Focusing on Ford Société anonyme française (Ford SAF) from the 1920s to the 1950s, the authors of this book use materials from French, German, British, and American archives to tie business history to a political history of industrial production during the German occupation of France. Treated as a foreign company, Ford SAF under Maurice Dollfus faced difficulties establishing a market, but, when the French government needed trucks, Ford SAF used that niche to improved its standing among French automobile manufacturers. With the sudden fall of France in 1940, Germans looked to French automobile companies for trucks, and the new French government in Vichy saw opportunities to increase government direction of the economy. It established the Ministère de la production industrielle (MPI) and the Comité d’organisation de l’automobile et du cycle (COA) under François Lehideux. Germans established military control and, mainly under Colonel (and later General) Max Thoenissen, a number of organizations to deal with French automobile companies. Some Germans, like Hermann Goering, wanted to dictate to the French. Fritz Sauckel scoured France for workers to be sent to work in industry in Germany. The German Ford-Werke sought control over Ford SAF, and various German agencies and companies signed contracts to produce goods. Beginning in 1942, Albert Speer sought to control armaments production, but never gained centralized control over German efforts in France. In addition, without the manpower or expertise necessary to oversee French efforts, Germans increasingly relied on willing collaboration to provide creative initiatives to resolve increasing problems in production.

Initially, German contracts provided welcome profits, which remained an inducement to cooperate. When it looked as though Germany was winning the war, French companies, including Ford SAF, welcomed opportunities to keep factories running and labor employed. Attitudes changed as the Wehrmacht ran into increasing difficulties beginning in late 1942. It needed more trucks. The Ford-Werke developed a truck production plan, but, with support from the COA, Ford SAF warded off subjugation to the Ford-Werke. French officials argued that Sauckel’s efforts to take French workers and Ford-Werke’s efforts to change to German trucks threatened to reduce production of French trucks. Worried about the postwar period, Ford SAF sought to maintain its autonomy and ability to produce French trucks. Speer’s efforts to centralize control, in fact, pushed control down to the industry and company levels. In France, he had to rely on the French to provide expertise and information. The authors argue that if the French reduced production, it was not due to political resistance; rather, they lacked manpower and resources and worried about rebuilding after the war ended.

The authors provide a detailed investigation into political efforts to organize production. They stress interaction among the French and Germans, but provide glimpses into a number of factors that would strengthen their argument. Germans had to rely on French willingness to produce trucks due to asymmetries in information—the Germans lacked the manpower and expertise to oversee and ensure French efforts. Although, the authors are concerned with company and industrial management, they hint at other kinds of practical knowledge. Thus, before the war, Ford engineers in Dearborn planned to design and build machine tools for Ford SAF’s new factory at Poissy. Although they often identify machine tools as an issue, the authors do not note that Fordist mass production depended on well-designed and well-built machine tools. Changing models required designing and building new ones to produce interchangeable parts. Standardization and skilled labor mattered. At one point, the authors identify a skilled laborer who claimed not to tighten nuts properly. Lack of skilled labor would make that issue systemic, rather than a choice. Thus, Ford-Werke trucks had many problems, and, after the war, Ford SAF did not meet production standards sought by Ford officials in America. Ford SAF was not demonstrating political resistance, but was facing significant problems with its productive facilities. With little shop floor opposition to evaluate, the authors write little about labor politics. However, identifying skills involved in designing, constructing, and operating machine tools—rather than just noting the time involved in switching to a German truck model—would strengthen the authors’ evaluation of information asymmetries, German reliance on the French, collaboration, and postwar hopes.