In his influential book The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Belknap, 2010), Samuel Moyn reoriented our understanding and the accepted narrative of human rights, focusing especially on the explosion of the idea of human rights into a full-fledged international political project in the 1970s. Christian Human Rights adds a significant new chapter to that story. Here Moyn extends his gaze back to the mid-twentieth century, reconstructing the ways in which Christian leaders and elites were instrumental in generating the language, concepts, and political commitments that gave rise to the first emergence of human rights on the international plane. As the author concisely puts it, “the general thesis of Christian Human Rights is that [in the transwar era] it is equally if not more viable to regard human rights as a project of the Christian right, not the secular left” (8). Original, important, and provocative, the book is a valuable, if flawed, contribution to the burgeoning literature on the history of human rights.
The slim volume begins with a discussion of the advent of the constitutionalization of “human dignity” in the Irish Constitution of 1937—an early example of the use of this idea that was largely overlooked in the expansive literature on human dignity until Moyn started introducing us to its importance some years ago. Moyn shows that, contrary to some conventional views today that see the rise of the idea of human dignity as a nod to liberal secular and Kantian understandings of freedom and autonomy, “for most of the period since the 1940s, dignity was something like a proprietary Catholic concept, generally restricted to natural law circles” (62). Chapter 2 offers a reinforcing and parallel history of “personalism,” arguing that the dominant Christian language of human rights in the 1940s was rooted in a communitarian vision quite different from the later development of a more individualistic discourse that dominates human rights today. Moyn then turns briefly from his largely Catholic sources to the man he names “the first historian of human rights,” the Lutheran, conservative, nationalist German scholar Gerhard Ritter. The fourth and final (and least successful) chapter looks at the way that Christianity shaped postwar European understandings of religious liberty in such a way that, even today, makes secularism too “ambiguous” and constrained in Moyn's assessment.
A fascinating and very worthwhile read, the book's broad scope and capacity to make connections draws on huge and varied bodies of literature, across several different languages, and without question helpfully “problematizes” the twentieth-century birth of international human rights. Moyn helps us to see even more clearly that human rights are not historically inevitable, politically neutral, or culturally and historically acontextual. They were, are, and will continue to be always part of an ideological project. In fact, in a certain sense this book is an ideological history of human rights: Moyn examines why the language of human rights emerged as a political-social-ideological force when and where it did, who deployed it, and for what purposes. This is a helpful corrective to a tendency to abstract the intellectual history of human rights from the concrete realities of politics and interests that have shaped it.
Yet, precisely as an ideological history it also manifests certain critical limitations. Invaluable as a piece of a larger intellectual history, by itself it seems simultaneously to explain both too little and too much. Three short examples can help illustrate the point.
First, an approach that ignores the deeper and longer philosophical and theological pedigree of the Christian understanding of human rights inevitably understates the extent to which the shape and use of the idea are conditioned by its past. For example, the book overstates the discontinuities in Catholic developments of ideas of human rights and dignity, adopting uncritically the views of Leo Strauss, Michel Villey, and Richard Tuck on this point (83). It ignores the robust and persuasive arguments that there is deep intellectual continuity between classical natural law and the modern form of “subjective” individual human rights. This is not to deny the strategic and political uses of human dignity and human rights in the twentieth century, but it does show the thinness and inadequacy of limiting our reading to the ideological plane, like characterizing Pius XII's endorsement of human rights as just an effort to appropriate and redefine liberal rights-discourse for conservative purposes. A more complete understanding of that momentous turn would require also including that part of the story that is internal to the tradition of Catholic thought. Traditions of inquiry, in a MacIntyrean sense, do matter in explaining why these ideas emerged and were taken up at this time, but in this book one is not really able to see how that is so.
Similarly, seeing the emergence, meaning, and role of human dignity in the mid-twentieth century almost exclusively in terms of a Catholic/Christian ideological project cannot explain why that idea had the pervasive and rapid impact and resonance that it did. Was the success of these ideas due to non-Christians and liberals being duped, and not understanding that “human dignity” in fact represented a Christian rightist agenda in new garb? Or was the Christian Right so hegemonic in political and cultural life everywhere in Europe that it did not matter what others thought? Either hypothesis is equally implausible. Maybe, notwithstanding its evident ties to Christian ideas and language, the idea of dignity was also representative in many non-Christian people's minds of something greater than its contingent origins; perhaps it resonated with their own views and human experiences as well; possibly they recognized in it something useful or appealing—dare we say true?—that was not circumscribed by a conservative social morality. Human dignity had a long history and resonance in Europe from Roman law onward, and its twentieth-century constitutionalization in places other than Ireland was often the result of overlapping, intersecting views among diverse actors, more than the covert or forced importation of Catholic natural law discourse—as the constitutional history of Italy, for example, illustrates with its pluralistic interplay of Catholic, secular liberal, and Communist forces. It obscures more than it reveals to reduce that broad core appeal of dignity. Instead, situating the ideological project within a larger and longer intellectual history could help to provide a thicker account of the reception of the idea as well as its deployment.
