“Nature makes Us Friends”: Human Brotherhood as the Basis for Moral Responsibility

The first set of arguments Douglass offered as the basis for a strong sense of moral responsibility were rooted in universal human brotherhood.Footnote ²¹ He presented his audience with both divine and secular versions of these arguments. Early in his career, when he was convinced that slavery continued to exist because it was considered religiously respectable, he emphasized the idea of Divine Fatherhood. Emancipation, he argued, ought to be motivated by “the pure, single-eyed spirit of benevolence” rooted in “the heavenly teachings of Christianity, which everywhere teaches that God is our Father, and man, however degraded, is our brother.”Footnote ²² Later, his arguments tended to be more secular in character. Reflecting on his career as a humanitarian reformer, he described his motivation in this way: “In the essential dignity of man as man, I find all necessary incentives and aspirations to a useful and noble life. Manhood is broad enough, and high enough as a platform for you and me and all of us.”Footnote ²³ Human brotherhood was, for Douglass, a powerful moral idea. Whether one believes that all human beings are children of God or that all men are dignified by virtue of their humanity, the appeal to human brotherhood is one possible basis for a strong notion of moral responsibility to others.

What are the implications of this insight for liberal statesmanship? Douglass's belief that human beings have a natural sense of brotherhood led him to have some faith that moral suasion could move men to behave in responsible ways. A good statesman, he believed, could seek to cultivate this sense of brotherhood by reminding people of the divine and secular reasons for feeling connected to their neighbors. The slave, Douglass declared, is your brother and you ought to treat him as such.

“Our Civic Catechism”: Commitment to Natural Rights and Our Obligations to Others

Douglass called the Declaration of Independence our “civic catechism.” The fundamental commitment of the Declaration, as he read it, was to universal natural rights. The second major component of his argument for a more robust sense of moral responsibility was an appeal to the idea of natural rights. According to this argument, one's feeling of obligation is rooted less in a sense of connection with others than it is in a devotion to a principle of political morality. In making the case for abolition and equal citizenship, Douglass often appealed to the philosophy of natural rights as the basis for linking individuals together. Even if one does not love one's neighbor, he thought, the belief in the truth of natural rights theory may move a citizen to care if a neighbor's rights are violated.

Douglass's understanding of the power of commitment to an idea was rooted in his reflections on the Southern “slaveocracy.” He argued that slavery was able to persist in the South because it begot “a character in the whole network of society surrounding it, favorable to its continuance.” The “friends of slavery,” he said, “are bound by the necessity of their system to do just what the history of the country shows they have done—that is, to seek to subvert all liberty, and to pervert all the safeguards of human rights.”Footnote ²⁴ The friends of freedom, Douglass argued, ought to learn a lesson from the friends of slavery. In order to achieve and maintain a political ideal, a moral ecology supportive of its existence must be developed.Footnote ²⁵ This moral ecology “shapes” individuals in a way that promotes that political ideal.

Just as the friends of slavery acted in ways consistent with their devotion to the idea of slavery, the friends of freedom, Douglass contended, should be devoted to the idea of freedom and act accordingly. During the periods of Civil War and Reconstruction, he often appealed to the idea of natural rights as the basis for a robust sense of moral duty. Douglass's hope was that men would be so devoted to freedom that they would be moved to action on behalf of those who were not free.

To the liberal mind, this may seem like a decidedly more promising rationale for a more robust sense of moral responsibility than human brotherhood. While fraternal theories often seem to be rooted in emotion, a sense of community based on the shared commitment to freedom appeals to our reason.Footnote ²⁶ I express concern when my neighbor is deprived of his liberty not because I love him as a brother, but because I am deeply committed to personal freedom as an ideal of political morality. This may seem like a more reasonable basis than human brotherhood, and it may be better suited to a pluralistic society, where inclusive bases for interpersonal affection are hard to find.

Can commitment to the idea of natural rights serve as an actuating motive for a more robust sense of moral responsibility? Douglass expressed some hope that it could. His emphasis on commitment to natural rights manifested itself politically in his shift from the Garrisonian focus on moral suasion to the political abolitionist case for state action to abolish slavery. In the late 1840s, Douglass rejected the Garrisonian reading of the Constitution as proslavery, and in 1851, he announced his conversion to the antislavery reading developed by Lysander Spooner, Gerrit Smith, and William Goodell. The question of whether Douglass converted to antislavery constitutionalism on the basis of principle or pragmatism is beyond my scope here. What is important for my purposes is the ways in which the conversion affected his case for a more robust sense of moral responsibility. When he announced his conversion in The North Star, Douglass wrote that he now believed it was “the first duty of every American citizen, whose conscience permits him to do so, to use his political as well as his moral power for [slavery's] overthrow.”Footnote ²⁷ The basis of this “first duty,” Douglass could now argue, was devotion to the natural rights philosophy of the Declaration of Independence—the basic expression of American political morality.

