The Making of Law is a sound legal history that uses Supreme Court opinions, legal texts, US State Department memoirs, and law and policy articles to prove that adjudication was an integral part of the law-making process in Mexico during a period when the Supreme Court played an important role in the nation. Additionally, the book demonstrates how the conduct of social actors – employers, workers, legal scholars and politicians – influenced judges’ decisions and shaped labour law. In all, this skilfully structured and superbly researched work illuminates how labour legislation came into being as an independent category of law, and portrays how the lack of overarching federal legislation set the tone for state, business and labour relations in the Porfirian and early postrevolutionary periods.
The book's introduction provides a primer on Mexico's legal system that will benefit the legal scholar and general history student alike. Here the reader learns that, despite a constitutional separation of powers in place to restrict political decision-making to the legislature and the application of laws to judges, jurisprudencia, or case law, had an influence on the making of law in Mexico after at least 1875. Jurisprudencia, we also learn, was a factor in the legislative process that became especially important after 1917, when the federal judiciary adhered to a narrow policy of stare decisis that allowed the creation of a controlling precedent after five consistent, consecutive rulings by the Supreme Court. Similarly, the Supreme Court used the juicio de amparo, a judgment of support or protection that was essentially injunctive, to exercise a degree of independence from the executive and, in some cases, eventually to invalidate labour laws and practices it deemed unconstitutional.
Subsequent chapters present case studies that examine the amparo and the shifting tendency of the Supreme Court to grant or deny the petition consistent with or counter to the will of the executive. Chapter 2 examines cases disputed on the topic of debt peonage, an institution that was constitutionally prohibited but one that Porfirio Díaz permitted to continue in the interests of agrarian development. Consulting 17 published opinions from a wide array of states, Suarez-Potts demonstrates that the Supreme Court prior to 1899 routinely contravened the will of the government by upholding the right of free labour and by granting amparos that freed petitioners from penalties such as imprisonment, forced payment of debt or forced return to work.
In contrast, in the 1923 case of La Corona, described in chapter 6, the Supreme Court decided an amparo petition to the executive's advantage. This ruling saw the Supreme Court withdraw an amparo that had been granted to a Veracruz oil company by a federal judge and restore the order issued by the state's conciliation and arbitration board that required the company to compensate the widow of an employee killed on the job. In overturning the decision of the lower court, the Supreme Court effectively gave the state labour boards, which had been established only in 1917, the power to make law by resolving disputes or ratifying outcomes. As importantly, the Supreme Court's decision empowered the federal government, whose control over the newly established boards increased its influence in the sphere of industrial relations.
The Supreme Court's independence from the executive resurfaced again in 1927, when it overturned an order of the federal labour ministry and ruled in favour of railway workers who were members of a union that was a rival of the Mexican Regional Labor Confederation, then a pivotal government ally. The high court's ruling was made moot, though, when President Calles took preemptive action and established a federal labour board to adjudicate that and all future disputes having a national scope. The railway workers’ conflict of 1927, described in chapter 7, thus revealed that the revolutionary state had little tolerance for an independent judiciary and that a federal labour law was required if the government wished to channel the course of industrial relations and prevent similar future shows of judicial insubordination.
Whereas Suarez-Potts vividly details the legal and philosophical rationales for judicial decisions, he presents a sometimes sterile narrative that excludes its human participants. What killed the employee of La Corona? Why did conditions at Cananea cause workers to revolt in 1906? The author admits the obstacles of using legal opinions to illuminate broad historical patterns when he explains: ‘The published opinions normally discuss the rationale of their ruling … but rarely is the social context of the underlying conflict fully presented’ (p. 45). This is undoubtedly true, as any historian who has tried to craft a narrative using only dry and minimalist pleitos (lawsuits) surely knows. Yet, being aware of the personal circumstances of the petitioners and knowing about the Porfirian or revolutionary ‘social contexts’ within which they lived may be as useful in understanding the court's decisions as knowing the legal doctrines that founded them. Many of the episodes examined here, such as La Corona or El Águila, are documented in other media and may be more colourfully told by cross-referencing amparo petitions with reportage in newspapers, a source Suarez-Potts uses primarily for editorial commentary.
The Making of Law reveals how new paradigms and social orientations influenced labour law in Mexico long before their codification in 1931. The book also stresses continuity by demonstrating how the judiciary was a constant factor in law-making and exerted a greater than realised independence from the executive during both the Porfirian and early postrevolutionary periods. The book's sole shortcoming is its voice, yet its tendency to speak primarily to matters of legal doctrine does not prevent it from making a broad historiographical contribution. Historians of even late twentieth-century Mexico will benefit from consulting the book's nuanced exploration of how Mexican policy-makers worked to enact a federal labour code and create conciliation and arbitration boards that transferred the power to resolve industrial questions out of the hands of an unreliable judiciary and into those of a centralising and increasingly authoritarian federal state.
