This book is in some ways a sequel to the author's Rethinking Multiculturalism, and in it a multiculturalist agenda continues to be pursued, whilst the discussion is widened to include the question of identity in a global context. One problem about the book is the level at which it is written. Parekh sees it as contributing to political philosophy, and many of the subjects raised are highly pertinent to philosophical understanding. Parekh remarks in the introduction that, after being appointed to the House of Lords, he asked himself what political philosophy had to contribute to the great issues of the day. He concluded (7) that ‘it needs, at least from time to time, to take its bearings from concrete issues and test itself against them.’
This is a difficult tightrope to walk. It means that he has to argue with philosophical rigour and understanding while discussing and illuminating practical problems. He has to avoid descending to the level of a journalist's analysis, or to mere political partisanship, but not be so philosophical that any connection with the real world appears lost. It cannot be said he succeeds too well in this. Sometimes he seems to be giving very ordinary and cursory surveys of complex contemporary problems. His chapter on the globalization of culture, for example, rapidly summarises many global trends, and we learn, amongst other things, that the television programme Dallas was a failure in Brazil and Japan. More seriously, when dealing with the issue of national identity he devotes just over two pages to a sketchy analysis of the problems of contemporary Canada, particularly over Quebec. Even a Sunday newspaper could have done better.
Parekh's own political views are often to the fore, although usually asserted rather than argued for. He does not approve of Margaret Thatcher, saying sweepingly (64) that the language of national identity in her hands ‘becomes a mischievous attempt to foreclose a wide variety of views and breathes the spirit of intolerance’. Similarly a spirit of anti-Americanism pervades the book. At one point, he proclaims (168) that ‘not surprisingly the US government's rhetoric and behaviour display a remarkable resemblance to those of the terrorists’.
How then does the book fare in its more philosophical moments? The subjects it is dealing with, such as the issue of different layers of identity, personal, social and national, are real enough. The problem of how to deal with the predicament of adherents to different religions and cultures living together raises profound theoretical, as well as practical, questions. What then are Parekh's positive philosophical views? Towards the end of the book he tries to enunciate three basic principles of global ethics, given the impact of globalisation. He says, innocuously enough, that we can only arrive at a global ethics through rational deliberation. He appears to place a high value on reason (178), and the possibility of rational dialogue, although, paradoxically, he does not wish to privilege reason over other human capacities (218). Yet it is far from clear what rationality is to be grounded in. Parekh continually stresses the historical dimension of our existence. We are historically conditioned. Each of our identities, personal and collective, is constructed. He says (140) that human beings are not transcendental subjects standing outside their inheritance. He concludes (208) that the universality of global ethics must be grounded in our historical context, and ‘limited to our times.’
In fact, then, the very idea of a global ethics becomes somewhat illusory, as people rooted in different contexts, and with different identities, may try to converse with each other. Parekh says resoundingly (214) that ‘moral values have no foundations in the sense of an indisputable and objective basis, but they do have grounds in the form of well-considered reasons’. Yet, if there is no truth in morality and it has no universal application, why should reasons be rooted in anything other than historically conditioned forms of life, with little common ground? Indeed, we are told (208) that ‘moral and cultural diversity is an ineliminable fact of life.’ An appeal to human nature may seem a possible solution, since that is something we all share. Parekh undercuts that by saying (209) that ‘we have no access to it in its raw form and cannot easily separate what is natural from what is social.’
Parekh's constant emphasis on the importance of diversity, and his consequent hostility in practical politics to ‘accommodation’ or ‘integration’ between different cultural communities, makes the aim for a global ethics seem quixotic. He produces three basic principles, which seem at odds with each other. He believes that human beings have equal worth. He believes in the principle of human solidarity, and also the principle of respect for difference or plurality. Yet since he sees different communities develop different forms of life, each deserving of respect, it is unclear what the common basis for human solidarity consists in. He has already dismissed the aid of a substantive human nature. Similarly, although an appeal to equality is no doubt admirable, not all people believe that everyone is equal. What do we do when we encounter those who have no room for human solidarity, and do not value all humans equally? Have we to respect their views because they are different from ours?