“The Sheet Anchor of Common Safety”: Self-Interest as a Basis for Community

Douglass's third argument for a strong sense of connection to others appeals to an essential part of human nature, “the spirit of selfishness.” Individuals might be moved to feel connected to one another and behave in responsible ways, he thought, by appealing to their self-interest. Douglass argued that a stronger sense of mutual obligation would benefit everyone. The prevalence of a more robust sense of obligation to others, he reasoned, makes all of our rights more secure and makes our communities more hospitable to economic, intellectual, and moral progress. In this section, I examine Douglass's appeal to what Alexis de Tocqueville called “self-interest well understood.”Footnote ²⁸

Negative and positive dimensions of self-interest were appealed to in order to motivate free people to feel a stronger sense of responsibility to the slaves. Abolitionists appealed to the fear of Northerners by warning of a “slaveholders' conspiracy”—a plot by Southerners to extend slavery over as much of the nation as possible.Footnote ²⁹ This conspiracy was a threat to free Northerners not because they were likely to be enslaved but because these conspirators would be willing to trample on the rights of all Americans in order to accomplish their nefarious aims. The slave power wanted to extend slavery into the territories so it could dominate the federal government. Once the slave power dominated the federal government, Douglass warned, it would subordinate Northern values and interests. Douglass's warnings about the “slaveholders' conspiracy” and “the slave power” are examples of appealing to the self-interest of his Northern audience in order to get them to feel a strong sense of obligation to abolish slavery.

In addition to appealing to Northern fears about the secret machinations of the slave power, Douglass appealed to self-interest by making arguments that everyone benefits from strong bonds of community. This is a sort of “we are all in the same boat” argument for stronger bonds of community. Douglass often defended the principle “each for all and all for each” by appealing to self-interest: “The principle involved [in the struggle for equal rights] is one for which every man ought to contest. It involves the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and it is the business of every American citizen, white and black, to stand for this principle, each for all, and all for each, as the sheet anchor of common safety.”Footnote ³⁰ It is my business to stand up for the rights of others, Douglass argued, because my willingness to do so would strengthen the “sheet anchor” that protects my rights.

Douglass extended the self-interest argument to economic matters. In 1889, as former slaves were still being systematically discriminated against in the South, he delivered a speech on the so-called Negro Problem. He hoped that Northerners would intervene once again on behalf of Southern blacks: “There is yet good reason to believe in the virtue of the loyal American people. They hate fraud, loathe rapine, and despise meanness.”Footnote ³¹ He expressed less faith in the virtue of Southerners, but there was still some basis for hope that they would begin to behave in responsible ways. A great moral revolution would not take place overnight but perhaps, Douglass thought, the selfish side of human nature might move them to alter their treatment of blacks.

Twenty years after the conclusion of the Civil War, Douglass had little hope that Southern culture would be reformed on the basis of humanitarianism or a rediscovery of the principles of the Declaration of Independence. Instead, he thought, the best hope for former slaves was an appeal to the self-interest of their white oppressors.

In this section, I have suggested that, perhaps paradoxically, Douglass appealed to self-interest in making his case for a strong sense of moral responsibility to others. One dimension was to appeal to the self-interest of Northerners by warning about the rise of the “slave power,” which sought to extend its dominion throughout the Union. The second dimension of the self-interest argument was more positive: strong bonds of moral community will benefit all of us in both political and economic terms. Politically, the prevalence of moral responsibility will benefit all of us because it will strengthen “the sheet anchor of common safety,” which protects all of our rights. Economically, responsible behavior will establish conditions that are more hospitable to development and prosperity. Economic prosperity, Douglass contended, is beneficial to the community not only because of the material comfort it provides but also because it provides the basis for intellectual and moral flourishing.Footnote ³³ In his role as a reformer-statesman, Douglass attempted to convince his fellow Americans that to concern themselves with the well-being of slaves and other marginalized individuals was in their interest. Prevalence of a strong sense of duty to others, he insisted, was in each individual's interest.

