Is private diplomacy just meaningless “cheap talk”? James Fearon (“Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization, 49(3), 1995) showed in an elegant game-theoretic model of crisis bargaining that the disputants’ interests are too opposed to allow costless messages to credibly convey private information. He argued that communications between diplomats can often be regarded as costless messages, and thus made the famous and provocative claim that private diplomacy is often just “cheap talk” and largely ineffective in changing beliefs in international crises.
In recent years, however, a number of scholars have argued that Fearon’s international crisis setting was too stark and have shown that in some richer crisis settings, even costless messages may allow for credible information transmission. Most of these contributions have focused on a single mechanism. The most sustained argument for the efficacy of costless messages has been made by Robert Trager, who in a series of articles analyzes several mechanisms by which costless messages allow for credible signaling in international relations. In this book, Trager collects and synthesizes these theoretical contributions, while engaging in significant qualitative and quantitative evaluations of the theorized mechanisms at work in European great power politics from about 1850–1950. The book will be the definitive social scientific analysis of private diplomacy for years to come.
This review proceeds by discussing the four theoretical models (Chapters 3–6, arguably the heart of the book), and then turns to the empirics (Chapters 2, 7–9). In the “Scope of Demands” model, Trager assumes a finite number of compromise outcomes and shows that when the target of the signal is highly believed to be unwilling to make a maximal concession, then making a maximal demand (even privately, with no “audience costs” for backing down) is a credible signal of high resolve. This is because moderate signaler types prefer to make a moderate demand that is accepted with high probability, rather than a maximal demand that is rejected with high probability (but that would provide more benefits if accepted). A crucial non-standard assumption here is that there is no feasible agreement that is mutually acceptable to the toughest type of each side, because then the usual incentive to bluff that makes private diplomatic communication non-credible would cause the informative equilibrium to break down. There may be real crises in which this condition is met, but nevertheless this model has a bit of the flavor of allowing costless messages to matter simply by changing a foundational assumption. The same is not true of the other models, however.
In the “Risk of a Breach” model, Trager enriches a simple deterrence model by giving the target of the message an additional option beyond just standing firm or backing down, namely taking an action that imposes costs on the signaler regardless of whether the target stands firm or backs down. These actions can include forming an alliance directed against the signaler, internal balancing via an arms buildup, draining resources by increasing competition in other areas, joining the signaler’s opponent, etc. With this simple but very plausible change, informative equilibria may exist in which low-resolve signalers choose to reveal this by separating from highly-resolved types, because even though mimicking the highly-resolved types may cause the target to back down, the latter does so while breaching relations in a way that is too costly for low-resolve types to find mimicking worthwhile. When targets may react to private threats by breaching relations, Trager thus shows insightfully that private threats can be informative.
In the “Balancing Allies and Adversaries” model, Trager shows that the risk of entrapment can make even private threats to defend an ally credible. If the signaler wants to deter an attack by the target on the signaler’s protégé, even unresolved types have an incentive to claim they will defend the protégé if this achieves deterrence. But because the protégé, emboldened by the threat, may start behaving aggressively in a way that provokes the target into attacking, possibly drawing the signaler into an “unnecessary” war, even private messages of support to the protégé are risky for the signaler and hence may allow for credible information transmission.
In the “Diplomatic Approaches” model, Trager analyzes a 3-player model in which the signaler has disputes with two other states, and under certain conditions a costless-message cooperative signal to state 1 allows state 1 to get a better deal in its dispute with the signaler, but beneficially (for the signaler) causes the now-satisfied state 1 to not intervene in a war between the signaler and state 2. Thus, diplomatic approaches for improved relations can allow for credible signaling via giving bargaining leverage to an opponent, a cost that deters some potential bluffers from mimicking the cooperative message. In a nutshell, Trager provides four plausible (the first one perhaps less so) crisis settings in which even costless messages can be informative and affect behavior.
Turning now to the empirics, Chapter 2 describes Trager’s new dataset and some preliminary analysis of it. Trager codes the Confidential Print of the British Empire from 1855–1914, which consists of nearly all “documents circulated by the British Foreign Office to the cabinet, officials of the Foreign Office, and the King and Queen” (p. 23). A whopping 30% of the documented security-related inferences drawn by British officials about the future intentions of the other great powers during this time period were drawn from private diplomacy, compared to only 7% from public diplomacy and 13% from military factors. These numbers provide significant backing for Trager’s argument that private diplomacy plays an important role in inferences drawn by leaders about other states’ intentions. However, as with all evidence that relies on the writings of officials and leaders, these numbers should be taken with a grain of salt. For example, these leaders and officials presumably had certain inferences they wanted believed, and foreign policies adopted, and would be expected to make the strongest possible case for such “inferences” regardless of their actual source. Nevertheless, these are striking numbers that skeptics of private diplomacy’s effectiveness will have to take seriously.
In Chapter 9, Trager further analyzes these data and finds that 89% of the public threats that are referred to in the Confidential Print from 1900–1914 were believed reasonably credible by British officials, while 76% of private threats were. For offers, the numbers are 69% and 64%, respectively. Thus, while public threats and offers are somewhat more frequently believed credible (in line with the audience cost hypothesis), private statements also have high credibility. It is not completely clear from Trager’s analysis the extent to which private threats/offers in isolation are believed credible, i.e., without public threats/offers or other signals reinforcing them. Trager also uses these data to conduct empirical tests of a number of the hypotheses derived from the theoretical models. Due to data constraints, other hypotheses are evaluated qualitatively in two chapters (Chapters 7–8) focusing on European diplomacy prior to the two World Wars. By providing substantial theoretical and empirical support for the efficacy of private diplomacy, this book will be the definitive social-scientific analysis of diplomacy for years to come.
