Rather like one […] in whose ear the clock has just thundered with all its force its twelve strokes of noon, suddenly wakes up, and asks himself, ‘What has in point of fact just struck?’ so do we at times […] ask in complete astonishment and complete embarrassment, ‘Through what have we in point of fact just lived?’ further, ‘who are we…?’
Friedrich NietzscheFootnote 1
Introduction
To date, studies of international politics have little space for time. This is curious, considering the significant role that time plays in other accounts of the modern era.Footnote 2 For instance, the historian David Landes calls the mechanical timepiece ‘one of the great inventions in the history of mankind – not in the same class as fire and the wheel, but comparable to movable type in its revolutionary implications for cultural values, technological change, social and political organization, and personality’.Footnote 3 In this article, I offer a genealogical historical sketch of the coevalFootnote 4 rise of territorial state sovereignty and Western standard time (consisting of seconds, minutes, and hours). This sketch serves two purposes. First, from the vantage point of International Relations (IR), linking Western standard time to territorial state sovereignty is tantamount to yoking a mole hill to a mountain.Footnote 5 Territorial state sovereignty is rightly a foundational concept of both the international system and IR, but I contend that the emergence of the contemporary method of reckoning time also buttressed the edifice of political modernity in important ways, and is thus critical to students of IR.
Excluding time from academic investigations of social phenomena prolongs and empowers its hidden influence. However, opening up space for time in IR without problematising its character substitutes genuflection for inquiry, congealing time as a socio-political object further than the basic reification accomplished by prior outright omissions.Footnote 6 Therefore, my second objective is to understand the modern method of reckoning time – the linear progression of rational, consistent, infinitely divisible units measured by an engineered timepiece and thus divorced from their natural (celestial) foundations – as both a manufacturer and a product of modernity. I do so by outlining the spread of this Enlightenment phenomenon around the globe as a result of specific historical, material, ideological, and socio-political processes.
A genealogical account of modern time as a global convention seeks to expose its historical contingency. Founded in critical social theory,Footnote 7 genealogical techniques challenge a ‘logic of calculability and an appearance of scientific objectivity that places […] fundamental assumptions […] beyond discussion and debate’.Footnote 8 Genealogies have been used in studies of international politics to historicise such concepts as finance,Footnote 9 diplomacy,Footnote 10 and sovereignty.Footnote 11 Inherent in all these efforts is the belief that the concepts under investigation have become reified and naturalised – that they have come to be viewed as given, timeless, or universal. Genealogies are thus a process of rediscovery that contest the naturalness of such social facts, all of which were constituted somewhere and some when.Footnote 12
Kimberly Hutchings, one of the few scholars to explicitly analyse time in IR theory, poses a genealogically inclined challenge to the perspective of a ‘singular, progressive temporality’ in IR by exposing the unconditional adoption of a homogenous temporality – even by IR dissidents – and by tracing its effects through the development of the discipline.Footnote 13 Although the subject matter differs, the inclination of this article shares much with genealogies in general and Hutchings’ approach in particular. Similar to genealogical studies, I question whether the temporal and spatial organising principles that are today taken largely for granted have always seemed natural to human beings. I then outline a history of how those principles helped constitute the international system. A crucial part of this history recalls Hutchings’ metatheoretical example by addressing how dissidents, intent on grasping socio-political power, challenged the control of temporal authority without questioning its nature. Thus, at every historical turn, and no matter who wielded it, the authority of Western standard time increased.
The article begins with a preliminary discussion of terms. I then turn to conceptual connections between Enlightenment epistemological inclinations and the rational, abstract organisation of sovereignty and time, arguing that both territorially organised polities and abstract temporal units belong to a cosmopolitical image of modernity predicated upon a belief in the affinities between natural (physical) and social organising principles. In the remainder of the article, I examine the conception of Western time in Europe, its diffusion around the world, and its standardisation as a global social institution. In order to demonstrate the imbrication of temporality and spatiality during the rise of the modern international system, I locate ‘sites’ of the emergence of territorial state sovereignty and explicate contemporaneous processes and events implicated in the rise of Western standard time at those sites. Essentially, I am arguing for the coevalness of modern space and time by demonstrating that both developed in the same places at the same times. The sites are: churches, cities, factories, ships, railroads and telegraphs, colonies, the trenches of World War I, and post-colonial nation-states. Because the literature on sovereignty is substantial,Footnote 14 I have chosen sites common to many accounts so as to avoid detouring into debates regarding specific hypotheses about the emergence and establishment of sovereignty as a modern principle of global political organisation. One such debate regards the eminence of the 1648 treaties of Westphalia, whose statuses fluctuate between marking the ‘origin’ of modern international societyFootnote 15 and amounting to a ‘myth’ of mainstream IR.Footnote 16 By aiming for breadth, I hope to demonstrate that modern temporality is generally relevant to inquiries into how the modern international system came to be organised as it is. By revealing the importance of time in the spaces of sovereignty, I advocate for an infusion of time into IR. In the conclusion, I address how such an infusion might contribute to IR by connecting this study with other movements in the field.
Terms
Before proceeding any further, I must clarify three terms that feature prominently in the subsequent discussions. First, when referring to modernity, I take an inclusive – if Eurocentric – approach that deems ideas and technologies even loosely associated with the Renaissance, Enlightenment, and later historical periods as modern.Footnote 17 Thus, the modern era refers to the time period from the thirteenth century to present. This includes what might be considered the late medieval era, but in terms of Western standard time and territorial state sovereignty, the late medieval is better understood as pre-modernity, since the roots of both concepts reach back at least to the thirteenth century.Footnote 18
Second, when referring to territorial state sovereignty, or modern sovereignty, I adopt an understanding based on ‘internal hierarchy and external autonomy’Footnote 19 – the division of the earth's ‘land surface […] into discrete territorial units, each with a government that exercises substantial authority within its own territory’.Footnote 20 This understanding requires neither ‘supreme’ domestic authorityFootnote 21 nor internal monopolisation of violenceFootnote 22 and it elides, for the most part, important discussions of mutual recognition by like units.Footnote 23 Much as in the proposed meaning of modernity, these omissions facilitate argumentation by subjugating nuance to relevance.
