Both modern and ancient commentaries on Hebrews acknowledge the significance of comparison or syncrisis in the rhetoric of Hebrew. How one understands the function of syncrisis in Hebrews plays no small role in determining its rhetorical outline and aim. Syncrisis could be employed in service of any of the species of rhetoric—judicial, epideictic, or deliberative—and currently the debate in Hebrews centers upon whether the decidedly syncritical rhetoric of the letter ultimately has deliberative or epideictic force.Footnote 1
Because of the prominence of epideictic syncrises in Hebrews and their liberal use of encomiastic topics (1.1–14; 2.5–18; 3.1–6; 5.1–10; 7.1–10.18; 12.18–24), many scholars have proposed that Hebrews' argument is primarily epideictic in nature. In their view, Hebrews seeks to inculcate community values and commitment to a certain way of life in the present. Thomas Olbricht, for example, likens Hebrews to funeral orations, which employed syncrisis and encomiastic topics to praise the deceased. Olbricht thereby concludes that Hebrews is epideictic in its ‘superstructure’.Footnote 2 Timothy Seid reaches a similar conclusion because he understands the epideictic syncrises in Hebrews to be the structuring principle of the whole discourse.Footnote 3 More recently, Ben Witherington has argued that Hebrews is written to shore up faith in the face of persecution. ‘This act of persuasion is surely epideictic in character, appealing to values and virtues that the audience has already embraced in the past’.Footnote 4 Additionally, Witherington states the focus of Hebrews is clearly on the present as in epideictic rhetoric, and most homilies (of which he considers Hebrews one) are epideictic.Footnote 5 Finally, as with Olbricht and Seid, Witherington points to the use of syncrisis and the implementation of encomiastic topics as evidence of an overall epideictic thrust in Hebrews.Footnote 6 How then does Witherington understand the extensive hortatory material in Hebrews? Witherington states that the encomium of Jesus is used for moral exhortation, which we take to mean the advocacy of particular community virtues ‘already embraced in the past’.Footnote 7 Witherington, however, ends up essentially arguing for a deliberative purpose for Hebrews when he concludes that Hebrews was written to prevent some of its audience from reverting to non-Christian Judaism for protection against pagan imperial persecution.Footnote 8 In this understanding, the overall thrust of Hebrews is to persuade against a future detrimental course of action. Such an act of persuasion is decidedly in the realm of deliberative rhetoric.
Among those who argue Hebrews is ultimately deliberative in its rhetorical aim,Footnote 9 David deSilva offers the most extensively argued case.Footnote 10 As deSilva points out, deliberative rhetoric urges a particular course of action, and one of its tactics is to point out the consequences of following a certain course of action. In deSilva's view, Hebrews adopts such a strategy, highlighting the negative consequences of apostasy and the positive consequences of perseverance in confessional faithfulness and community identification. Two other factors are also critical to deSilva's assessment. First, deSilva believes he can identify several rhetorical topics associated with deliberation in Hebrews: justice, courage, honor, expediency, and security. Second, deSilva argues that epideictic-expositional sections of Hebrews serve to set up subsequent exhortations. Thus, deSilva concludes that Hebrews is ‘deliberative speech that uses epideictic topics extensively to amplify the significance of making the right choice between remaining firm and turning away’.Footnote 11
DeSilva's last point is central to the thesis of this article. In a previous article we argued that the discourse in Hebrews is structured around five epideictic syncrises which are arranged according to standard encomiastic topics and collectively argue for the superiority of the new covenant to the old.Footnote 12 In the present study, we propose that these five epideictic syncrises are paired with five corresponding deliberative syncrises that (a) assume the premise established in the epideictic syncrises, and (b) take up, together with the hortatory units in which they are situated, the encomiastic topic (e.g., origin, birth, education, deeds, death/posthumous events) of the epideictic syncrises. By demonstrating these relationships, we attempt to further the argument for Hebrews as an occasion of deliberative rhetoric, since we show that the epideictic syncrises are in service both logically and topically to the deliberative syncrises. Additionally, by relating epideictic and deliberative syncrisis in Hebrews, we can propose a comprehensive outline of the work's macro-structure.
The study will proceed in two parts. First, we consult the ancient handbooks of rhetoric, noting both the aim of deliberative rhetoric and, with regard to syncrisis, its standard logical forms. Second, in view of this survey, we identify all deliberative syncrises in Hebrews, describing their aim and form in categories derived from the handbooks. It is in the light of this latter analysis that the relationship between epideictic and deliberative rhetoric in Hebrews will emerge.
