This book is yet another in the long-standing lament over the mischaracterization of Smith’s ideas in the popular discourse. The particular myths that have so exercised Prof. Kennedy are the familiar charges that Smith saw economic activity as driven solely by self-love and that he advocated an unqualified laissez faire policy stance, leaving no role for government beyond that of a “minimalist ‘night watchman’” (p. xiv). In response, Kennedy offers us “corrective comments from [Smith’s] life and Works that reveal his actual, not mythical, but very Scottish, contribution” (p. xvi). To that end, the book is divided into four sections, beginning with a brief biographical treatment, then turning to the familiar elements of Smith’s work in the order they appear in his lectures, moving from Moral Sentiments through the Lectures on Jurisprudence, to The Wealth of Nations. The last receives, by a wide margin, the greatest attention, comprising more than half the book. Curiously, these four sections rest atop an underlying structure divided into four introductions and fifty-seven chapters, no single element longer than six pages and most a good deal shorter. Because this sequence of tiny vignettes cannot accommodate an integrated, coherent exposition of a complex analytical framework, many of the unifying links that are the hallmark of Smith’s thought are lost in this disjoint expository structure.
Consider, as just one of many possible examples, the treatment accorded Smithian justice. In chapter 15 we learn of just two motives to adhere to the strictures of justice: authority and the weaker inducement arising from the slow operation of reason in grasping the utility of the principle for the maintenance of social order. We do not learn that the previous chapter’s comment regarding Nature’s reliance on instinct to ensure the preservation of the species has a parallel application in the context of justice as well. Our desire to aid in the punishment of the wrongdoer arises from our natural and immediate fellow-feeling with the resentment felt by the person harmed, tempered of course by our judgment of the wrongdoer’s motive. But even this is not enough. To further “enforce the observation of justice,” even the wrongdoer is formed to expect punishment: “Nature has implanted in the human breast that consciousness of ill-desert, those terrors of merited punishment which attend upon its violation, as the great safe-guards of the association of mankind” (TMS II.ii.3.4). Hence, there is a good deal more behind our adherence to the demands of justice than the power of authority and the slow operation of our reason, but these and other qualifications, nuances, and unifying themes in Smith’s system are frequently obscured by the highly disjoint exposition given here.
The most arresting aspect of this book, however, is not its exposition of Smith’s thought nor its reply to the myths of the misappropriated Smith that Kennedy sets out to confront. Though constrained and disjoint, the exposition of Smith’s work treats the familiar points in the familiar way. The sophomoric claim of an unqualified egoism in all market behavior is nicely dismissed by appeal to the mutually beneficial character of exchange (requiring attention on the part of both parties to the needs of the other), and the argument is illustrated by reference to the expected Smithian passages making the like point (WN I.ii.2 and the parallels in Jurisprudence), though, ironically, the exposition is marred slightly by a striking transcription error in the quotation offered in support (compare the long quotation on p. 103 with Smith’s original, which is found at LJ (A) vi.45; and notice the repetition of the error on p. 105). Finally, the charge of a doctrinaire laissez faire is refuted just as it has been since Viner (Reference Viner1927), whose famous concluding remarks are quoted.
What will bring readers up short is the professedly “speculative” claim that Smith was “emotionally and physically cowed … into circumspection” by a “rabid hostility to [religious] dissenters.” By Kennedy’s telling, Smith was “determined never to cause offence to the Church, not least to protect the sensibilities of his religious mother, but also to avoid persecution by the zealots, of which Scotland had plenty at the time” (p. ix). Smith’s mother gets a particularly prominent role in this story. As “a passionately devout member of the Christian Church … who had brought him up in obedience to God’s will” (p. 20), her “abiding presence throughout his adult years restrained his public utterances when, intellectually, but never publicly, he moved away from orthodox Christian revelation” (p. 40). With no new biographical information to offer, however, Kennedy’s picture of a Smith “cowed into circumspection” by a filial deference to his mother’s religious sensibilities reflects nothing more than an extraordinary willingness to rest very strong claims on very slender evidence.
Interested readers can judge for themselves the degree to which those claims are persuasive inferences from that evidence. I will note only that this image of a Smithian determination to avoid religious conflict influences at a number of points the picture drawn of his analytical structure. For example, the recurring appeals to a Creator whose design permits even our “irregularities” of sentiment to work for the good of society are not to be taken seriously because Smith “ducked a potential religious challenge to his ideas by writing in an overtly religious ‘code’ that appeared to accept the Deistic verities.” Thereby, “he escaped the morbid attention of the zealots” (p. 66). This, of course, presents something of a challenge to those who, like Alvey (Reference Alvey2003) or Hill (Reference Hill2001), take at face value Smith’s teleological language. Kennedy’s readers will search in vain for any effort to confront that literature.
Without question, the most astonishing appearance of this “cowed,” conflict-avoiding Smith arises in Kennedy’s explanation of Smith’s failure to complete his long-promised work on jurisprudence. In Kennedy’s telling, Smith’s jurisprudence lectures expressed the fundamental principles of British democracy, but those same “principles were among those incorporated into the Constitution of the United States” (p. 136). This, we are told, presented Smith with a problem: “How could he publish Jurisprudence and not cause great offence to the King and the King’s Ministers?” Since “Jurisprudence could not ignore the U.S. Constitution,” and since Smith’s lectures demonstrate his democratic sympathies, to publish would necessarily “endorse the colonists’ version of the … democratic principles in the U.S. Constitution,” which, in turn, “would give succour to the victorious enemies of the King” (p. 137). Consequently, we are to believe that in seeking the appointment to the Customs Board, Smith “chose deliberately to frustrate any hope of his completion of Jurisprudence.” As usual, it was the mother’s fault: “Avoiding confrontation between his beliefs and the comforts of his mother’s final years was so ingrained in his personal habits, that discreetly suppressing publication of his democratic quasi-republican beliefs to avoid exciting the fears and insecurities of the upper reaches of the British Establishment was for him a typically prudent decision” (p. 138).
Readers will immediately note a number of objections to Kennedy’s story, not the least being an inconvenient matter of dating. Smith announced his candidacy for the Customs post upon the death of the incumbent in October 1777 (Correspondence, p. 226), some six weeks before news of Burgoyne’s surrender at Saratoga would reach Britain, four years before the contest would be brought to its conclusion, and ten years before an American Constitution would be written. Moreover, there is the peroration with which he chose to close his magnum opus and which he allowed to stand through all subsequent editions. Long after the loss of the colonies, he apparently felt no compunction over his ridicule of the “rulers of Great Britain” for having “amused the people with the imagination that they possessed a great empire on the west side of the Atlantic,” an imaginary empire of “immense expense without being likely to bring any profit,” and delivering himself of the opinion that “Great Britain should free herself from the expense of defending those provinces … and endeavour to accommodate her future views and designs to the real mediocrity of her circumstances” (WN V.iii.92). Are these the words of an author fearful of giving “offence to the King” and his ministers? To the contrary, this is an author whose works remain, two centuries after his death, the best defense of his legacy.
