In 1809 Pennsylvania chartered the Farmers’ and Mechanics’ Bank of Philadelphia. As the Charters and By-Laws of the Farmers’ and Mechanics’ Bank (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1849: 16–30) reveal, Pennsylvania's legislature gave the bank the right to engage in traditional banking activities—primarily issuing notes, taking deposits, making loans—for 15 years. The charter also stipulated that a majority of the directors be farmers, mechanics, or manufacturers “actually employed in their respective professions,” and that at least 10 percent of the bank's $1.25 million capital be granted in loans to farmers on mortgage at an annual interest rate not exceeding 6 percent. Further, the bank was required to set aside 1,250 of its 25,000 shares for the state. The state did not pay for these shares; rather, the state agreed to forego dividends on those shares for five years. After that, 5 percent of the bank's distributed profits accrued to the commonwealth treasury.
The F&M charter typifies what Charles Calomiris and Stephen Haber label the “Game of Bank Bargains,” the result of which is that “chartered banks are always the outcomes of political partnerships that include [the bank,] the government and the coalition of citizens that wins control over shaping the banking system” (p. 477). The game includes all three features evident in the F&M charter: the bank receives a (semi)exclusive license that offers its owners economic rents; in return, the bank agrees to share a fraction of its profits with sundry government officials or their pet causes; and, the bank agrees to provide relatively low-cost credit to a politically favored group, whose support is critical to the politicians’ continuation in office. The game matters because the bank-government-citizen coalitions that emerge from it determine which groups have access to credit and which do not (p. 13). It also determines the competitive nature of the industry, the aggregate flow of credit, the range of permissible bank activities, how and when banks are expropriated, and the allocation of losses when banks fail. In short, the nature of the coalition determines how much and how well capital is allocated with important ramifications for long-run growth.
It is standard fare in the institutions-growth literature to identify the finance-growth nexus, typically expressed as private credit's effect on GDP growth, in a cross-country setting after controlling for or using as instruments such features as legal origins, election contestability, limits on the executive, economic freedom, respect for private property, and so on. Most such estimations include country fixed effects, which tend to absorb most of the interesting variation. To understand the finance-growth nexus, then, means that scholars must unpack the fixed effects. Calomiris and Haber develop a series of historical lessons that they label “structural” narratives (p. 454), in the sense of structural models in which economic and econometric models (absent the formal modeling), exclusion criteria, preconditions, and plausibly exogenous variation are employed in the unpacking.
Calomiris and Haber take us on a tour of English, American, Canadian, Mexican, and Brazilian banking from their inception to yesterday, with a brief discourse on modern China. Only the Canadians emerge as having played the game in a way that controlled egregious rent seeking, forestalled expropriation, mitigated the detrimental effects of panics, and protected taxpayers from expensive bailouts. Briefly stated, England's system was burdened by privilege; America's was undone by populist demands for unit banks; Mexico's leaders just could not stop themselves from expropriating the previously-granted monopoly; and Brazil's system never stood a chance because it was designed solely to perpetuate the economic and political power of the already powerful.
Canada's good fortune was not the consequence of wise and prudential regulation; for most of its history “there was neither a safety net nor much government regulation of risk” (p. 326). Rather Canada had just the right mix of federalism (banking policy was determined at the national rather than provincial level), concentration of economic power (merchants large and small operated in competitive markets), output (large quantities of primary products moved across international borders), and democracy (a strong upper house) so that nation-wide branch banks dominated. Canada has not experienced a serious banking crisis since the 1830s and though the Canadian money stock and bank assets declined between 25 to 30 percent during the Great Depression and the number of bank offices fell sharply, it avoided the rout seen in the United States.
There is a long history of investigating the intersection of banks and politics in America and elsewhere. Bray Hammond's engaging Banks and Politics from the Revolution to the Civil War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957) is, of course, a familiar classic. But Fragile by Design is more in the tradition of the once-influential essays edited by Rondo Cameron in Banking in the Early Stages of Industrialization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967). It pushes well past Cameron, informed as it is by five decades of advances in economic and political theory and econometric practice, but it still tells important stories of financial development in all their messy glory. What has separated and what will separate economic history from workaday applied economics is the historian's appreciation of differences too subtle to be quantified in a freedom index or a common-law dummy. Economic historians, almost by nature, relish the confusion that is history unfolding in real time in real space driven by real people with real objectives, both good and ill. Books like Fragile remind us that no matter how much the modern cliometrician emulates workaday economics or how tight her scatterplot, there is a story behind each dot that may be worth the telling. The narratives offered here reward the reading.