1. Deliberative Syncrisis in the Handbooks
According to the theorists, ‘deliberative syncrisis’ is characterized by at least two essential traits:
(1) As deliberative rhetoric, its aim is to show the merit (or lack thereof) of a proposed course of action. In ancient Greek rhetoric, merit was construed strictly in terms of the potential ‘advantage’ to the listener. Aristotle provides the classical statement:
The end of the deliberative speaker is the expedient or harmful; for he who exhorts recommends a course of action as better, and he who dissuades advises against it as worse; all other considerations, such as justice and injustice, honour and disgrace, are included as accessory in reference to this. (Rhet. 1.3.5 [Freese, LCL])
In his most mature statement on the matter (Part. or. 83–90), Cicero echoes the classical verdict that advantage is the singular aim of deliberation, only he construes advantage more broadly than did Aristotle, as encompassing good things that are ‘necessary’ and ‘not necessary’. Among the latter he counts things desired for their own sake, things desired for their intrinsic moral value (i.e., honor, understood in terms of the four virtues), things desired for the ‘advantage’ they confer (i.e., bodily goods and goods of fortune), and means to something of value (i.e., wealth, resources, etc.). Rhetorica ad Herennium, too, reflects a broadened understanding of ‘advantage’ as the single aim, dividing it according to two subtopics, ‘security’ and ‘honor’ (3.2). Similarly Quintilian, though drawn to the idealistic view of a younger Cicero that ‘honor’ is the chief aim of deliberation (De or. 2.334; cf. Inv. 2.146), ultimately concludes pragmatically that the nature of audiences commends identifying and distinguishing two aims in deliberative rhetoric, expediency and honor (Inst. 3.8.1–3).
(2) As syncritical rhetoric, it takes one of three logical forms: comparison to the greater, comparison to the lesser, comparison to the equal. Once again, Aristotle provides the classical statement. Surveying topics of arguments he prescribes for use in all three species of rhetoric, he arrives at the topic ‘from the more and the less’ and illustrates three forms of this argument.
Syncrisis with the greater: ‘For instance, if not even the gods know everything, hardly can men; for this amounts to saying that if a predicate, which is more probably affirmable of one thing, does not belong to it, it is clear that it does not belong to another of which it is less probably affirmable’.
Syncrisis with the lesser: ‘And to say that a man who beats his father also beats his neighbours, is an instance of the rule that, if the less exists, the more also exists’.
Syncrisis with the equal: ‘Further, if there is no question of greater or less; whence it was said, “Thy father deserves to be pitied for having lost his children; is not Oeneus then equally to be pitied for having lost an illustrious offspring?”’ (Rhet. 2.23.4–6 [Freese, LCL])
By the Hellenistic period, Aristotle's divisions of this argument were standard.Footnote 13 For our purposes, it will be helpful to note Cicero, who paraphrases the logical move of each succinctly:
Syncrisis with the greater: ‘What is valid in the greater should be valid in the less’.
Syncrisis with the lesser: ‘What is valid in the less should be valid in the greater’.
Syncrisis with the equal: ‘What is valid in one of two equal cases should be valid in the other’. (Top. 4.23 [Hubbell, LCL])
Theon, too, provides his own account of the logic and, in addition, actual judicial examples of each:
Syncrisis with the greater: ‘When we make a syncrisis to something greater we amplify the lesser to show that it is equal to that; for example, that a thief does as much wrong as a temple robber because both are moved by the single desire of stealing and the thief would not hesitate to rob a temple if he had the opportunity nor would the temple robber hesitate to steal’.
Syncrisis with the lesser: ‘When we make a syncrisis to the lesser we shall speak as follows: “If the thief is punished for taking men's money, how much the more will this man be punished for looting the possessions of the gods?”’
Syncrisis with the equal: ‘But when we put an equal beside an equal we shall say that if we do not allow one doing equal wrong to go scot-free, neither is it right to overlook this man's action’.Footnote 14 (108)
Only Quintilian provides models of the three forms in which explicitly comparative language is absent. This is because he does not distinguish between syncrises, which draw distinctions or analogies explicitly, and examples, which do so implicitly, but rather insists that all examples are syncrises and vice versa.
A reminder of parallels will be useful also in speaking about the future; for example, someone arguing that Dionysius was asking for a personal bodyguard in order to seize absolute power with their help could adduce as an example the fact that Pisistratus attained power in the same way.
But while examples are sometimes complete parallels (like this last one), they are sometimes taken ‘from greater to lesser’ or ‘from lesser to greater’. ‘If whole cities have been overthrown because of violated marriages, what should be done to an adulterer?’ ‘The pipers, having left the city, were recalled by the authority of the people; how much more should leading citizens who have deserved well of the state, but have been victims of envy, be recalled from exile!’ (Inst. 5.11.8–10 [Russell, LCL])
Quintilian appears exceptional in this regard among the theorists, who generally treat syncrisis and example as distinct arguments, and so we shall limit our analysis of Hebrews to explicitly comparative language with deliberative aims.Footnote 15
Of particular interest for the study of Hebrews is a recurring ‘how much more’ formula that is frequently employed in syncrisis to the lesser: ‘if X is true in the case of the lesser, then how much more is X true in the case of the greater’. This formula is reflected in the language of Aristotle (ἐκ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον [Rhet. 2.23–4]), Theon (‘When we make a syncrisis [συγκρίνωμεν] to the lesser we shall speak as follows: “If the thief is punished for taking men's money how much the more [πόσῳ μᾶλλον] will this man be punished for looting the possessions of the gods”’, 108), and Quintilian (‘The pipers, having left the city, were recalled by the authority of the people; how much more should leading citizens who have deserved well of the state, but have been victims of envy, be recalled from exile!’, Inst. 5.11.8–10 [Russell, LCL]). Hebrews also employs a form of this formula for some of its deliberative syncrises in 9.14 (πόσῳ μᾶλλον), 10.29 (πόσῳ…χείρονος), and 12.9 (πόλυ…μᾶλλον) in order to make emphatic its deliberative rationale.
