Recent media coverage of the threatened collapse of the vast Wilkins ice shelf highlights the manner in which the established focus on global warming and the ozone hole has led Antarctica to be well and truly accepted as playing an integral role in global environmental systems. By contrast, histories of the 1950 and 1960s continue still to treat Antarctica largely as, to quote Philip Quigg (Reference Quigg1983), ‘a Pole Apart’, that is a marginal region struggling for inclusion on most world maps. Despite the occasional newsworthy item, like the 1952 Anglo-Argentine clash at Hope Bay (Beck Reference Beck1987: 18–21) or the 1955–1958 British Trans-Antarctic Expedition (Fuchs and Hillary Reference Fuchs and Hillary1958), Antarctic affairs have not been regarded, except perhaps in Argentina, Australia, Chile and New Zealand, as sufficiently mainstream during the 1950s and 1960s to warrant inclusion in national or global histories covering that period. As a result, it remains easy still to gloss over the 1959 Antarctic Treaty as possessing rather limited contemporary significance, and hence to dismiss it as a limited purpose agreement confined to a relatively marginal area. Indeed, for some commentators, the treaty was even interpreted as a lost opportunity in terms of failing either to internationalise the region or to resolve the longstanding Antarctic sovereignty problem.

In reality, the Antarctic Treaty, signed by twelve governments at Washington on 1 December 1959, can be properly understood only if viewed in the broader post-1945 cold war context. Apart from providing the fundamental postwar framework for international affairs, this east-west conflict escalated beyond Europe to cover other parts of the world, not excluding the vast cold continent of Antarctica. Indeed, during the 1950s the leading powers feared that Antarctica was gradually being drawn into this broader conflict. For example, in July 1959 Henry Dater of the USA's State Department asserted that:

References to, the ‘Free World’, ‘with us’, ‘the global matrix’, ‘non-committed’ and ‘the shield’ offer revealing insights into American official thinking at a time when sections of the American media were speculating about the, to quote the title of an article published in June 1959 and found in US government archives, ‘Red threat from Antarctica’ (Missiles and Rockets: Magazine of World Astronautics 1959: 15–16). In October 1959 worries about Soviet intentions led The New York Times to use the opening of the Antarctic treaty negotiations at Washington DC to stress that ‘it is in our interest to insure that this vast region should never be turned by the Russians into a kind of Antarctic Albania . . . . Launching pads could be used by the USSR to blackmail the entire Southern Hemisphere from here’ (The New York Times 26 October 1959).

Of course, military experts might argue that such picturesque and ‘loaded’ language displayed an ignorance of both Antarctic and strategic realities, given the restricted range and operational effectiveness of contemporary submarines and missiles or the logistical difficulties posed by Antarctic conditions. However, it is worth quoting from such publications, which were read in official circles and which in turn articulated the assumptions underlying the thinking of many Americans. Similar perceptions influenced official thinking in other countries, particularly those located in the southern hemisphere, as Harold Macmillan, the British prime minister, discovered in February 1958 when he visited Australia and New Zealand. Nor was the politico-strategic dimension irrelevant to the Soviet Union, where concerns were articulated about the perceived threat posed by ‘western imperialists’ to Antarctic peace in general and Soviet interests in particular (Toma Reference Toma1956: 612–613).

Notwithstanding frequent references to its military capabilities and conflict potential, in reality Antarctica's politico-strategic role derived less from any government's concern to militarise or nuclearise the region but more from a desire to deny an advantage to a rival power bloc. In this sense, the continent possessed essentially a negative strategic utility, which proved a function of what might happen in the long term rather than of what had actually happened already. This aspect was reinforced by the long standing sovereignty issue, given the manner in which seven rival, occasionally overlapping, territorial claims (but there was some mutual recognition however), prompted tensions and occasional incidents. The refusal of the two superpowers to recognise existing claims merely complicated the problem. Looking back to the late 1950s, John Heap, who worked in the Polar Regions section of the British Foreign Office for nearly thirty years, pointed to the ‘fear of chaos’ over claims as a principal factor prompting the treaty's conclusion (Heap Reference Heap and Orrego Vicuna1983: 105). For Heap, the treaty's benefits in the form of peaceful use and scientific cooperation, as pressed in the international media, ‘should lead no one to believe that such altruism was in the minds of the negotiators; it was not. The parties gained little from it but what they all variously stood to lose without it made the exercise worthwhile’. In brief, the continuation of the demilitarised and denuclearised status of Antarctica, in conjunction with the shelving of sovereignty disputes, represented the basic raison d’être of the treaty.

The success of the 1959 Washington Conference was facilitated by what Vasili Kuznetsov (Reference Kuznetsov1960: 23), the Soviet delegate, described as ‘favourable conditions’, most notably by the cooperative framework provided by the Antarctic programme of International Geophysical Year (IGY) and the improvement in east-west relations signalled by recent progress in the Geneva nuclear weapons talks and the visit made in September 1959 to the USA by Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet leader. In retrospect, it was perhaps fortunate that the treaty was concluded some five months before the serious Soviet-American rift consequent upon the U-2 spy plane affair as well as the serious crises centred upon Berlin and Cuba during the early 1960s.

