Although perhaps more widely known as a theologian and philosopher, the Franciscan William of Ockham was also among the most prolific political authors of the late Middle Ages. Yet the intellectual substance of his work remains “elusive,” to use the term repeatedly invoked by Takashi Shogimen in this major reinterpretation of Ockham's thought. A large part of the problem derives from the bifurcated character of Ockham's literary output. Prior to 1326, he concentrated his writing entirely on theological and speculative philosophical topics, eschewing any interest in ecclesiopolitical affairs. In the second half of his career, after he arrived at Avignon from Oxford to answer charges of heresy before a papal commission, he turned his pen entirely to generating vast polemical treatises concerning questions of ecclesiastical and secular politics, in particular confronting the myriad issues arising from his unshakeable conclusion that the pope, John XXII, was a pernicious heretic who must be opposed.
In the scholarly literature on Ockham's political ideas, three main questions have predominated: How does his later polemical writing relate, if at all, to his earlier theological and philosophical work, most especially his so-called “nominalism”? What forms of organized political institutions in church and secular community did he favor or reject? How did his involvement in the “Spiritual Franciscan” controversy – that is, the famous conflict between the dominant wing of the Franciscan order, which favored a doctrine of absolute poverty on the part of the Friars Minor, and John XXII – shape the development of his political ideas? In a comprehensive and judicious survey that introduces the volume, Shogimen distills the major answers to these questions that scholars have offered during the past half-century or so. He is respectful of all his predecessors, but he ultimately concludes that they share a similar pattern of seeking in Ockham's writings some “core” or “systematic” features that unite his political output, as a consequence of which such interpretations are highly selective. Shogimen argues that “existing accounts have not paid attention to the plain fact that Ockham was primarily a polemicist in his involvement in political disputes” (p. 32). By contrast, Shogimen asserts that a full understanding of Ockham's thought requires a thoroughgoing “contextualization” in the recognition of its primarily “ideological” quality. This requires comparing Ockham's approach to the issues that animate him with the positions outlined by his contemporaries in order to discover “whether there is any constant perspective permeating his polemical responses” (p. 33).
Employing this hermeneutical strategy, Shogimen identifies a central “ideological” preoccupation in Ockham's clashes with his polemical rivals: namely, a “theological” concern about heresy that stands “ideologically opposed to … the canonists’ intervention in doctrinal matters …” (p. 232). This interpretation challenges, in particular, Brian Tierney's longstanding insistence that Ockham extended and elaborated a view of the church derived from a canonistic perspective. According to Shogimen, Ockham makes the key move of detaching the definition of heresy from the ecclesiastical system of authority with which it had become associated in the work of the canonists. “The sources of orthodox faith are purely textual, and so is heresy,” meaning that theologians rather than incumbents of ecclesiastical office are best qualified to determine doctrinal error (p. 85). Yet Shogimen points out that Ockham resisted the temptation to institutionalize the expertise of theologians by affording authority to their definitions of orthodoxy in place of popes and other clerical officials.
Rather, on Shogimen's account, Ockham allocates a surprisingly high degree of liberty to individuals to determine the tenets of true faith. In Ockham's view, the onus for demonstrating that a given belief stands in error pertains to the person who performs the correction. If an individual (even a layperson) who upholds such supposed error clings to it because he does not grasp the manner of his own mistake, it is unwarranted for clerical authorities to punish him. In part, this is because prelates themselves are often ignorant and fallible in matters of faith. But more importantly, Ockham maintains that the only reason one may legitimately employ coercion is to correct a person who explicitly admits that his position is erroneous and still refuses to surrender it. The individual who cannot or does not acknowledge that he is in error because he does not accept the reasoning presented to him must be accorded patient forbearance, not persecuted. To do the latter is to misuse the corrective power granted to the church, according to Ockham. The authority of the individual to maintain or refuse a belief until its error or truth is proven to his own satisfaction forms the centerpiece of his treatment of heresy. Consequently, the clerical official who attempts to compel sincere believers to give up the tenets of their faith abuses the nature of his office; one who uses such force to make others adopt heretical beliefs attacks the purpose and foundations of the Church.
Shogimen's Ockham, then, is first and foremost a theological controversialist fighting against those who, in his opinion, endanger the faith and the church. Ockham's guiding concern, to employ Shogimen's felicitous phrase, was the “crisis management of ruling institutions” (p. 233). What about Ockham's writings concerning earthly government? Shogimen contends that Ockham develops an essentially “negative” doctrine rooted in two principles that apply equally to the temporal sphere as to ecclesiology: first, the political theory of institutions is essentially negative, that is, an account of what magistrates can't do, rather than what they can; and second, the maximization of human liberty, understood as an individual property exercised in accordance with reason and will, should form the main aim of secular as well as clerical powers. Shogimen believes that these two propositions, which sound as though they support a quasi-constitutionalist and proto-liberal position, actually yield the foundation for a somewhat more robust political theory, which he terms “ecclesiastical republicanism” (p. 256). Unfortunately, he discusses this idea only briefly in a few pages contained in the final chapter of the book; it is a theory that, if sustainable, requires far lengthier and deeper analysis, perhaps even a sequel to the present volume. However, the latter may be asking too much of Shogimen, who is a historian by trade, not a political theorist, and may feel hesitant to wade into unfamiliar waters.
I am sure that this book will not please those scholars who have sought to fit William of Ockham into a prefabricated intellectual or historical frame. But Shogimen's careful readings and precise contextualization bring to the fore a full picture of an Ockham who has been only dimly viewed in the past. Serious scholars of medieval thought owe him a large debt of gratitude for writing a volume that will be read and debated for decades to come.