2. Deliberative Syncrisis in Hebrews
In view of the criteria above, six explicit deliberative syncrises may be identified in Hebrews: 2.2–3; 4.1–2; 6.17–18; 10.28–29; 12.9; and 12.25.
(1) Each of these syncrises takes up the classical deliberative aim of advantage/disadvantage, generally arguing that perseverance in the faith is advantageous for the readers/listeners, or that apostasy is disadvantageous. Four of these point to the negative consequences of apostasy (I–II, IV, and VI) and two point to the positive consequences of perseverance in the Christian faith (III and V).Footnote 16 (2) Each of these happens to be a syncrisis to the lesser, reflecting the logic of the form as it is described by Cicero: ‘What is valid in the lesser should be valid in the greater’. Several of these, moreover, employ some variation on the formula, ‘If X is true in the case of the lesser, then how much more is X true in the case of the greater’. Even those that do not, however, can be translated in terms of the formula, since they all operate according to the same logic.
3. The Logical Relationship of Epideictic and Deliberative Syncrisis
Of the six deliberative syncrises identified above, five play a key role in the overall structure and argument of Hebrews. They are 2.2–3, 4.1–2, 6.17–18, 10.28–29, and 12.25. The evidence of their importance to Hebrews' outline is seen in their relationship to the five-part epideictic syncritical project of Hebrews which we describe in our earlier study.Footnote 17 This project, which spans nearly the full length of Hebrews, compares corresponding representatives of the old and new covenants, arguing consistently that the new covenant representative is superior to the old covenant representative. We have outlined the project as follows:
I. Angels vs. Jesus (1.1–14; 2.5–18)
II. Moses vs. Jesus (3.1–6)
III. Aaronic high priests vs. Jesus (5.1–10)
IV. Levitical priestly ministry vs. Melchizedekian priestly ministry (7.1–10.18)
V. Sinai vs. Zion (12.18–24)
Taken as a whole, the obvious end of the project is to show that the new covenant is superior to the old covenant. The strategy of consistently comparing representative figures of the covenants rather than the covenants themselves is in keeping with rhetorical theory and practice.Footnote 18
In view of this outline, the logical relationship of five of the six deliberative syncrises to the project will become apparent. In each deliberative syncrisis, the following rationale can be demonstrated: if a certain course of action results in an advantage or disadvantage in the lesser case (= in old covenant experience), then the consequences for such a course of action are all the more valid in the greater case (= in new covenant experience). In each deliberative syncrisis, the disadvantageous course of action is generally understood to be apostasy while the advantageous course of action is understood to be continued faithfulness. The basis for the rationale is established by the preceding epideictic syncrisis.
In epideictic syncrisis I (1.1–14; 2.5–18), Jesus (= new covenant mediator) was demonstrated to be the superior heavenly messenger with a superior destiny to the angels (= old covenant mediators). In deliberative syncrisis I (2.2–3), the lesser case concerns those under the old covenant who transgressed the message declared through angels, and the greater case, those who might neglect the salvation revealed through Jesus. Its argument, made explicit with the ‘if…, then how…’ formula in vv. 2–3 and the comparative adverb περισσοτέρως in v. 1, is that what is valid for the lesser case (that rejection of the message results in ‘a just penalty’) is valid all the more in the greater case. The deliberative syncritical rationale then centers upon the disadvantage of apostasy and is an extension of the preceding syncritical evaluation between Jesus and angels in 1.1–14 where Jesus is demonstrated to be the superior heavenly being.
In epideictic syncrisis II (3.1–6), Jesus, the son (= new covenant inaugurator), was demonstrated to be superior to Moses, the servant (= old covenant inaugurator). The superiority is grounded not only on the son/servant dichotomy but also on the fact that the fulfillment is greater than the witness to that fulfillment (3.4–5). Understanding Moses as a witness to Christ through the establishment of the old covenant and specifically its Levitical priestly ministry is how one is able to understand that the gospel was preached (by Moses) to the wilderness generation in deliberative syncrisis II (4.1–2).Footnote 19 In deliberative syncrisis II, then, the lesser case concerns the proclamation of the gospel in its old-covenant-shadowy form to the wilderness generation led by Moses (cf. 3.16), the servant, while the greater case concerns the proclamation of the gospel in its new-covenant-reality form to the present community led by Jesus, the son, (cf. 2.10).Footnote 20 The argument of the syncrisis is that if faithless hearing (apostasy) of the gospel under the old covenant brought no benefit (= exclusion from God's rest), then such a penalty is valid all the more for faithless hearing under the new covenant. Again the deliberative syncritical rationale centers upon the disadvantage of apostasy; the covenant representatives of the preceding epideictic syncrisis are implicitly carried over into the deliberative syncrisis through the communities they lead (i.e., the wilderness generation and the authorial audience); and the deliberative rationale extends the evaluative conclusion of the epideictic syncrisis.
