This academic monograph represents the second installment of David Sunderland's history of the Crown Agents. It covers the six decades from the outbreak of the First World War until the much-publicized 1974 bankruptcy of the long-standing British institution. Although the agency was under the overall purview of the Colonial Office, it had a unique status as a quasi-governmental body that administered itself and arranged for its own finances. All the while, the Crown Agents fulfilled a miscellany of tasks ranging from managing colonial investment funds to supplying the empire with goods produced in the metropole to financing the construction of railroads to selling stamps. As Sunderland rightly notes, historians have not devoted sufficient attention to this important institution, and his scholarly study seeks to rectify this unfortunate omission. The author's further-stated purpose is to determine the degree to which the agency contributed to the advancement of Great Britain as well as to that of its colonies. All in all, he does well with both these tasks and as a consequence contributes to our understanding of imperial history.

The Crown Agents interaction with metropolitan and colonial authorities is the primary focus of this work, and Sunderland approaches his subject from the methodological perspective of principal-agent theory. This study thus emphasizes the contradictory interests pursued by the multiple agents involved in the colonial enterprise and the bureaucratic infighting that occurred among them. To whit, the Crown Agents and Colonial Office generally, although not always, tried to uphold the interests of the colonies, while agents such as the Treasury and Bank of England tended toward a bias in favor of the British economy. While Sunderland argues that officials at the quasi-independent body were not obliged to follow public-sector norms, he goes on to point out several occasions when these individuals used subterfuge to get what they wanted in their dealings with other government agencies. Indeed, he notes instances when agency officials acted unethically and even at times illegally. Ultimately, what emerges is a nuanced and balanced treatment of the behavior of imperial authorities as well as insights into the complex relations that existed among imperial institutions.

Another aspect of this book that recommends it is Sunderland's compelling revisionist treatment concerning where to assign responsibility for the insolvency of the Crown Agents as part of the collapse of the secondary banking sector in the 1970s. The author clearly demonstrates how the agency became the victim of a disinformation campaign waged against it that arose from a combination of personal vendetta, irresponsible journalism, and the political calculations of both the Labour and the Conservative Parties. Moreover, he notes the role played in the body's demise by other institutions that wished to stifle any attempt to broaden the inquiry into their role in the financial crisis. Yet, Sunderland does not shrink from assigning blame to the Crown Agency. Accordingly, he underscores the poor judgment of agency officials as well as the mistakes they made in failing to secure loans and not grasping that the market was taking a negative turn until too late. He laments the failure of the Crown Agents in the secondary banking venture as he believes that it could have a positive impact on promoting third world development.

There are some other facets to this book that deserve mention. In particular, what is noteworthy about this work is the author's thorough use of a multitude of sources. The author has assiduously exploited a host of archives, including those of the Crown Agents in Liverpool and Sutton as well as the Public Record Office at Kew. Papers from the Colonial Office, Treasury, and the Home Office are well integrated with records from the agency as well as with parliamentary papers. Likewise, the author has conducted personal interviews and has consulted a number of contemporary journals. There is also a good bibliography of secondary works. A number of tables and figures help illustrate points made in the text, and the appendixes provide information and data that should prove quite useful for other researchers.

While this is a good piece of scholarship, there are also a few minor issues that detract from its overall merit. Its rather esoteric subject matter is not one for a general audience, nor is it always the most engaging. While that is, of course, not the fault of the author, there are ways that he might have made this work more interesting and inviting. Sunderland writes best when he includes some of the individuals who had an impact on the history of the Crown Agents, such as Ralph Yablon and Sir Stephen Luke. Yet, much of the book is devoid of such personalities, and it suffers as a result. The author's proclivity for the passive voice similarly tends to bog down the narrative. Finally, one must question Sunderland's contention that Iran and Yemen were acquiring arms in the mid-1970s “largely to counter the military threat posed by Israel” (147). Teheran was certainly more concerned with Baghdad than Tel Aviv, and the two Yemeni states surely had more to worry about from each other than from any distant threat from the Jewish state.

All that being said, this study of the Crown Agents is a positive contribution that fills a gap in the existing literature on the British Empire. Those interested in imperial and colonial studies, not to mention British economic and financial history, will benefit from Sunderland's impressive scholarship.