Third, by Western time, modern time, or clock time I am referring to the time now commonly associated with contemporary clocks and watches, a form of reckoning based on the ‘continuous indication of equal hours’ abstracted from celestial motions.Footnote 24 In modern daily life, hours are further subdivided into minutes and seconds, producing a unified, elegant, rational manner of marking daylight that is, in reality, highly variegated depending on one's earthly and seasonal location. The modifier Western refers to the distinctly European, and later North American, roots and impulses of this form of time reckoning. Alternate time conventions existed in non-European cultures before and after the development of clock time, and most certainly persist in some cultures today. However only the Western version of standardised reckoning achieved a global hegemony – we do not currently coordinate our temporal lives by global time zones based on the Chinese or Islamic clepsydrae (water clocks), or by ancient sundials – so it will be my sole concern for now. A final modifier, standard, or standardised, appears in passages referring to the global institutionalisation of Western, modern, clock time.
Enlightenment epistemology and cosmopolitics
Before turning to the sites of the dual rise of territorial state sovereignty and Western standard time, I want to adumbrate their shared Enlightenment lineage by pointing out the conceptual affinities between them. Critiques of the reification of territorial state sovereignty often apply equally well to modern time. For instance, R. B. J. Walker claims that ‘As a practice of states, [sovereignty] is easily mistaken for their essence.’Footnote 25 Rediscovering Western time's historical specificity as a reckoning conventionFootnote 26 suggests that it is also a practice that is easily mistaken for the essence of its object. Walker goes on to point out that ‘As a category of analysis, [sovereignty] is easily treated as the silent condition guaranteeing all other categories.’Footnote 27 The same is true of modern time in political science, especially that of the quantitative variety. In this way, modern time reflects an Enlightenment tendency to ‘conceal’ or ‘hide’ the origins of epistemological practices, which began as propositions among alternatives and attained efficacy only through social argumentation and agreement.Footnote 28
But Enlightenment epistemology contributes much more than reification. It is primarily responsible for the germination of the spatial and temporal propositions that currently predominate. Modern sovereignty and time both represent highly rationalised images of social organisation. In the case of sovereignty, the multitude of peoples and cultures around the world are organised by the discrete partitioning of the earth into self-contained units. In the case of time, a highly nebulous, intuitive concept is explicitly described via the discrete partitioning of abstracted averages of celestial motions. Both can be considered part of the Cartesian project to ‘bring to light permanent structures underlying all the changeable phenomena of Nature’.Footnote 29
In the seventeenth century, such efforts represented an attempt to introduce to virulent ideological competitions an alternative system of assessment that would delimit debates in such a way as to preclude their ultimate settlement on the battlefield. The Thirty Years’ War threatened Europe with ruin, and philosophers such as Descartes believed that changing the nature and process of foundational debates was the only way to limit symptomatic political violence. The key to peace and stability lay in constructing a ‘secure body of human knowledge’, starting with an epistemologically ‘clean slate’ and proceeding ‘using “rationally validated” methods’.Footnote 30 In lieu of appeals to lineage, Church doctrine, or religious texts, Enlightenment philosophers substituted materialism, empiricism, and Reason.Footnote 31 If a claim could not be ascertained through the physical examination of nature, or through rigorous logic, it lost validity as a philosophical and political topic.Footnote 32 Michael C. Williams describes these boundaries as ‘epistemic ethical practices’ that constituted ‘a negative ontology […] in the name of opposing innatist ontologies of privilege and traditional authority’.Footnote 33 Such delimitations further championed ‘abstract universality’ over particularity so that ‘political violence was […] removed from the private or personal realm and the public, political realm was […] insulated from personal acts of violence’.Footnote 34
Enlightenment epistemology correlated conceptually with the emergence of the doctrine of raison d'état, which lent legitimacy to discrete, autonomous territorial rule by substituting state interests for dynastic interests so that individual sovereigns came to represent their subjects rather than simply ruling over them.Footnote 35 An important aspect of representation was the ability of the sovereign to provide stability and security, guarantees which rested on an understanding of social order as based not on the promise of religion but on the connection between an orderly, unified body of knowledge and an orderly society. Thus Enlightenment sovereign authority included the ability to adjudicate between criteria of knowledge.Footnote 36 Instead of ruling populations and territories by fiat, sovereigns set the epistemic standards that facilitated the creation and smooth functioning of societies.Footnote 37 Indeed, from this period onward, the association of standardisation with civilisation and legitimacy has been quite durable.Footnote 38 Importantly, civilised societies required (and produced) model citizens,Footnote 39 individuals that would learn to ‘think of themselves and their worlds in terms of objective material calculation’ so as to ‘provide the foundation upon which a stable politics [could] be built’.Footnote 40 Thus, Enlightenment thinking wove a strong epistemic fibre through the standard-setting sovereign, civil society, and its citizens.
Raison d'état has typically been associated with the secularisation of politics,Footnote 41 a claim which Enlightenment epistemic practices seem to support. However, Stephen Toulmin argues that rationalism was not so much a removal of religion and tradition from philosophy and politics as it was a reconceptualisation of ‘cosmopolis’, the idea that the order of the cosmos (nature) and the polis (political society) emanate from a single, fundamental source.Footnote 42 The search for a more convincing basis for social order compelled by the Reformation wars found its focus in the lens of the natural sciences, concluding that ‘the structure of Nature reinforces a rational Social Order’.Footnote 43 As the cosmos was being more and more accurately described by the ‘causal necessity’ of mechanical processes, the hope was that the polis could be stabilised by grafting ‘enticing new analogies’ from those processes onto social and political thought.Footnote 44
One of these analogies was the ‘geometrical certainty’Footnote 45 achieved by the territorial partition of political authority. But a more compelling illustration from that era exposes the importance of rationalised time to the rise of modernity. Since the modern version of cosmopolitical thinking retained the idea of ‘treating natural systems like the planetary system as templates for social systems’,Footnote 46 images of the organisation of the cosmos exerted great influence – so much so that an image of the ‘State as modeled on the solar system dominated the imagination of respectable Europeans and Americans for generations’.Footnote 47 During the Enlightenment, the ascendant image of the celestial realm was that of a ‘cosmic clockwork’,Footnote 48 indicating that the analogy of the mechanical timepiece provided the essential link between nature and society in the emerging cosmopolitical imaginary.Footnote 49 For those ‘who reconstructed European society and culture after the Thirty Years’ War […] it was important to believe that the principles of stability and hierarchy were found in all of the Divine plan, down from the astronomical cosmos to the individual family’.Footnote 50 Obviously, this included the rational ordering achieved by territorial state sovereignty. What is less obvious, but conceptually prior, is that the Divine plan was understood by the metaphor of the mechanical clock, an image that would not have been convincing absent the increasing consistency and accuracy – the rationality – of modern time reckoning.Footnote 51 Rationalism's greatest social theoretical achievement may have been imagining politics spatially in order to reduce conflicts of authority, but it was a temporal vision that provided the inspiration.
