In David Hume on Miracles, Evidence, and Probability William L. Vanderburgh presents a concise defence of David Hume's ‘Of Miracles’. By providing a more in-depth look at the relevant biographical details of Hume as well as an expanded investigation of Hume's broader epistemology, Vanderburgh argues that many commentators, both historical and contemporary, have either misunderstood or misrepresented Hume. At the heart of Vanderburgh's defence of Hume is the rejection of the arguments put forth by Hume commentators such as Richard Price, John Earman, and others who have attempted to interpret ‘Of Miracles’ from a Bayesian perspective. Vanderburgh argues that approaching Hume's epistemology from this perspective is fundamentally wrong and that Hume's argument ought to be interpreted using a non-mathematical probability framework.
The first two chapters of the book set the stage for Vanderburgh's forthcoming arguments. They provide the reader with the historical context in which Hume's ‘Of Miracles’ was written and situate it within his more extensive philosophical views and within the theological and political climate in which Hume was working. Here, some of the broader ideas on testimony are addressed, both as Hume discusses them in his other works and as others, such as John Locke, discuss them in their works.
Chapter 3 examines Hume's conception of laws of nature and how this conception, in conjunction with his views on testimony, come together to form his overall position in ‘Of Miracles’. This chapter also addresses the charge of apparent inconsistencies related to accepting or rejecting the testimony of miracles from trusted friends or loved ones. Here, Vanderburgh demonstrates how such a contradiction appears on the surface but, on more in-depth investigation and understanding of Hume's ethics, and distinctions between theory and practice, no inconsistency exists.
Chapter 4 begins the more elaborate discussion of evidential theory, providing a survey of the history of reasoning and probability. In this chapter, Vanderburgh presents a historical narrative to demonstrate from where Hume derives his views on reasoning and probability in his epistemology and, more specifically, in his views regarding testimony and laws and nature. In this chapter Vanderburgh also begins his work of addressing and objecting to the Hume commentators who he thinks have misunderstood or misrepresented Hume. These commentators generally view Hume's writing, or at least ‘Of Miracles’, as being best suited for interpretation via a mathematical model of probability. Vanderburgh argues that this is plainly wrong and presents several examples of textual analysis to demonstrate his point.
Chapter 5 carries on some of the same lines of thought as the previous chapter, adding Vanderburgh's argument that, when reading Hume, it is best to apply a non-mathematical approach to evidential probability. This chapter primarily consists of Vanderburgh making his case for the non-mathematical reading of Hume's evidential probability and defending this view against both possible and actual objections and Bayesian readings of Hume.
Vanderburgh uses chapter 6 to defend Hume from an apparent contradiction. It is argued, by some, that there is a potential contradiction between Hume's epistemic voluntarism, his epistemic normativism, and the role that he takes custom to play in belief formation. Vanderburgh argues that there is no contradiction because, for Hume, these three do not occupy the same realm. That is, Hume's account of belief formation through custom rests only at the philosophical level and not at the practical, everyday level. In this chapter, Vanderburgh underscores the importance of recognizing the shift to what he calls ‘the level of ordinary analysis’ in resolving the apparent contradictions within Hume's epistemology.
In the final chapter, Vanderburgh circles back to address the work of several Hume commentators. In this chapter, he focuses on Anthony Flew, Robert Fogelin, and Kenneth Furguson by providing his analysis of a debate in which the three philosophers above were engaged in regarding, among other things, whether or not Hume provides an a priori argument against the acceptance of testimony regarding the occurrence of miracles in ‘Of Miracles’. Through the analysis of this debate, Vanderburgh inserts and situates his view among the views of other recent commentators who address many of his same worries.
Drawing from a diverse set of historical facts about Hume as well as from his writing, Vanderburgh makes a very straightforward and convincing argument. Seemingly working his way, one by one, down the list of prominent Hume detractors, Vanderburgh methodically points out the crucial flaws in each of their arguments or interpretations of Hume, thereby undermining their conclusions of Hume's failure. With most of the discussion in the text being focused on addressing probability and distinctions between mathematical and non-mathematical accounts of Hume, Vanderburgh uses ‘Of Miracles’ as his guiding light and, while at times appearing to stray into tangential territory, consistently finds a way to bring the discussion back to the central text of his investigation. Vanderburgh does a nice job of situating his argument among those made by other commentators, highlighting the relevant similarities and where they end.
In addition to the chapters presented above, this monograph also includes an epilogue, a prologue, a short biography of Hume, and a reprinted text of ‘Of Miracles’. The biography and the reprint are valuable features. The reprint of ‘Of Miracles’ provides a reference point for those readers who like to check up on the specific wording of particular passages. At the same time, the biographical information is an added resource to help further understand the climate in which Hume conducted his work and how it may have influenced his writing.
While this is a rather short treatment for such a storied and complex debate, Vanderburgh maintains good focus throughout and presents his argument in a refreshingly concise style. Vanderburgh pulls no punches in telling the reader which commentators he thinks are wrong, and why, before moving on to present his arguments. He does not talk around his arguments or lose the reader in a sea of jargon or unnecessary asides. Vanderburgh, quite simply, gets to the point.
This monograph will make an excellent addition to the bookshelves of Hume scholars, epistemologists, and, in a more limited sense, philosophers of religion. While the writing is clear and concise, the level of the material is not one that I find suitable for use at the undergraduate level. The text presupposes knowledge of a range of epistemological concepts so I would only recommend it for adoption as a text for a relevant course at the graduate level.
