Just over forty years have passed since the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict. Publications, documentaries, and media output were being produced even before the conflict ended and a plethora have been produced since 1982. However, the majority of these publications have reinforced the phrase: “history is written by the victors,” as a large proportion of them focus on Britain's Falklands Campaign or Britain's view of the conflict.
Importantly, Falklands/Malvinas 1982: A War of Two Sides breaks with this tradition; it seeks to add to the literature's growing interest in examining Argentina's war and Argentine views of the conflict forty years on, telling the story from a “different angle.” This book's main focus is to provide “more […] on the islanders’ experiences” and “on the Argentine experience of the war” (1). The book achieves this through some very good use of first-hand accounts, through a series of chapters laid out with the background, build-up to the crisis, conflict, and surrender. This is in addition to two intriguing penultimate chapters, which focus on the two “Societies at war” (148–66) as well as reflection and “Looking back on the war” (167–90). These chapters add to the growing Falklands/Malvinas Conflict literature as scholars seek to examine and reexamine the conflict from different angles and perspectives, just over forty years after the conflict's end.
However, the work does slip into reinforcing some old myths about the conflict. The book recounts how British Ambassador to Argentina, Sir Anthony Williams, “dismissed the report” “which speculated on increased Argentine pressure” (25). Despite common perceptions, Ambassador Williams repeatedly warned London of the growing tensions amongst the Argentine Government over the unresolved sovereignty dispute with the British. As official papers, memoranda, and telegrams show, these warnings were expressed well before April 1982. It was those in London who chose to ignore Williams. In addition, this book needs to be clearer about the terms of the 1981 British Nationality Act. The authors sway between all islanders being excluded by the Act (8), to “(nearly half)” of islanders (13), to seemingly all islanders again (48). It is to this end that this work relies too much on popular history sources such as Hugh Bicheno, Jimmy Burns, Dominic Sandbrook, and Andrew Marr, with both aforementioned issues emanating from popular history works.
There is also the need for some additional context to be provided in places in this book for readers who are not well-versed in the ins and outs of the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict. This includes explaining who certain individuals are when mentioned in the text for the first time. For example, “Nicko” Henderson (15) could be British Ambassador to the United States, Sir Nicholas “Nicko” Henderson. This additional information is also required for mentions of Galtieri (19) and Costa Méndez (29).
Nonetheless, the book does not overlook, as many have, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's government's domestic approval rating immediately prior to the outbreak of the crisis in April 1982. It is important that the book notes how, despite the general consensus that has pervaded the Falklands/Malvinas literature, “the Conservative Party regained its lead in opinion polls” prior to the 1982 crisis (15). Additionally, this work also provides some very good insights into Argentina's side of the conflict with use of material from Ejército Argentino and Junta Militar—CAERCAS—offering new and original material.
Unfortunately, there are some copyediting issues in this book, such as “British Sumer Time” (2) and the italicization and then non-italicization of The Sun newspaper (49). However, these are minor and do not detract from the fresh insight into Argentina's and the islanders’ sides of the conflict. This book is an enjoyable read, provoking a keen interest for those wishing to gain a deeper understanding of the multifaceted nature of the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas Conflict.
