In his book, Christian Welzel develops a comprehensive theory to explain how changes in people’s values promote democracy and expand freedom all around the world. The scope of the theory is immense, making claims about universal human nature, reasons for the rise of what would ultimately become democratic societies in Western Europe in the fifteenth century, and long-term—even future—outcomes of human development. Welzel tests his theory with World Values Survey (WVS) data and a wide range of country-level data. The book is both ambitious and impressive and is likely to inspire many other researchers. Whether or not one is convinced by the author’s analysis, his will be the important argument to address.
Welzel’s focus throughout Freedom Rising is on emancipative values—those orientations that favor increasing human freedom. His central argument builds on Ronald Inglehart’s earlier work on “postmaterial” values and Inglehart and Welzel’s previous work on “self-expression” values. This book advances those arguments with a more fully developed evolutionary theory, improved measures, and new empirical tests. Welzel’s argument starts with the claim that emancipative values are not simply Western in nature—as some scholars, including Samuel Huntington, have implied—but are grounded in a universal human desire to live free of external domination. Welzel supports this claim with WVS data and also with the observation that all major religions promise a form of salvation that closely resembles freedom.
Although emancipative values are present all over the world, there is substantial cross-country variation in levels of those values, and that is a central puzzle Welzel seeks to solve. His sequence thesis posits that growing action resources—which include knowledge, networks of exchange, and material resources—lead to increases in levels of emancipative values. As emancipative values increase and are widely shared across the population, people press their governments for civic entitlements. Alternately, if action resources are low, the utility of freedom is low, emancipative values remain dormant, and citizens do not push their governments for more rights. Although it may appear that culture shapes social values, Welzel claims that action resources play a much bigger role: “Culture zones seem to shape people’s emancipative values because the culture zones differ in the action resources that truly shape values” (p. 105).
Welzel’s source thesis aims to explain why some civilizations developed the necessary action resources earlier than others. His argument is that a “Great Redirection” began in the Atlantic West between 1450 and 1500. Where previously societies had aimed to perfect human exploitation, societies began to develop that advanced human empowerment. The author traces the difference to the moment that urban societies arose in cool water zones, where the climate was relatively cool and people enjoyed equal and permanent access to water year round. This water autonomy cancelled a historic route to despotism, encouraged reductions in fertility that increased the cost of labor, and ultimately led to technological advances. The technological advances allowed the growth of action resources that in turn pushed the rise of emancipative values. Since emancipative values also explain the rise of democracy, these societies became democratic sooner and, based on their technological advances, more prosperous.
If human flourishing is ultimately based on accidents of climate and geography, then the prospects for countries in warmer and drier areas seems bleak. But that is not Welzel’s conclusion. His contagion thesis predicts that human empowerment is about to break free from the cool water condition. As the global communication network spreads the good news of emancipation, emancipative values diffuse to new areas and people become empowered to act together to bring about political change. Welzel also predicts that emancipative values will help solve the sustainability challenge. With stronger emancipative values, social activism to protect the environment becomes more likely. As he states, “Humans are programmed to ascend rather than descend the utility ladder of freedoms: they stop their ascension as long as necessary to continue it as soon as possible” (p. 408).
Clearly, Welzel makes some bold claims. The critical question, then, is whether his data fully support them. In many ways, they do. His analysis of the World Values Surveys allows him to test most of his hypotheses with data from 95 countries representing all major regions of the world. With these data he is able to show, for instance, the powerful effect of emancipative values on social movement activity and on democracy. With rising emancipative values, people are more critical of the democratic quality of their own society and more likely to put pressure on institutions that are not reaching their full democratic potential. Where people favor democracy but do not rank high on emancipative values, they tend not to pressure imperfectly democratic governments to improve. Using country income estimates stretching back two millennia and data on the percentage of territory with abundant water and cool weather, Welzel makes a convincing case for the importance of the cool water condition. Throughout, his analysis is careful, thorough, and clearly explained even for readers without a great deal of practice in the art of survey data analysis. Most of the book is devoted to testing the sequence thesis, with the test of the source thesis largely in the penultimate chapter. The contagion thesis is not really tested, though evidence of growing emancipative values all over the world provides some support.
As with all empirical work, some of Welzel’s decisions about measures, data, or types of analysis could raise questions. A better measure of emancipative values, for instance, might produce different results. The World Values Surveys lack sufficient historical sweep to fully test some of Welzel’s claims. In Chapter 4, for example, the author aims to demonstrate that action resources precede emancipative values, and both appear before governments grant civic entitlements. This is an important claim because it contradicts the common view that democracy gives rise to emancipative values, and not the other way around. To test this claim with World Values Survey data, however, means relying on hard data that extend back only to 1990. And surveys extending back that far primarily include only advanced industrial societies (pp. 151–54). Welzel uses WVS surveys to estimate earlier data points, but even then the simulation extends back only six decades, not necessarily to the start of democratic systems in the countries that are included.
Welzel ‘s data also provide a macro-level view, exposing relationships between factors that hold true across recent periods of time and around the world. His approach does not help much to explain why a particular country can or cannot manage to sustain democratic institutions at a particular point in time, or why a specific social movement forms or does not form.
In any case, whether or not one is fully convinced, it is impossible to dismiss Freedom Rising. It is a big, bold, and provocative book, and it is likely to inspire both devotees and critics to devise other ways to test its central claims. Importantly, Welzel provides a great deal of help to those who might challenge him. He explains each methodological choice and each step in his analysis clearly and thoroughly. There is a 146-page online appendix that provides further documentation of measurement and coding procedures. All the tools for replication are present, which is wonderful in a book so likely to inspire further research.