A critic may worry that Douglass's appeal to self-interest suffers from serious shortcomings. Although it is difficult to gauge the effectiveness of Douglass's appeal to self-interest, when we consider this strategy in hindsight, difficulties arise. Most important, the reliance on white self-interest seems to be a rather precarious foundation for black elevation. Unlike a foundation rooted in the immutable idea of natural rights, the appeal to self-interest is essentially contingent. If you believe that your interests are served by feeling a strong sense of concern for your neighbor, then you ought to behave in a morally responsible way. If not, your neighbor is out of luck. Furthermore, the idea of appealing to white interests, one might argue, perpetuates the existence of a hierarchical and unjust social structure.

Although this is a potent criticism of Douglass's appeal to self-interest, I think it would be a mistake to conclude that such appeals were unwise. It is important to remember the context within which Douglass offered these arguments. Before and after the Civil War, he lamented the fact that the vast majority of Americans were unmoved by appeals to reason and morality. As a statesman with concrete and urgent political goals, Douglass could not afford to stand by and wish that he were operating in a more humanitarian political culture. We may look back at the appeal to self-interest and see it as an inherently problematic strategy, but it is certainly an understandable one given the context in which Douglass operated.

Earned Sympathy: Proving Oneself Worthy of Respect and Concern

So far, I have described three of Douglass's arguments for a strong sense of moral responsibility: natural sympathy based on human brotherhood, commitment to the idea of natural rights, and self-interest properly understood. The final category of argument is what I am calling earned sympathy—sympathy that arises in response to virtuous action. Even if I do not believe an individual is entitled to concern and respect as my brother, I may come to believe you have earned my sympathy.

It may seem strange to include Douglass's discussion of how individuals can earn the respect of others in the context of an exploration of the arguments he offered to build up the bonds of moral community. What, a critic may ask, does Douglass's encouragement of virtuous behavior have to do with the problem of cultivating a robust sense of moral duty to others? I believe this discussion is appropriate here because Douglass thought that what marginalized groups do for themselves was crucial to the quest for inclusion. As a statesman, Douglass had two primary audiences. First, he was speaking to those in positions of power—the white population and their elected representatives. His hope was that he could convince them to feel a sense of moral duty to slaves that was strong enough to move them to take action. As I demonstrated above, he did this by appealing to feelings of human brotherhood, commitment to the idea of natural rights, and to self-interest properly understood. Douglass's second audience was composed of those at the margins of or excluded from American citizenship: the free black population, women and, to the extent he could reach them, the enslaved population. Understanding his message to these outsiders is crucial to my task here because Douglass believed their behavior was essential to the cultivation of strong bonds of community. By demonstrating himself to be virtuous, Douglass hoped, the outsider could earn the sympathy of those in power and move them to take action to include him in the political community.

In a liberal political culture, the idea of earned sympathy is intriguing because it emphasizes the importance of individual initiative. This behavior-based argument is rooted in the notion that individuals can earn the respect of others by acting in particular ways. In this section, I explore Douglass's discussion of the types of behavior that can earn the respect and concern of others.

In an important 1860 essay, “The Prospect in the Future,” Douglass's strategy of encouraging individuals to earn concern and respect is evident. He began the essay by acknowledging that abolitionists had “reached a point of weary hopelessness.” Whereas Douglass had once believed that enlightenment would bring about emancipation, he now recognized that this was not to be. The American people acknowledge the “horrid truths” of slavery, “but they are not moved to action.”

Douglass's loss of faith in reason and morality is striking, but not surprising. The 1850s were difficult for abolitionists. The congressional compromises, the Dred Scott decision, and the execution of John Brown were, for abolitionists like Douglass, indications that most Americans were not sufficiently moved by appeals to human brotherhood or the “civic catechism of the Declaration of Independence” to do the right thing. The big question was why: “What is the explanation for this terrible paradox of passing history?”Footnote ³⁵

Douglass said the problem was not that the American people “fail to appreciate the value of liberty.” History, he wrote, demonstrates that they “have shown great courage and patriotism in defending their own freedom, but have utterly failed in the magnanimity and philanthropy necessary to prompt respect for the rights of another and a weaker race.” It is not, he continued, “because we fail to appreciate or lack the courage to defend our own rights that we permit the existence of slavery among us, but it is because our patriotism is intensely selfish, our courage lacks generosity, and our love of liberty is circumscribed by our narrow and wicked selfhood, that we quietly permit a few tyrants to crush a weak people in our midst.”Footnote ³⁶ Douglass declared that our national character was based on the selfish philosophy of Cain. We, as a nation, look at the plight of the slave and ask, “Am I my brother's keeper?”

