The puzzle that sets the agenda for this book is the divergent paths taken in the United States and Britain with regard to the role of the state in industrial relations. Despite a common heritage of limited government and an ideological aversion to an interventionist state, the United States responded to the depression of the 1930s with the construction of the now familiar system of state regulated and sanctioned trade union recognition and collective bargaining, a system in which the state became intimately involved in the relations between labor and capital. In Britain, on the other hand, the state played a more muted role in industrial relations leading to the creation of what became known as “collective laissez faire,” in which unions and employers' organizations regulated their own relations with only limited legislative interference. Focusing upon the period between the outbreak of the two World Wars, Larry Gerber traces the role of the state in these two countries with the goal of explaining their divergent industrial relations policies. His argument, in a nutshell, is that culture and ideology cannot explain the divergence because they were sufficiently similar, but that differing economic structure can.
The chronological account is organized around an examination of the role of the state in the construction of what Gerber, perhaps misleadingly, refers to as corporatism at the macro- (national), meso- (industry) and micro- (firm) levels. Corporatism is a contested term so it is hard to appeal to a generally accepted definition, but utilized in the fashion of this volume it loses any specificity and becomes more or less synonymous with industrial relations. Gerber recounts the failure of national corporatist experiments in the 1920s in both countries, the successful implantation of industry bargaining in Britain before, during, and immediately after World War I while equivalent efforts failed in the United States, and the spread of firm-level collective bargaining in the United States in response to the National Labor Relations Act. The critical difference between the two countries, he argues, was the role of the American state in regulating and underpinning the system of firm-level bargaining during the Depression.
The essence of Gerber's argument is that the smaller, less bureaucratically organized British firms remained reliant upon skilled labor, thus making a union avoidance strategy less feasible. As a result, unions were able to encourage firms to enter into industry-level collective bargaining arrangements without calling upon the British state to impose union recognition or bargaining upon employers. In the United States, on the other hand, larger, bureaucratically organized corporations, with increasingly specialized and sophisticated personnel departments, were able to reduce their reliance upon skilled labor and hence their need for cooperation with unions. Furthermore, the experience of World War I encouraged the spread of company unions, making resistance to independent unions more plausible. As a result, Gerber argues, the only way that collective bargaining with independent unions could appear in the United States was if the state itself imposed it through the highly juridified system of the National Labor Relations Act. Hence the more interventionist role of the state in the United States than Britain.
The focus upon the state in this volume is welcome. Particularly among labor historians, but also among industrial relations specialists, there has for too long been a focus upon the workplace and the forms of conflict and cooperation that emerge out of the processes of capitalist economic restructuring and work reorganization. Gerber pays close attention to debates among political actors, particularly in the United States, in order to explain when intervention took place and when it did not. One could ask for a more expansive definition of state intervention; the term is here used in an almost exclusively legislative sense, and in that sense it does appear that the paths of the United States and Britain diverged in the interwar period. However, there was an enormous amount of administrative, judicial and police intervention, which shaped industrial relations and the resulting institutional architecture of collective bargaining. The distinction between the United States and Britain was less the degree of state intervention than its form. Administrative action on the part of the Board of Trade and other government agencies played a central role in the spread of industry bargaining in Britain between 1900 and 1920.
This is a relatively short book, and yet it wades into one of the most contested areas of American historiography and political science: the interpretation of the New Deal. Gerber argues that two of the major approaches to explaining that brief burst of progressive legislation—one focusing upon the efforts of liberal corporate interests, and the other emphasizing the far-sighted role of the state in regulating capitalism to save it—misread the historical evidence. The very weakness of U.S. labor unions is sufficient to explain the need for the state to step in and force employers to recognize unions. There is merit to Gerber's preferred explanation, but there is simply not the space in this volume to adequately evaluate alternatives. To take but one example, Peter Swanson's work (Capitalists Against Markets. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) is cited approvingly by Gerber, but through a detailed examination of corporate and political archives for the period of the 1930s, Swanson demonstrates that important elements of American business either did favor the bulk of the New Deal legislation, or that the state could anticipate their acquiescence to it.
One final issue raised by this book is the that of path dependence. For Gerber, the structure of the British and American economies in the interwar period created the conditions that led their two paths of industrial relations development to diverge, and those paths remained divergent for close to forty years. Yet the question is why, when economic and political conditions changed, there was not pressure for an institutional restructuring of the two industrial relations systems. By the middle of the 1930s British firms were coming to adopt the organizational form of their American counterparts, a form that was presumably more amenable to union avoidance, and reliance upon skilled labor was far less significant than it had been before World War I. Yet pressures for a more interventionist role on the part of the state did not appear until the middle of the 1960s. Similarly, the political conditions under which the American state was willing to impose union recognition and collective bargaining upon corporations was extremely short-lived, and yet the New Deal industrial relations system has survived, albeit in bastardized form, into the present. Certainly its original intent and functioning has been twisted, but why did it survive the 1940s at all unless it served some useful function for employers?
Larry Gerber has written an engaging and provocative book, which importantly directs our attention to the actual practice of the state, even when antistatism forms the dominant ideological trope. Like any book with the scope and ambition of this one, it raises as many questions as it answers.