In epideictic syncrisis III (5.1–10), Jesus, the Melchizedekian (= new covenant) high priest, is demonstrated to be superior to Aaron and his line, the Levitical (= old covenant) high priests. In deliberative syncrisis III (6.17–18), the lesser case concerns the promise and confirming oath given to Abraham as evidence of the unchangeable character of God's purpose, while the greater case concerns the promise and confirming oath given to Jesus as even clearer evidence of the unchangeable character of God's purpose (the character of his purpose is said ‘to be shown more clearly’ περισσότερον…ἐπιδεῖξαι). The argument of the syncrisis is that if it was advantageous for Abraham to endure on the basis of the first promise—that is, if he obtained what was promised because of his endurance (cf. 6.12; ‘inherit what has been promised’, NIV, contra the NRSV; also 6.15)Footnote 21 —then it is certainly advantageous for the present generation (‘heirs of the promise’)Footnote 22 to endure in light of God's more clearly revelatory promise to Jesus.Footnote 23
In what sense does the author understand this second promise to be more clearly revelatory for the readers—that is, to ‘show even more clearly…the unchangeable character of his purpose’? In the case of Abraham, the promise (Gen 22.16–17; cf. 15.4–5; 21.12): (a) merely concerned Isaac; (b) served in the writer's fuller telling of the story in 11.17–19 as a guarantee of Isaac's resurrection beyond his sacrifice;Footnote 24 and (c) was realized figuratively when Abraham ‘received him [Isaac] back’ from the dead (11.19).Footnote 25 In the case of Jesus, however, the promise (Ps 110.4): (a) concerns Jesus himself; (b) is a guarantee of Jesus' resurrection beyond his sacrifice; and (c) was realized literally and not figuratively. On the basis of this promise, which was also confirmed by an oath, the readers have an even clearer understanding of the character of God's purpose for his people, and, therefore, all the more reason to seize the hope set before them.
Deliberative syncrisis III seems to retain only one of the two figures (Jesus) featured in epideictic syncrisis III (Jesus vs. Aaronic high priests) and appears in this regard to be exceptional compared to the other deliberative syncrises, which consistently retain both figures from the epideictic comparisons with which they are paired. The syncrisis essentially argues: if perseverance on the basis of the promise given to Abraham (= the lesser) was advantageous for Abraham, then perseverance on the basis of the promise given to Jesus the high priest (= the greater) is advantageous for the audience. What we expect is: if perseverance is shown to be advantageous on the basis of some lesser case involving the Aaronic high priests, then it is certainly shown to be advantageous on the basis of some greater case involving Jesus the high priest.
We could explain the anomaly as an instance simply of literary license: the writer has chosen to depart from the pattern he generally follows. Though the writer has not seemingly in this scenario retained the old covenant/new covenant polarity seen in the other deliberative syncrises, he has, nevertheless, most certainly retained the shadow/ideal polarity common to all of them and crucial to the logic of syncrisis to the lesser: the promise and confirming oath given to Abraham is a shadowy anticipation of the aforementioned (5.5–6) promise and confirming oath given to the high priest Jesus, since both provide assurance of ‘resurrection’; hence, if the former may be taken as a source of assurance, the latter may be all the more. In this scenario, the present community's greater assurance and superior perspective is still grounded on the conclusion of the preceding syncrisis, namely, that Jesus' perfection due to his obedience has made him a source of eternal salvation.
There is evidence suggesting, however, that this syncrisis is not exceptional, that the writer at this point considers Abraham a progenitor both by blood and by type of the Aaronic priesthood and therefore its representative in the comparison. We know from epideictic syncrisis IV that the writer not only thinks of Abraham as the progenitor of the old covenant priests, but on that basis is willing to treat him as a representative of old covenant priesthood in a syncrisis with Melchizedek, who is the progenitor (by type, not by blood) of the new covenant priesthood (7.1–10).
Moreover, we know that the writer considers Abraham to bear a relationship to his priestly descendants that goes beyond blood, that he shares with them a history of faithful priestly service, for the writer frames Abraham's near slaying of Isaac as a form of priestly sacrifice in ch.11:
By faith Abraham, when he was tested, offered up (προσφέρω)Footnote 26 Isaac. He had received the promises, yet he was ready to offer up (προσφέρω) his only son. God had told him, ‘Through Isaac descendants will carry on your name’, and he reasoned that God could even raise him from the dead, and in a sense he received him back from there. (vv. 17–19)
The fact, then, that deliberative syncrisis III parallels this same story with the story of Jesus' own priestly self-sacrifice suggests that the writer already is thinking of Abraham's near slaying of Isaac as a priestly ‘offering’ that foreshadows Jesus' priestly sacrifice, and, therefore, of Abraham as the progenitor priest and representative of the lesser Aaronic priesthood.Footnote 27 Certainly the parallels are striking:
Abraham thus ‘works’ in deliberative comparison III as the Aaronic high priest representative because he is viewed by the writer as the progenitor both by blood and by type of the Aaronic priesthood and therefore its representative in the comparison: if perseverance on the basis of the promise given to Abraham, the proto-Aaronic high priest (of the lesser/old covenant), was advantageous for Abraham, then perseverance on the basis of the promise given to Jesus, the Melchizedekian high priest (of the greater/new covenant), is advantageous, not only for Jesus, but also for the present community of whom he is the forerunner.