Welcoming its conclusion, in December 1959 Sir Harold Caccia, the British ambassador in Washington, pressed the case for viewing the treaty's broader significance:

Despite being treated in both the contemporary press and present day histories of the period as a region ‘of little relevance to the great issues that concern the world today’, the 1959 Antarctic Treaty represented a substantial international achievement, as suggested by the manner in which it resulted from a lengthy and difficult series of secret meetings conducted by a working group (1958–1959) and the six week Washington Conference (Dodds Reference Dodds2007: 57–60). Quite apart from its novel, even precedent-setting, features relating to peaceful use and conflict management, the agreement was signed by both the American and Soviet governments. Indeed, The Guardian (2 December 1959) claimed that this was the first time that the Soviet Union had joined western governments in such an agreement since the start of the cold war. The inclusion of the seven claimant governments was also important in enabling the future containment of the tricky sovereignty issue. Unsurprisingly, in January 1960 the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists presented the year as marking ‘the Dawn of a New Decade’ (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 1960: 3). Since 1947 this journal had used a so called ‘clock of doom’ to remind readers about the fearful destruction implicit in the development of atomic and nuclear weapons. Initially, the time was set at eight minutes to midnight, but subsequently the minute hand was advanced to two minutes to midnight in the light of advances in nuclear weapons technology. However, in January 1960 the clock was reversed for the first time, when the hands were put back to seven minutes to midnight because, the journal asserted, of the signature of the Antarctic Treaty, Khrushchev's visit to the USA, and the initiation of the Geneva test ban talks.

In effect, the Antarctic Treaty created a ‘continent for peace’ through provisions for demilitarisation, a nuclear weapons free zone, inspection, the suspension of sovereignty disputes, and international scientific cooperation. Moreover, it provided the basis for the establishment of the Antarctic Treaty system as a management regime. Following ratification by all signatories, the Antarctic Treaty came into effect in June 1961. Soon afterwards, in August 1961, The Economist (1961: 554) welcomed the creation of a twelve nation ‘peace club’ for a region, wherein ‘nobody can be quite sure what future pitfalls need to be guarded against’.

At a time when we are celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the treaty's signature, it is worth noting the way in which many commentators, including those who should have known better, came to assume that the treaty had a fixed thirty year duration. During the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, this proved one of the most common points raised in questions at the end of any talk delivered by me on Antarctica, given the manner in which 1991 came to be viewed by many people as a critical date marking the end of the treaty. In part, this view was encouraged by initial press reports of the treaty's signature. Thus, The Times (2 December 1959) report was headlined ‘Peaceful cooperation in Antarctica for 30 years’: ‘The treaty runs for 30 years, after which it will be reviewed’. Subsequently, ‘reviewed’, most notably the provisions allowing for a review conference ‘after the expiration of thirty years from the date of entry into force of the present Treaty’ (article XII), came to be interpreted as ‘terminated’. Writing during the early 1970s Paul Daniels (Reference Daniels, Lewis and Smith1973: 44–45), a leading actor in the treaty negotiations, stated that ‘the Treaty is to remain in effect for 30 years from the date of its entry into force on June 23 1961’. Soon afterwards, this line was echoed by Malcolm Booker, an Australian diplomat involved in the actual negotiations, who asserted that ‘the treaty expires in 1991’ (Booker Reference Booker1978: 116). Nor did The Times avoid such errors, as highlighted in January 1983 when an editorial commenting on Margaret Thatcher's visit to the Falklands referred to Antarctica, ‘whose Treaty is to be renewed in six years’ time’ (The Times (London) 10 January 1983). Thus, The Times committed a double mistake in respect not only to the matter of renewal but also to the irrelevance of the year 1989, even in the sphere of treaty review.

In reality, as events proved, the position was somewhat different. Lacking a specified duration, the treaty could last indefinitely without any need for renewal or re-negotiation, let alone review. Significantly, the preamble employs the word ‘forever’ in regard to the treaty's objectives: ‘it is in the interests of mankind that Antarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes’. Appreciating the national and international benefits accruing from the preservation of the 1959 treaty, most notably the ATS, the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs) came increasingly to regard the treaty as a long term obligation extending into the indefinite future. Far from resulting in the expiry, let alone the review, of the treaty, 1991 was used by ATCPs to issue a celebratory declaration to mark the thirtieth anniversary of the ‘outstandingly successful’ Antarctic Treaty: ‘The Antarctic Treaty Parties are proud of their achievements over the last 30 years and the example of peaceful cooperation that the Treaty provides to the rest of the world’ (ATCM 1991: 139). This sense of achievement and durability was reinforced by the almost simultaneous conclusion of negotiations for the comprehensive environmental protection regime embodied in the Protocol on Environmental Protection.

The 1959 Antarctic Treaty embodied both static and dynamic qualities, and this combination has enabled ATCPs not only to preserve Antarctica as a continent for peace but also to accommodate the ATS to a fast changing world. The ATS's responsibilities have been extended into new areas, most notably environmental protection and living resource management. Membership has expanded, while ATCPs have sought to ensure that the ATS has responded effectively to external challenges to the regime's validity and international acceptability (Beck Reference Beck2004). Hitherto, the 1959 Antarctic Treaty has been largely ignored by history books. Hopefully the role of the Antarctic Treaty system in managing the treaty regime, preserving the peace of Antarctica, and protecting its environment during the past half century or so will find a much deserved place in future history books.