Historically, the doctrine of precedent in the secular courts had no place in the ecclesiastical courts. However, judicial comity, consistency of judicial decision-making, and the desirability of securing equality of treatment as between different petitioners in similar cases, all have an important role to play in the determination of cases in the consistory court. Indeed, the Court of Arches has affirmed that ‘precedent has practical application at the present day because of the desirability of securing equality of treatment, so far as circumstances permit it, as between petitioners’: Re Blagdon Cemetery [2002] Fam 299 at para 36(v).

The petitioner wished to introduce a churchyard memorial to her late husband, reflecting his Jewish heritage and Christian faith by including a Star of David as well as a Cross. In Re St Mary, Shotesham [2024] ECC Nor 4, Etherington Ch had given a careful and reasoned judgment refusing a faculty for such a memorial. The court agreed with the conclusion that a symbol indicative of beliefs inconsistent with those of the Church of England should not ordinarily be permitted on a churchyard memorial. However, following consultation with two of the Diocese’s archdeacons, including the chair of the Diocesan Committee for Interfaith Relations, the court concluded that the Star of David was not such a symbol. Judaism and Christianity share a common monotheistic history and tradition; Jesus was recognised as the Son of David; and the symbol can be found within some Anglican churches. The court would consider the Star of David to be permissible by faculty, at least as long as it was to be displayed together with the Cross. The fact that, as here, the burial plot was to accommodate a couple of mixed faith would be likely to be a good and sufficient reason for the grant of such a faculty.

The court went on to consider whether it was open to it to give effect to that conclusion in the light of Shotesham, considering the weighty authority of the earlier decision and the importance of judicial comity, consistency of judicial decision-making and the desirability of equality of treatment between different petitioners. It concluded, with some hesitation, that it should decline to follow the earlier decision. The matter was essentially a question of doctrine rather than law, on which the views expressed to it were clear; its own reasons for disagreeing with the earlier decision constituted a good reason for refusing to follow it; and it would be wrong to determine the present petition contrary to the conclusions it had clearly reached, leaving the petitioner to invoke the court’s own reasoning in an appeal to the Court of Arches or (because to an extent the matter involved doctrine) the Court of Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved. A faculty would accordingly be granted.