In epideictic syncrisis IV (7.1–10.18), Jesus' Melchizedekian (= new covenant) priestly ministry is demonstrated to be superior in its administration of the new covenant to the Levitical (= old covenant) priestly ministry and its administration of the old covenant. In deliberative syncrisis IV (10.28–29), the lesser case concerns those who violate the Law of Moses—that is, the old covenant code earlier said to be administered by the Levitical priests (7.11). The greater case concerns those who essentially violate the new covenant—that is, those who deliberately keep sinning (10.26) and thus spurn the Son of God, profane the blood of the covenant, and outrage the Spirit of grace. Each of these phrases employs a primary term from 7.1–10.18 related to Jesus' new covenant, priestly ministry (Son—7.28; blood of the covenant—9.20, 25; Spirit—9.14) and thus anchors the warning in the cultic presentation of that ministry.Footnote 28 The argument of the syncrisis is that if apostates were put to death under the old covenant on the testimony of two or three witnesses,Footnote 29 then ‘how much worse’ punishment will those deserve who in violating the new covenant spurn three witnesses (Son, blood, Spirit). Thus, deliberative reflection on the relative greatness of the respective offenses logically extends the preceding epideictic syncritical analysis in 7.1–10.18 of the covenants' respective priestly ministries. Again, we have returned to the deliberative argument based upon the disadvantages of apostasy.
In epideictic syncrisis V (12.18–24), the superiority of Zion (= the mountain of approach under the new covenant) to Sinai (= the mountain of approach under the old covenant) was demonstrated chiefly by the relative access to God that was found at each by virtue of their cosmological location (Zion-heaven/Sinai-earth). In the accompanying deliberative syncrisis (12.25), the warning given to the recipients of the old covenant on earth at Sinai is presented as the lesser case, while the warning given to the recipients of the new covenant from Zion in heaven is presented as the greater case. Its argument is that what is valid in the lesser case of those warned on earth—namely, that those who ignored the warning were unable to escape judgment—is also valid in the greater case of those warned from heaven. Thus apostasy (= refusing the warning) results in disadvantage (not being able to escape judgment). The warnings from earth and heaven deliberatively extend the Sinai-earth and Zion-heaven rationale of the preceding epideictic syncrisis.
In sum, each of these five key deliberative syncrises generally argues that what is valid in the case of old covenant experience is valid in the case of new covenant experience. What makes each a syncrisis to the lesser is that the preceding epideictic syncrisis with which it is paired has clarified (through the representative logic of syncrisis of wholes by parts) that the old covenant is the lesser covenant, and the new covenant, the greater. In short, epideictic syncrisis is logically in service to deliberative syncrisis, establishing the premise on which it proceeds:
Furthermore, a specific relationship is also evident among each of the five epideictic-deliberative syncrisis pairs. That is, the covenant representatives in view in each epideictic syncrisis remain in view in each deliberative syncrisis's juxtaposition of covenant experiences: Jesus/angels (I), Jesus/Moses (II), Jesus/Aaron (III), Melchizedekian priestly ministry/Levitical priestly ministry (IV), and Zion/Sinai (VI).
The remaining deliberative syncrisis (V), Heb 12.9, does not relate new covenant experience to old, the concern that spans the superstructure of Hebrews' outline from chs. 1 to 12, but rather, relates the readers' experience with the heavenly father to their experience with their earthly fathers, a concern that prevails only in the relatively shorter supporting unit of 12.5–11. We exclude it, therefore, from the present analysis.
4. The Topical Relationship of Epideictic and Deliberative Syncrisis
In addition to taking their logical premise from the epideictic (expository) syncrises with which they are paired, the deliberative syncrises identified above, together with the deliberative (hortatory) units in which they are situated, also derive from these epideictic syncrises their topical theme. In our previous study of epideictic syncrisis in Hebrews, we argue that the five-part syncrisis is arranged conventionally by standard headings or ‘topics’ of syncrisis.Footnote 30 According to the handbooks, a syncrisis of persons or things is supposed to employ as its basic, compositional outline the epideictic topics used to divide a life in encomia of persons: e.g., families and places of origin, circumstances of birth, upbringing and education, career pursuits and achievements, circumstances of death, posthumous honors—the lists vary, depending on the theorist. Though these topics are better suited for syncrises of persons, in that they follow the contours of a person's life from start to finish, they can be adapted, the theorists say, for use in syncrisis of things: one merely finds something ‘analogous’ in the life or history of the thing.
