DEMOCRACY AND VICE-PRESIDENTIAL RUNNING MATE SELECTION

The affirmation of voting rights through the 15th, 17th, 19th, 24th, and 26th amendments have made elections in the United States more inclusive and democratic (Dahl Reference Dahl2002).Footnote ³ Despite this, the vice presidency has shown the opposite tendency over the last 220 years. Rather than becoming more open, the selection of the vice-presidential running mate has instead fallen into the hands of only one person: the presidential nominee. As previous scholarly accounts have commented, because the vice-presidential race is “decided” only indirectly as a byproduct of the decision made on the presidential contest, “it can seriously be questioned whether the vice president is an elected official in the customary meaning of the term” (Sindler Reference Sindler1976,33).

Initially in the Constitution, the presidential candidate with the most electoral votes became president and the second most, vice president. In other words, the electors did not cast a ballot for the office of vice president; they only voted for president. This mode of election attempted to provide two things: First, that the vice president would be elected in a relatively democratic fashion: the electorate, through the electors, would choose the person with the second most votes for president as vice president.Footnote ⁴ Second, because the vice president was a presidential contender, the eventual winner would be of presidential caliber and could provide quality leadership if needed. However, three events occurred in the 1790s which called into question this method of electing vice presidents.

First, political parties, which were not yet formed during the drafting of the Constitution, slowly began to materialize more formally.Footnote ⁵ While the original mode of election guaranteed a successor of high quality, it did so by rejecting the idea that the vice president should be of the same party as the president (Sindler Reference Sindler1976, 23). In other words, it required a “depoliticized environment to sustain presidential contests among ‘statesmen’ unconnected with durable factions.”Footnote ⁶ Thus, the formation of parties aggravated the original method of election.

Second, when John Adams was elected president in 1796, Thomas Jefferson, Adams' bitter political rival, became vice president. Given that Jefferson was a defeated opponent, it came as no surprise that the two did not work toward the same ends while in office. As vice president, Jefferson played little role in the executive branch and did not support the Adams' presidency (Wilmerding Reference Wilmerding1953).Footnote ⁷ Given that the two were of different parties, some worried that the situation could, at worst, give rise to a coup d'état, and, at best, diminish the energy needed in a unitary executive branch (Crockett Reference Crockett2004).

Third, the election of 1800 demonstrated a glaring weakness in the original method of vice-presidential selection. Jefferson was the presidential and Aaron Burr the vice-presidential nominee of the Democratic-Republican Party. Although they each received more votes than their defeated Federalist rivals, Adams and Charles Pinckney, Jefferson and Burr had tied. While the electors had clearly intended Jefferson to be president, balloting at the time did not discriminate between the two positions. Because of the tie, the Constitution required the Federalist-controlled House of Representatives to decide the election between Jefferson and Burr. Intending to disrupt the Democratic-Republican victory and perhaps extract concessions from the victor, the Federalist-controlled House cast 36 ballots before deciding to award correctly the presidency to Jefferson (Waugh Reference Waugh1956, 43).

To address these deficiencies, the 12th Amendment created separate ballots for president and vice president. This would ensure that presidential candidates could not tie with their vice-presidential running mate in the balloting (Crockett Reference Crockett2004). Additionally, to avoid the problems created by having a president of one party/ideology and a vice president of an opposing party/ideology, the drafters of the 12th Amendment intended presidential and vice-presidential running mates to run as pairs. This would, in their line of reasoning, unify the executive branch in the face of party divisions by having presidential and vice-presidential running mates of the same party and provide the “energy” and cohesiveness that Alexander Hamilton argued for in Federalist #70 (Crockett Reference Crockett2004; Wright Reference Wright1996).

Although many hoped that the 12th Amendment would lead parties to pair like-minded candidates on their respective tickets, several members in Congress feared that “the vice presidency would be hawked about at market and given in exchange for the presidency” (Wilmerding Reference Wilmerding1953). For example, senator Samuel White (F-DE) claimed that the vice president would be chosen simply to “best promote the election of a president” and senator Gouverneur Morris (F-NY) claimed “the vice presidency would be put as bait to catch state gudgeons.”Footnote ⁸ In more modern terms, this decision included choosing vice-presidential running mates based on their political differences with the presidential candidate to entice voters the presidential candidate could not obtain on their own. For instance, to appeal to moderate voters or voters of the opposite party, a party might “balance the ticket” by picking a running mate considered more moderate than themselves or of a differing ideology.Footnote ⁹