Third, if Moyn's ideological history in the previous examples explains too little, in a different way it also seems to say too much. It overstates the unity and cohesiveness of the Catholic conservative ideological project, and of the conservative implications of the Catholic conceptions and discourses of dignity. The language of dignity and rights was diffuse among diverse Catholic voices. The relationship of personalism and dignity to democratic politics, social justice, and rights had not only a rightist and patriarchal valence like that of De Valera but also influential exponents as different as Luigi Sturzo and Dorothy Day. The book sometimes notes this diversity in passing but then dismisses it each time as peripheral to the main narrative of retrograde Catholic conservatism.
This marginalization of the complexity within the Christian tradition is particularly apparent in the book's treatment of the Catholic Church's historic shift in its understanding of freedom of religion and democracy. Can the history of religious liberty really, as the book suggests (e.g., 140, 156), be explained as just a strategic attempt to marginalize secularism? Or was it also an achievement in the recognition of past mistakes, a retrieval of other parts of the tradition that stretched back to the Gospels and the Church fathers, and a development that has a history that is not intelligible only as an instrumental project of power and interest?
Moyn's treatment of the Catholic affirmation of religious liberty and his stubborn insistence that it is a strategic capturing of human rights by antisecularist forces reveal more than anything else the way that his book is not only a history of the ideological uses of these ideas, but itself a strongly ideological project of its own. Pervasive throughout the book, and emerging explicitly by the end of the short epilogue, is a view that religion in general and Christianity in particular are inherently and inescapably hierarchical, repressive, and exclusionary forces, and therefore any political or constitutional settlement that allows greater room for religion in public life (even if fundamentally secularist or if pluralist with regard to religions) is “conservative” or even “theocratic” (165). Moyn's curious category of “religious constitutionalism,” which always has a strongly negative connotation in context, seems to apply to a wide variety of different constitutional experiments of the last seventy years that have sought to find a way of accommodating modern understandings of freedom and secularism, the enduring centrality of religious belief and practice in human affairs, and the raw fact of increasing religious pluralism within every political community. Moyn's lament that in some cases contemporary instantiations of religious liberty may be allowed to prevail over antidiscrimination norms is a pointed example (e.g., 165). Is it self-evidently the case that a constitutional system that provides robust defenses of the integrity of religious communities, and thus of pluralism in a diverse society, is necessarily a retrograde one that tends toward theocracy? If there are serious arguments to be made to that effect, Moyn does not make them. He simply takes it as given that this is so, and leaves his implicit but pervasive judgments about the proper role of religion in constitutionalism unexamined. In this respect the ideological project of Christian Human Rights is likely to convince no one who is not already convinced.
At the end of the book, Moyn makes a final plea that we not abandon the utopian aspirations of human rights to bring about justice and right in the world. But the terms on which he would see that happen are quite revealing. “Most Christians,” he avers, “take refuge in opacity and mysticism in response to failure” and thus religion “helped believers reconcile themselves to the endurance and even permanence” of sinning and suffering (180). Human rights, now emancipated from their early Christian influence, must instead resist becoming a “new faith” and unlike the failed promise of Christianity “cannot stop short of the elimination of sinning and suffering” (180). Moyn's negative view of Christianity is here as transparent as is his frighteningly totalizing view of the secularist human rights agenda. Rather than seeing such a radical opposition between human rights and religious beliefs and believers and their communities, this reader is instead more inclined to see the idea and institutionalization of human rights as a historically embodied and extended dialogue, in which multiple actors, both religious and secular, engage critically with one another and seek, however haltingly and imperfectly (and even ironically, in the realistic self-awareness of our incapacity ever to arrive definitively at our goal) to grasp together what is true and good and valuable about human beings and to critique and abandon what is unjust in our social relations. From that perspective, Christian Human Rights is an indispensible contribution to our understanding, even if ultimately constrained by its own bunkered view of Christianity and of religion's place in public life.