The five-part syncritical project in Hebrews, we argue, adopts just such a method, taking up five commonly employed topics—or, to be more precise, topics analogous to those used for persons—in its comparison of the two covenants. Here we provide in summary form what we have extensively argued elsewhere.Footnote 31
I. Origins: Syncrisis of Covenant Heavenly Mediators (Angels vs. Jesus, 1.1–14 and 2.5–18)
II. Birth: Syncrisis of Covenant Earthly Inaugurators (Moses vs. Jesus, 3.1–6)
III. Pursuits—Education: Syncrisis of the Priestly Apprenticeships of Each Covenant (Aaronic high priests vs. Jesus, 5.1–10)
IV. Pursuits—Deeds: Syncrisis of the Priestly Deeds of Each Covenant (Levitical priestly ministry vs. Melchizedekian priestly ministry, 7.1–10.18)
V. Death/Events after Death: Syncrisis of Covenant Eschata (Sinai vs. Zion, 12.18–24)
(1) The project's first syncrisis considers a heading analogous to ‘origins’, contrasting the angels and Jesus as the heavenly mediators from which each covenant derives (= covenant founders).Footnote 32 In the tacit argument of the larger project, the idea of this first syncrisis is that the new covenant is superior to the old because it originates with the superior heavenly mediator.
(2) The project's second syncrisis focuses on a topic analogous to ‘circumstances of birth’, contrasting the covenants' respective earthly beginnings via inaugurators with contrasting births themselves in God's household: whereas Moses is a servant in the household, Jesus is the Son over the household.Footnote 33 The function of the syncrisis in the larger project is to show that the new covenant is better born than the old, deriving as it does from the better-born inaugurator. The fact that the old covenant is also shown to serve at its inauguration as a shadowy witness to the new covenant reality only strengthens the argument: though the old covenant came first (a potential marker of superiority with regard to birth), it did so as testimony to the latter, proving the latter is the superior-born.
(3) The third epideictic syncrisis takes up a topic analogous to ‘education’, contrasting the Melchizedekian high priest, Jesus, with the Aaronic high priests in terms of the training they have undergone for priestly service. Whereas Jesus undertakes an apprenticeship of self-sacrificial suffering from which he ‘learn[s] obedience’ (presumably to his Father) and thereby graduates to ‘perfection’, the Aaronic high priests share in the weakness of the ‘ignorant and wayward’ and sacrifice accordingly. The function of the syncrisis is to show that the new covenant has the better-trained high priest.
(4) The fourth syncrisis treats the topic of ‘deeds’, comprehensively contrasting all that is done by the Levitical and Melchizekian priesthoods in their administration of their respective covenants, and showing the former ministry to be but a shadow of the latter. The function of the syncrisis is to show that the new covenant's priestly accomplishments are superior to the old.
(5) The fifth syncrisis takes up a topic analogous to ‘death’ and ‘posthumous events’, juxtaposing Sinai and Zion as contrasting eschata of access to God belonging to each covenant. On the one hand, Sinai is depicted as an earthly (‘something touched’) mountain of limited, historical access to God, a mountain ominously characterized by fire, darkness, underwordly ‘gloom’, tempest, trumpet-sound, and a fear-inspiring ‘voice’ warning of death for those who come too close in their approach to God. On the other hand, Zion is depicted as a heavenly mountain of unlimited eschatological access to God, a heavenly city populated by angels in festal gathering, the assembly of the firstborn, God as judge-of-all, the perfected spirits of the righteous, Jesus, and his sprinkled blood that, in contrast to the voice at Sinai, speaks a word analogous to Abel's blood, only ‘better’—a reference to the tradition that Abel's blood promised future vindication for the persecuted righteous and judgment for the oppressor.Footnote 34 These voices of warning deriving from each mountain, voices which become the focus of the deliberation that follows, are especially significant to the topical theme at hand. For the writer, the voice at Sinai is proof that the access to God provided by the old covenant was always under the threat of ‘death’ and the pall, even, of underworldly ‘gloom’—and this in contrast to the voice at Zion promising, like Abel's blood, ultimate vindication for the righteous.
When one examines the deliberative materials that follow each of these five epideictic units, the same topical theme is evident. Each deliberative unit features as its central argument a deliberative word of advice and a supporting deliberative syncrisis both of which further reflection on the topos at hand. Thus the deliberative syncrises advance the argument begun by the epideictic syncrises not only logically but also thematically.
(1) The first deliberative unit (2.1–4) retains the preceding epideictic unit's focus on the covenants' respective origins—that is, on the heavenly mediators from which the covenants respectively derive, the angels and Jesus—shifting the emphasis to the reception of each covenant upon its mediation by these heavenly agents. Its counsel is essentially for readers not to reject salvation of such great origins (i.e., salvation mediated through Jesus). Its supporting syncrisis cites the contrast drawn in the preceding epideictic unit's syncrisis of covenant origins, arguing that if rejecting a message of lesser origins (‘declared through angels’) resulted in disadvantage, then rejecting a message of greater origins (‘declared through Jesus’) most assuredly will.