Not surprisingly, given the political stakes of the presidential contests, the fears of the early members of Congress were realized. Following the ratification of the 12th Amendment, parties began to choose running mates for their differences with the head of the ticket (Baumgartner Reference Baumgartner2006a; Nelson Reference Nelson1988a; Sindler Reference Sindler1976).Footnote ¹⁰ This strategy was used to gain an electoral advantage by unifying a divided party or to attract general election voters. Thus, while the passage of the 12th Amendment provided for two separate ballots, in practice there would be only one election of significance with parties selecting the vice-presidential running mate and appending them to the presidential candidate.Footnote ¹¹ Thus, this practice limited the energy in the executive branch and directly contradicted at least part of the intention behind the 12th Amendment. For example, some of the pairs were not of the same party: in 1840, the Whig party chose Democrat John Tyler to run with their presidential nominee, William Henry Harrison, and in 1864, Republican Lincoln dropped incumbent Republican vice president Hannibal Hamlin to run with Democrat Andrew Johnson. Other pairs were of different ideologies and chosen to satisfy rival party factions: In 1880, Chester Arthur, a member of the Stalwart faction of the Republican Party, was selected to run with James Garfield to appease the political boss Roscoe Conkling and his Stalwart followers (Baumgartner Reference Baumgartner2006a).

Since the 1940s, presidential nominees have taken an increasingly larger role in the selection of vice-presidential running mates and currently make the choice single-handedly (Sindler Reference Sindler1976; Baumgartner Reference Baumgartner2006a). Presidential nominees continue to consult advisers, influential party members, and party leaders; convention delegates continue to cast ballots for the vice-presidential nominee. However, in practice, the decision ultimately belongs to a single person, the candidate (Witcover Reference Witcover1992).Footnote ¹² Unlike party bosses or conventions that made selections primarily based on policy and electoral concerns, presidential candidates also have incentive to choose a running mate who is competent, can carry on a legacy, and has similar views so that the pair will work well together (Nelson Reference Nelson1988b). The greater role played by the presidential candidates in choosing the vice president appears correlated with positive trends in vice-presidential selection. First, vice-presidential candidates have been more experienced and of “better quality” than previously (Baumgartner Reference Baumgartner2006a, Reference Baumgartner2006b; Nelson Reference Nelson1988a). Second, vice-presidential candidates have been more like their running mates as well (Hurwitz Reference Hurwitz1980; Baumgartner Reference Baumgartner2006a).Footnote ¹³ This has provided a more cohesive executive branch.Footnote ¹⁴

However, the incentive for parties to sacrifice cohesive governance before the 1940s still exists for presidential candidates today: Having a competent and ideologically similar vice president means little to a presidential candidate who loses the election.Footnote ¹⁵ Thus, presidential candidates often consider and/or ask ideologically different politicians to join the ticket. For example, in 2004, the hypothetical Democratic ticket of John Kerry and Republican John McCain had a 14-point advantage over the incumbent Bush-Cheney ticket, 53% to 39%, in polls of registered voters (Halbfinger Reference Halbfinger2004). This lead was nearly double the advantage Kerry alone enjoyed over President George W. Bush. It seems with each new election, presidential nominees are tempted to consider running mates of opposing party and policy preferences. To name three recent examples, in 2008, Republican John McCain gave serious consideration to Democratic senator Joe Lieberman, and Democratic nominee Barack Obama is reported to have considered Republican senator Chuck Hagel of Nebraska (Kuhn Reference Kuhn2008). Four years earlier, Democratic presidential nominee John Kerry asked Republican senator John McCain to join the Democratic ticket (Bumiller Reference Bumiller2008).

The following sections demonstrate how having an ideologically balanced ticket may induce perverse incentives and undemocratic outcomes using historical examples and a fictional illustration featuring a President “Smith” and a Vice President “Jones.” In addition, the following sections show that although the strategy of balancing the ticket appears to be advantageous during the campaign, a wealth of previous literature demonstrates that, ironically, the choice of vice president plays little role in election outcomes.