Time bred: the birth of modern temporality in Western Europe
In this section, I examine three sites where modern sovereignty arose and find among them a common interest in modern time reckoning techniques and concepts. The first two sites, churches and cities, laid the groundwork both temporally and spatially for the emergence of modern modes of social organisation exemplified in the third site, the factory. As with all the sites to follow, there are admitted historical overlaps between churches, cities, and factories. However, I point out some sequential relationships between them in order to move the story along as well as to accentuate common themes running through it.
Churches
Despite the tangled ligatures of feudalism that often subjected a person or territory to multiple claims of obligation based on religious, secular, or personal bonds,Footnote 52 medieval time emanated from a single source. Combined with a general indifference to time in daily, secular life, the efforts of the Roman Catholic ChurchFootnote 53 to ensure orderly religious observance resulted in a common view of time as belonging only to God, ciphered solely by scriptural revelation, and associated primarily with the afterlife. The Church alone ‘kept the day and times of year, it told people which days were holy and which not, it determined when to work and when not to’.Footnote 54 Daniel Philpott makes the counterfactual claim that modern sovereignty would not have emerged when it did without the challenge of ‘Protestant propositions’ to the Church's predominance, the violent responses of the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire, and the resulting alliances between kings and religious pluralists who opposed them.Footnote 55 These alliances typically led to an increase in secular authority and the eventual impotence of ecclesiastical claims within territorial realms. Philpott discusses the ‘Janus-faced’ nature of the new sovereign states, staring inward at their subjects and outward at a world of equals devoid of ‘robed ecclesiasts who claim temporal authority within their borders’.Footnote 56 Concomitant with this revolution in authority was the de-monopolisation of time.
However, the time that secular authorities wrested from the Church's grasp was already rationalised and abstracted in two important ways. First, time had already come to be viewed as a commodity, in large part due to monastic communities. The monks’ vocation ‘was to pray and pray often’,Footnote 57 but they also had to keep monasteries functioning on a daily basis. In order to ensure a balance between the sacred and the mundane, canonical hours dictated a specific number of services each day as well the times of their observance.Footnote 58 As more services were added, the longstanding habit of dividing the day into quarters became insufficient.Footnote 59 Thus, the celestially determined day was increasingly subdivided to enable religious observance, and this process encouraged a commodified view of time. The good monk attended to his duties in such a way as to maximise the amount of the day he could devote to prayer, so time usage came to understood as a form of worship. This view was extended to the secular realm, becoming ‘axiomatic’ by the early twelfth century, when the political philosopher John of Salisbury wrote that nothing was more ‘unworthy […] than the man who wastes time – this precious time, the one thing you can't get back once you lose it. The man who, wasting time, wastes his own life, […] dishonors himself’.Footnote 60 In this critique can be found an early association of productivity with virtue, a connection later institutionalised in, among other places, modern industrial capitalist factories.
Second, and in support of the commodified view, Church time reckoning was accomplished with the assistance of mechanical invention. By the end of the thirteenth century, mechanical timekeepers were an established item in cathedral accounts.Footnote 61 While the development of various types of measuring devices had been ongoing for centuries, Landes argues that this period marks the ascension of the mechanical reckoning device because churches spent large amounts to construct them, and because their attachment to bells to signal the hours to observers necessitated that they be placed ‘in high places – the better to hear them’.Footnote 62 Older reckoning devices such as water clocks were unsuitable for tower placement since ‘no one hauls water any higher than he has to’;Footnote 63 smaller and lighter mechanical clocks were the solution, and they began to appear atop church towers during the fourteenth century.Footnote 64 An important corollary of this argument is Landes’ observation that rationalising and abstracting ‘sensibilities preceded the invention of the mechanical clock; indeed helped create the need and gave birth to its realization’.Footnote 65
Thus, the existing temporal knowledge that sovereigns annexed from the Church was of a particular character that anticipated the abstract, rationalising tendencies of modernity. Significantly, struggles over temporal authority did not involve questions about the nature of temporality itself, and thus served to reproduce and refine it rather than challenge or alter it. Modern temporality in turn helped to produce particular modes of social life. The roots of modern sovereignty trace back to conflicts over secular-religious authority relationships, and the roots of modern time can be found in religious authority. A largely unacknowledged result of those struggles was the export of commodified, mechanised time from the religious to the secular realms, manifested in the rise of cities in early modern Europe, where tower clocks and commodified views of time became increasingly prevalent.
