B.'s impressive monograph, based on his Ph.D. thesis (Loyola University Chicago, 2012), is dual in nature. On the one hand, it is a detailed study of the concept of love (eros) in Plotinus’ system; on the other, as its subtitle indicates, it forms an introduction to Plotinian metaphysics. In both respects, this work is highly successful: it is relevant both to specialists in Neoplatonism (and the concept of love in the history of philosophy) and to beginners, since, despite its density, it has the analytic virtues (exemplary clarity of structure and prose, systematic exposition, constant argumentation) that make it approachable to anyone wanting to understand Plotinus’ demanding edifice. Although we possess various good introductions to Plotinus (e.g. E.K. Emilsson, Plotinus [2017], while looking forward to L.P. Gerson and J. Wilberding's New Cambridge Companion to Plotinus) as well as multiple studies on Plotinian love (e.g. A. Pigler, Plotin: une métaphysique de l'amour [2002], with which B. is in broad agreement; as of July 2021, we are awaiting S. Magrin's translation/commentary of Enneads III.5.[50]: ‘On Love’), B.'s work is a welcome addition to this body of scholarship, as well as unprecedented, as far as I know, due to its duality.
How has B. succeeded in this? Apart from his excellent skills as a philosopher and a historian of philosophy, it is because, as B. lucidly shows, eros is the key to unlock Plotinus’ system and acquire a synoptic view of it. B.'s study is structured according to the familiar duo of procession-reversion. Part 1 examines a Neoplatonic crux (how multiplicity is derived from unity; Chapter 1) and goes on to explain how this process is grounded in the concept of eros (Chapter 2). Part 2 corresponds to the ascent of the individual soul (of a human, leaving aside previous reincarnations: cf. pp. 242–4) to the One: its return via erotic conversion (to be distinguished from the necessary reversion, characterising the standard Neoplatonic divine principles/‘hypostases’ after the One, i.e. Nous/Intellect and Soul, as B. aptly remarks, p. 252). This ontological journey to the homeland (cf. Homer, Iliad 2.140 apud Enn. I.6.[1].8.16) can be paralleled to the reader's fascinating journey through this book until everything, as far as possible, has been answered (along with a close analysis of Enn. III.5 [Chapter 3] and vital programmatic clarifications [Chapter 5]). The work is concluded with a discussion of mysticism, i.e. the soul's ‘union’ (Chapter 6.3) with the One, which is the A & O in Plotinus’ system (see also Chapter 4). The final conclusion gives a helpful summary (cf. also the appendix) and poses ‘Some Open Questions’ regarding personhood and the possibility of Neoplatonism as theology (in the sense of Aristotle's ‘first philosophy’ [cf. Metaphysics VI.1.1026a15–22], within a Roman-Catholic atmosphere). Owing to the inextricable connection of Platonic ontology and ethics, Part 2 in particular comprises ethical considerations (e.g. Chapter 6.1–2, along with pp. 185–8: on pleasure), which make this book an apt introduction to Plotinus’ philosophy as a whole.
Thus, this volume is so rich that I have no space to deal with all its aspects. Instead, I confine myself to the following remarks, beginning with the basis of B.'s argument. To employ an Aristotelian distinction (cf. Posterior Analytics I.2.71b33–72a5), B. does not start off with what is prior to us, which in this case concerns the ubiquitous attestation in Plato and Plotinus of the erotic desire's connection with lack/deficiency, but, at least from B.'s perspective, with what is prior simpliciter: the sui generis case of the One as ‘eros of itself’ (Enn. VI.8.[39].15.1). If we take Plotinus’ positive description seriously (NB: there is no accompanying ‘as if’/οἷον or a composite ὑπέρ-formula), eros in its most fundamental sense denotes the utmost unity with the beloved (a pure activity, we might surmise). Consequently, according to the connection of the Principles of ‘Double Activity’ and ‘Henologic Giving’ (pp. 64–76), the One imparts to its inferior entity (generated by its external activity) something (a trace) that the One does not have: eros for the One qua other, so that this entity (intelligible matter) reverts upon the One in order to constitute itself as Nous (equated with the Forms/one-many). The generation of lower realities (e.g. Soul as one-and-many) follows as a by-product (cf. Enn. III.8.[30].4.39–43), transmitting this erotic trace so that, even if indirectly, everything (apart from prime matter) desires the Good. This is how eros as lack enters B.'s story, and why from multiplicity's perspective the One is also couched as δύναμις τῶν πάντων (Enn. III.8.10.1; cf. P. Kalligas, The Enneads of Plotinus: a Commentary, vol. 1 [2014], pp. 220, 640), while matter is mere potentiality.