DEMOCRATIC OUTCOMES AND PERVERSE INCENTIVES

It is unlikely that a modern presidential candidate could put together a winning coalition that can win the primaries and secure a major party nomination without having policy preferences or other characteristics preferred by a majority of the constituency (e.g., Norrander Reference Norrander1986).Footnote ¹⁶ Hence, a nominee, who we will call “Smith,” could be said to be democratically chosen. But, that same candidate, Smith, may single-handedly choose a running mate—let us name her “Jones”—who has a dissimilar position on a salient policy issue.Footnote ¹⁷ Let us say Smith is in favor of the gold standard and Jones is in favor of the silver standard. Smith may have chosen Jones to appeal to Jones' losing coalition and thus broaden his own coalition.

On one hand, balancing in this way may provide normative value: having a president and vice president who vary in their issue positions (or have different geographic, demographic, or other characteristics) may provide better representation to more segments of the population. In terms of governance, dissimilar presidents and vice presidents may provide more balanced governing, with policy disagreements being negotiated between the two (e.g., Kengor Reference Kengor2000b). With this said, however, vice presidents have few formal powers and duties; they perform these, for the most part, at the discretion of the president. Should the president prefer not to work or negotiate with the vice president, the president does not have to do so. Thus, the vice president's ideological distance from the president may add little to White House policy.

On the other hand, this presents a problem for democracy because Smith's choice of Jones, from the beginning, was undemocratic. The winning coalition that chose Smith likely would not have chosen Jones—the coalition would have preferred a vice-presidential candidate similar to Smith. This highlights the problem for democracy: Smith sacrificed the wishes of his majority coalition to appeal to a minority coalition. As Ronald Reagan said publicly, he did not believe that “you choose someone of an opposite philosophy in hopes he'll get you some votes you can't get yourself, because that's being false with the people who vote for you and your philosophy.”Footnote ¹⁸

In the past scholars have argued that voters can punish candidates who select vice-presidential candidates for overly political purposes (e.g., Heclo, Reuss, and Schlesinger Reference Heclo, Reuss and Schlesinger1988). Returning to the Smith and Jones example, the voters could punish Smith for his choice of running mate by not voting for him in the upcoming election. This is, in theory, a democratic mechanism that could keep Smith from selecting a candidate too different from himself. However, this strategy presents serious problems. Given that the ticket of Smith and Jones still most likely represents the best choice for Smith's coalition, Smith's supporters have little choice but to support the ticket (e.g., Wattenberg Reference Wattenberg1995). In other words, asking citizens to vote for their least-preferred presidential candidate because they disapprove of their party's vice-presidential candidate could lead to an undemocratic outcome as well: citizens would be supporting their least-preferred presidential candidate and least-preferred policy positions.

An overwhelming body of extant literature, however, shows that citizens do not hold presidential candidates accountable for their choice of running mate. In other words, vice-presidential candidates do not affect general election outcomes. For instance, Polsby and Wildavsky (Reference Polsby and Wildavsky1971) comment that “there is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that vice presidents add or detract from the popularity of presidential candidates with the voters.” Dudley and Rapoport (Reference Dudley and Rapoport1989) find that, even in their home state, vice-presidential running mates add only 0.3% more votes than expected (see also Devine and Kopko Reference Devine and Kopko2011). Frankovic (Reference Frankovic1985) shows that in the 1984 election, less than 1% of all voters cited the vice-presidential candidates as the prevailing reason for their vote choice. When examining the small segment of the population that prefers a presidential candidate of one party and a vice-presidential candidate of another party, Wattenberg (Reference Wattenberg1995) finds that the former preference overwhelmingly prevails. Furthermore, while some voters claim that the vice-presidential candidate swayed their vote choice, Romero (Reference Romero2001) finds that after rationalization effects are accounted for, vice-presidential candidates have “no influence on the voters' choice for president.” Even in the 2008 election, where Republican vice-presidential candidate Sarah Palin was a highly salient and polarizing figure, the compiled evidence suggests that her effect on the eventual outcome was negligible (Kenski Reference Kenski2010; Knuckey Reference Knuckey2011; Mutz and Dilliplane Reference Mutz, Dilliplane, Sniderman and Highton2011; Ulbig Reference Ulbig2010; Brox and Cassels Reference Brox and Cassels2009).

