Jansenist theology, admires the moral grandeur of their teaching. More particularly, Tocqueville is keenly aware of human finitude and believes that human beings are necessarily an enigma to themselves, characterized as they are by irremediable duality (esp. 170–76).
The core of Jaume's view on Tocqueville's relationship to Jansenism is, however, less than fully clear—although it is enticingly suggestive. On the one hand, Jaume maintains that what Pascal says about the human condition in universal terms, Tocqueville transposes into the democratic social context. Whereas Pascal describes the human condition as one in which every effort to moor ourselves to some fixed point inevitably “eludes our grasp” and “flees in eternal flight” (161), Tocqueville writes that although democratic nations easily achieve a certain equality, it is “not the equality they desire. That equality recedes a bit further every day, yet never disappears from view, and as it recedes, it entices them to chase after it” (DA 2.2.13) (162). This helpful comparison reveals a similarity but also an important contrast between Pascal the philosopher and Tocqueville the moral and social scientist.
On the other hand, Jaume maintains that there is an “esoteric side to Tocqueville as moralist,” although it is hard to know exactly how he is using this fraught term (172, 187n24). He goes on to assert that it was not merely democracy, but “man's metaphysical condition that interested [Tocqueville],” and that it was recurring metaphysical concerns that “he wished to reconsider by exploring the mores of a foreign country” (namely, America) (180–81). This description, however, suggests a very different and far more philosophically ambitious Tocqueville, one who is primarily interested in understanding the human condition in general terms. Putting these two statements together one is left with a tantalizing question: Is Tocqueville's writing governed primarily by a practical statesmanlike desire to provide clear-sighted guidance for his countrymen as they move toward an inescapably democratic future? Or is Tocqueville's written work, like that of Pascal, fundamentally a philosophic attempt to articulate the truth about human existence?
Unfortunately, Jaume never addresses this kind of question in a sustained or systematic way. He only deepens the mystery when he asserts that “democracy carries with it a hidden meaning, which few people will be able to decipher” (187). Does the “hidden meaning” of democracy, as Jaume seems to suggest, refer to the inherent but poorly understood dangers of “individualism” and “soft despotism,” or the fact that democracy is compatible with either servitude or freedom—even though these Tocquevillean concerns would be fully apparent to his reader? Perhaps Jaume's references to esotericism and hidden meanings are intended to recall his provocative analysis of l'honnête in the immediately preceding chapter in which he argues that Tocqueville's writing is informed by the distinction between “honor,” understood to include the kind of personal and social utility accessible to average and decent people on the one hand, and, on the other, to those who aspire to a rarer and more disinterested understanding of virtue, grandeur, and heroism (esp. 154–55). If, as Jaume asserts, “[Tocqueville's] notion of l'honnête was intended to awaken what was best in selfish democratic man” by directing him toward “immaterial gratifications” (156), is there some “hidden meaning” of democracy addressed to those who aspire to greatness? In the end, Jaume leaves all such questions shrouded in ambiguity: he maintains that Tocqueville writes “in multiple registers” for “several possible readers” (230); that he is an “unclassifiable and ambivalent … figure” (247); and that “Democracy in America is also an oracle,” which like all oracles “could be interpreted in many ways,” even if none is “definitively true” (187).
One reason Jaume never pursues the kind of questions raised here, is that the primary aim of his book is to bring to light the enveloping influence of Tocqueville's conscious and unconscious dialogue with a wide range of contemporary aristocratic viewpoints (hence the book's subtitle). Jaume accomplishes this historical goal with aplomb; his erudite study offers readers an abundance of specific insights based on intimate acquaintance with primary sources from the nineteenth century and careful attention to the historical and linguistic nuances of Tocqueville's texts. Those, however, who are looking for a more philosophically consistent and internally driven Tocqueville are likely to be less than fully satisfied. Although Jaume sheds light on the way in which Tocqueville's most characteristic political, sociological, moralistic, philosophic, and esoteric themes emerged from an aristocratic milieu, he never provides a compelling synthesis of the way in which these disparate aspects of his writing fit together. Although Jaume elevates Tocqueville to “the role of democracy's Sphinx” (247), some readers will be left wondering whether the sphinx possesses a secret.
