This interesting book examines the relationship between two progressive political agendas: resource redistribution to mitigate disadvantage, and social recognition of fulfilling lives lived despite, even from, disadvantage. ‘I believe the difficult job of promoting the values of equality and diversity is to respond to both injunctions, recognising that they pull in opposite directions and cannot be reduced to each other’ (Smith, p. 101). Through chapters addressing the relationship between universalism and particularism, the limits of empathic imagination, the value of reciprocity and the constraints of reason, Smith explores the equality/difference tension from various angles. While mainly anchored in liberal egalitarian philosophy, he also draws on currents within continental political philosophy, alongside feminist and disability theorising to explore equality thinking's limits and strengths.
One major theme is incommensurability. Focusing on disability, Smith dismisses the assumption that disadvantaged lives can be ranked as less worthwhile. Instead, he argues for the need to recognise the subjective, often surprising, and positive, ways people respond to difficult experiences. Living with disability can generate motivations, connections, understandings and desires that make rich, satisfying forms of life possible. The fact that we cannot know and compare the life lived but for the disability does not make equality's pursuit unnecessary, however. For living with disadvantage generates a more limited ‘range of potential future lives’ (p. 78). The challenge for states is to provide ‘robust egalitarian redistributive policies and practices’ (p. 18) without presupposing disadvantaged lives are themselves second-rate.
For readers outside liberal philosophy, there are many commendable dimensions to this book. Unlike much analytical scholarship, Smith crosses epistemological divides; he also provides a compelling account of choice and identity, recognising the power of social conditions, the capacity for mutability and change, and the strength of actors’ attachments. In other words, as the final chapter elucidates, tensions and paradoxes are worked with rather than ironed out. However, a frustrating limit of this book, at least for this reader, is its reliance on liberal philosophy at the expense of more radical approaches (briefly addressed but not fundamentally engaged). Smith argues keenly against conservative forms of pity, judgment and disregard; but in my view the book would have benefited from also engaging as deeply with critical diversity/equality scholarship.
Take authorial standpoint and address. While the debt owed to liberal imaginaries is clear, the book pays little regard to the social and material conditions, or problems, that compel its ‘conscious thinking’ – to echo Nietzsche (cited in Smith, 2011: 138). Yet, as Smith himself notes, seemingly a-perspectival work often obscures particular interests and standpoints. Here, despite the ‘moral priority’ given to the worse-off, and despite its premise that we can learn from the ‘other’ (p. 25), the implicit, but unacknowledged, vantage point is that of advantage, evident in the ‘empathic response to the suffering of others, derived from shared stocks of objective knowledge about the condition of the disadvantaged other’ (p. 76, emphasis added). The assumption that neither Smith nor his readership is part of this disadvantaged (and very sizeable) other (given it embraces manifold social cleavages) contrasts with more radical, explicitly perspectival equality/diversity scholarship emanating from feminist, disability and anti-racist writers, amongst others.
Speaking from and with recipients of inequality's harms is not simply an ethical injunction, it also brings the otherwise unmarked and invisible problem of ‘advantage’ into view. Smith explores how disadvantage people experience bad ‘luck’ ― from their ‘intrinsic’ condition and from society. Implicitly, other people experience good luck, but the relationship between the two is un-discussed. Instead, remedies involve ‘shar[ing] the burden’ through institutional mechanisms (p. 92) that make the disadvantaged ‘more equal to those in advantaged groups’ (p. 128). Yet, adopting a position which brackets the co-constitutive relationship between ‘good luck’ and bad allows neoliberal and conservative proponents to argue that equality oriented redistributions are unfair since the rich are being used for others’ ends (p. 134). What is missing, despite Smith's engagement with critical scholars, such as Nancy Fraser, is a recognition (or refutation) of how inequalities, such as gender, class and race, are not only unfair, but relational, dynamic and purposive; that some interests benefit from inequality, and that some (e.g., sexuality or race – p. 93) do not precede or exist apart from the social relations that constitute them.
Failure to account for the social place and force of inequality – the investments people, systems and regimes have in relations of exploitation, exclusion and exoticisation – allows liberal philosophical modelling to appear sufficient. For, if equality's operationalisation is a low-level implementation problem, then once a better model has been designed, and its philosophical challenges resolved, installation can proceed. Like much liberal political philosophy, Smith neglects the complexity of social life (its systems, norms, processes, institutions, regimes and flows) – a neglect not just practical, but with acute theoretical relevance. Social and institutional life is not simply where inequality happens, it also structures and shapes the rationalities, strategies and effects of its pursued undoing; and recognising social complexity affects analytical methods adopted and questions asked. Without an account of social power, how can we know what difference means, the scope of its expression or who is ‘worse’ or ‘worst off’? Without an understanding of (and interest in) inequality's generative processes, how can we avoid obsessively measuring and comparing different experiences, as the calibration of subjects becomes the only way of responding to inequality? And without exploring how institutional practices contribute to interests and identifications, how can analysis illuminate or resolve the tricky conflicts between competing ‘equality’ claims – as in current demands that equality for conservative Christians means not having to provide equal services to lesbians and gay men?
Equality's apparent intractability demonstrates the limits and problems of commensurability. This book strongly endorses incommensurability as a fact and norm, but it does not address the political struggles and institutional processes that produce identities, relations and ways of living as comparable. Indeed, the abstraction and simplification of social life to ‘talents’, ‘handicaps’ and ‘luck’ contribute to a form of ordering, as disparate social processes and practices become reduced to a single conceptual system. But should incommensurability fashion an ideal, or is its place and relevance rightly political? Smith offers a clear and interesting account of liberal debates in this area. However, in his keenness to avoid ranking lives and choices, the political norms at stake become lost. Take Smith's account of more radical perspectives. While he identifies such scholars as insisting on difference's pursuit (p. 16) and the right to live outside the norm, a major dimension of radical movements (alluded to but, significantly, not explored) is for the norm itself to change. In this book, what is normative or hegemonic is largely occluded, albeit with some sign-posts evident in the presumption that private property is a foundational good, that life-long romantic relationships are monogamous and that identity attachments (while revisable) should also be ‘deeply-felt’. But how does Smith's equality/diversity framework relate to other social visions – where the organisation of intimate life, work, governmental decision-making desires and ethos are radically changed? Do such aspirations (to the extent they are aspirations) have a place within equality/diversity theorising? And what otherwise can such theorising offer if key questions about how we want our worlds to become are left outside?