Beyond the findings from the extant literature, I provide two specific examples of this. In 1972, the press reported that then Democratic vice-presidential nominee Thomas Eagleton had received frequent electroconvulsive therapy treatments for mental illness (Tubbesing Reference Tubbesing1973; Witcover Reference Witcover1992). Even after Eagleton admitted to receiving the treatments, polls showed supporters of Democratic presidential nominee George McGovern still intended to support the ticket.Footnote ¹⁹ In other words, McGovern supporters stayed loyal regardless of the fact that by doing so, a person (1) on the potent anti-psychotic drug, Thorazine (2) diagnosed with manic depression, suicidal tendencies, alcoholism, bouts of nervous exhaustion, and gastric disturbances, and (3) who had received electroconvulsive therapy would have been a heartbeat away from control of the country's nuclear arsenal. Clearly, turning to incumbent Republican Richard Nixon and his policies was not a viable option for McGovern's supporters.

Another example showing the vice-presidential candidate's inconsequence to the ticket occurred in 1984. Democratic nominee Walter Mondale had been receiving pressure from women's groups to choose a female running mate. During the summer, several polls showed that a majority of voters wanted a female vice president, and that a female running mate could bring Mondale not only a majority of female voters, but also 10 percentage points in the general election (Frankovic Reference Frankovic1985). Responding to political pressure and to the potential gains he could make in November with a female candidate, Mondale chose Geraldine Ferraro as his running mate (Witcover Reference Witcover1992). However, in the general election, the expected electoral advantage from choosing a female did not materialize: Mondale not only lost in one of the biggest defeats in recent history, but ironically, the Democratic ticket lost the female vote to Reagan as well (Frankovic Reference Frankovic1985).

As the extant literature and above examples show, the vice-presidential candidate has little influence over the general election outcome. Beyond this, asking voters to support their least-preferred presidential candidate because of disagreement with their party's vice-presidential candidate makes little logical sense. Thus, the idea of holding presidential candidates accountable at the ballot box for their choice of running mate appears untenable.

Returning to the fictional example of Smith and Jones, if “President Smith” carries out his term uninterrupted for the next four years, the problem of having a vice president with minority policy preferences is somewhat mitigated—Smith enacts the policies he prefers and Jones has little power to enact the policies she prefers. However, if Smith leaves office unexpectedly, then greater problems could manifest—voters would inherit President Jones who espouses policies the opposite of what voters intended. Although the voters supported Smith's gold standard, the country could inherit a president supporting and instituting the silver standard. Disagreement between the president and vice president could lead not only to an abrupt change in policy, but also to policy that is discordant with public preferences. As one early representative, John Clopton of Virginia, remarked, “When one person is intended for an office and another person actually obtains it, such election, if indeed it can properly be called an election, is not conformable to the will of those by whom it was made.”Footnote ²⁰

DEATH

Given that eight elected presidents have died while in office,Footnote ²¹ how would differences between the president and vice president affect democratic outcomes if the president passes? Returning to the previous example, assume that Smith dies. Smith's vice president, Jones, who has different policy preferences and appeals to different constituencies takes office. Let us say Smith was in favor of and instituted the gold standard, but died while in office, and Jones is in favor of the silver standard. On becoming president, Jones may decide to put national policy in line with her own preferences and abruptly switch to the silver standard. Jones represents a losing coalition and a minor subset of voters. In this example, although the country voted for a president who was in favor of one policy, because of a natural and unexpected occurrence, death, the country receives a policy in opposition to the majority's expressed preferences.Footnote ²² Such undemocratic outcomes have occurred. For example, when the Democrat John Tyler succeeded the deceased William Henry Harrison, a Whig, in 1841, he governed like a Democrat rather than a Whig (Waugh Reference Waugh1956, 70). Tyler vetoed Whig-sponsored bills, especially bank and tariff legislation, that came out of the Whig-controlled Congress. Most of Harrison's Whig cabinet resigned after Tyler's ascension, and he was eventually renounced by the Whig party (Abbott Reference Abbott2005). Although the voters reasonably expected to have a president espousing Whig policies for four years, they inherited a Democrat following Democratic policies for almost a full term. As such, Tyler was not renominated by the Whigs or reelected to the White House.

