Anne-Marie Brady's account of China's increasing role in polar affairs is also the story of its emergence as a great power. Nothing illustrates this more clearly than the vertical map of the world on the cover of her book – instead of displaying the polar regions at the peripheries, this map drawn by a Chinese scientist shows China at the centre surrounded by the two poles. According to Brady, the subtext here is that China is playing an increasingly important role in polar affairs and that China's role in these regions supports its broader geopolitical aims. Brady notes that this map symbolizes the ongoing reconfiguration of Chinese foreign policy and “is the visual reorientation of China's new global Realpolitik: pragmatic, assertive of China's national interests, cooperative where it is possible to be cooperative, and yet ready to face up to conflict” (p. 5).

Brady's book is a rich piece of scholarship which will be of great interest to China scholars, who will be especially grateful for the bilingual glossary of polar terms, as well as to polar experts seeking to understand China's evolving role in the Arctic and Antarctic. This book will also appeal to informed general readers with an interest in geopolitics as it portrays well the long game that China has been playing in the polar regions, gradually expanding its footprint through investments in science, technology, personnel and logistics with the aim of becoming a polar great power as environmental conditions change and its own capabilities permit.

Brady's book came out just a few months before China published a white paper on its Arctic policy on 26 January 2018, available in English translation, though she convincingly argues that the Chinese language materials on the polar regions provide a more accurate picture of China's polar policies than those issued for foreign audiences. Indeed, her book provides a useful backstory to the 2018 Arctic white paper. Brady notes that for domestic consumption Chinese officials portray the polar regions as the common heritage of mankind in which China has a right to share. She points out that China's interests in the polar regions are framed differently for foreign audiences where China's scientific and environmental concerns figure more prominently and geopolitical aims are downplayed.

Brady emphasizes that China's security, resource and scientific interests in the Arctic are strategic and designed to support the country's great power aspirations. In particular she highlights the overlap between Chinese polar policy and military strategy – this is especially true in the maritime dimension where China's polar aspirations provide a further rationale for creating a blue water navy. She also notes that China's polar research stations and placement of ground stations for its BeiDou satellite system will be significant for the development of China's space programme as well as its command and control capabilities. While greater polar access and presence help reduce some of the vulnerabilities China faces in terms of its energy security and nuclear deterrence, Brady warns that regional states may perceive China's actions as a threat, especially in the Arctic.

In the polar regions, we see the Chinese military, state institutions and state-owned enterprises working in parallel and chapter four, “The party-state-military market nexus in China's polar policymaking,” provides an interesting case study of the policy process in an interdisciplinary issue area. Indeed, this is an area where the State Oceanic Administration (rather than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) has taken the lead, though there is no coordinating body beyond one advisory commission to corral the seventeen agencies with polar interests. She also explains how Chinese government authorities support the activities of state-owned enterprises in the polar regions, as these corporate activities contribute to the country's overall objectives of expanding presence and access to resources. Brady further contends that the People's Liberation Army has been an important actor in polar affairs, by lending expertise and equipment, though “one whose role has been disguised by China's polar science program” (p. 131).

While Xi Jinping referred to his country as a polar great power in a 2014 speech in Hobart, Australia, has China really achieved that status? In Brady's assessment, China's number of research bases and scientific logistics capabilities place it on par with Russia and the United States, though she points to a number of weaknesses in its polar science programme. Nonetheless, Brady sees China assuming the role of a polar leader in the future thanks to substantial investments in its research and scientific capabilities and the priority placed on the development of its maritime and economic power.

In the short term China needs the cooperation of other polar states to achieve its goals and downplays its interests, especially in resource exploitation, yet Chinese officials are working to position their country to have greater voice in future polar governance. For example, while China signed the treaty to limit fishing in the now frozen Arctic high seas, they would likely be eager to fish there once conditions allow and would want to participate in developing any new fishing regime. Similarly in the Antarctic, China has seen environmental protection as a barrier to its resource interests and has pressed for fewer restrictions.

With China's Arctic strategy now linked to Xi's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – plans for a Polar Silk Road were outlined in 2017 – we see a familiar pattern of infrastructure and resource investments as a means of extending China's logistical and economic control over key ports and industries along the route. This may well lead to some of the same sort of blowback the BRI has begun to encounter in South-East Asia and pose new challenges to what Brady convincingly portrays as China's quest for polar great power status.