Social movements, collective action and social policy

The literature on social movements examines the relationship between structural change and social transformation. Scholars have analysed how social problems and discontent becomes the basis for collective action (Tilly and Tarrow, Reference Tilly and Tarrow2007; Tarrow, Reference Tarrow2011; Goodwin and Jasper, Reference Goodwin and Jasper2012) as well as the agency of movement actors (i.e. why individuals join or drop out) (Touraine, Reference Touraine1984; Wieviorka, Reference Wieviorka2005; Pleyers, Reference Pleyers2011). Collective action is not outside of politics, but rather is the space through which ‘ordinary people’ come into confrontation with elites or authorities around a shared common purpose (Tarrow, Reference Tarrow2011: 9). So as to understand how shared grievances become transformed into collective action, in recent years sociological research on social movements (van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, Reference Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans2013) has also examined the role of emotions and ‘emotional dynamics’ during all the processes and phases of protest (Jasper, Reference Jasper2014: 208). Research on emotions examines how emotions can lead to collective action, but also result in demobilisation and non-action.

The question, which often follows those of why collective actions emerge and why individuals mobilise, is concerned with analysing movements’ success or impact (Della Porta and Diani, Reference Della Porta and Diani2006; Rochon and Mazmanian, Reference Rochon and Mazmanian1993; Giugni, Reference Giugni1998; Weldon, Reference Weldon2011). In the narrowest sense, impact is often interpreted as a change in legislation or the adoption of a new policy instrument. Such a narrow (or what some call a productivist) understanding of impact (Castells, Reference Castells2012) ignores how movements engage with and seek to shape wider public debates, social policies, and attitudes. In this article, my aim is to examine the context from which Brexit emerged and became possible, but also to problematise some of the reigning assumptions about it.

In 2010, two years after the 2008 financial crisis, we saw the explosion of protest movements throughout the globe. It is important to recall that these were movements that were against austerity and inequality and for greater democracy, dignity, and social justice (Ishkanian and Glasius, Reference Ishkanian and Glasius2018). Many writing about recent movements argue that the protests and occupation of squares beginning in 2010 were an expression of anger and reflected growing concerns around the lack of democracy, social justice and dignity (Kaldor and Selchow, Reference Kaldor and Selchow2012; Glasius and Pleyers, Reference Glasius and Pleyers2013; Tejerina et al., Reference Tejerina, Perugorria, Benski and Langman2013; Della Porta, Reference Della Porta2015), representing a tipping point in a globalisation of discontent (Biekart and Fowler, Reference Biekart and Fowler2013) and indignation (Calhoun, Reference Calhoun2013). Yet because of their progressive demands, horizontal forms of organising, and participatory nature, the global wave of protests, including those of the Arab Spring, the Spanish and Greek Indignados, Gezi Park, and Occupy were also described as movements of hope (Flaherty, Reference Flaherty2016; Castells, Reference Castells2012; Boukalaa and Dimitrakopoulou, Reference Boukalaa and Dimitrakopoulou2017). Thus, positive (i.e. hope) and negative (i.e. anger, indignation) emotions drove people to the streets and squares.

It has now become clear that the prospects of activists’ demands – as well as their conceptions and practices of democracy, social justice, and participation bleeding outward and upward into the transformation of society and of political decision-making – are very bleak. Instead, in the UK, in the US and all over the western world, nativist, right-wing populist movements have been on a rising trajectory, based at least in part on very similar sentiments of discontent with electoral politics and neoliberal policies. And we increasingly hear about the crisis, death, decline of and fatigue with democracy (Keane, Reference Keane2009; Flinders, Reference Flinders2016; Plattner, Reference Plattner2015; Appadurai, Reference Appadurai and Geiselberger2017). Scholars and pundits argue that we are now living in the period of the ‘great regression’ (Geiselberger, Reference Geiselberger2017), which is also characterised as the ‘age of anger’ (Mishra, Reference Mishra2017).