ASSASSINATION

Having a president and vice president who differ politically may incentivize policy-minded assassination. Again, assume that President Smith is in favor of the gold standard and Vice President Jones is in favor of the silver. Also, assume the money standard is a rather contentious issue, and some people are so concerned they are willing to resort to violence. The dissimilarity between Smith and Jones makes assassination an advantageous way to single-handedly change policy. An assassin in favor of the silver standard has motive to kill President Smith. Should the assassin be successful, he would be rewarded with Jones, a president who would change policy favorably for him. However, if Jones agreed with Smith on the gold standard, then the assassin would have little incentive to kill Smith: policy would not change. In other words, a more preferred policy outcome may be achieved if a sitting president is assassinated whose vice president has discordant policy positions. The problem for democratic governance is that this provides incentive to thwart majority rule with the pull of a trigger.

In US history, several assassins have been concerned with political issues and some were able to put a vice president in the White House who more closely agreed with their views.Footnote ²³ John Wilkes Booth, a southern sympathizer, killed Republican president Abraham Lincoln, putting Democrat Andrew Johnson into the presidency. Like Booth, Johnson was a Southern sympathizer and stymied efforts to bring about racial justice in the South (Clarke Reference Clarke2001). Charles Guiteau, a disgruntled “Stalwart,” unhappy with president James Garfield's “Half-Breed” patronage appointments, killed Garfield putting vice president Chester Arthur into the presidency. Like Guiteau, Arthur was a member of the Stalwarts and was viewed as more favorable to the patronage system (Clarke Reference Clarke1982; Waugh Reference Waugh1956, 80).Footnote ²⁴ President William McKinley was killed by Leon Czolgosz, an anarchist in opposition to McKinley's imperialist and capitalist policies (Clarke Reference Clarke2006). Czolgosz put into the White House, vice president Theodore Roosevelt, who championed trust busting, greater regulation over business, and conservation; Roosevelt was far more progressive than the conservative McKinley (Rauchway Reference Rauchway2004). History does not suggest the vice-presidents' positions caused, on their own, the assassinations.Footnote ²⁵ However, these examples do show that when presidents and vice presidents differ, incentives are created to make policy change through assassination.

IMPEACHMENT

Impeachment is rather extreme; only presidents Andrew Johnson and Bill Clinton have been impeached, however, discussions of impeachment have become more frequent in the last 50 years (Kyvig Reference Kyvig2008).Footnote ²⁶ The impeachment and removal processes are in the Constitution to ensure against the abuse of executive power and facilitate removal in the case of high crimes and misdemeanors (Tassel and Finkelman Reference Tassel and Finkelman1999). These removal mechanisms were not meant to give Congress the power to remove executives for political purposes or decide the length of presidential terms (e.g., Berger Reference Berger1973).Footnote ²⁷ Impeachment has an inherently political component (e.g., Amar and Amar Reference Amar and Amar1995), however, and has been increasingly discussed as a mechanism for Congress to bring political change (Kyvig Reference Kyvig2008). For this reason, legal scholars recognize that political disagreement between presidents and their successors can introduce a perverse set of incentives into the impeachment process (e.g., Calabresi Reference Calabresi1995).Footnote ²⁸

When deciding to impeach or remove, Congress may consider the crime committed, the political costs for pursuing impeachment, and the successor. Concentrating on the latter consideration, if the successor is more favorable to Congress's political agenda, then Congress may have political incentive to impeach the president. Although scholars suggest that presidents should only be impeached when a crime has been committed, the two cases of presidential impeachment show the charges were more for political purposes than for the “high crimes” discussed in the Constitution (Kyvig Reference Kyvig2008). For example, in 1868, president Andrew Johnson had no vice president because he inherited the presidency from Lincoln.Footnote ²⁹ As such, because the president pro-tempore of the Senate, Radical Republican Benjamin Wade, was first in line to succeed Johnson, Wade, for all intents and purposes, was the vice president. Because Johnson was a Democrat in opposition to most of the Republican reconstruction policies (Clarke Reference Clarke2001), the Republican-controlled Congress wanted Johnson removed so they could pursue their policies unhindered (Silva Reference Silva1968).

To remove Johnson, the Republicans essentially pushed him into not complying with a law of questionable constitutionality that Congress had passed specifically to induce his non-compliance (Silva Reference Silva1968).Footnote ³⁰ When, as expected, Johnson did not comply, the Republican-controlled House haphazardly drew up articles of impeachment and sent the case to the Senate for trial (Tassel and Finkelman Reference Tassel and Finkelman1999). Although most historians rate Johnson a poor president,Footnote ³¹ many agree that his impeachment and trial were politically motivated and based on trumped-up charges (Kyvig Reference Kyvig2008; Linder Reference Linder1999; Silva Reference Silva1968). In this case, although the president did not act criminally, Congress impeached and tried a president because the alternative was politically better: the political differences between President Johnson and his potential successor provided incentive to Congress use the impeachment mechanism mischievously.

