The erosion of national economic sovereignty and the development of constitutionalism in the past decades seem to confirm the optimism of the current global constitutional enterprise. However, the creation of the international legal framework needed to make cosmopolitanism operational should be grounded in a normative agreement among countries with varying cultural traditions. In contrast to the optimistic belief held by many that there is already a new common framework for humanity based on human rights and a shared understanding of values, An Inquiry into the Existence of Global Values warns us that the considerable similarities among different constitutional texts tell us little about the extent to which there is actually a truly universal agreement on values. The authors further caution us that, while there may be a nascent global human rights regime, differences in human rights practices stemming from the histories, religious and political values, and jurisprudence of various nation states mean that we are still far from an operational global constitutionalism.
This book is the result of a series of conversations between Dennis Davis, Judge of the High Court of South Africa and Judge and President of the Competition Appeal Court; Alan Richter, the Founder and President of the New York based QED Consulting; and Cheryl Saunders, Professor of Comparative and Constitutional Law at the University of Melbourne. It addresses, through an analysis of the jurisprudence of national constitutions, the ambiguities that surround the foundation and implications of allegedly universal rights. Leading scholars provide an account of the values contained in national constitutions, looking at how such values are described, whether they were prioritized, and whether they were congruent with the current values of the societies in question. The book examines the constitutional regimes of Australia, Brazil, Canada, China (Hong Kong, Taiwan and People’s Republic of China), Finland, France, Germany, India, Iran, Israeli, Japan, South Africa, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Venezuela, and provides a broad picture of the variety of constitutional orders and, within individual nation states, of the plurality of interpretations. This comprehensive overview highlights the fact that, although the same values are mentioned in the various texts and there is a general tendency to prioritize dignity, life, equality, and freedom, there are many different ways in which constitutions understand a given value, and a variety of jurisprudences and ways in which these values are received and practised by society. For instance, freedom and independence can be understood in opposition to each other, with the independence of the state being framed as in contrast with individual freedom.
The book adopts as its overarching framework a state-centric perspective. While highlighting the complexity of constitutional orders, it also assumes that the growth of national constitutions provides “evidence of the possibility of a common constitutional discourse which, in turn, is predicated on some measure of reasoned agreement about shared values” (p. 471). The editors point out that the common vocabulary of human rights and the homogenization of constitutional practices through transnational judicial dialogue may seem to imply a convergence towards a tentative, but developing, common global framework of values. In order to avoid the imposition of only one set of values, namely Western liberal ones, they express their hope that the framework elaborated by Amartya Sen of the impartial spectator and open impartiality may provide a pathway towards a convergence on universal values. Sen’s framework assumes that there is a constant engagement between institutions and the reality of the people they are designed to govern, and stresses the importance of examining one’s own conduct and of imagining how others—the impartial spectator—would examine it. This is presented as a way to be more open to other voices and perspectives in defining global values. The editors suggest that the use of the impartial spectator framework would make it possible to ultimately depart from a state-centric perspective, moving on to a consideration of basic human rights and global values that need not depend on nationality or citizenship. For them there is no need for a world government, but simply “the imperfect obligation associated with the recognition of these human rights can be seen as falling broadly on anyone who is in a position to help” (p. 471). However, the impartial spectator as it is exemplified in the preceding quote seems still too vague as an answer (how is one to define who is in a position to help, and how does the impartial spectator make someone accountable?); the framework is also too weak to be institutionalized. The value neutrality the framework supports goes against the very story narrated in the book and the variety of religious, cultural, and political elements that enrich the entire discourse of universal values. Moreover, if there are “significant normative and legal possibilities for a form of shared political and legal discourse which may, at some point, transcend national boundaries, history and culture” (p. 473), the problem remains how to determine whether such discourse will be about human rights or about something else, and whether it will be able to represent the values of cultures and traditions that have been neglected.