Cities
Territorially delineated cities, and later city-states, were important antecedents to the modern state because, as an alternative to the cross-cutting jurisdictions of the medieval period,Footnote 66 they provided an example of a unified polity ruled by a distinct authority.Footnote 67 As discussed above, Protestantism provided a crucial impetus to political change by challenging Catholic authority,Footnote 68 but Protestantism was also significantly related to the rise of urban life. Philpott argues that the growing urban commercial class displayed an ‘elective affinity’ for Protestant propositions in that higher literacy rates and a burgeoning sense of ‘administrative autonomy’ predisposed urban populations to embrace challenges to Church and imperial authority, in contrast to rural areas where Protestantism ‘took root the least’.Footnote 69 Although cities eventually gave way to sovereign states as the dominant mode of political authority, Hendrik Spruyt argues that city-states displayed important features of modern sovereignty: ‘the city-state developed notions of sovereignty and the public realm […] And like the sovereign state, the city-state had territorial borders’.Footnote 70
Cities were equally important to the development of modern time. Borrowing directly from the Church, cities relied on a commodified view of time and on mechanical tower clocks for much of their daily social organisation. In contrast to rural consciousness, which merely ‘received’ or ‘perceived’ time, urban consciousness ‘tracked’ and ‘used’ time itself.Footnote 71 To the emerging middle class ‘Time was no longer the ephemeral time of the afterlife.’Footnote 72 The bourgeoisie had cultivated its socio-political relevance by acquiring wealth through commerce and trade, and such activities ‘required formalized calculation of time’ as well as a common, commodified understanding of time's passage.Footnote 73 Whereas medieval time had belonged to God alone, urban businessmen utilised ‘mathematical precision’ to calculate interest rates on loans based on the belief that ‘time itself had value’.Footnote 74 Time was also a symbol of the urban challenge to Church authority: ‘Throughout Western Europe towns constructed clock towers which were strategically placed opposite belfries of the churches’,Footnote 75 offering denizens new sources of daily order. Crucially, such alternatives challenged only the Church's temporal authority, not the authority of Church temporality. ‘[T]he rulers of Europe seized upon and delighted in the new bell-ringing clocks […] costly to build and maintain, but well worth it for their plangent ubiquity – the ideal, quotidian reminder and symbol of high authority’.Footnote 76 Such authority was viewed as emanating from the constructor rather than the construction of time. Nevertheless, by wresting the right to mark time from the Church, the mechanised calculation of city time contributed to the overall rationalisation of social and business activities that helped carve out an urban niche in the emerging modern social order.Footnote 77
The temporal transformation in fourteenth century social life that rationalising and standardising efforts wrought cannot be overestimated. Whereas the daily life of the rural peasant was defined solely by the sun, city time was ‘man-made […] an invitation to serial engagements: with careful planning (that is, timing), one can multiply oneself’.Footnote 78 In municipalities, serial engagements both facilitated and responded to an expanding array of services and opportunities available to urban populations. As Gerhard Dohrn-van Rossum explicates, municipal governments and citizenries bore much of the responsibility for a ‘growing flood of deliberative and decision-making processes’ epitomised by burdensome committee, court, and guild participation, all regulated by the new tower clocks and bells.Footnote 79 As responsibilities increased, temporal rationalising techniques further subdivided the urban day, which in turn allowed for the scheduling of more activities – a recursive process that contributed to the sense of ‘hustle and bustle’ that would become synonymous with cities. Although the temporal rationalising innovations that underpinned this process appear in retrospect as ‘a long-term development toward greater temporal precision’, in the context of emerging city life it amounted to an ‘abstraction […] away from the natural system of reference’.Footnote 80 Such abstraction held the kernel of the idea of compartmentalisation endemic to modern, urban life – multiplying oneself implies adopting different roles in different contexts at different times.
In addition to communal duties, the urban populace also saw its professional activities curtailed and regulated in accord with the emerging time consciousness. By the late fourteenth century statutes for day labourers and artisans alike were based not on sunrise and sunset but on specific points on the tower clock face.Footnote 81 The new time regulations uniformly restricted work for reasons of quality and professional parity.Footnote 82 By way of examples, the following passages are indicative:
Weavers of fustian, armorers, and pursemakers could not begin before five in the morning and could work at the very most until nine in the evening. Coppersmiths and needlemakers had to stop at eight o'clock. Joiners (chestmakers) were allowed to work from four until eight, felt hat makers from four until ten […] Though [smiths] could start at eight o'clock in the morning, they had to cease working as early as five.Footnote 83
Seasonal and weekly variations were also taken into consideration: ‘Only during winter could [belt makers] continue by candlelight until nine […] On Saturdays and on evenings preceding high holidays, belt makers had to stop at four, needlemakers and smiths in the winter at four, in the summer at six and seven, respectively.’Footnote 84 In an interesting twist, whereas commodified time had helped John of Salisbury to turn productivity into a virtue, it now served the purpose of constraining that work ethic. In this way, modern temporality was both the creator and master of modern labour. Social control based on time was made possible in two new ways afforded by the ever-growing precision and consistency of mechanical clocks. First, ‘events, whose previous temporal determination was vague or nonexistent’, were ‘fixed on a temporal axis’, as in the case of market hours of operation, a term suggestive of the change.Footnote 85 Second, the concept of duration in social and commercial activities was revolutionised in that requiring a maximum or minimum length of time to those activities was made possible by the presupposition of ‘abstract times that are always of equal length’.Footnote 86
The increasingly autonomous urban bourgeoisie welcomed political bargains offered by such kings as France's Louis IX and Henri IV that included a ‘legal framework and ideological legitimation’ based on territorial boundaries and ‘an exact locus of authority’ instead of medieval cross-cutting,Footnote 87 bolstering the momentum of territorial sovereignty. Prior to these bargains, bourgeois self-sufficiency was facilitated in part by constructing secular tower clocks that offered an alternative marker but similar mode of reckoning time to that of the Church, whose commodified and rationalised understanding of it was well-suited to the development of commerce and the abstraction of daily life upon which urban vitality relied. As a result of the appropriation of Church time, social and commercial relations became more predictable, but such acclimation was not accomplished without conflict. Nowhere was this conflict more apparent than in labour relations, in particular disputes in the urban, modern factory.