Where in the midst of such a moral abyss could the slave turn? “The motive power which shall liberate the slave,” Douglass wrote, “must be looked for in slavery itself—must be generated in the bosom of the bondman. Outside philanthropy never disenthralled any people.”Footnote ³⁷ He said that while “our” philanthropy, sense of justice, religion, and politics have all failed to motivate action, “there is a latent element in our national character which, if fairly called into action, will sweep anything down in its course. The American people admire courage displayed in defense of liberty, and will catch the flame of sympathy from the sparks of its heroic fire.”Footnote ³⁸ Unlike sympathy rooted in the simple fact of shared humanity, the sympathy based on merit depends upon action.Footnote ³⁹ Throughout the 1850s, Douglass had doubted the practical wisdom of slave revolts, but by late 1860, his state of “weary hopelessness” led him to conclude that “the mere animal instincts and sympathies of [the American] people will do more for [American slaves] than has been accomplished by a quarter of a century of oratorical philanthropy.”Footnote ⁴⁰ Douglass concluded the essay by expressing regret that we had reached this point, but he offered some hope that once slavery was abolished and the moral ecology of American society was changed, a more humane politics might emerge.

Douglass's speech on “The Prospect in the Future” demonstrates that he believed exhibition of courage might foster self-respect and the respect of others. Through action, those excluded from the promise of freedom could undermine the notion that they were content with their condition and, hence, gain the respect of others. We must, Douglass declared, “struggle and make sacrifices for our rights. I hold that next to the dignity of being a freeman, is the dignity of striving to be free.”Footnote ⁴² If one's dignity is not acknowledged on the basis of human brotherhood or a commitment to freedom, perhaps it might be acknowledged in response to courageous action in pursuit of liberty.Footnote ⁴³

Courage is not the only virtue Douglass thought could lead to a greater sense of concern and respect. Throughout his writings, he emphasized the importance of independence for self-respect and the respect of others. This is yet another example of Douglass offering a merit-based argument for a sense of connection and duty to others. Prior to the Civil War, he urged a black audience to demonstrate by their behavior that slavery and other forms of subordination were unjust.

On another occasion, Douglass put this point in even starker terms: “Men are not valued in this country, or any country, for what they are; they are valued for what they can do. It is in vain that we talk about being men, if we do not the work of men. We must show that we can do as well as be. . . . Society is a hard-hearted affair.”Footnote ⁴⁵ Statements like these are an indication that Douglass believed the concern and respect of one's fellows does not always follow from the dictates of reason or morality. Sometimes this concern and respect must be earned through virtuous action.Footnote ⁴⁶ After the war, Douglass continued to offer this message as an essential part of the quest for full citizenship and assimilation into American society. The American people “can pity us as they can sympathize with us. But we need something more than sympathy—something more than pity. We must be respected. And we cannot be respected unless we are either independent or aiming to be.”Footnote ⁴⁷

As noted above, Douglass had two audiences when he appealed to the idea of respect for virtuous action as a reason for mutual concern. First, he appealed to “outsiders” to behave in virtuous ways in order to prove themselves worthy of inclusion in the moral community. Second, he appealed to the sense of sympathy of the “insiders.” Even if they lacked a feeling of natural sympathy based on shared humanity, he wanted to convince them that they should feel moved to act on the basis of earned sympathy. Even if those in power do not view outsiders as their natural equals, Douglass hoped, they might be moved to believe that they have proven themselves worthy of concern and respect.

Douglass's strategy of appealing to blacks to behave virtuously and appealing to whites to feel a sense of sympathy in response to this virtuous behavior is not without its difficulties. As Douglass himself would come to acknowledge later, virtuous behavior and individual success often intensified racism in the South. Blacks who were considered too bold and enterprising were often targets of white anger and violence. These blacks, the oppressors claimed, did not “know their place” and had to be taught to respect traditional hierarchies. Given this atmosphere, Douglass's insistence that blacks act courageously and attempt to achieve independence may have been an invitation to further alienation and subordination, not greater concern and respect.

Once again, we may be tempted to use hindsight to condemn Douglass's strategy. Given what Douglass knew about the evil in human nature, a critic might say, he should not have been so naïve. But we must keep in mind what options were available to him. Douglass's earned sympathy arguments were aimed at those moderates who were not completely determined in their opposition to equal rights. His hope was that those who were unable to reason or moralize their way out of a selfish understanding of justice might be moved by “mere animal instincts” to feel sympathy for victims of injustice who behaved in virtuous ways.