The UK-focused social policy literature, which examines the role of civil society in policy shaping and implementation, has tended to overwhelmingly focus on how formal, professionalised voluntary or third sector organisations have developed partnerships with the State (Billis, Reference Billis1993; Lewis, Reference Lewis1999; Deakin, Reference Deakin2001; Alcock, Reference Alcock2010; Harris, Reference Harris2010), their comparative advantage and efficacy in delivering services (Billis and Glennerster, Reference Billis and Glennerster1998; Harris et al., Reference Harris, Rochester, Halfpenny, Harris and Rochester2001), and the challenges they face in maintaining their independence and autonomy in the wake of funding cuts and increasing reliance on contracting (Rochester, Reference Rochester2013; Deakin, Reference Deakin and Slocock2014; Milbourne and Cushman, Reference Milbourne and Cushman2015; Murray and Milbourne, Reference Murray, Milbourne, Milbourne and Murray2017). There has been far less focus on more contentious civil society actors, including social movements and informal grassroots groups, which are less interested in working in partnership with the State and instead contest and critique existing policies and campaign for the recognition of unmet or unrecognised needs (Martin, Reference Martin2001; Halfpenny and Reid, Reference Halfpenny and Reid2002; Powell, Reference Powell2009; Rochester, Reference Rochester2013; Milbourne and Murray, Reference Milbourne and Murray2017; Ishkanian and Ali, Reference Ishkanian and Ali2018).

In examining Brexit, it is important to recall that what would eventually become Vote Leave grew out of the campaign which started in 1975 regarding the UK's withdrawal from the membership of the European Common Market, which it had only joined two years prior. I agree with Della Porta who maintains that we should view both the Brexit and Trump campaigns as ‘other forms of populist politics’ rather than social movements (Della Porta, Reference Della Porta and Geiselberger2017: 27). But even if we agree with Della Porta that Brexit was a form of ‘populist politics’ rather than a social movement, what constitutes populism remains difficult to define. Laclau (Reference Laclau2005) characterised populism as an empty signifier which is defined by antagonistic frontiers and, rejecting analyses of populism that focus on ideological content, he noted that there can be both right and left populisms. Yet even if we focus on form rather than content, the task of defining populism remains difficult for, as Müller maintains, that there isn't yet a ‘theory of populism’ which provides us with ‘coherent criteria for deciding when political actors turn populist’ (Müller, Reference Müller2017: 2) [emphasis in the original].

Regardless of whether we consider Brexit a form of populist politics or simply as a specific political issue or demand, I show below how, similar to many recent movements, Brexit had a heterogeneous base of supporters (Peterson et al., Reference Peterson, Wahlstrom and Wennerhag2015). I discuss how Brexit brought together individuals with grievances around the current economic and political context but who hold diverse political and ideological views and allegiances – or, in some instances, no allegiances at all. This illustrates how the issue became a touchstone for diverse grievances. While I acknowledge the limits of social movement theories in explaining phenomenon such as Brexit, I argue that these theories remain useful in helping us to analyse how shared grievances are transformed (or not) into action.

In the sections below, I explore why and how actors from across the ideological spectrum supported Brexit and examine the sources of discontent which coalesced into a victory for Leave. Drawing on empirical research with activists in London conducted in 2013–2015, I discuss their discontent and demands as they existed in the period after the crisis leading up to Brexit to argue that one of the driving factors for recent discontent is neoliberalism. By examining the different actors and their critiques of the status quo, I highlight that, while there may be shared grievances, the diverse groups who express anger with the current situation do not share common explanations or solutions.