Factories
Capitalism, here emblematised by the industrial factory, is a nearly ubiquitous component of conventional accounts of the rise of territorial state sovereignty.Footnote 88 Immanuel Wallerstein explains the existence of the sovereign states system as part of a ‘unilinear’ process related to capital in general, and specifically as a response to the ‘needs of class forces operating in the world economy’, an argument whose causal relationship Spruyt reverses without challenging the fundamental connection between the two.Footnote 89 Rodney Bruce Hall goes as far as to claim that modern states that accomplish the Janus-faced task of providing a ‘favorable forum’ for citizenship while competing well internationally are linked significantly by their ability to ‘provide favorable forums of capitalist production’,Footnote 90 and that the dominant unit in international affairs is the specifically modern, capitalist, nation-state.Footnote 91
Clearly, it is not easy to imagine the historical rise of modern sovereignty without the presence of capitalism. It is even more difficult to imagine capitalism, especially as embodied in factory life, without a commodified understanding of timeFootnote 92 and the controlling presence of a mechanical signalling clock. Moreover, Landes argues that the rise of modern time consciousness encouraged the industrial revolution by exposing a conflict in the eighteenth century between the traditional putting-out system, in which rural and cottage workers operated unbound by any time other than sunrise and sunset, and owners/employers, who had adopted a sense of time-as-commodity.Footnote 93 The perception of profits lost by the employers due to the poor efficiency of the dispersed labour force could only be reconciled by ‘bringing the workers together in a place where the employer could directly oversee their performance’.Footnote 94
Just as in the monastic day and in city commerce, during the industrial revolution ‘the importance of a rational economic use of time and the new forms of time discipline moved to the forefront of public interest. Mechanization of production, [and] industrial working conditions […] made [employers and workers alike] more keenly aware of the economic implications of the organization of time and working time’.Footnote 95 Capitalism is predicated on a distinctly modern notion of efficiency in which ‘each unit of time is utilized in as productive a manner as possible given scarce resources’,Footnote 96 contrasted to the pre-modern notion of efficiency as constant busyness. Thus, ‘Control of time is a major part of capitalist life.’Footnote 97
Concurrent with the widespread transition to industrial production beginning in the eighteenth century, the combination of notions of productivity with the mechanical clock's ability to specify precise start-points, end-points, and duration produced a factory life in which the worker's entire existence outside the home was at the beckon and mercy of the clock.Footnote 98 Attached to a whistle or bell, and often architecturally reminiscent of Church and city towers,Footnote 99 the factory clock signalled every step of the workday. Its control by management abetted the maximal extraction of value creation from the labour force by setting the length of a day's labour during which foremen would spur workers to contribute more than a day's product.Footnote 100
This clock exerted a most direct and unyielding influence on factory life, so it is not surprising that it became a primary source of conflict between labour and management. Rural persons who came to work in factories often viewed their new jobs as ‘a kind of jail, with the clock as the lock’.Footnote 101 The primary reason for this sentiment was management's control over the shift clock: ‘the employer knew the time, whereas the employee had to take his word for it’.Footnote 102 In this sense, the factory clock exercised power that was both ‘visible and unverifiable’.Footnote 103 During the early stages of the industrial revolution, labour forces often suspected management of tinkering with the shift clock. Their suspicions were exacerbated by the absence of coordination between clocks from one location to another (for instance between their town square clock and the factory clock), for while clocks were more and more accurate, they still had no global referent against which to be set in the first instance, resulting in a proliferation of local times.Footnote 104 The natural response, increasingly within the economic reach of labourers due to the proliferation of inexpensive personal timepieces in the nineteenth century, was for workers to keep their own clock in order to check the factory's time against their own.Footnote 105 For instance, in 1863, workers at a power-loom spinning mill in Wiltshire, England, refused to return from a strike until a workers’ clock was procured to monitor the factory horn.Footnote 106
In this manner, factory labourers, like city leaders before them, contested authority over time without challenging the authority of a particular type of time – they fought ‘not against time, but about it’.Footnote 107 As cities imported the Church's time within their walls, workers imported capitalist time into their individual lives. This is most evident in the emergence by the late nineteenth century of the concepts of ‘leisure time’ and ‘free time’, ideas responding to a ‘labor time’ controlled by someone else. As Stephen Hanson notes, ‘Early liberal capitalist regimes forced newly urbanized workers to adjust to the idea that the rule of abstract time is inexorable; work must therefore be steady and disciplined and “free time” kept within strict bounds.’Footnote 108 Correspondingly, leisure time came to be seen as a measure of wealth, and thus deserving of zealous safeguarding.Footnote 109 Much like urban serial engagements, such practices contributed to the further compartmentalisation of modern life and the embedding of rationalised time consciousness in Western Europe.
As I will argue in the next section, modern time and territorial sovereignty were exported to the colonial frontier during the nineteenth century period of colonial nationalism. By then, modern clock time had become Western Europe's standard method of reckoning while territorial sovereignty accommodated the majority of Western European geography, and both were part of the effort to re-make colonial cultures in the Western European image. Both standards resulted from socio-political interactions epitomised in churches, cities, and factories. Technologies associated with the rise of modern time also facilitated colonial territorial expansion, necessitated a truly globalised time standard, and set the stage for a cataclysm far more destructive than the religious wars that provided crucial motive force to the initial rationalisation of modern time and space.
Time spread: the diffusion of Western time
Even though modern sovereignty and time had appeared and in many ways had become established in Europe by the nineteenth century, the majority of the world still operated based on more locally determined principles. The spread of particularly European methods of organising social life spatially and temporally occurred over the following two centuries, and required the ability to first subdue, and then assimilate, indigenous territories and cultures. Momentous technological innovations brought the world at large within the grasp of European powers, and assimilationist practices associated with colonial nationalism effectively remade the frontier in the spatial and temporal image of Western Europe.
Ships
Accounts of the rise of territorial sovereignty typically view the contribution of European mariners either in terms of the importance of navies to military balances of power or in terms of the significance of burgeoning long-distance tradeFootnote 110 to the economic mobility of Europe's emerging middle class. However, maritime exploration also made possible a cartographic comprehension of the world and thus underpinned the ‘geographic imagination’ necessary for intercontinental territorial sovereign delineation.Footnote 111 The epic efforts of seafaring explorers to chart the earth's surface, and later of colonisers to acquire territorial assets for their sovereign homelandsFootnote 112 would not have been possible without a consistent, accurate mode of navigation. Accurate navigation became a reality with the clock-based discovery of the longitude.
Sailors had long been able to discern latitude by making use of the North Star and the sun.Footnote 113 However, longitude was much more problematic: ‘Since the earth turns continually on its axis, there is nothing visible from one longitude that is not visible in the course of the day from every other [longitude]’.Footnote 114 This difficulty results from the earth's motion, which also brings day and night, making it the ‘original clock’;Footnote 115 appropriately, clocks would eventually provide the solution. Accurate longitude became important in the fifteenth century as soon as Europeans undertook transoceanic voyages. By the sixteenth century, long-distance trade gave longitude ‘the highest political and commercial urgency’ because navigational errors not only risked the lives of those aboard but the substantial investments of European entrepreneurs.Footnote 116 Accordingly, European powers interested in colonial expansion, including Spain, Holland, France, and England, initiated contests offering lucrative awards to anyone who could devise an accurate method of determining longitude.Footnote 117 Better navigation also held obvious implications for European navies at the time. Importantly, though, the quest for longitude was not viewed as solely a matter of national competition or security. Perhaps because it ‘was the great mystery of the age, a riddle to seamen, a challenge to scientists, a stumbling block to kings and statesmen’, and had attained an aura matched only by ‘the fountain of youth and the philosophers’ stone’,Footnote 118 longitudinal precision was seen as a project ‘transcending national interests and boundaries’,Footnote 119 an early example of cooperation in the embryonic international system.
