It does not take a Ph.D. in economics or political science to look across the world and see a strong positive correlation between democracy and the level of economic development. Economic historians have long believed that institutions “matter,” including political ones. Yet what precisely are the “microfoundations” of institutional change, when the institution in question is the form of government? Why are some countries democracies and others dictatorships? Why do some countries shift from control by elites to control by the “masses”? Why are some shifts to democracy unstable whereas others are (apparently) permanent?
Political scientists such as Barrington Moore, whose well-known book Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1966) is the provocation for Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson's choice of title, have long proposed answers to these questions. But to economists, these answers lack rigor because they are not derived from a model in which individuals maximize self-interest subject to well-defined constraints and in which there exists one or more (hopefully, one) equilibrium such that no individual has an incentive to change her behavior. The goal of Economic Origins is to provide a class of models that exhibit the kind of rigor that economists expect. Acemoglu and Robinson's models are game-theoretic, and dynamic at that.
At the outset it must be emphasized that this is not a book for the mathematically squeamish. It is certainly true that the game theorist down the hall will not find anything particularly novel or difficult to understand, but the game theorist down the hall is not the intended reader. Acemoglu and Robinson assert that “knowledge” of game theory at the level of Robert Gibbons's Game Theory for Applied Economists (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1992) should suffice to follow their arguments. I own a copy of Gibbons and have read it, and I disagree (“mastery” of Gibbons is more like it). This should not deter anyone because enough of the book is in English to follow the basic drift.
Economic Origins is divided into 12 chapters grouped into six parts, one of which is an appendix. Chapter 1 briefly presents narratives of four “paths” to democracy. England's path was inexorable. Once started, it never stopped. Another path is cyclic. Once established, democracy is unstable, and government switches back and forth from democracy to dictatorship. In such cases there is frequent class conflict, and the military often does the dirty work of the elites. Argentina is such a county. The third way is Singapore's, a nominal democracy but still a one-party state in which the party is not very violent or oppressive and in which living standards are high and equitably distributed. A fourth path is South Africa's, long delayed and revolutionary in origin.
Chapter 2 is a nontechnical summary of the basic ideas of the book. The players in the game are the “rich” and the “poor” and, sometimes, the “middle class.” Government, which is a passive actor, redistributes income by taxing the rich and giving to the poor. Initially, the rich hold de jure political power. The poor are much more numerous, but they lack clout to change the status quo. However, if the “state of nature” changes (a random variable)—a food crisis, for example—the masses might be able to overcome the free rider problem and overthrow the elites. The elites do not want to be overthrown, this being bad for their wealth (if not health). They could promise to go easy on the masses. For example, the rich could offer to redistribute income once the masses put down their weapons. But such promises are not credible. The masses know that once the threat has passed there will be an overwhelming incentive on the part of the elites to renege. The masses, therefore, will not (or rather should not) be swayed. To sway them, the elites need to make credible promises which they may do by establishing democracy. Chapter 3 surveys the evidence on the correlations between democracy, inequality, and income per capita.
The remainder of the book elaborates on the basic ideas of Chapter 2 in headier mathematical detail. Chapters 4 and 5, for instance, invoke single-peaked preferences and the median voter theorem to justify aggregation of preferences, and they develop Acemoglu and Robinson's “workhorse” models. Chapter 6 shows that the simplified version of the game in extensive form carries over to an explicit dynamic game with infinitely lived individuals. Chapter 7 allows a nascent democracy to revert via coup or to consolidate. Chapter 8 introduces the middle class into the picture. Chapter 9 makes factor prices endogenous, and Chapter 10 allows for trade.
There is no question that Economic Origins is a major achievement on its own terms. Over the 25 odd years that I have attended the annual meetings of the Economic History Association, I have heard a lot of chatter about the necessity to properly model institutional change but seen little in the way of serious progress. Acemoglu and Robinson talk the talk, and walk the walk; their book is the real thing. And what they know between them about economic and political history would put a lot of economic historians to shame.
Economic Origins, however, is not without sin. I found the text to be highly repetitive and grew annoyed as the same ideas were hammered over and over into my head, albeit at higher levels of generality from one chapter to the next. This is probably inevitable because the book originated as a course text, but for those who are not looking for a perfect substitute for Acemoglu and Robinson's graduate lectures, the book could have been much shorter. As already noted, the text can be mathematically dense, but at other times the authors engage in utterly elementary discussions of the need for formal models or, at another juncture, the Cobb-Douglas production function. The contrast is jarring.
The book is disappointing in its studious avoidance of empirical work. Clearly this is a conscious choice on the part of the authors; they are intent on fashioning a theory of political institutions not testing one. But this does not stop them from casual empiricism, asserting that this or that morsel of a country's political history can be illuminated by some variant of their model. Readers are told that the absence of democracy in Singapore can be “explained” by high living standards and low levels of inequality and that the elites in power are not really elites (they are drawn from the middle class, like everyone else). There is no “demand” for Western-style democracy in Singapore, so there is none. But is this the only story? What is the percentage explained by high income and low inequality? I do not know, and they do not provide one with the tools to find out. In fairness to the authors, forging an econometric link to the theory strikes me as a difficult problem. At the same time, I fear that journal editors are likely to be subjected to an incredible number of bad regressions on bad data purporting to “test” one or another hypothesis derived from this book.
Inequality plays a central role in Acemoglu and Robinson's basic setup; their models predict subtle nonlinear relationships between inequality and the onset of democracy. However, throughout much of the book inequality is exogenous. Clearly this is wrong, and they know it. But when they do get around to making inequality an outcome in chapter 9, they only go part of the way by making factor prices endogenous. As far as I can tell, ownership of capital and land is still exogenous (“endowments”). This is not really making inequality endogenous. We need a theory of ownership, which means we need a theory of investment in physical capital (and human capital—there is some of this), as well as a theory of the specification and enforcement of property rights. Having grown up on Douglass North, one expects the form of government to matter in such specification and enforcement and, therefore, in the willingness of elites to support or repress democratic impulses.
Criticisms aside, Economic Origins belongs on the shelves of anyone purporting to be interested in “institutions,” which is to say, every card-carrying member of the Economic History Association, the Cliometrics Society, related scholarly bodies, and then some.