Brexit's heterogeneous supporters

In analysing Brexit and Trump, and the rise of authoritarian populism elsewhere, it is common to read of how those left-behind by globalisation have lashed out in anger against the current political elites and wider system, which they believe has impoverished them. Such analyses are hardly new; and scholars, including Kriesi and others, have analysed the so-called winners and losers of globalisation in the 2000s, noting the growing nativism, xenophobia and anti-immigrant claims (Kriesi et al., Reference Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschier and Frey2008). Since the Brexit referendum, there have been a bevy of post-mortem reports. One such report, commissioned by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, explains the Brexit vote by arguing that those on the margins of society, living on low incomes, with few qualifications and without the skills required to prosper in the modern economy, were more likely than others to vote ‘Leave’. According to the report's authors, ‘Groups in Britain who have been “left behind” by rapid economic change and feel cut adrift from the mainstream consensus were the most likely to support Brexit’ (Goodwin and Heath, Reference Goodwin and Heath2016: 3). While emphasising the socio-economic drivers for Leave, they also acknowledge that educational attainment, geography, attitudes, and values all matter. In particular, they argue that low educational qualifications, socially conservative views, and a very strong sense of English identity predisposed people towards Leave (Goodwin and Heath, Reference Goodwin and Heath2016: 18). Kaufman argues against the economic inequality argument, maintaining it was all about culture and attitudes. Drawing on the British Election Study 2015 Internet Panel and census data, he unequivocally concludes that, ‘all told, the Brexit story is mainly about values, not economic inequality’ (Kaufman, Reference Kaufman2016). Another report, this one published by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, finds that Brexit was overwhelmingly supported by those on the right, and that UK far-right groups ‘gained significant number of followers’ from the Brexit campaign (Smith and Colliver, Reference Smith and Colliver2016: 1). While Smith and Colliver acknowledge that the Leave campaign ‘actively sought to distance itself from the UK far-right movements’, they maintain that the xenophobic narratives ‘resonated and gained traction with communities who felt they had lost control, or simply lost out, because of national immigration policy’, adding that inevitably ‘parallels were drawn between the narratives of the two’ (Smith and Colliver, Reference Smith and Colliver2016: 2). But this is hardly the whole story. In addition to those so-called losers of globalisation, Brexit supporters included many winners, including those with high educational qualifications and incomes. Nick Clegg, the former leader of the Liberal Democrats, describes the elite Brexiteers as follows:

Finally, alongside the so-called left-behind and the financial elites that supported Brexit, there was also a group of Brexit supporters on the political left who are sometimes referred to as Lexiteers. Lexiteers by and large reject the xenophobic anti-immigration arguments which they ascribe to the right-wing ‘big business’ and ‘little-Englander’ Leave campaigns (Choonara, Reference Choonara2015: 3), arguing instead that their opposition to the EU is based on socialist principles and is based on advancing workers’ rights and anti-racist policies. According to the chair of the Left Leave group, Brexit supporters on the left reject the ‘anti-foreigner kind of nonsense’ (Zagoria, Reference Zagoria2017) and base their support for Brexit on the premise that the EU is promoting an anti-democratic neoliberal agenda which advances ‘market rather than collective planning’ (Tuck, Reference Tuck2016). They cite the EU's support for free movement as ‘based on a desire to create a European-wide labour force that can be profitably exploited by capital’ (Choonara, Reference Choonara2015: 3) and argue that post-EU immigration controls would put the interests of British workers first. One such Lexit supporter, Labour MP Frank Field, argues in The Guardian for greater immigration control in the following way. He writes,

Harvard academic and Lexit supporter Richard Tuck similarly argues that a planned welfare state, which is ‘the traditional heart of modern left-wing politics. . . is rendered virtually impossible if Britain stays in the EU since no one will have any idea of the population numbers’ (Tuck, Reference Tuck2016). Lexiteers maintain that the referendum has ‘broken the neoliberal consensus, and alerted the establishment to the polling power of the “left behind”’ (Buxton, Reference Buxton2017).

As I have discussed in this section, it is far too simplistic to describe all Brexit supporters as ascribing to a particular ideological position or indeed of being driven by common concerns or grievances. A more nuanced interpretation should consider how Brexit wasn't just the outcome of the so-called left behind voting out of anger and fear, but to consider how the issue became a flashpoint for varied grievances. Moreover, what is often ignored in the discussions about the so-called winners and losers of globalisation is that many of the people who are now protesting in the streets, not for Brexit necessarily and often against it, are people who in recent years would have been described as the winners of globalisation. As Della Porta writes, ‘. . . they are the well-educated and the mobile, once described as globalization's ‘winners’, but far from enjoying such a self-perception today’ (Della Porta, Reference Della Porta and Geiselberger2017: 30); and, as Streeck maintains, in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis ‘. . .the number of “globalization losers” has been steadily growing’ (Streeck, Reference Streeck and Geiselberger2017: 161). ‘Left-behind’ is a fluid rather than a static category and even those who may have in the past been described as ‘winners’ of globalisation (i.e., young, middle-class, university graduates) are now are facing increased precarity in the job market, growing personal (including student) debt, and even relative poverty.