The full story of the determination of the longitude deserves more space than is presently available.Footnote 120 In this context, the relevant aspect of its discovery is the crucial role that modern time played. The break-through solution used increasingly accurate chronometers to monitor time at a place of known longitude, which could then be compared with local times at uncharted locales and the difference transformed into a measure of distance.Footnote 121 Clearly, the further explorers travelled from their European points of reference, the more important chronometric consistency and accuracy became. Life on the high seas was not conducive to the precision instruments employed in land-based clocks, and it was not until the late seventeenth century that inventors could find a way to make marine chronometers ‘more or less impervious to motion’,Footnote 122 allowing for accurate long distance measurement and mapping. Thus, the comprehension of the world's oceans was dependent on innovations in time.
Rails and wires
Much as maritime knowledge and strength allowed Europeans to seek out and subdue peripheral coastsFootnote 123 around the world, railroads and telegraphs played a crucial role in the comprehension and conquest of colonial interiors. Such processes preceded colonial disputes over territorial delineation of European holdings across Africa and Asia that effectively set the boundaries along which many future modern states would be constituted following the World Wars of the twentieth century. Contrary to maritime pursuits, which waited on temporal innovations, railroads and telegraphs spurred time reckoning revolutions as they covered more and more of the globe.
Railroads provided the fastest travel and communication over long distances in human history. They also crossed a plethora of ‘local times’ based on a municipal clock set against some natural marker such as ‘high noon’ and thus dependent on the geographic position of the locality.Footnote 124 Railways initially set each rail line to the time of the largest city or town it served and kept two clocks at all stations, one for the line time and one for local time.Footnote 125 This practice lost efficacy as more and more track was laid, placing more than one large city on the same line and running multiple lines through single cities. Local reckoning and crisscrossing rail lines produced a plurality of pertinent times involved in train travel,Footnote 126 and travellers often missed their connection.
Telegraphs, following fast on the heels of trains globally (and preceding them in some colonies), provided a solution to the problem of temporal coordination.Footnote 127 By broadcasting a daily time signal, they facilitated the uniform correction of local clocks by a single, master clock. Convincing localities to change their time to match some distant source was another matter altogether, and required extensive commercial and political appeals to the connection between ‘advanced society’ and a ‘common standard’.Footnote 128 But where railroads covered extremely broad distances, such as the United States (US) and Russia, a single national time was insufficient, and in 1883 time zones were instituted in the US for the first time.Footnote 129
In 1884, the International Meridian Conference (IMC) proposed a system of time zones covering the entire earth, with the prime meridian marked by the Greenwich observatory in England.Footnote 130 Unlike the quest for longitude, the IMC and subsequent ratification process were sources of persistent international dispute, suggesting that time was an important component of Western national identities. During the conference, Americans claimed that using Greenwich as a global referent challenged the ‘sovereignty’ of the American National Observatory and imposed ‘English time’ on the US.Footnote 131 The French delegation refused to accept Greenwich unless the US and England adopted the metric system.Footnote 132 France's proposal was rejected, and the French abstained from the final vote, portending a lengthy ratification process. In Europe, Germany did not adopt Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) until 1893, when Helmuth Von Moltke declared, ‘we have in Germany five different units of time […] which, since we have become an empire, it is proper should be done away with’.Footnote 133 Portugal, Holland, Greece, Turkey, Russia, Ireland, and most of South America did not adopt GMT until after 1905. France was most intransigent, refusing to ratify until 1911, and then only by ‘defining their standard as “Paris Mean Time, retarded by nine minutes twenty-one seconds”’ from GMT.Footnote 134 Arguments for and against GMT indicate the duality of the new institution – on the one hand, a singular time symbolised the increasingly unitary nation-state, on the other, it signified nation-states’ subordination to a global standard. However, the coordinating power that a global standard offered to commerce, factories, railways, governments, and militaries eventually prevailed.Footnote 135 Once France gave its mitigated assent, the IMC system, much like the telegraphy that facilitated it, covered most of Europe and the Americas.
As railroad tracks and telegraph wires enveloped more and more of the earth, territory and time came increasingly under the coordination, regulation, and control of Western European (and now American) powers, a process C. A. Bayly refers to as the world-wide ‘convergence’ of time.Footnote 136 Technological dominance on the oceans had facilitated European conquests in the eighteenth century, and in the nineteenth, it furthered the interior development of Europe and its ‘frontier’. When colonialism took on a nationalist character, Western European notions of spatial and temporal organisation were part of a particular vision of ‘civilization’ that was exported to the colonies.
Frontiers
Hall distinguishes between eighteenth century mercantilist imperialism, motivated by a desire for increased tradable commodities and taxable wealth available through the attainment of colonies,Footnote 137 and nineteenth century nationalist imperialism, ‘a crusade to transmit [Western European] national culture and institutions to the periphery – a process that transformed peripheral societies’.Footnote 138 Railroads and especially telegraphs supported the kind of order and control necessary for such transmissions, aiding the colonial development of commerce, modern administrative practices and economic structures, and helping to quell political unrest.Footnote 139 The penetration of the concept of territorial sovereignty in the post-colonial era is evidenced by the retention of colonial geographic borders. But the Western time that rails and wires helped to standardise and import also remained behind when imperialists relinquished the frontier.
Nationalist imperialism operated at nearly all levels of colonial life, and ‘Every form of social power at the command of the imperialist states was harnessed to thoroughly penetrate and transform peripheral society, economy, ideas, and self-perceptions.’Footnote 140 Particularly important in the course of modern sovereignty's expansion was the view of territorial statehood as communicating authority, simplifying enforcement, and reifying power.Footnote 141 Furthermore, territorial sovereignty was seen as an important part of the positive legal tradition communicated to colonies,Footnote 142 as well as the context for modern political administration.
