This book is a deeply stimulating contribution to normative political theory. Its core argument is that China instantiates (imperfectly) a meritocratic “ideal” that is a superior alternative to contemporary liberal-electoral democracy. This “ideal unique to China” (p. 180) is a practical “model” and a “standard,” with “the potential to remedy key defects of electoral democracy”: “China can assist other countries seeking to build up meritocratic rule” (pp. 61, 79, 195, 197). Yet “from a theoretical point of view,” the “ideal itself is not so clear” (p. 67). My aim is to assist readers in clarifying the ideal.
The ideal “unique to China” must be viewed over and against the “basic idea of political meritocracy” (p. 32) as it runs through Western republican political thought. The fountainhead text is Plato's Republic. But Daniel Bell is impressed with Allan Bloom's interpretation of The Republic as ironic (p. 111). A more straightforward capital text is Hegel's Philosophy of Right, with its argument for an unelected ruling class of highly educated civil servants mediating between a monarchic executive and an elected, corporatist legislature (p. 59; reflected in today's French civil service, emerging from the École Nationale d'Administration (ENA) p. 128). Hegel conceives this as the culmination of the Western tradition of the Aristotelian “mixed regime,” which tempers popular sovereignty with major elements of aristocratic governance, above all in the independent judiciary.
Against this stands the “unique” Chinese “ideal,” which more realistically confronts the “contradiction between meritocracy and democracy” (p. 33; my italics). Less bluntly put, the Chinese ideal is “substantively” rather than “procedurally” democratic: Precisely because it seeks “guardian” government “for the people,” it eschews government “by the people” (pp. 147, 162).
We are given our bearings by Max Weber's famous essay “Politics as a Vocation,” and its strife-ridden dialectic, between “rational-legal legitimacy,” instantiated in unelected Hegelian-type civil servants, and “charismatic legitimacy,” instantiated in “the great demagogue in parliament” who “dominates by virtue of the devotion of those who obey, because they believe in him.” Charismatic leadership is what Weber regards as the true “vocation of politics”—not least because it is “prepared to use morally dubious means for good results.” In contrast, the Chinese ideal of political leadership, while not ruling out charismatic leadership as necessary “in times of warfare or violent civil strife,” is “closer to the characteristics of what Weber calls the ‘civil servant'” (pp. 75–77, Bell quoting Weber; and p. 173). The Chinese ideal is reactive against Maoism, and diverges from Marxism in all the latter's forms, since Marxism is essentially antimeritocratic, and “offers little insight into ethical behavior by public officials”—indeed, the effect of forced study of “the Marxist classics” is to make officials “more cynical” (pp. 124, 146–47, 182, 197). The Chinese ideal is deeply moralistic, and harmonistic, and rule- or even “ritual”-governed: for the Chinese ideal is grounded in Confucianism.
Although the roots of Confucian political theory are distinctively Asiatic, the normative claim has always been “global” and even transglobal—as opposed to nationalistic and temporary (pp. 140, 143). Confucian political theory broadens the scope of governmental concern “for the people” to include responsibility to ancestors and for future generations—of foreigners as well as nationals. What is more, governmental responsibility extends beyond humanity, to the natural environment, viewed as not undetached from “a transcendent ruling will, and a sacred sense of natural morality” that subordinates “earth” to “heaven” (pp. 163–64). Within humanity, great attention is given to distributing a modest prosperity universally—but with a moderating higher purpose: “[P]eople must be educated so that they can develop their moral natures” (p. 143). Crucial to the latter aim is limiting or forestalling “competitive individualism” while promoting “rich and diverse, harmonious, social relations” centered on the family and “filial piety,” as well as on “voluntary associations and community groups” (pp. 55, 59).
Equally distinctive are the neo-Confucian principles by which, and the modes through which, the rulers (seen as “the highest” members of society; p. 149) are rigorously selected and severely judged. Intellectual ability and knowledge is prized, but is ranked third, behind moral virtue and empathetic social skills. The latter two are fostered by a demand for intimate familiarity with, and capacity to apply, the lessons of “statecraft,” and of personal virtue in officials, found in the great books of the Confucian tradition. Formal competitive exams play a key role. Still more important are regular evaluations by peers as well as superiors and subordinates. Essential are years of tested, experiential ascent through a variety of challenging posts requiring collective decision making. “Eloquent speech” or popular oratory (as opposed to clear writing and rich dialogue) is suspect: “[V]erbal craftiness is viewed as an impediment to moral self-cultivation” (p. 101) and as fuel for the grave vice of arrogance, overwhelming the high virtue of humility, which should arise out of and culminate in ceaseless collective self-examination, self-criticism, and conspicuously unhedonistic self-restraint.
How, then, is the “Chinese ideal” more than “neo-Confucian?” The answer is simple: In today's world, “the whole thing can be implemented only by a ruling organization similar to the CCP/Communist Party” (p. 195); without this organization's discipline and control, the regime would be swamped by the forces of modern populism (unknown to Confucian tradition). Here we encounter the problematically unfinished character of the “ideal,” for the CCP is burdened with the populist/democratic Marxist ideology. But since “Marxism is basically dead,” Bell is confident that this baggage is being jettisoned: “in fact, the CCP is neither Communist nor a party”; “it is a pluralistic organization” of the “meritocratically selected”; “the party has yet to take the formal step of officially replacing Communism with Confucianism,” but “a more accurate name might be the Chinese Meritocratic Union” (pp. 124, 197).
In the contemporary era, however, Demos needs to be not only guided but somehow placated, by being involved in rule. After wrestling with and showing the unrealistic character of proposals for a mixed Confucian regime at the top, Bell settles for elective democracy at the local level (only)—carefully supervised by party cadres. The feebleness, and desperation, of this suggestion indicate the Achilles' heel of “the Chinese ideal.”