Indeed, analysis of recent protests movements have repeatedly illustrated how the 2008 crisis and the ensuing austerity negatively impacted a wide set of the population, including young people, pensioners, public sector workers, and those who were previously considered middle class (Joya, Reference Joya2011; Tejerina et al., Reference Tejerina, Perugorria, Benski and Langman2013; Matsaganis and Leventi, Reference Matsaganis and Leventi2014; Simiti, Reference Simiti2017). For example, drawing on my own research with anti-austerity activists in London, I found that many activists who identified as middle class expressed a deep concern for growing inequality, precarity, loss of opportunities, and lack of voice. Charlie,Footnote ¹ who at the time of the interview was in his early thirties and was employed in a NGO, said,

William, a professional in his late fifties, was active in the Occupy movement which he characterised as ‘a very broad church of dissatisfaction’, adding ‘. . .the overriding message of Occupy from its spontaneity and the way it rolled across the globe was just a demonstration of anger at just the way we're being governed and manipulated’. During the fieldwork (2013-2015) Brexit was not mentioned by any respondent and it did not feature prominently in the mainstream press. I cannot, nor do I wish to speculate, how William, Charlie, or indeed any of our respondents voted in the referendum. Rather, I wish to illustrate that the discontent with the status quo was shared widely and that Brexit emerged from this context of discontent, anger, and indignation. While the anti-austerity movements, both in London and elsewhere, sought to be inclusive (Ishkanian and Glasius, Reference Ishkanian and Glasius2017) as noted by the activists quoted in this article, there were those who did not engage or join. I do not wish to speculate on the reasons behind a lack of participation, but it is important to keep in mind that non-engagement in a movement or collective action does not mean absence of discontent or grievances.

Therefore, rather than writing off those with grievances – as losers, the left-behind, and even more problematically, as ‘deplorables’ (Clinton, Reference Clinton2016) or ‘victims’ who are ‘fearful, angry, and resentful of what their societies have done for them and to them’ (Appadurai, Reference Appadurai and Geiselberger2017: 2) – a more robust and empirically grounded analysis is required to understand the complex political reconfigurations and shifting alliances which have contributed to Brexit and the rise of Trump. This in turn can inform our thinking of how social policy can mitigate social conflicts and advance greater social justice and cohesion. If nothing is done to recognise and address the social and economic drivers that contribute to rising discontent, populist politicians from Trump to Farage will continue to tap into the anger by creating a divisive politics of us versus them.

The trouble with neoliberalism

Brexit exposed deep fissures and cleavages in British society and, as many argue, neoliberal policies have not only deepened inequality and poverty but are also deeply anti-democratic (Merkel, Reference Merkel2014a; Streeck, Reference Streeck2014; Brown, Reference Brown2015). While I agree with those who argue that we should embrace a ‘more nuanced approach’ which views neoliberalism as a ‘mobile technology’ or ‘logic’ which mutates as it travels rather than ‘a fixed set of attributes with predetermined outcomes’ (Ong, Reference Ong2007: 3; Collier, Reference Collier2012), most authors writing about neoliberalism agree that, at a minimum, neoliberalism entails a focus on individual responsibility rather than collective meeting of needs (George and Wilding, Reference George and Wilding1994; Dwyer, Reference Dwyer1998; MacGregor, Reference MacGregor, Sad-Filho and Jonston2005; Harvey, Reference Harvey2007) and that, as an ideological position, neoliberalism is characterised by a hostility to the ‘public realm’, representing instead policies which are a combination of anti-welfarism and anti-statism (Clarke, Reference Clarke2004: 30).