Through administrative and missionary education, Western European nationalists applied a socio-cultural pressure to indigenous populations that ‘left only one rational response: abject imitation as a condition of survival and self-affirmation’.Footnote 143 Some of the most successful socialisation projects took place in missionary schools, where the African schoolboy was ‘educated in the language of his colonial master, according to a curriculum devised by his colonial master, within a strict schedule laid out by, and in the time of his colonial master, to prepare him for service in the military, bureaucratic, ecclesiastical and administrative institutions of his colonial master’.Footnote 144 Matriculants thus came to value the ‘rubber stamp and the row of pens in the breast pocket’ along with the ordering precision of the pocket watch.Footnote 145 Such temporal order had been introduced during the initial colonial period, when ‘Slave plantations […] were controlled by bells sounded to the time of the master's watch.’Footnote 146 Western standard time was thus in the vanguard of the ‘great domestication’ of the periphery, encouraging the ‘creation of modern societies from Indochina to central Africa’.Footnote 147 Examples of this domestication, or abject imitation, occurred in India and China when ‘municipal grandees began to build great clock towers to regulate the rhythm of bazaars and offices where once they would have put their money into temples or mosques’.Footnote 148
Departing their homelands on ships equipped with accurate navigational instruments, national imperialists expanded the reach of Western culture around the world, transforming many local conventions and further delineating the earth's territory. Whereas eighteenth century imperialism was based on the material interests of European metropoles, the nineteenth century variety stemmed from a ‘will-to-manifest identity’ – a particularly Western European identity with specific understandings of space and time.Footnote 149 If the export of cultural and political conventions was in fact an effort to ‘become the composers and fiddlers of the tune to which […] the rest of the world would dance’,Footnote 150 Western standard time provided the tempo. The embeddedness of modern time and space in peripheral societies became evident in the post-colonial period following two World Wars. Ironically, railroads and telegraphs, so crucial to the diffusion of modern spatial and temporal understandings, contributed directly to the first of these cataclysms.
Time embedded: the destructiveness and durability of Western standard time
By the beginning of World War I, Western ways of confronting time and space, coupled with superior technologies, had penetrated societies and cultures on every continent, drastically altering local reckonings of space and time. As a measure of the effect of European spatio-temporal colonialism, when a long chapter of indigenous challenges to external authority culminated in the 1960 UN declaration that all colonies deserved the right to self-determination, existing map borders and clock faces were accepted with little contest. But before this era of colonial independence could gain momentum, European metropoles had to exhaust themselves in a pair of devastating World Wars, exacerbating the political and material costs of maintaining colonies. The First World War displayed the tragic potential of Europe's own territorial and temporal creations, as both nationalised territorial states and modern time conventions hastened the onset of hostilities.
Trenches
Territorial nationalist accounts of World War I will be familiar to most students of international politics. The standard story weaves together threads such as the entangling effect of alliances, the Balkan tinder box ignited by the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand, historical and ethnic links binding sentiments across territorial lines, and volleyed accusations of overly belligerent heritages. However, modern time was also crucial to the arrival of the war, as well as to its prosecution.
By the eve of World War I, railroads and telegraphs networked much of the European continent together, revolutionising diplomatic communications and military mobility. Whereas previous centuries had imposed significant logistic limitations on troop movements,Footnote 151 the speed and span of railways allowed powerful European nation-states to deploy forces to continental locales in a matter of hours or days, rather than weeks. Prima facie an improvement on history, deployment by rail contained a hidden danger in that it reduced mobilisation timeframes and thus limited opportunities to reverse decisions or utilise the appearance of belligerence to thaw diplomatic impasses. For instance, once initiated by statesmen, French mobilisation plans obeyed only the clock and the map:
From the moment mobilization is ordered, every man must know where he has to join, and must get there in a given time. Each unit […] must be ready to proceed on a given day at the appointed hour to a prearranged destination in a train awaiting it, which in its turn must move according to a carefully prepared railway scheme […] No change, no alteration is possible during mobilization.Footnote 152
The most extreme example of thoroughly modern mobilisation was the German Schlieffen Plan which, to preserve the element of surprise and initiative, drew no distinction between mobilisation and the immediate invasion of Belgium.Footnote 153 Once German troops were spirited away from their barracks on rail cars, there was no mechanism for returning them until the battle had been joined and done.
Similarly, although telegraphs and telephones facilitated unprecedented speed of communication, contemporaries described telephonic conversations as a ‘vision of death’, apropos of the diplomatic July Crisis that awakened the guns of August 1914.Footnote 154 Technologically accelerated exchanges at the highest levels added to ‘the spectacular failure of diplomacy’, including ‘crossed messages […] sudden surprises, and […] unpredictable timing’.Footnote 155 Wrought by the new technologies of the era, accelerating temporalities combined with a shared confidence in the ‘soundness’ of the basic, territorial organisation of Europe to allow states and their increasingly nationalist populations to associate boldness and bravery with quick, decisive action.Footnote 156 The effect of the new technologies was not a single acceleration, but a ‘series of new and variable paces that supercharged the masses, confused the diplomats, and unnerved the generals’.Footnote 157 On the eve of World War I, time – the traditional ‘conciliator’ of diplomatic crises – effectively disappeared, drawing in its wake millions of lives.Footnote 158
The temporal experience of the war itself was felt keenly in the daily life of the trenches. Stephen Kern generalises this as a ‘thickened’ perception of the present, when past and future slipped away and the paradoxical duo of boredom and danger bound the imagination to an endless succession of days in the trenches.Footnote 159 World War I also saw the proliferation of the wrist watch, a timepiece hitherto considered ‘unmanly’.Footnote 160 As significant as clocks had been for delivering the common soldier to his deployment on time, wrist watches were even more crucial in the trenches, when the importance of a coordinated instant of attack necessitated a pre-offensive ritual in which ‘a runner distributed watches which had been synchronized at field headquarters’.Footnote 161 The appearance of watches in the trenches might have mitigated the thickened present, but since they measured the interminability of trench life and also marked the imminent moments of greatest danger, this was not the case. As one veteran observed ‘Time went by, but no one felt the passage of it, for the shadow of death lay over the dial.’Footnote 162
Wrist watches more often marked the occasion of mass casualties rather than any moment of success. But Western standard time and all its associated technologies outlived the war, as did a belief in territorial nation-states. At the end of the war, the Treaty of Versailles, in addition to setting the terms of peace, took another substantial step in the comprehensive partitioning of the earth's surface by setting borders in Eastern Europe and much of the Middle East.Footnote 163 European colonies would be the sites of significant fighting in the next World War, further reifying the sense of holdable territory and preceding claims by those territories’ indigenous populations. At the end of World War I, the writer James Joyce provided a synopsis of the new, deadly nexus of modern territoriality and temporality that would dominate the next half-century: ‘I hear the ruin of all space, shattered glass and toppling masonry, and time one livid final flame.’Footnote 164
Nascent states
After Europe and the rest of the world narrowly survived a second apocalypse, holding colonies became an increasingly difficult and indefensible practice. Philpott argues that the abrogation of colonial claims throughout Europe's periphery embedded the idea of territorial sovereignty, ‘extend[ing] globally the formula of 1648’.Footnote 165 For instance, UN General Assembly Resolution 1514, adopted toward the end of 1960, granted the right of self-determination to colonial peoples without establishing an explicit criterion for international recognition of the new polities. Without a criterion, and with independence within reach, former colonies generally accepted colonial borders as the limits of their new states.Footnote 166 The reification of Western organisational concepts was further encouraged during this period by the return of European – and American-educated indigenous elites, who brought with them Western ideas such as national pride, the value of freedom, and capitalism.Footnote 167 Similarly, many indigenous soldiers were sent to the fronts of World War II, where they were exposed to the Western ideals for which they were presumably fighting.Footnote 168 Philpott concludes that the particular character of successful post-colonial independence movements, based on Western concepts, thus encouraged the subsequent era of economic neo-colonialism.Footnote 169
Along with Western territorial and economic ideals, former colonies also adopted without significant opposition the temporal conventions contained in Western standard time. As discussed earlier, modern European temporality featured significantly in colonial education and governance training during the nineteenth century, hence Western temporal conventions were already in place by the 1960s. And since ideas can shape identities,Footnote 170 we cannot omit the significance of a specific type of temporal reckoning, in this case that propagated by Western European colonial powers, in shaping the daily lives and roles of indigenous peoples around the world. As many colonies gained their formal independence in the 1960s, they evoked the earlier struggles for autonomy in cities and factories by challenging the sources of political control without questioning the modes of organisation of that control. If the reasoning offered has been persuasive, then the conclusion that authority over time is a component of post-colonial struggle while the authority of Western standard time remains a colonial artefact should also hold.
