Epistemic contextualism is an influential view in contemporary epistemology. Peter Baumann’s book argues for a distinctive version of epistemic contextualism. On his view, knowledge is not ordered hierarchically as many contextualists assume, but disordered. A comprehensive table of factors that determine contexts is provided in this book.
The book consists of three parts. In the first part, Baumann provides three arguments for contextualism. He starts by considering some ordinary cases that give prima facie support for contextualism. While recognizing that ordinary cases of knowledge attribution are only the first word and ultimately inconclusive, Baumann also provides more theoretical support for his theory. He puts forward the Argument from Reliability and the Argument from Luck. The former goes roughly as follows: (1) knowledge requires reliability, and (2) reliability is context-sensitive, so (3) knowledge is context-sensitive. Perhaps more interesting is the argument from luck. Baumann considers cases that suggest that the truth conditions of attributions of knowledge and of luck depend on contextually variable descriptions of the case. Compare the following two cases:
(a) A wants to know the time. A looks at a stopped clock that happens to indicate the right time, say 12:15. So, A has a true belief about the current time as a matter of luck.
(b) A’s watch also stopped. After consulting the stopped clock, A immediately sets her watch that from now on indicates the correct time. One year after the clock incident—having consulted her watch many times—A checks the time again and comes to truly believe that it is 1:19 pm. (68-69)
According to Baumann, readers tend to say A does not know the time in case (a), but will nonetheless grant A knowledge of the time in case (b). However, it seems that the passage of time does not change the epistemic status of a believer. Hence, he argues that knowledge can be lucky. To explain what is going on here, Baumann says that different factors of the descriptions can change the ascriptions of knowledge and luck. In cases where we have a focus on the initial lucky coincidence, the attributions of luck will be more likely; while in cases where we focus instead on the reliability of the watch, we’ll tend to attribute knowledge. Crucially, factors that are more relevant to luck are not, therefore, factors more relevant to knowledge, hence we see the divergence of luck and knowledge attributions and that lucky knowledge is possible.
Set aside the two cases and their variants (69-73), I have some worries here. First, the fact that readers’ tendencies to attribute knowledge varies with case descriptions is, after all, still an ordinary language basis for contextualism. As Baumann (32) explicitly agrees with John Austin on the point that ordinary language is the first word but not the last word, why would he rest his more theoretical argument on ordinary verdicts? After all, the idea that attributions of luck and knowledge can separate is motivated primarily by cases. Second, regarding case (b), safety-based anti-luck epistemologists can motivate an alternative explanation. They can reply that luck and knowledge are incompatible in a synchronic sense, and hence A does not know the time because the error possibilities are very near. But cases like (b) show the compatibility between luck and knowledge in a diachronic sense. In case (b), consulting a stopped clock in the long past does not undermine one’s coming to know the time via looking at a reliable watch as A’s true belief of current time cannot be easily false. How long the time has passed can affect how close the error possibilities are. Hence, I am unconvinced that there is a clear case where knowledge is lucky.
In the second part, Baumann clearly shows how contextualism can deal with some perennial problems in epistemology. Among these problems are Cartesian scepticism, the lottery problem, the knowability problem, and the uniqueness problem. Showing that contextualism aids in their solutions demonstrates its significance.
In the third part, Baumann deals with core objections to contextualism, including the ‘warranted assertibility maneuvers’ against contextualism, linguistic objections to contextualism and other related challenges. He concludes that all these problems leave contextualism unscathed. Moreover, he compares contextualism with three of its main theoretical alternatives, i.e., subject-sensitive invariantism, epistemic contrastivism, and semantic relativism. By comparison, he displays the superiority of contextualism over its rivals.
Baumann’s book is a superb monograph. His exposition and defence of contextualism is novel, comprehensive, and thought-provoking. In contrast to the typical understanding of contextualism, Baumann provides a new perspective. He considers the arguments for, the objections to, and the theoretical virtues of epistemic contextualism in a thorough fashion. I am especially impressed by his wide coverage of relevant literature in the field. This can be seen in the 25 pages of references. His outstanding mastery of the development of contemporary epistemology contributes to the great value of this book. There is no doubt that epistemic contextualism, especially Baumann’s version, will attract much attention.