The global wave of protests of the early 2010s were as much concerned with the economy as with the political system (Ishkanian and Glasius, Reference Ishkanian and Glasius2018); moreover, as already stated, they brought together individuals with shared grievances around the status quo. As such, they can be seen as embodying what Laclau and Mouffe call ‘diverse antagonisms and points of rupture’ (Reference Laclau and Mouffe1985: 191). Contrary to those who argue that democracy is in decline or that there is fatigue with democracy (Merkel, Reference Merkel2014b; Plattner, Reference Plattner2015; Appadurai, Reference Appadurai and Geiselberger2017), through our comparative research with movements in Europe, North Africa, and in Asia, my colleagues and I found that activists almost universally rejected representative democracy as a sufficient model but that, rather than feeling fatigued with democracy, they wanted more, real democracy: which they understood as being a process-oriented notion of active citizenship that places strong demands, both on the citizens themselves and on those at all levels who govern them (Ishkanian and Glasius, Reference Ishkanian and Glasius2017). They argued that democracy means having a voice, a right, and even a responsibility to participate in politics and the public life of the commons. Moreover, they developed more demanding practices and ideas of what democracy should mean: ideas that are not idiosyncratic, but resonate with each other and with certain writings in political theory. Activists in these movements also developed solidarity and self-help practices, which were intended as political interventions, rather than philanthropic acts of charity, through which people began to confront the state with its failure to meet its responsibilities to its citizens, including, but not limited to, providing basic services. These forms of solidaristic action represent an inherent rejection and subversion of the neoliberal logic of individual responsibility that goes well beyond the expression of grievances.

A number of scholars writing about the resilience of neoliberalism argue that civil society actors, and in particular social movements, have an important role to play in articulating challenges against neoliberal ideas and policies (Crouch, Reference Crouch2011; Peck et al., Reference Peck, Theodore, Brenner, Cahill, Edwards and Stillwell2012; Thatcher and Schmidt, Reference Thatcher, Schmidt, Schmidt and Thatcher2013). Yet critical scholars who have examined the relationship between democracy and neoliberalism maintain that democracy will be in crisis until such time as the problems created by capitalism and neoliberalism are addressed (Crouch, Reference Crouch2011; Keane, Reference Keane2009; Merkel, Reference Merkel2014a; Streeck, Reference Streeck2014; Della Porta, Reference Della Porta2015). While they recognise the importance of movements in challenging prevailing views, they also acknowledge how inequalities of power between movements and market and state institutions may limit their impact (Brown, Reference Brown2015; Badiou and Gauchet, Reference Badiou and Gauchet2016).

My colleagues and I have examined and analysed the driving factors, demands, repertoires of action, and mobilising strategies and practices elsewhere (Glasius and Ishkanian, Reference Glasius and Ishkanian2015). In this article, I focus on the reality that, however inclusive and participatory the movements sought to be, they cannot be said to have been entirely representative. Indeed, the activists we interviewed in London spoke of their concerns that many who were worst hit by the crisis and subsequent austerity policies were not very engaged with or integrated into the anti-austerity struggle. Luke, early fifties, who was involved in a grassroots anti-austerity campaign and is also a trade union activist described the growing poverty and inequality in his London borough as providing ‘fertile ground’ for the rise of the far right. He said,

Jack, early twenties, who was involved in the student movement against fees and cuts argued that, while students had an outlet to express their anger, he worried that ‘. . .the white working class don't have those opportunities, might associate with a hooliganistic type of nationalist politics. . . . Politics in the EU will become a lot more populist, without a doubt.’ For Mia, late forties, the shift to the right was hardly new. She said,

While anti-austerity groups in England have raised concerns around the impacts of cuts on different groups of people, highlighted alternatives to austerity (e.g. cracking down on tax evasion), and demanded the reversals of the cuts, Government has yet to substantively change course from the austerity agenda. This agenda, which was introduced by the 2010–2015 Coalition Government, led to the largest welfare spending cuts since 1921–24 (Lupton et al., Reference Lupton, Burchard, Hills and Stewart2013). Hence while we can analyse and argue over why the 2010+ movements emerged, if we consider, purely from a policy perspective, what these movements achieved, then it is clear their impact has been very limited (Ishkanian and Glasius, Reference Ishkanian and Glasius2017). Movements have shaped the political discourses and wider public discussions, issues such as inequality and tax justice, but apart from contributing to shifts in public discourse, there is little evidence that they are having a direct impact at the level of social policy; albeit I recognise that impact as such is difficult to measure and attribute.