Such authority was not a given outside the European continent – political and social power embedded it around the world. In the periphery, authority over time has lately been ‘culturally neutralized’ as (intrinsically capitalist) ‘“modernization” or simply “development”’, part of a general attempt to create ‘“westernized” societies in aboriginal dress as a salve to “national” pride’.Footnote 171 It follows from this that ‘aboriginal’ garments today, in addition to holding a row of pens, continue to make room for a Western standardised timepiece.
Conclusion: modernity's most global hegemon
Standard accounts of the twentieth century describe two eras of globalisation. The first ended almost as soon as the century began, subverted and subsumed in three decades of world wars.Footnote 172 The second era followed colonial independence, and continues today. But taking a trans-economic view of modern history resolves a different image. While trade and commerce have expanded in fits and starts, dominant conceptions of space and time have matured, expanded, and, in the last century, solidified their hold on the international system. Today, territory subject to multiple authority claims remains the exception rather than the rule. And while transnational or multinational governance and political power represent a significant challenge to the territorial state,Footnote 173 the outcome of this struggle is far from decided. The case for the global dominance of Western standard time is even stronger. As of this study, there remains only one prominent system of global time zones – that instituted by the 1884 IMC. Daily contemporary life almost anywhere is paced in relation to standardised timepieces counting off uniform seconds, minutes, and hours of the day. And contrary to sovereignty, challenges to modern time have yet to be found. There exist no multinational corporate efforts to offer a different method of reckoning the progress from day to night to day again, no rogue actors calling for a 23-hour day, and clichés describing fundamentalist regimes as trying to ‘turn back the clock’ only signify the hegemony of the metaphorical referent.
In this article, I outlined a history of the present method of time reckoning, Western standard time, arguing that it was an Enlightenment sibling of one of the essential constituents of IR – territorial state sovereignty. This history had a genealogical inclination to uncover – or rediscover – the contingent, abstract, and particular roots of a time that is today largely understood as given, natural, and universal. I freely admit to doing violence to the sophisticated accounts of sovereignty and time used in this account, and appeal to the relationship between the necessary historical span and the available space as rendering such decisions unavoidable. Furthermore, since the other objective of this article was to increase scholarly attention to time in IR, its inherent sketchiness hopefully can serve as an invitation to further discussions, which can make contributions to IR in at least three ways.
First, the sites treated above deserve more substantial attention, as they have much more to say about the importance of a particular vision of time in the constitution of the modern, Western self. Second, a greater understanding of Western standard time connects with extant treatments of time in IR. Hutchings discusses the merits of ‘heterotemporality’ as a response to the linear-progressive temporality of IR theory,Footnote 174 a project which inquiries into the character of modern time support by facilitating more reflective engagement with a plurality of times. By critiquing hegemonic time, IR stands better prepared to encounter the many times of the world in an inclusive yet not totalising framework. In this sense, time can become global without being globalised.
Through this nexus of heterotemporality, inquiries into Western standard time can also connect directly to post-colonial IR, which has begun to expose the ways in which the Western view of history as globally unified and linear-progressive is associated with colonial Othering practices.Footnote 175 As such, post-colonial studies address Western temporality – the quality or essence of time, sometimes akin to a speculative philosophy of history – whereas this article has been concerned with the Enlightenment reckoning of time. Exploring further how reckoning came to support but also to stand in for essence can thus bolster inquiries into the uses and abuses of both in the modern age.
An engagement between the character of Western standard time and questions about the social acceleration of time is also needed.Footnote 176 ‘Accelerationist’ research typically concerns twentieth century and later developments, so a clearer picture of the particular time that underpins contemporary life is important.Footnote 177 Furthermore, accelerationism addresses the ability of technological developments that reduce spatial and temporal constraints on interactions (thereby accelerating them) to problematise existing socio-political relations, and thus might suggest vulnerabilities in Western standard time's reign – does its emphasis on efficiency and productivity contain the seeds of its own obsolescence?
Such engagements all relate to the third potential contribution of the questions posed in this article to IR: an equitable inquiry into the normative aspects of modern time. An important part of the historical narrative offered here is the duality of power housed in Western standard time – whoever possessed the material reckoning device grasped significant socio-political authority, but implicitly submitted to the power of rationalised reckoning – which cautions against monothematic normative inclinations. We should re-forget neither the emancipatory uses to which modern time was put by underprivileged social groups, nor the delimiting effects on (inter- )subjectivity that were always part of the bargain. By carefully unpacking the conceptual components of modern time and relating them to other critical efforts we can thus begin to problematise modernity's hegemonic metronome.