Since we are not meant to ascribe to the One an erotic inclination towards what lies beneath (to use spatial metaphors), I am afraid that the paradigm of ‘henologic eros’ is narcissistic (a characterisation frequently held against the Aristotelian Prime-mover), although exceptionally, since there is no duality at this level (leaving aside the ‘freedom-necessity’ issue). Ironically, then, in this system other-directedness evolves as a failure to be a narcissist (of a perfect kind, or as the unintentional by-product of this peculiar state, while in Nature's marginal case it is a sign of weakness; cf. Enn. III.8.4.40–1). As for the ethical consequences of such a world view (with particular reference to Proclus, though), I have tried to flesh them out in my contribution to an open-access volume (K. Grødum et al. [edd.], Love – Ancient Perspectives [2021]), and I agree with B.'s reservation on p. 305.
Coming to the celebrated union, B. convincingly objects to a monistic interpretation (according to the Indian overtones of which the individual soul is annihilated). Still, even from a theistic reading's perspective (here M. Edwards's ‘Plotinus: Monist, Theist or Atheist?’, in L. Nelstrop and S.D. Podmore [edd.], Christian Mysticism and Incarnational Theology [2013], is informative) such a mode of existence, which excludes from the horizon of our self (in its idealised state, i.e. qua eros) the others as well as everything material (without implying that the sage, when ‘awake’, will act immorally in society/the cosmos) – in its minimal multiplicity (μόνου πρὸς μόνον, cf. Enn. VI.9.[9].11.51) and however consummate an experience –, it remains a failure to attain to the kind of love characterising the One. While this might call for comparisons with various Christian traditions, we might meditate as to whether such a union is an enticing life-goal.
Another result of B.'s thoughtful exploration is that Plotinus appears to be anticipating Proclus more than various interpreters would allow. I have in mind Proclus’ similar (but not identical to Plotinus’) formula of ‘providential eros’ (for which see my Eros in Neoplatonism [2021], pp. 67–140). Furthermore, B.'s systematic exposition of Plotinian material otherwise scattered (see pertinent remarks on pp. 1, 239) at times reminds of the Elementatio Theologica as a systematisation of the Enneads, as E.R. Dodds (Proclus, The Elements of Theology [19632], pp. 269–70) would suggest. For instance, this is the case with the discussion of eternity (Nous’ state) and time (connected to Soul), since B.'s perceptive distinctions of levels of Soul and their particular relation to the genesis of time (pp. 105–8) recall Proclus’ meticulous classifications of Soul(s) in the Elements (although seeing Eternity-Time differently). However, I must say that I was not always comfortable with the identification of World-Soul with Nature (hypostasis-Soul's lowest expression; e.g. p. 109), since B. himself allows for World-Soul's intellectual activity (e.g. pp. 283, 248 with n. 87), while Nature has an ἀφάνταστον/ἄλογον self-awareness (Enn. III.8.1.22 with Kalligas, p. 632).
Where exploration of a problem would lead astray, B. manages to give an excellent report (as in the case of Forms of individuals, pp. 232–41), taking also a critical stance. In this respect, I have a comment on the identification of matter (pp. 108–26) with evil itself (αὐτοκακόν: pp. 126–38; cf. Enn. I.8.[51]:8.37–42 & 13.7–26 and A. Manos’s Modern Greek Ph.D. published in 2002 as The Ontology of Evil in Plotinus). B. complains that matter appears not only incapable of reversion, but also actively ‘misleading the individual soul’ (p. 135); hence, evil is not only ‘perspectival’ (p. 136). However, if Plotinian matter is the structural polar opposite of the Good (named from the inferior perspective of multiplicity; cf. Enn. VI.7.[38].41.28–31), it mirrors the One/Good as being both efficient and final cause; however, like Aristotle's god (cf. pp. 197–9), its efficiency lies in its (apparent) finality.
Finally, one should extol B.'s extensive use of a multilingual bibliography (he even mentions P. Damaskos's 2003 Modern Greek Ph.D. thesis on Plotinian love. That said, he could have included J.-M. Flamand's translation/commentary of Enn. III.5 [2009], and on p. 175 nn. 94 and 97, as well as p. 192 n. 27 B. could have added Kalligas’s views ad loc.). To conclude, this is a superb monograph. I am sure it will become indispensable reading to all Plotinus/Neoplatonism lovers (actual or potential).
