The election of Donald Trump shocked many pundits and forecasters. It likely came as less of a surprise to the growing number of political theorists who have been emphasizing the significant dysfunctions, failings, and gaps that mark contemporary democracy. John Dunn and Ian Shapiro are two scholars who have spent much of their careers reflecting on such matters, and their new books offer important insights for thinking about democracy’s prospects. Both are framed by a strong sense that our world is in flux and the political institutions that have provided a modicum of freedom and order are under increasing strain. Of the two, Shapiro’s text is much more structured and systematic, compared with Dunn’s, which reflects the lecture format in which it was first prepared and presented at Yale University.

Breaking Democracy’s Spell is somewhat of an informal follow-up to Dunn’s 2005 book, Setting the People Free: The Story of Democracy, which offered a contrasting narrative to the one commonly associated with Francis Fukuyama’s End of History. Dunn has instead sought to demystify democracy, stressing the centrality of historical contingency and seeking to counter excessive confidence in its virtues. In this new work, he continues his efforts, urging us to “distinguish better a (predominantly) happy accident from a magic formula” and arguing that “this faith in the vindicatory and directive force of our conception of democracy is utterly misplaced: (p. 5). The lecture structure that served as the basis of this book is both a strength and a weakness. It allows for a natural flow of ideas and is enjoyable to read. The downside is that the argument largely stays at a sufficiently general level that it becomes difficult to fully work through many of his claims.

As in his previous work, Dunn successfully captures the beguiling and slippery nature of the concept of democracy, which over time has taken on a range of different—and sometimes competing—meanings. For him, our tendency to romanticize democracy, to be fooled by its charms, means that Western societies have become overly confident and complacent, leaving them ill-prepared for the massive political, economic, social, and environmental problems that are becoming increasingly pressing. One of the points that Dunn stresses is the danger of confusing democracy with good government: The two can go together, but it is deeply mistaken to regard them as synonyms. From this perspective, Brexit and Trump’s victory are hardly a surprise. There is nothing about democracy than ensures good outcomes or smart decisions. Rather, “We the People are the nefarious and the foolish every bit as much as the fine and the wise. When we choose badly, we have no one to blame but ourselves” (p. 45). The author is at his strongest when reminding us of this.

Dunn chops democracy down to size, offering a much less inspiring explanation for its current preeminence. He suggests that it has as much to do with the failure of alternate ways of justifying and exercising rule as it does with the virtues specific to it. He concludes that “we should not see democracy’s global ascent as a stunning triumph of credulity or a majestic forward march of justified true belief, but simply as an uneven, reluctant, painful series of surrenders of an immense miscellany of other kinds of belief” (p. 43). While Dunn is certainly justified in warning us against being overly confident in democracy, he risks pushing too far in the opposite direction. He is correct in rallying against a simplistic belief in democracy’s value and strength, but this is not as big a problem as it was in the years immediately following the fall of the Berlin Wall. Whereas Setting the People Free appeared at a time when the sun was still setting on the liberal zeitgeist of the 1990s, there has been a marked shift in mood following the disastrous “Global War on Terror,” combined with the 2008 financial crisis and the ensuing Eurozone mess. In this regard, Dunn’s contribution feels a bit behind the times. Even before Brexit and Trump, there was far less confidence and faith in democracy compared to the 1990s. The more pressing intellectual task is this: If we accept that democracy is a much more flawed, uneven, and contingent form of rule, how can it be adapted and strengthened to respond to the manifold problems it now faces? On this, the author has less to say, which is a shame, given his uncanny ability to reveal vital aspects of democracy’s character.

In Politics Against Domination, Shapiro’s approach of “adaptive political theory” offers more promise in terms of tangible ways forward in response to the challenges facing democracy. In comparison to Dunn’s emphasis on downplaying democracy’s virtues, Shapiro is sensitive to the need for it to inspire, noting that “people need grounds to believe that they will be better protected over time by democracy than by the going alternatives, even though there is no certainty about this” (p. 17). The author starts with the institutions we currently have—rather than what would ideally be in place—and considers how these could be refashioned and improved. Some of the strongest parts of the book are Shapiro’s reflections on the limits of possibility and on the need for theorizing that responds to the world we have inherited.

At the heart of this book is an argument for nondomination as a foundational principle for informing political action and institutions. Eschewing a more abstract conception, Shapiro explains that “rather than try to escape domination as such, people try to escape instances of domination that they experience or by which they feel threatened” (p. 5). And compared to the alternatives, he argues that majority-based democracy offers the best institutional mechanisms for nondomination within the state (p. 177). He builds his argument empirically by reflecting on a series of important issues shaping democracy primarily as it exists in the United States, such as special interests, economic inequality, the role of the Supreme Court, and the role of parties.

Looking beyond the state, Shapiro argues that “democratic options are not available internationally, but ‘stop the bully without becoming one’ is available” (p. 180). In the preface, Shapiro notes that the two chapters of the book dealing with global challenges were not originally planned but were later deemed necessary in working through his case for nondomination. While certainly correct in observing that there are many issues above the state that are relevant, he is clearly at his strongest when in the realm of state-centered political theory. The chapters “against world government” and on “resisting domination against borders” are less convincing compared to the rest of the book. In the latter chapter, Shapiro’s critique of George W. Bush’s foreign policy repeats what is now basically the commonsense conclusion about the mistaken response to 9/11. Likewise, he points toward the 2011 Libyan intervention as a case of humanitarian overstretch, with the country now in far worse condition than in the period immediately prior to NATO’s intervention. In both cases, the conclusions he draws are sensible, realist ones with which most commentators, except for neoconservatives and liberal hawks, would agree.

That Shapiro ends up relying heavily on George Kennan reflects that much of what he is suggesting matches with what realists have already worked through in much greater detail. In this sense, it is unclear what exactly his nondomination framework adds when international issues are considered. It would have been easier to appreciate the contribution had Shapiro engaged more with the relevant international relations literature. Notably missing are references to work that seems particularly pertinent to his argument, especially Barry Posen’s Restraint (2014) and Daniel Deudney’s Bounding Power (2007).

Present in both books is an underlying sense that things can—and may likely—get worse, but that what lies beyond our political horizon is not yet determined. At the end of his book, Shapiro notes that “I have made the case for an adaptive approach to combating domination that takes account of political reality without capitulating to it. The hardest questions for this view concern knowing what the limits of the possible are, and how best to push against them” (p. 182). This dilemma has become even more pressing in the present context, where systemic forces seem to be continually reducing the scope for agency, and much of the agency we do see is actually leading in a direction likely to increase domination and reduce freedom. In this regard, Trump’s victory was a remarkable case of agency overcoming structure, but the likely consequences look overwhelmingly bad from the perspective adopted by these two authors. If Dunn warns us off being fooled by democracy’s charms, Shapiro gives us strong reasons why democracy should be defended and cultivated further.