This study presents a sympathetic exploration of British imperial policy and its leading personalities in the post-Ottoman Arab East. Its principal thesis is that T. E. Lawrence and Winston Churchill both advocated what they called the “Sherifian Solution” for the post-Great War Middle East settlement. The debates revisited here will be familiar to many readers. They have been covered by chroniclers as diverse as Lawrence himself and George Antonius, author of the seminal treatment The Arab Awakening, which the author dismisses without explanation in his notes as “partially discredited” (p. 20, n. 11). In a second edition, the author may wish to consider reversing the order between title and subtitle, because The Sherifian Solution might make a better title.
The author examines British policy between 1920 and 1925 in great, and well-deserved, detail. The book begins with an introduction that posits that British policy was driven by fiscal retrenchment, political devolution, and an effort to reconcile imperial interests with Arab national aspirations. It argues that the Allies developed the Mandate system to serve these goals: “These Mandates were to encompass Arab lands of the former Ottoman Empire, those in which some measure of Allied tutelage was thought necessary to guide the indigenous populations towards eventual autonomy” (pp. 1–2, 58). The author approaches his sources, mostly British diplomatic and personal correspondence, with a high degree of credulity. His stance is notable because many scholars have argued that the Mandate system was a shroud to hide unreconstructed British and French imperial ambitions from international criticism. The author refers to British imperial interests and Arab national aspirations but does not explain what these might have been.
The second chapter reviews the circumstances surrounding Sharif Husayn's appointment as Ottoman governor of Mecca in 1908. It concludes with extensive quotations from Lawrence's initial reports on the sharif and his sons, along the lines of the following on Faysal, “He is hot tempered, proud and impatient, sometimes unreasonable, and runs off easily at tangents” (p. 19). The author notes that Lawrence had been in the Hijaz only ten days when he wrote this report, and yet, such characterizations, recorded by Lawrence and others, are repeatedly quoted with the apparent assumption that the reports reveal more about the people under discussion than about the people who wrote them.
The following chapters discuss the wartime agreements between the British and Husayn, and the unfolding of the postwar Mandate system. The author argues that Husayn's willingness to collaborate with Britain in launching the Arab Revolt was driven not by nationalist zeal, ambition to secure the caliphate for his family, or personal ambition, but rather by fear that the Ottoman government might replace him. In this telling, the British supported Husayn's revolt for defensive tactical and political reasons and expected minimal results from the Arabs, hoping only that the revolt might distract the Ottoman military command and blunt the force of the Sultan's call for a jihad to defend the empire and its caliph. The author notes that British officials withdrew support for the Hashimite family after the war, but support for Faysal remained.
Still, when the time came to honor pledges made to France over the control of Syria, Faysal had to go. The author absolves British policymakers of duplicity in dealing with the Hashimites both during and after the war. This argument hinges on the contention that the Husayn– MacMahon correspondence did not actually constitute an obligation, whereas the Sykes–Picot agreement was comparatively binding. “On balance, the facts point to the conclusion that the British did not break any promises to the Arabs concerning Syria, and that they made determined efforts to allow for the realization of Syrian goals” (p. 83).
The book is most useful as it sheds light on the intense machinations of the various groups within the British government and the process by which the British Mandate of Iraq came to be ruled by Faysal. It argues that Lawrence defeated his rivals, A. T. Wilson and the India Office, which favored direct British rule in Iraq, and convinced Winston Churchill, the colonial office secretary, of the utility of Faysal as king of Iraq. The author pays little attention to the influence of a major revolt in Iraq against British rule that erupted in 1920 or to the crushing financial burden of direct rule and suppression of the insurgency. Surely these added to the urgency of Faysal's installation as king.
The study progresses to the decision to allow ʿAbdallah to rule Transjordan and the advancement and eventual withdrawal of British support for Husayn's rule in Hijaz. The author concludes by heaping praise on Lawrence for his skillful advocacy of the “Sherifian Solution” and argues that Lawrence was not responsible for failure in the Hijaz and Iraq, but that he was nevertheless worthy of praise for success in Jordan.
This work explores in great detail the actions and recorded thoughts of British Middle East experts of the period, and in so doing adopts much of their language and their assumptions of imperial prerogative. Arab opinion is characterized by broad generalizations direct from the colonial archives, and the language is imprecise and general. The Ottoman government is referred to as the “Turks.” The inhabitants of the new Mandate for Iraq are called “Mesopotamians.” The Mandate for Palestine is described as 10 percent Jewish, “the rest being, in large part Muslim,” never mind that the Christian Arab population was then larger than the Jewish population (p. 42). Orientalist characterizations of Arab and Ottoman leaders are reproduced verbatim from the archives in chapter after chapter, and readers may grow tired of reading that so-and-so was “lazy, luxurious, and not to be trusted,” and so forth.
Given the American occupation of Iraq and the associated greater Middle East plan, the relevance of British Middle East policy and decision making in the 1920s could hardly be greater. This study is a detailed defense of postwar British policy and its architects, most particularly Lawrence. It includes several pages of impressive photographic plates of the leading figures. It will be valuable for those who seek a comprehensive guide to the various bureaucratic fiefdoms and polices of postwar British politicians and colonial civil servants.