(2) The second deliberative unit (3.7–4.11) retains the second epideictic unit's focus on the covenants' respective births—that is, on their historical inaugurations via Moses and Jesus respectively—juxtaposing the readers' reception of God's address ‘today’ (3.7, 13) with the wilderness generation's reception of God's address at the time of the rebellion against Moses at Meribab (3.7–8; cf. Num 20.1–13). The wilderness generation is the primary focus of this deliberative section because it is the inaugural recipient of the old covenant, and the writer is treating the historical inauguration of the covenant as something analogous in the life of a covenant to birth. The unit's central counsel is for the readers not to respond with the same hardheartedness and unbelief displayed by that generation (3.8, 12, 13, 15; 4.2, 11) and thereby fail to enter into God's rest as did they (4.1, 11).Footnote 35 The supporting syncrisis argues that if unbelieving reception of the ‘good news’ resulted in failure to enter God's rest for the wilderness generation, then it also will for the present generation (4.1–2).
(3) Though often treated in contemporary scholarship as a digression,Footnote 36 the third deliberative unit (4.14–16; 5.11–6.20) actually continues the third epideictic unit's reflection on the topic of ‘education’, shifting the focus from the superior training of the new covenant's high priest to the training the present community is called to undergo in view of it. The introductory hortatory material (4.14–16), introduces the first pedagogical metaphor, Jesus' testing, and is followed by the syncrisis of priesthoods, which continues the pedagogical theme (5.1–10). The subsequent hortatory section begins with a lengthy rebuke that chastises the readers for essentially being untrained and immature. The rebuke features a series of metaphors drawn from Hellenistic paideia: the hearers are first accused of being dull in understanding, of being infants in need of milk rather than mature persons in need of solid food, of being unskilled rather than trained, and of needing to be taught the basic elements, though they should be teachers (5.11–14).Footnote 37 The rebuke leads naturally to the central counsel of the section, which is for the readers essentially to be trained like Christ. First, they are exhorted to move on to ‘perfection’, the standard goal of Hellenistic paideia and the end to which Christ's curriculum of obedience-learned-through-suffering was said to have ledFootnote 38—and, correspondingly, to leave behind ‘basic teaching’ about Christ so that the writer and his fellow teachers do not have to ‘lay again the foundation’ of basic Christian catechesis. Second, the readers are exhorted to engage in the standard pedagogical practice of mimesis,Footnote 39 imitating others who like Christ (cf. 4.15) patiently endured testing and so inherited what was promised (6.12). Abraham, a well-known exemplar of successful endurance of ‘testing’Footnote 40 is then cited in the syncrisis supporting this advice: if he could patiently endure the test, the writer reasons, on the basis of the promise and confirming oath given to him, certainly the readers can do the same on the basis of the more clearly revelatory promise and confirming oath given to Jesus in advance of his own ‘testing’ (4.15; 5.6–10).
(4) The fourth deliberative unit (10.19–12.17) continues reflection on the topic of deeds, shifting the focus from Jesus' Melchizedekian priesthood's superior deeds to the good deeds they enable, those of the readers.Footnote 41 If in the previous epideictic syncrisis, Jesus' Melchizedekian priestly service was shown to grant readers (as the writer summarizes it in 10.19–20) ‘confidence to enter the sanctuary…through the curtain’, now in three parallel, hortatory subjunctives, the writer urges readers to appropriately responsive action: to approach confidently (10.22), to hold fast to the confession (10.23), and finally, to provoke one another to love and good deeds (10.24). Here the writer arrives explicitly at his topical theme and the primary concern of this section, loving action (understood as ongoing commitment to the faith community, 10.25), rooting it causally in the confident approach enabled by Jesus' priestly mediation. In all the material that follows, the writer may be seen to be either encouraging such loving action or discouraging its opposite, the ‘sin’ (10.26) of community defection (10.25). He warns readers that persistence in such sin will result in a sacrifice for sin not remaining (10.26–27). He reasons in the supporting deliberative syncrisis that if apostasy under the old covenant was met with punishment, it will be met with even greater punishment in the case of the new covenant (10.28–30). He reminds readers of their own faithful deeds in the past when they had previously faced suffering, encouraging them to similar confidence and endurance in the present (10.32–39). He describes the many faithful deeds of the elders (11.1–40), upholding them as an example of the ‘assurance’ and ‘conviction’ (11.1) he is encouraging. He summons readers to ‘run the race with perseverance’ (12.1–12), looking to their pioneer and perfecter and the ‘endurance’ seen in his faithful deed (12.2–3), and seeing in their trials the deeds of a Father who is disciplining them for their good (12.5–11). Finally, after encouraging peace (12.14) and discouraging bitterness (12.15) within the community, he reminds readers of the deplorable deed of Esau, warning readers not to join him in selling their birthright and losing their inheritance (12.16–17).