However, in other cases, the successor to the sitting president may not present a preferable choice for Congress. In these cases, vice presidents who have similar policy stands to the president may incentivize Congress not to impeach or convict. In other words, a vice president may help a president escape removal. The impeachment charges against Bill Clinton were based on crimes poorly understood by the public (Shah et al. Reference Shah, Watts, Domke and Fan2002; Tassel and Finkelman Reference Tassel and Finkelman1999). However, it was clear that Clinton had perjured himself (Kyvig Reference Kyvig2008), and because of this, he later lost his ability to practice law.Footnote ³² Following the House vote to impeach, Clinton's conviction proceedings ended deadlocked, 50-50, and Clinton remained in office.Footnote ³³ Had the Republican-controlled Senate removed Clinton from office, they would have inherited a President Gore. Gore would have been politically worse for the Republicans: Gore had been termed a “Presidential Vice President” and was not carrying the baggage of scandal and infidelity consuming the Clinton presidency (Cohen Reference Cohen2001; Kengor Reference Kengor2000b). Removing Clinton from office at the time would have advantaged Gore, the presumed frontrunner in the 2000 election: the Republican Congress would have made the front-runner, Gore, an incumbent who would have been constitutionally able to serve almost 10 years in office if re-elected in 2000 and 2004.Footnote ³⁴ This outcome could have appeared far worse to Republicans than simply damaging Clinton and leaving Gore to stand in the 2000 election as the heir apparent to an impeached and scandal-ridden administration. In the end, Republicans did the most damage they could to the Democrats without removing Clinton. Unlike in the Johnson proceedings, Congress had a political incentive to keep Clinton, even though unlike Johnson, Clinton was guilty of an actual crime.Footnote ³⁵ Just as the prospect of a Republican presidency brought about illegitimate charges against Johnson, Gore may have protected Clinton from removal for crimes he did commit.Footnote ³⁶

INCAPACITATION

It is imperative that the president be of good health and mind. For instance, assume again that President Smith is for the gold standard and Vice President Jones is for the silver. Also assume that Smith becomes severely ill and bed-ridden. Most would argue that, if Smith cannot carry out the duties of the office, he should cede, either temporarily or permanently, the duties of office to Jones. However, President Smith may be reluctant to cede power to Jones given her policy positions are different than Smith's. Smith and his staff may fear Jones overturning his policies. This creates a dilemma because citizens would have to endure dysfunctional government to preserve the democratically preferred policy agenda. Had Smith and Jones shared policy positions, Smith may have allowed Jones to carry out policy.

Let us examine one historical example where the differences between the president and vice president may have led to such a situation. President James Garfield was a member of the “Half-Breed” faction of the Republican Party while his vice president, Chester Arthur, was a member of the “Stalwarts.” This essentially meant that Garfield was in favor of civil service reform while Arthur was not. Without delving too far into specifics, when two Stalwarts, Conkling and Thomas Platt, resigned their Senate seats in protest of Garfield's policies, Vice President Arthur came to their aid, publicly defying Garfield. This led to “hostility between the president and vice president” (Hansen Reference Hansen1962, 22).

On July 2, 1881, Charles J. Guiteau shot Garfield twice in the back. Garfield survived the assassination attempt for 80 days, lingering bed-ridden between life and death before finally succumbing.Footnote ³⁷ While the members of Garfield's cabinet attempted to keep executive business moving, the country was in “political limbo” (Bernstein and Agel Reference Bernstein and Agel2003, 162). Foreign affairs and the prosecution of Post Office swindlers were put on hold and executive officers were unable to carry out their duties because they had not yet been commissioned (Silva Reference Silva1968).

