The pollution and destruction of the environment caused by large corporations appears to be an ever recurring topic in today's public debates. Whether it is a chemical company diverting its wastewater into a river or an atomic power plant causing an environmental disaster, the companies responsible for these accidents see themselves confronted with hostility in times of crisis and with skepticism, at best, in regular times.

Surprisingly, this public skepticism is quite a new phenomenon, as Thilo Jungkind points out in his dissertation, Risikokultur und Störfallverhalten der chemischen Industrie: Gesellschaftliche Einflüsse auf das unternehmerische Handeln von Bayer und Henkel seit der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts. He analyzes how the German chemical industry after World War II perceived its relatively risky production and how it reacted in cases where these risks turned into hazards for the companies’ surroundings. Even though Jungkind states that his work is mainly a business history, his declared aim is not just to build his argument on the reactions provoked by hazards within the factory gates, but to set a major focus on the perceptions and demands of society on the outside. To combine these two approaches, the author places his study on a broad theoretical foundation, applying theories from sociology, such as new institutionalism, as well as economic perspectives, including new institutional economics.

Jungkind uses the two German chemical companies Henkel and Bayer—each with an entirely different focus in production—as case examples for his argument. While Henkel produced consumer goods such as detergent and soap, Bayer set its sights on a wider and, according to the author, riskier portfolio, ranging from basic chemical products to pharmaceuticals. Also, when it comes to their development after World War II, the great differences between the two companies are revealed. Bayer was merged into the IG Farben in 1925 and did not become an individual company until the IG's divestiture in 1950. Henkel, on the other hand, continued production immediately in 1945. Despite their different postwar histories, both companies contributed to and benefited from the enormous economic growth of the 1950s and early 1960s, the so-called German Wirtschaftswunder. As the author points out, they thereby also regained the standing they had enjoyed in the German Imperial Era, when large enterprises were seen as economic saviors, justifying nature's exploitation for the greater cause of economic wealth. According to Jungkind, this contribution to wealth again greatly affected the way German society perceived the risks related to the chemical industry after 1945. Although accidents and disturbances at Bayer and Henkel often also affected the companies’ surroundings, these incidents were understood as a necessary evil along the path to German recovery. The companies’ experts actively influenced the drafting of new laws; frequently, the result was that the laws were not put into effect. But even in cases where a draft became law, the Bayer and Henkel experts had often turned them in their companies’ favor. This balance of power did not change until the late 1960s. By the end of the decade, however, the framework conditions of society had changed quickly, finding expression in the election of a social-liberal government in 1969. New laws for environmental protection were adopted, confronting the chemical industry with a shift in power.

Although both Bayer and Henkel tried at first to fight the new regulations, both companies eventually had to adapt to the new laws. While Bayer and Henkel were adjusting to the new situation, the 1976 chemical accident near Seveso, Italy, signaled the definite demise of the chemical industry in the view of the German public. As Jungkind illustrates, the two companies saw themselves confronted with public fear and hysteria, to which they reacted by introducing new security systems and a newly organized disaster management plan. As the public were now fully aware of the potential disasters that could be caused by the chemical industry, their negative perception of the industry did not change until the late 1990s. Jungkind points out that this rehabilitation was based on consistent communication from the industry—even indicating possible risks in times of no immediate danger. However, he also suggests that this change in perception requires further research.

Overall, Jungkind presents an interesting and innovative work. It is innovative in its approach. While the history of environmental protection has been studied for quite some time now, the focus is often on a general history of environmentalism or the history of environmental legislation. This book's approach—analyzing society's changing awareness of the environment from the point of view of industry—therefore offers a new and beneficial perspective. However, the line of argument is sometimes hard to follow due to difficult and highly theoretical phrasing. It is understandable that Jungkind wants to do justice to the broad theoretic framework, but his work certainly would have profited from a simpler writing style. Despite this obstacle, Jungkind succeeds in adding a new angle to both business and environmental history, one that offers new insights to interested readers from both disciplines.