Indeed, Parekh remarks (210) that ‘although all religions value human life, they do not place much value on the lives of outsiders, heathens, apostates and idolaters.’ Given this sweeping view, which certainly does not apply to all religion, it is again unclear how ‘rational’ argument will make much progress against those who, it is admitted, simply do not believe in human equality. Indeed Parekh seems to have put himself in the position of having, on principle, to ‘respect’ their views. Respect for diversity, and valuing pluralism, can quickly degenerate into a debilitating relativism. Yet he himself finds no difficulty in declaring some views ‘morally unacceptable’, although, even here the views that are condemned are an ill-assorted selection. He mentions (210) a ‘low view of women, hostility to outsiders, and intolerance of dissent and heresy.’ What though of those who despise women and are xenophobic in any society? If we show our repugnance, and even intolerance, of such views, are we not ourselves guilty of not allowing dissent? Could we not also be seen to be hostile to outsiders? We need some criterion of which disagreements are acceptable, and which are not, and this drives us back to the quest for some objective moral criterion.
Nowhere are Parekh's prejudices and muddles more obvious than in the vexed field of religion. The place it should have in public life is currently much debated., and is still highly controversial. He seems to endorse some form of ‘secularism’ which he nowhere clearly defines, but which he associates with liberalism and democracy (265). He curiously thinks that it has grown in the West out of ‘an extensive public debate and widespread consensus.’ Yet although he clearly has to see this as part of a particular tradition, it is in fact questionable how far Western societies can so easily be wrenched from their Christian roots. This is not just an empirical issue for Parekh, as, because of his distrust of any context-free rationality, he has to show that Western societies are not as tied to Christianity as some might imagine. Otherwise the advent of multi-culturalism, with separate cultures and religions existing alongside each other in one country, would prove a violent disruption of Western traditions in a way Parekh, given his relativist tendencies, could hardly justify.
Parekh, in fact, wants to detach Western society from Christianity, whilst having to acknowledge its pervasive influence He says at one point of Europe (114) that ‘its Christian heritage has shaped, and continues to shape its vocabulary, self-understanding, institutions, ideals and practices.’ He even accepts that ideas of human dignity, equality and the unity of humankind derive their moral energy from it. Given all this, it is hard to see, on Parekh's own assumptions, that Europe is, or can be, secular, without losing much of its present identity. It is not surprising that later in the book he tries hard to show that the ideas essential to contemporary Western self-understanding cannot be traced directly to Christianity. He mentions those of social equality, tolerance, critical rationality and democracy. A few sentences suffice for him to dismiss the relevance of Christian origins for these. He claims that ‘tolerance is not central to Christianity.’ This is the edge of a very large debate, but it certainly cannot be settled, as Parekh, does by a few quick references to Christians who have been intolerant over the centuries. Inevitably the Spanish Inquisition gets a mention, while no reference is made to the development of avowedly Christian ideas of freedom, toleration and democracy from the seventeenth century on, particularly in England and in the American colonies, and then the United States, through the influence of such writers as John Locke.
Parekh, against what he earlier admitted, all too easily assumes that Christianity can be dispensed with in public life, while leaving Western societies otherwise unchanged. This requires a great leap of imagination. There is also the question how comfortable other religions may be in an aggressively secular society, which pursues a policy of removing all religious influence from the public sphere. Yet Parekh has to argue that Christianity in particular, and religion in general, is not an important component in contemporary Western self-understanding, because the latter has to be his point of departure. He has left himself nowhere to stand but on the shifting sands of historical contingency. He cannot appeal to any rational principle which could claim universal validity. His whole project must therefore be anti-modernist, even though his wish to resort to reason has to rely for any cogency on modernist assumptions. Yet the latter can well undermine multi-culturalism, because some cultures could prove to be less rationally based than others. Parekh cannot both uphold reason, and demand equal respect for all cultures.
This book is a fascinating attempt to weld together the practical politics of what is termed multiculturalism with a more philosophical understanding of the principles involved. It concerns matters of vital importance, and pressing urgency. It may not be altogether Parekh's fault that his arguments are unconvincing and not altogether consistent. It may be that the whole ‘multi-cultural’ project of equally respecting different cultures and ways of life in the same place is deeply flawed. Not all beliefs, and not all practices, are of equal value, and to pretend that we cannot in principle judge between any of them is ultimately to undermine the possibility of human reason.
