The study of great power conflicts and the results of defeat and victory in wars around the globe has been the traditional purview of scholars of international relations. The modern discipline owes much to the theoretical underpinnings that were created in the aftermath of World War II and institutionalized in the crucible of the Cold War. Although disputes over methodology and theory persist within a variety of disciplines concerned with this period of history, this has thankfully not been the case for the study of empires, which has recently become an area of exploration for scholars of international relations. Contributing to ongoing interdisciplinary debates in this new area of inquiry, Ayşe Zarakol's recent book After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West is a welcome addition.
Zarakol starts by highlighting the Western bias of international relations theory, which she argues has been based in no small measure on the European experience with the historical trajectory of nation–states rather than that of empires. After Defeat makes a compelling case for incorporating lesser-studied comparative examples of defeated non-Western empires whose successor states sought to be associated with the West into theory building for scholars of international relations. As many a graduate student has found while studying for comprehensive exams in international relations theory, one could easily conclude as Zarakol does that non-Western states today are simply the “decorative plants of modern international society” (p. 241). Zarakol's work engages the Orientalist critiques popularized by Edward Said and expanded upon by various constructivist scholars and social theorists to help explain the evolution of the non-Western imperial successor states after defeat.
From the ashes of a defeated empire usually emerges an heir in the form of a postimperial successor state, an imperial metropolis that reorganizes itself in the form of a nation–state. The examples offered by Zarakol—Turkey after the Ottoman Empire's defeat in World War I, Japan after the Japanese Empire's defeat in World War II, and Russia after the Soviet Union's defeat in the Cold War—are compelling, unique, and worthy of further research. Even in countries such as China, India, and Iran, where Western influence reduced once great empires to colonies or arenas of great power rivalry, memories of defeat and empire shape the contours on which contemporary policymakers must tread. It is therefore surprising that more research has not been done along these lines. Understanding memories of defeat and subsequent behavior offers critical insights into areas of identity formation and nationalism that Zarakol explores and further systematizes for the reader.
Turkey, Japan, and Russia are political entities that pre-date the Westphalian state system. As empires, they long sustained social universes capable of producing comprehensive worldviews—in other words, before their incorporation into the Westphalian system, these states had their own standards by which they defined themselves as “normal” and others as “different,” “abnormal,” or “inferior.” Zarakol makes the case that all three shared the experience of stigmatization as a result of comparative “backwardness” from the onset of modern state formation, as well as the difficulty of living in the shadow of a greater past. Yet, differences among them remain. Japan's geography, for instance, sets it apart from both Turkey and Russia. Russia's Christian heritage sets it apart from Turkey and Japan. Turkey's trauma as a result of being “double-crossed” by Christian millets during the Ottoman Empire's decline sets it apart from Russia and Japan (both of which suffered other traumas). Still, as far as state identity from a systemic perspective is concerned, the similarities After Defeat highlights do seem to be the most determinative (p. 102).
The emotional trauma inflicted by the defeat of empire, which came at the beginning of a century in which the Japanese, the Russians, and the Turks internalized modern standards and their own stigmatization vis-à-vis the West, have made these states, according to Zarakol, overly preoccupied with international stature, recognition, and acceptance (p. 7). In the reconstructed nationalist narrative of Turkey, for example, the failure to modernize, to become Western, is seen as the primary reason for the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. In contrast, the Japanese believe that their empire was defeated by the West precisely because of technological modernization without checks and balances on the military. Thus, for Turks, the pain of losing an empire is fused with the feeling of inferiority due to not being Western/modern enough, whereas in Japan there is a sense of accomplishment at having modernized beyond Western standards.
With the reshaping of the international system, where the “rise of the East” has been felt most prominently, scholars of international politics must develop a deeper understanding of the fundamental character of key non-Western nation–states as well as their historical underpinnings. Japan, Russia, and Turkey represent three of the most important modern examples of non-Western collapsed empires that have bequeathed to their successor states legacies which have at various times puzzled and confused scholars. Yet, this historical legacy's shaping of these important nations and their relationships with the West has until now rarely been studied in a systematic or comparative way.
Through these historical case studies, Zarakol details the consequences of falling outside Western norms that became the template for international order in the aftermath of World War I and World War II. Since emerging as nation–states, the relationship between Japan, Russia, and Turkey and their respective regions has been tenuous. Japan's Asianism, Russia's Eurasianism, and Turkey's “Neo-Ottomanism” are being challenged in a variety of ways because of the decisions by political elites in these countries to follow a path of Westernization after defeat. The simplistic dichotomization of East or West does not capture the unique qualities of these empires cum nation–states, which were very much shaped by their experiences with the West but ultimately defined in opposition to it.
By tracing how the Japanese, Russians, and Turks initially dealt with defeat and then went on to reformulate their identities, Zarakol builds a theoretically rich comparative framework for what she describes as “stigmatization in international relations.” Historically, these countries are major players in their regions. As a result, shared cultural and historical connections with their respective regions exist that make their understanding of imperial defeat carry weight far beyond the former metropolises themselves.
Resurgent nationalism in Japan, Russia, and Turkey are particularly important when set against the backdrop of post Cold War challenges facing the international system and Asia in particular. Discerning how these players are rediscovering their identities and re-engaging with their former space is therefore critical for understanding the trajectory of international relations both regionally and globally. Scholars are converging from a variety of disciplines onto a trend stretching from Southwest Asia, through Eurasia, and into East Asia that involves a return to the imperial past largely suppressed during the Cold War. From within the discipline of international relations, After Defeat provides an important contribution to analyzing this unfolding realization.
Zarakol's book is as timely as it is well written and accessible. After Defeat should be required reading for undergraduate or graduate courses dealing with Japan, Russia, or Turkey or with East Asia, the Soviet Union, or the Middle East more broadly and for any course in comparative politics and international relations.
