The arcane Third Amendment of the US Constitution restricting the boarding of soldiers in private homes was a reaction to the colonial-era British Quartering Act. Nearly two centuries later, many British referred to the American presence in the United Kingdom during World War II as “Overpaid, Oversexed, and Over here.” Given this history of basing friction among people of similar culture, it should be no surprise that the installation of US bases in countries along the Arabian Peninsula could trigger domestic resistance that in some cases would threaten the very regimes the United States was trying to sustain. In Gulf Security and the U.S. Military, Geoffrey Gresh does not challenge the need to place American forces abroad to defend national and regional security interests. Instead, he investigates three regional nondemocratic monarchies—Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Oman—to explore the internal/external security balance the ruling families must consider when weighing the question of whether to allow American boots on the ground. He uses four historical case studies—two involving Saudi Arabia—to drive home the point that American foreign policy must be sensitive to the domestic side of the equation. These cases are extremely selective; discussion of events beyond them (such as the threatened Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1961 thwarted by Bahrain-based British forces, the 1967 Arab–Israeli War, and the 1980s Iran–Contra affair) would have provided a broader and more critical picture of why American military basing has proven to be such a contentious and loaded issue.
Gresh's assertion is that Arab regimes are resistant to host American bases given how this foreign presence serves as a focal point of domestic opposition. This seems especially true with Saudi Arabia, guardian of the most sacred place in the Islamic world. Gresh details the Saudis’ initial reluctance to allow foreign forces to deploy to the kingdom even in the aftermath of the Iraqi conquest of Kuwait. Photographic evidence of Iraqi forces massing on the Saudi border provided the rude awakening that changed the Saudi position, enabling a coalition of American-led nations to deploy hundreds of thousands of troops to liberate Kuwait. With Saddam Husayn's Army defeated but not eliminated, the Americans would stay in Saudi Arabia during the 1990s to provide external security against the threat not only from Iraq, but also from Iran. The American presence ended only after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. By then the American presence in Saudi Arabia had fostered a strong domestic threat. Gresh is quick to point out that fifteen of the nineteen hijackers in the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States were Saudi nationals.
Ironically, Gresh undermines his argument that internal/external security concerns provide the sole tipping point on nay/yeah for American ground presence with his initial case study of Saudi Arabia of the US Air Force base at Dhahran. While Gresh cites the Germans, the Hashemites in Iraq, the Persians across the Gulf, and finally the Soviet Union as external threats to support his thesis, he also elaborates on the American willingness to provide financial aid to keep the Saudi government solvent as the nation's oil resources were only beginning to be exploited. He also stresses the Arab appreciation for personal relationships, citing the bond established between King Ibn Saud and President Roosevelt following the Yalta Conference in February 1945.
The personal relationship angle is one I emphasized in Amirs, Admirals and Desert Sailors: Bahrain, the U.S. Navy, and the Arabian Gulf. In contrast to the Saudis, the ruling Khalifa family in Bahrain had long embraced a foreign presence in the British protectorate. The ruling family depended on London to handle the archipelagoes’ foreign affairs and defense, especially given longstanding challenges from Iran to its sovereignty. With the British decision to withdraw from “East of Suez” in 1968, Bahrain moved toward independence. A Bahraini plebiscite supporting independence over Iranian rule convinced the shah to drop claims. Despite the lack of an external threat, the Bahraini Amir desired a nominal foreign presence in the form of the US Navy's Middle East Force, which had operated from the British Naval Base at Juffair since the 1950s.
Gresh argues that domestic pressure in the face of the ruling family's dissolution of the National Assembly in 1975 led to a decision to evict the Americans. I would argue that pressure from other Arab nations in the wake of the 1973 Arab–Israeli War may have played a greater role. The subsequent subterfuge arrangement that maintained the US base in Bahrain by simply shifting on paper the homeport of the Middle East Force flagship La Salle from Manama to Philadelphia placated Bahrain's neighbors.
The case study for Oman titled “Sultan Qaboos and Operation Eagle Claw” reinforces Gresh's argument in that news that the United States had used Oman as a way station during the Iranian hostage rescue attempt without informing the Omanis proved awkward for both the sultan and President Carter. In the end, diplomacy and a bolstered aid package enabled the United States to maintain a small footprint on the island of Masirah at the northwestern end of the Northern Arabian Gulf. Assigned to a Military Sealift Command oiler operating off Masirah during the tanker wars of the mid-1980s, I can attest to the critical role the Masirah facility played in sustaining US Navy operations that kept the Strait of Hormuz open.
Perhaps as thought provoking as Gresh's internal/external security framework are his observations in the concluding section. His first chapter “Oil and War” makes it clear that access to cheap energy sources drove American interests in the region. Now that the United States is reachieving energy independence, how will American foreign policy in the region change? Certainly the United States will want to continue to contain Iranian nuclear aspirations and support efforts to defeat radicalized terrorists. Gresh hints at a coming changing of the guard as China is becoming as dependent on the Gulf for energy supplies. As demonstrated by the Chinese construction of bases in the South China Sea and the opening of a facility in Djibouti, the Chinese are working to secure their sea lanes to and from the region. The forthcoming regional competition between the United States and China need not be confrontational. It's a coming reality that warrants further examination.
Most impressive is Gresh's use of primary source materials. I found it strange that no bibliography of secondary sources was provided. Instead, secondary sources, when used, are buried in the endnotes. One personal annoyance is that he misidentified me as an employee of the Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC) and identified the Bahrain book research papers I loaned him as being part of the NHHC archives. There are Winkler Papers at NHHC—the collection of papers associated with my US–USSR Incidents at Sea dissertation. For the near future I intend to retain the Bahrain book papers at my Naval Historical Foundation office.