Despite this, Vice President Arthur was not employed to help manage government affairs during the 80 days. Historians cite two reasons to explain this: First, the Constitutional and other legal provisions were unclear about whether Arthur could assume temporary or permanent presidential responsibility during Garfield's incapacitation.Footnote ³⁸ And given that, Arthur did not want to exceed his authority and appear as a usurper. Second, while the cabinet did consider attempting to install Arthur at least temporarily to handle executive business, the cabinet feared, because of Arthur's affiliation with the Stalwarts, that “if Arthur took over executive power, the President's civil service reform would be washed down the drain in a flood of patronage” (Hansen Reference Hansen1962, 26). Beyond the cabinet's reluctance to designate Arthur, Garfield did not even see Arthur during his incapacitation. This was perhaps because of their political rifts; Garfield deeply distrusted Arthur (Feerick Reference Feerick1976, 8). Had Garfield and Arthur been of like minds politically, it is possible that Garfield and his cabinet may have engaged Arthur better in an effort to carry out executive prerogatives during the president's incapacitation. This response could have provided better functioning government.Footnote ³⁹ For example, president George W. Bush transferred power to his vice president, Dick Cheney, during minor outpatient procedures in 2002 and 2007. Although it was not necessary that Bush transfer power to Cheney in these instances, Bush wanted to be “super cautious” during a time of war (Bush Reference Bush2002). Bush and Cheney agreed on a broad range of salient policy issues and had a very close relationship (Pika Reference Pika and Nelson2010; Warshaw Reference Warshaw2009), which made it easy for Bush to transfer presidential responsibilities.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Given that the vice president is expected to carry out the functions of the presidency at a moment's notice, scholars should reflect on the implications of vice-presidential running mate selection. Because of precedent and constitutional amendment, over time, vice-presidential selection has fallen into fewer hands. This practice was partially intended to provide stable policy and a seamless transition should the president unexpectedly leave office. However, parties and presidential candidates have often opted for vice-presidential running mates who are politically different from the heads of the ticket. This strategy has often been followed to increase the chances of winning the general election. At the same time, when presidents and vice presidents differ significantly, (1) the country could inherit a leader espousing policies the country does not democratically support, and (2) a perverse set of political incentives may be created. I have demonstrated this using a fictional illustration and a series of historical examples.

During the election cycle, the media generally assess potential vice-presidential running mates by two criteria: (1) the running mates' ability to lead as president if the unfortunate were to occur and (2) the votes they may bring to the ticket. The media provide an important service by assessing and vetting potential running mates' qualifications and weaknesses. On one hand, this type of coverage not only informs the public, but may dissuade presidential candidates from picking unqualified running mates (e.g., Nelson Reference Nelson1988a). On the other hand, the horserace style of coverage, which captivates most of the media coverage during elections, provides little pertinent information to voters. The media spends much time hypothesizing about the electoral advantage a running mate may offer. This coverage has already begun for the 2012 election cycle: For example, Washington Post commentator, Sally Quinn, recently argued that President Obama should choose Hillary Clinton as his running mate in 2012 because Clinton “appeals to independents.”Footnote ⁴⁰ Ironically, extant research has been unable to show that these supposed advantages materialize on Election Day.

The media generally ignore the undemocratic outcomes and perverse incentives that may be created when presidents and vice presidents differ substantially. In other words, while news outlets do assess the qualifications of a vice-presidential candidate, news outlets rarely ask what the resultant policies will be should the vice president succeed. As such, the public is rarely asked to consider the unintended policy consequences that may result. Because of this, polls show that citizens often hunger for “dream teams” of dissimilar running mates who can unify a divided party or polarized electorate. For example, while numerous articles touted the electability of a Kerry/McCain ticket in 2004, few journalists stopped to consider what the outcome would have been had Kerry left the office before his term had ended. It is hard to imagine that Kerry's anti-war base would have been thrilled with a president John McCain.

Over the years, while many scholars have, for a variety of reasons, advocated the reform or abolition of the vice presidency (Ackerman Reference Ackerman2008; Sindler Reference Sindler1976; Schlesinger Reference Schlesinger1974; Rossitier Reference Rossitier1948), for a variety of reasons, this article does not advocate structural change to the electoral process or Constitution. This article does, however, ask scholars and the media to consider more closely how political differences between the president and vice president may lead to unexpected shifts in policy. During election years, the media should not only discuss the ability of the vice president to lead, but also how their policies may differ from the head of their ticket. This should not be done as a “game of gotcha” with the presidential candidates, but rather in a concerted effort to inform the public of potential policy shifts given an unexpected change in power. This type of further consideration by both the media and voters could lead presidential candidates to choose running mates who share similar policy positions on the most salient and divisive issues facing the electorate. This could ensure that the public gets continuity in the executive should the unfortunate occur.