Flattery is a pervasive, perpetual, and perplexing feature of human life. It is too useful to categorically denounce but too distasteful to wholeheartedly embrace. Or so argues Daniel Kapust in an illuminating and crisply written new book which emphasizes the morally ambiguous status of flattery. Pushing gently, but firmly, back against a “moralistic” account which characterizes flattery as an unqualified evil, Kapust seeks to partially rehabilitate the concept by highlighting the way in which it “turns power relationships upside down, allowing the physically weak … to trick and trap his more powerful adversaries” (8). Though the attempt to underscore flattery's subversive potential might have been more effectively realized by engaging more with the literary traditions of marginalized peoples than with the usual cast of canonical thinkers, it is difficult to find fault with Kapust's case selection: chapters on civic republicanism, Castiglione and Machiavelli, Hobbes, Mandeville and Adam Smith, and the American Founding era are all useful variations on his theme and serve to reveal the uses and abuses of flattery in very different intellectual and historical milieu.
Flattery, like obscenity, is easier to identify than to define, and Kapust theorizes flattery as a form a deferential speech which alters the behavior of the audience in ways which serve the interests of the speaker. This conceptualization is precise without being reductive and provides a sturdy foundation for Kapust's careful and informative interpretive work. Highlights on this score include chapter 1, which uses the theme of flattery to reveal the creative ways in which thinkers such as Cicero and Pliny sought to come to terms with the emergence of monarchical rule and the power asymmetries which attend it, and chapter 4, which contains a superb discussion of Smith's and Mandeville's disagreements about flattery. This latter chapter is the best in the book, providing the most direct and forceful statement of flattery's profound moral ambiguity: Kapust opposes Smith's “remoralized” critique of flattery to Mandeville's thoroughgoing “strategic” embrace of it through an illuminating analysis of their respective views on language, ultimately siding with Smith on the ground that being flattered “is simply not enough” to suffice for our happiness (165). Though I think Kapust embraces Smith's view somewhat too quickly—one can imagine a number of plausible positions between Mandeville's, which relies too heavily on the desire to be praised, and Smith's, which relies too heavily on the desire to be praiseworthy—his analysis of both authors is illuminating.
A systematic study of flattery is especially welcome in an age where the president of the United States begins cabinet meetings by forcing subordinates to bestow praise upon him, and perhaps the greatest of this book's many strengths is its ability to connect questions of civic practice to perennial political problems in a way which brings out the importance of each. The Trump question looms over the text and gives urgency to the inquiry without unduly narrowing it. Thus as Kapust marshals evidence to the effect that the problem of flattery is, more or less, as it has always been, one is reminded—and somehow comforted by the reminder—that Donald Trump is hardly the first demagogue to openly court flatterers. Whatever one makes of Trump, Kapust's analyses of Castiglione and Machiavelli in particular reveal the ways in which his, or any political leader's, susceptibility to flattery can make him the (unwitting) agent of political changes which they could never have envisaged on their own. In so doing, they point to the perennial importance of something like an axis of adults.
Flattery is, of course, a matter of style as well as of substance, and Kapust analyzes the different forms which flattery can take in an informative, if imperfect, discussion of Castiglione and Machiavelli. Kapust contrasts the latter's unadorned “realist” style to Castiglione's embrace of ornamentation and rightly claims that Machiavelli's apparent abandonment of rhetoric must itself be understood as a rhetorical innovation. Yet it must be said that Kapust terminates his analysis of Machiavelli precisely where things get interesting, and that his analysis of chapter 22 of The Prince, which deals specifically with flattery, disappoints because it neglects the heavily self-referential and potentially deceptive character of Machiavelli's advice. There is, for instance, something rather obviously paradoxical about Machiavelli telling Lorenzo in an unsolicited book of advice to take counsel only “when he wants, and not when others want,” but Kapust elects to takes this bit of counsel at face value. One can't help but wonder how the analysis of The Prince in particular might have been enriched by a consideration of the possibility that Machiavelli is not only describing but enacting the problem of flattery in his text.
As it is for Machiavelli, so it goes for all of the authors whom Kapust treats. He is understandably hesitant to entangle himself in questions of authorial intention—and defends that hesitance very ably—but such entanglement seems inevitable once it is acknowledged that the very authors Kapust analyzes, in Castiglionian fashion, could well be utilizing some of the very practices that they describe in order to get their audience “to do what [they] ought to have done in the first place” (79). This limitation notwithstanding, Kapust is to be commended for having written a book which substantially advances our understanding of an exceedingly important and woefully neglected concept.
