Clausewitz famously compared war to a duel. Michael Barrett's book is very much set in the same tradition. Barrett has written a book about just over four months of 1916 told largely from the perspective of the generals. It is an intimate and thorough examination of operations. On several occasions, the perspective lifts to consider the place of the Romanian campaign in the larger war effort. There are few moments when Barrett turns the discussion to the ways in which combat was experienced. The limited exploration of the strategic significance of the Romanian campaign tends to emphasize the recovery of confidence after the horrendous slaughter of Verdun, the Somme, and the Brusilov offensive. Barrett does not explore the close connections between the Romanian war and the decision to launch unrestricted submarine warfare, nor the impact the Brusilov campaign had on weakening both Austria-Hungary and Russia, which played an immense role in the way the Romanian campaign played out. The book is also not written to explore the norms of war, even though one could use the destruction of the Romanian oil fields by the British as a means of critiquing Isabel Hull's thesis in Absolute Destruction.

Having noted the weaknesses, let us emphasize Barrett's strength. This is a well-researched book that very carefully explores the factors shaping command decisions and the consequences of those decisions on the battlefield. Barrett is quite good at assessing the strengths and weaknesses of generals. He brings out some of the humanity behind men such as Erich von Falkenhayn, August von Mackensen, and Henri Berthelot.

This is, then, a solid study of operational decision making. That intent is unfortunately masked by the poor title choice. Normally book titles are not particularly germane to a book review. Prelude to Blitzkrieg, however, seems to promise a study of how certain operational ideas about firepower and mobility developed. One might expect some discussion of the lessons Erwin Rommel and Friedrich Paulus took away from the Romanian campaign (both served in the invasion of Wallachia), or some suggestion that the development of the tactical innovation seen in Operation Michael originated in the Carpathian Mountains. The title suggests a study of doctrine. This is a book that is resolutely not about doctrine. It is about individuals and decisions, and as such, its title leads the reader to search for discussions that do not exist in the book.