(5) The sixth deliberative unit (12.25–29) retains the preceding epideictic unit's focus on the topics of death and events after death, continuing the juxtaposition of Sinai-earth and Zion-heaven as contrasting eschata of access, and in particular, the juxtaposition of the voices deriving from those mountains as voices that warn, respectively, of ‘death’ for those who approach too closely (the voice of God at Sinai; 12.20; cf. Exod 19.12–13) and of final vindication beyond death for the oppressed righteous and, correspondingly, of judgment for their oppressors (the voice at Zion, ‘the sprinkled blood that speaks a better word than the blood of Abel’; 12.24).Footnote 42 The unit's essential counsel is for readers not to refuse the voice of Jesus' ‘sprinkled blood’Footnote 43 promising (as did Abel's blood) final vindication beyond death for the righteous oppressed and final judgment for their oppressors. Its supporting syncrisis explicitly cites the contrast drawn in the preceding epideictic unit between the voices heard at the two mountains, arguing that if refusing the voice that ‘warned them on earth’ resulted in no escape from the ‘death’ it promised, then refusing the voice that ‘warns from heaven’ will most certainly result in no escape from the final judgment it promises.Footnote 44 A deliberative exemplum follows drawing a further distinction between the two voices: whereas the voice at Sinai merely shook the earth, the voice speaking from Zion will shake the heavens and earth, so that only that which cannot be shaken—Zion itself—will remain. The point of the syncrisis is made explicit in the counsel that follows, and again the focus has in view final vindication and salvation (events beyond death): the readers should give awe-filled thanks for what will remain once the heavenly voice speaks, the unshakeable kingdom of Zion that they are receiving.
5. Conclusion
In view of the analysis above, it is possible to sketch the essential structure of Hebrews' argument in outline form. Our previous study demonstrated that five epideictic syncrises supply the structuring principle. These syncrises, we argued, function collectively as a comparison of covenants, old and new, pointing to the latter as the superior. These syncrises, moreover, are arranged chronologically according to encomiastic topics analogous to those prescribed for comparing persons in syncritical compositions. What the present study has shown is that each of these epideictic syncrises has a corresponding deliberative syncrisis that takes up (a) the former's syncritical verdict as the premise on which the latter logically proceeds, and (b) the former's encomiastic topic, which serves as the thematic heading of the entire deliberative unit in which the deliberative syncrisis is situated. The result is that each epideictic-deliberative pairing is tied together (a) logically, with epideictic rhetoric serving what may be seen as Hebrews' ultimately deliberative aim—namely, to encourage perseverance in the faith and, correspondingly, to discourage apostasy; and (b) thematically, with five rhetorical topics functioning conventionally as compositional headings of this ‘word of exhortation’. These relationships are illustrated in the following general outline of Hebrews:
I. Covenant Origins—Angels vs. Jesus
a. Epideictic (1.1–14 and 2.5–18): The new covenant has greater origins with the superior heavenly mediator.
b. Deliberative (2.1–4): Pay greater attention to/do not neglect the salvation announced by the superior covenant mediator.
II. Covenant Births—Moses vs. Jesus
a. Epideictic (3.1–6): The new covenant has greater earthly beginnings via the better born inaugurator.
b. Deliberative (3.7–4.11): Do not listen faithlessly to the gospel announced ‘today’ by the better-born covenant inaugurator.
III. Covenant Education—Aaronic high priests vs. Jesus
a. Epideictic (5.1–10): The new covenant's high priest is the better trained.
b. Deliberative (4.14–16; 5.11–6.20): Undergo the new covenant's high priest's better training of faithful endurance based upon better promises.
IV. Covenant Deeds—Levitical priestly ministry vs. Melchizedekian priestly ministry
a. Epideictic (7.1–10.18): The deeds of the new covenant's priestly ministry are superior.
b. Deliberative (10.19–12.17): Enabled by the greater deeds of the new covenant priestly ministry, approach, hold fast, and provoke one another to loving action, not defecting from the covenant community.
V. Covenant Deaths/Events beyond Death—Sinai vs. Zion
a. Epideictic (12.18–24): The new covenant's mountain of eschatological access to God is superior.
b. Deliberative (12.25–29): Do not refuse the voice speaking a better word of final vindication and judgment from the mountain of better, eschatological access to God.
VI. Epistolary Conclusion (13.1–25)
If the rhetorical framework of Hebrews is, in fact, as this study suggests, primarily deliberative, how may the comparison of covenants be seen to function within this framework? In other words, what is the rationale for making a syncritical analysis of covenants the basis of a deliberative discourse on perseverance?
Throughout Hebrews the promises of God are held out as the goal of God's actions and the motivation for ongoing perseverance on the part of the faithful (cf. 2.3, 5, 10; 4.1; 6.12; 10.34; 11.13–16; 12.28). The new covenant mediated by Jesus and his priestly ministry (as anticipated in the old covenant and its priestly ministry) deals with the problem of human sin and faithlessness, which would otherwise keep God's people from inheriting God's eschatological promise (cf. 9.15).Footnote 45 The audience addressed in Hebrews is exhorted to present faithfulness in view of the new covenant realities inaugurated by Jesus. The covenant syncrises amplify these reasons, providing both greater encouragement and certainty concerning the soteriological foundation for present perseverance, so that the people of God may enter the eschatological rest of the world-to-come, the heavenly Jerusalem which God has promised to the faithful.