Jeremy Corbyn's rise and election as Labour party leader and his explicit anti-neoliberal stance has revitalised many on the left, yet he faces challenges from the Conservatives as well as those in his own party. Moreover, like Bernie Sanders in the US, Corbyn is often accused of promoting a type of left or socialist populism, which critics argue lacks fiscal constraint and discipline and is anti-business (Wolf, Reference Wolf2017). What we find then is that, despite the growing discontent, it remains difficult to challenge the position of TINA [there is no alternative] and to formulate a critique of neoliberalism, without being branded a regressive socialist who is reprimanded for ‘. . .being culturally and morally backward’ (Streeck, Reference Streeck and Geiselberger2017: 164)

Post-Brexit: what role for social policy

In this article, I examined the relationship between social movements, rising social discontent, Brexit, and social policy. Contextualising my discussion in the literatures on social movements and social policy, I examined how political and socio-economic developments since the 2008 financial crisis contributed to and helped create a fertile ground for Brexit. In discussing the context within which Brexit occurred, I critically examined the assumption that Brexit was a result of the losers of (or those left behind by) globalisation and problematised the accounts which proclaim the death of democracy and the rise of the age of authoritarianism. Instead, I considered why and how actors from across the ideological spectrum supported Brexit and the sources of discontent that created a fertile ground from which Brexit emerged.

While acknowledging that social movements and activists have had limited impact in shaping the social policy agenda in the post-2008 period, nonetheless civil society actors, including both movement activists as well as voluntary sector professionals, are engaged in campaigning for the recognition of unmet needs and for fairer redistribution, by also highlighting emerging inequalities of experience, of opportunity, and outcome.

Gramsci famously used the term ‘interregnum’ to describe a period of uncertainty during which the old system or order is dying and the new has yet to emerge. He wrote, ‘The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear’ (Gramsci, Reference Gramsci1978: 276). In other words, we are in a liminal, transition period, where there is a great deal of uncertainty, but also upheavals and danger. As I write this, we are in the last days of 2017 where despite months of discussions, there is hardly any further clarity about where Brexit negotiations are headed and how a whole host of issues will be resolved. All we know is that there is no guide map, that we are in uncharted waters, and given the political turbulence around Brexit negotiations, it is useless to speculate what Brexit will in the end mean. And yet, the grievances that initially brought people into the squares and streets in protest – both with the political and economic status quo – have not been resolved and, in some instances, they have been exacerbated. And as we have seen, drawing on the same sense of discontent with the status quo, populist politicians and parties have grown stronger. Given the continuing discontent, anger, and the fact movements keep coming up against unresponsive state structures, we can expect recurrent political mobilisation, despite the claims of democracy fatigue and despondency. So, the question remains, how will social policy makers respond?

The editors of this themed section argue that the current problems in Europe, such as the crisis in democratic representation and the Brexit vote among other developments (e.g. the ongoing sluggish economic performance, inhumane treatment of migrants and refugees, etc.) stem from the overall neoliberal direction of the EU, and especially, the influence of Anglo-American countries in this regard (Corbett and Walker, Reference Corbett and Walker2018). They suggest that neglecting the social has weakened the progressive and integrative role of social policy over the last forty years (2018). Recalling the 1997 Amsterdam declaration on social quality of Europe and judging from the anti-austerity protests which emerged across Europe from 2011 onwards, including in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the UK, it is clear that although European social scientists raised the alarm, policy makers have not necessarily been listening and that they have not done enough over the past twenty years to ‘. . .create a social policy that has its own independent rationale and legitimacy so as to counterbalance the dominance of economic and monetary policy within the EU’ (Walker, Reference Walker1998: 109).